Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 15th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his comments. He has set me a test here: normally I rely on his powers of persuasion and arguments rather than my own, but on this occasion I will take up the challenge and hope to persuade the Minister why Amendment 3 is important. I was rather hoping that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, would jump up before me; I am sure he will jump up after me, because he made comments about this in Committee.

I stress that this is not just about adding words for words’ sake; it is not just about being nice, kind and positive. These words are very important in one vital respect. The Bill—we have heard much criticism of this—is heavily reliant on regulation and the Executive taking powers. We have received many assurances from the Minister that they will use these powers wisely and that Parliament will anyway have the opportunity properly to scrutinise secondary legislation.

These words are important because, when Parliament scrutinises secondary legislation, it must know what it is judging the Government’s actions against. It cannot have vague definitions. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said in Committee: that we do not want to limit the powers of the Executive when it comes to foreign policy matters. These words do not limit, they enable. They enable Parliament to do its job of properly scrutinising regulations proposed under the Bill. Is it meeting the clear objectives that we set ourselves, which we all share, particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in relation to human rights?

The Minister assured the Committee that the Government,

“do not take their human rights responsibilities lightly … the UK has been a bastion and a beacon for human rights. That should and will remain a cornerstone of British foreign policy in years to come”.—[Official Report, 21/11/17; col. 123.]

That is a powerful argument why we should include these words, because it is about being consistent in future. If I were to be slightly partisan—and I am not usually in these matters, as the Minister knows—there have been doubts about the Government’s commitment, and certainly that of the Conservative Party, to the European Convention on Human Rights, and I want to put it beyond doubt that we are wholeheartedly committed to this vital element of our foreign policy. It is, as the Minister said, the cornerstone. I very much hope that he will think hard about accepting the amendment. It would not cause too much pain, because he is already committed to the principle. It is about how these words can help future scrutiny. If he is unable to accept the amendment, I will certainly wish to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I do not want to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Collins, by not intervening, albeit briefly, in this debate. My difficulty comes not with the way that the noble Lord and others have expressed their various objectives, which one would expect to be part of the Government’s approach to sanctions generally. I am concerned by the fact that the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, wants to exclude the specific reference to a foreign policy objective. I return to what I said in Committee, which was that it is important that we accept that foreign policy does not remain entirely stable and standing: there are always changes in the world and foreign policy objectives may vary from time to time. The danger of including these albeit admirable objectives is that there might conceivably be a construction placed on the relevant provision which is that foreign policy is not adequately reflected by the provisions.

I prefer the way the Bill is expressed, which gives the necessary flexibility. While I do not differ on the objectives, I differ on the amendments.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

Can I just ask my noble friend a question, and apologise to your Lordships that I was not involved in earlier stages of this legislation? Was there ever a time when, in deciding on sanctions policy, we did so other than in alliance with other nations? Unilateral sanctions can always be evaded, and even collective sanctions, when they are only from the west, can be nullified by actions by China, Russia and other Asian powers, for instance. Is not the practical situation one in which we have to take account of our allies and the broad consensus of agreement with them on whether sanctions are justified, or are there individual unilateral instances that I may have missed?