European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Trevethin and Oaksey

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I do not want to misrepresent what the noble Lord said, but he suggested that there might be some legal uncertainty and that, theoretically at least, I or some other barrister might be instructed to argue something in court, and this is to avoid legal uncertainty. I am all for avoiding legal uncertainty, but the existence of the royal prerogative can surely not be in doubt, and this is, I suggest, an attempt to fetter that royal prerogative.

I finish with this observation. Lord Reed, Deputy President of the Supreme Court, said in the Gina Miller case of the royal prerogative that the,

“the value of unanimity, strength and dispatch in the conduct of foreign affairs are as evident in the 21st century as they were in the 18th”.

This Bill and this amendment substantially undermine that strength.

[Lord Trevethin and Oaksey (CB)]

My Lords, I am yet another lawyer. I apologise for that. I will not detain the House for long.

I respectfully agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that this came to the House as a bad Bill—I would say a very bad Bill. It sought to send the Prime Minister into the conference chamber not naked but wearing a straitjacket, and that was clearly inappropriate given the very delicate negotiations that are going to have to take place this week. As it stood, it was not proper legislation but, in the words of Nye Bevan, “an emotional spasm”.

I fully support the amendments proposed by the noble and noble and learned Lords. They are obviously necessary, bizarrely, to prevent the Bill having the inadvertent effect of increasing the risk of an accidental no-deal exit, so I fully support them. However, I am concerned that, if these amendments pass, the Bill will appear to be, and be, a bit of a mess. The Prime Minister has already, as I recall, made one request for an extension, which is outstanding; I doubt whether it will be accepted. After the Motion is passed in the House of Commons, a further date will be introduced and she will have to write another letter, I think, to the EU specifying another date. That will presumably displace application number one for an extension.

The amendments, which I support, would make it open to her to make a further, third, application for an extension, specifying a further date. That will displace, as I see it, the second application made pursuant to the Motion in the House of Commons. What is left of the Bill, as I see it, is nothing more than this: an edict from Parliament that the extension that the Prime Minister is able to seek cannot end earlier than 22 May 2019. If it had been restricted to that, we would have saved a lot of time.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Trevethin and Oaksey

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a racketeering lawyer, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra would have it, although it has been some time since I was involved in whiplash claims.

I accept that there are genuine whiplash claims and that some whiplash problems last for a considerable time and can cause difficulties that continue well beyond six months, 12 months or even two years. The majority do not. However, the legislation we are concerned with here ought to be clear—I agree with all noble Lords who have said this—which would mean a definition in the Bill. This has been a problem for this Government and previous Governments and we have to accept that we are dealing with a slippery and powerful opposition in trying to pin down this racket.

Whiplash injuries have an attraction for fraudsters because, as no doubt my noble friend Lord Ribeiro will confirm, they are difficult to prove or disprove on medical analysis—they do not show up on scans of any sort—and doctors have to rely on the veracity of the patient to satisfy themselves that they may or may not have whiplash symptoms.

We do not want to pin down a definition of whiplash injuries and the nation’s necks appear to improve, only for its lower backs to deteriorate, and suddenly we are invited to consider claims in which, as a result of some movement of the thorax, lumbar or cervical regions in an accident, all the symptoms are referable to the lower back, which is outside the definition and would be equally difficult to prove or disprove. I therefore counsel the House to use caution in saying that we must pin down the definition. As legislators that is of course desirable but we want to help the Government to deal with this problem.

A similar issue arose during consideration of the Psychoactive Substances Bill, when everyone in the House said that we must be clear as to what the substances are and put them in the Bill. However, the conclusion was that we should not do this because of the infinite adaptability of those who produce such substances. While I sympathise as a matter of principle with those who have spoken—I will listen with interest to what my noble and learned friend says—we should be careful not to do anything which may assist those who have perpetuated this racket.

[Lord Trevethin and Oaksey (CB)]

My Lords, I support everything that has been said by every lawyer who has spoken this morning. Clearly, the Bill needs a definition. However, I also agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has said about the difficulty that has arisen in constructing the definition.

The House will not be able to tell whether the Bill will work as a matter of practical justice until we see the definition. It will need to be a broad definition for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. It is easy to foresee that when the Bill passes into law, as it probably will, there will then develop heavy tactical warfare between those acting on the claimant’s side and those acting on the defendant’s side, which will be focused on the precise wording of the definition. If there is undue looseness in the definition, that warfare will clog up the courts and be generally undesirable.

In short—I do not disagree with anything I have heard this morning—it is clearly necessary for the Bill to contain a definition and for this House to consider the proposed definition in minute detail and with great care to ensure that the Bill works when it passes into law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

The MedCo system has contributed very considerably to the improvement in the standards of medical reporting. For those of your Lordships who are not familiar with it, it was a system to prevent what was undoubtedly an abuse of the system by some doctors, to allow the random allocation of medical experts to deal with whiplash injuries. It is certainly an improvement. My point is that there is still a risk in certain cases of there not being reliable medical evidence.

[Lord Trevethin and Oaksey]

Before the Minister responds perhaps I may, in the probing spirit of the amendments, mention one point that has occurred to me in light of the noble Earl’s proposed deletion of the word “psychological” from various provisions in Clause 2. I completely understand what the Government are hoping to achieve by using the term “minor psychological injury” in those provisions. I imagine they have in mind the fact that in cases of the type we are considering, it did become routine, and probably still is routine, for claimants to be advised to get a supportive report from a psychiatrist that uses the term “post-traumatic stress neurosis” or something similar as a way of enhancing the eventual award. I can see that that is a problem that the use of the term “psychological injury” is directed at.

The noble Earl makes a significant point when he refers to the bruised or gashed knee of the claimant in this type of case. I am not sure how that type of case, where there is a whiplash injury but also some other injury that is outside the definition of whiplash injuries, will be satisfactorily addressed. I imagine that the tariff award for whiplash injury will be fairly low. I do not have the answer to this problem, but I am contemplating the position that will arise when a claimant has suffered a whiplash injury and is entitled to the tariff award, which may be only a few hundred pounds, but has also suffered a probably rather less serious injury to, say, his or her knee. A gashed or bruised knee might stop them from playing football, skiing or whatever it may be, and would be worth, I guess, a few hundred pounds—it might edge into £1,000. You might get an anomalous outcome that would involve claimants recovering more for very trivial injuries to the lower part of the body than they are entitled to recover, pursuant to the Bill, for the relevant whiplash injury. I do not know what the answer is, but it is a potential problem.