Enterprise Bill [HL]

Lord Flight Excerpts

Wednesday 25th November 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Flight]

61: Clause 20, page 38, line 34, at end insert—
“( ) It shall be open to the insurer to adduce evidence of the fact that it sought and obtained legal advice to the effect that it had reasonable grounds for disputing the claim without thereby generally waiving privilege in the substance or content of the legal advice it received.”

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, I have no interest to declare. I do not work for the insurance industry, never have done and have never been remunerated by it. Noble Lords may wonder why I am speaking on these issues. Over 45 years of my career, I have tried to keep an eye on things in the City that have been good for business and bad for business. Interestingly, it was the Wilson Government who took the key measures in relation to the payment of interest to foreigners that led to the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets and the dramatic recovery of London over the past 50 years to again being the financial capital of the world. I tried to persuade the Conservative Government of the 1980s to change the rules for funds so that they were competitive, particularly for European investors. That did not happen and Luxembourg has all this business, now running to many billions, which the UK could have had. Interestingly, the Government subsequently changed the rules, but it was too late.

I am concerned that the issues that I raised in Committee and now raise again put at risk a £60 billion international insurance business because there are some subtleties that would make London cease to be an attractive place to handle such business. These two amendments, however, are much narrower than the ones raised last time and neither undermines the aim of the Bill. I apologise for the absence of my noble friend Lord Kinnoull, who has been called overseas urgently. As I jointly tabled the amendment with him, it falls on me to move the amendment.

I will address Amendment 62 first, which has become known as the limitation period amendment. It is of great practical importance for the London insurance market. It draws in the limitation period for late payment claims under Clause 20 and creates more certainty for reserving purposes. Without the limitation amendment, insurers may not be able to assess accurately when they are able to close off the books in terms of reserving for the underlying insurance claim. The baseline for the limitation period under Clause 20 is the reasonable time for payment. Who knows when this is, unless a court is to rule on it? In the case of a disputed claim, insurers may not be able to close the books for years after the settlement of the underlying claim.

Amendment 62 would make the limitation period for bringing a claim under Clause 20 much more certain because it is referenced to the payment of that underlying claim. With a more certain limitation period, insurers would be able to reserve and close books more readily. This ultimately goes to capital and premium levels where more certainty means less capital. It is reasonable that the basic limitation period is one year from the date of payment of the underlying claim. The insured will have received payment of the underlying claim which it already thinks is late. It has a basic six years to bring the underlying claim, so a further one year is ample for it to decide to bring a late payment case under Clause 20.

The amendment is supported by buyers, intermediaries and insurers across the insurance market and it is not just a Lloyd’s proposition. It is also supported by the independent senior counsel Colin Edelman, who drafted the amendment. I understand that HM Treasury and the Law Commission both advised that there is a legitimate concern and the suggested amendment deals with this. Indeed the Law Commission sent a helpful email supporting the limitation amendment yesterday. I trust that the Government might either accept Amendment 62 or kindly offer to introduce a similar amendment in the other place.

I also ask the Minister to support Amendment 61. I do not know whether she will have had the time to consider the very serious and detailed independent legal opinion by Colin Edelman QC and Richard Harrison on the issue of privilege, which was sent to her this morning. Colin Edelman’s independent advice details the seriousness of the precise issue. The instruction to Colin Edelman was for an independent review of all the objections that have been raised by, in this case, the Government rather than the London market. This further opinion from him is too long for it to be practical for me to read out, but I will endeavour to highlight some of the key points.

The Bill, as it stands, places on the insurer the burden of proving that there were reasonable grounds for defending the claim. In the context of placing such a burden on the insurer the use of “were” is in our view capable of being construed as requiring not only that the grounds for disputing the claim were objectively reasonable, but that the insured subjectively believed that there were reasonable grounds for disputing the claim. The provision also stipulates that even if there were reasonable grounds for disputing the claim, the conduct of the insurer in handling the claim could still give rise to a breach of the implied terms. This introduces a clear element of subjectivity—the way in which the insurer behaved and the reasons for its behaviour.

Insurers rely heavily on legal advice in contentious commercial claims, so it seems to us—that is, to Colin Edelman—that if an insurer’s conduct is to be judged, the balance of fairness requires it to be able to explain to a court the real reason for its conduct, including its reliance on legal advice.

