Privacy Injunctions

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for repeating the Attorney-General’s Statement. I agree with a great deal of it. As far as this side is concerned, we agree that there should be a privacy law. Of course, the privacy law has to respect free speech. It involves striking a balance between an individual's right to privacy and the need for free expression.

That, basically, is the law currently. It requires an independent, neutral figure to strike the balance between freedom of speech and an individual's right to privacy. Nobody else can do that apart from the judges, and the judges who have been doing that have been doing it in accordance with the law, not through some invented new law that they are creating.

I completely understand and respect that individual Members of Parliament are entitled to wreck privacy injunctions because they think that they know better, but our system has worked well over the years, with Parliament dealing with laws and the judges dealing with individual cases. I have no idea of the detailed balance involved in relation to the Fred Goodwin case or the case that has been brought to public attention today. I do know that I know a lot less than the judges involved and that they were applying the law. I have no idea, for example, of the extent to which the families of the plaintiffs in those cases were thought to be affected by the terms of the injunction.

I welcome the creation of the Joint Committee. The matter should be looked at. We are getting close to a Rubicon in relation to this. The law is as it is. It is unlikely to be changed substantially because of the European Convention on Human Rights. There should not be this excited state about injunctions that have been granted. Instead, people, including parliamentarians, should comply with their spirit. There is something quite ugly about unpopular people being named in Parliament despite the fact that a judge has thought that they are entitled to privacy.

I have a few questions for the Advocate-General. First, do the Government agree that there needs to be a law on privacy? Secondly, do they agree that such a law must comply with the European Convention on Human Rights? Thirdly, does the Advocate-General agree that the judges are currently simply applying the law as determined by Parliament through the Human Rights Act 1998? Fourthly, what advice does the Advocate-General give to Members of Parliament—Peers or MPs—in relation to wrecking injunctions that have been made by the judges? Would his advice be the same as mine that perhaps it would be better to leave the courts to decide those issues rather than deciding for oneself whether a person should be entitled to what is currently his or her legal right?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

We on these Benches welcome the report, which recognises that where secrecy is ordered it should only be to the extent strictly necessary to achieve the interests of justice. We also welcome the provision of notice to the press of an application of this type and the requirement of an openly available judgment. Does my learned friend—my noble friend—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My noble and learned friend.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does my noble and learned friend accept that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides for the right to freedom of expression, is qualified? It is that the exercise of that freedom,

“carries with it duties and responsibilities”,

and,

“may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society”.

It specifically refers to,

“the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.

Would he agree with me that judicial authority must be maintained? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, the court sees the evidence and comes to a balanced judgment, and any attempt to interfere with that, even by the use of parliamentary privilege, simply because a politician cannot agree with the judgment when he does not know the facts, is to be deplored?