On our analysis of the operation of new subsection (4), the new cause of action could be open to abuse if the insurer were unable to assert the fact that it sought, obtained and relied on legal advice, without risking waiver of privilege. It could create a serious imbalance if the mere raising of a breach of the implied term were to place tactical pressure on the insurer to waive privilege in circumstances where there could be no such pressure on the insured. The allegation of breach could be used to try to flush out the insurer’s confidential advice, which could then be deployed to the insurer’s disadvantage in settlement negotiations.

In summary—this again is from the opinion—it is obvious that determining a claim for late payment should take place at the same time as the termination of the claim for the indemnity itself. The current provision risks routine—and possibly tactical—deferral claims for late payment which would quickly bring the law into disrepute.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Flight]

The noble Lord may not be aware that the measure we are discussing has the support of the Association of British Insurers, the London and International Insurance Brokers’ Association as well as Lloyd’s and, indeed, the International Underwriting Association, so it is not just Lloyd’s but the whole insurance industry that agrees with these points.

[Lord Lea of Crondall]

I spoke to some of those people yesterday and the general tone of their remarks was that they did not feel as strongly about this issue as they did about some of the other comments that Lloyd’s has made. They did not want to be quoted as being on the opposite side. That was the message I got from them.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Flight for his comments and for the work done by the absent noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Noakes for injecting realism into our discussion this evening. I agree that Clauses 20 and 21 are very important and overdue, and should improve London’s reputation, as the noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall, said.

The Government and the Law Commissions that first developed the clauses have been keen to find a solution which would satisfy all stakeholders, allowing the London market to support the provisions. I am grateful to the market for its continued efforts. The latest amendments proposed by industry stakeholders relate to the complex legal areas of limitation periods and legal privilege.

I will deal first with Amendment 61, but I should say at this point that the Government have more sympathy for Amendment 62, which I will come to. The starting position in both areas is that the default rules should apply unless there is a very strong justification for making special exceptions for particular circumstances.

Amendment 61 seeks to answer some insurers’ concerns that they will be forced to disclose legal advice they received in relation to the underlying insurance claim if they seek to show they had reasonable grounds for disputing that claim. Whether an insurer has reasonable grounds to dispute an insurance claim is an objective question, based on the substance of the grounds themselves rather than whether the insurer has received legal advice in relation to them. The insurer can establish these grounds without waiving privilege by setting out the grounds for dispute in its pleadings or by relying on the content of its correspondence with the policyholder.

Legal privilege is an important protection for parties, particularly during ongoing litigation. But the existing rules concerning waiver of legal privilege already balance the competing interests in the question of when legal advice should become disclosable. This amendment threatens to put policyholders at a disadvantage, which is not justified by a corresponding need on the part of insurers.

We have read the further legal opinion, which my noble friend Lord Flight kindly sent to me today. However, legal privilege is a complex topic which has been developed over the years by the courts and should not be changed in a specific context without very good reason. While I note all the work that has been done, the Government, like my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, are not convinced that such good reasons exist here. I therefore ask my noble friend to withdraw Amendment 61.

The Government have “some sympathy”, to pick up the wording quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, with Amendment 62, which relates to limitation. Some insurers have argued that the vast number of claims they deal with on a daily basis means that they need to know when they have satisfied all their liabilities in respect of a certain claim. I agree that it does not seem unreasonable to expect a policyholder to bring a late payment claim within a year of being paid the substantive insurance claim or the final payment under it.

It appears that Amendment 62 would increase certainty for insurers without materially prejudicing policyholders. It might even have the effect of encouraging insurers to make that final payment, to commence the one-year period for any subsequent late payment claim and bring the matter to a close. If that were the case, it would, of course, be a benefit to policyholders.

To that end, I believe that the amendment at least deserves further consideration. I agree that the policy intention behind it might represent an improvement to the late payment clause, which could be in the interests of both policyholder and insurer. In the light of this debate, I would like to explore the details of this possibility further and to discuss it with all interested parties. In the circumstances, I hope my noble friend will not move Amendment 62.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her professional and courteous reply. I am grateful that the Government are willing to further consider the issues raised in Amendment 62. With regard to Amendment 61, I say simply that I hope the relevant individuals will read the Edelman opinion. The bottom line is that if Clause 20 goes through as it is, it opens the door to vexatious litigation. But I thank the Government for their response and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 61 withdrawn.