Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

In conclusion, I agree with the right reverend Prelate; I am on his team and those who spoke with him. The way forward is family reunion, humanitarian visas and improving the first-tier administration in the Home Office. I once worked there, and the first-tier decision-making is appalling. By the way, seeking to avoid wars over there is quite a good idea if you are worried about the obligation under the international rule of law to give refuge over here. Noble Lords should think about the consequences. If every country—particularly every developed country—around the world adopted the approach in this Bill, would there even be a refugee convention left?

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Lea of Crondall (Non-Afl)]

My Lords—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord has an amendment and he wishes to speak to it.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to speak to my Amendment 41. It is a very specific amendment relating to Clause 11 as it currently stands. Before I turn to that, however, I will take up the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Brown in relation to providing a legal structure for our discussion here. The first thing, which has been emphasised by a number of noble Lords, though not all, is that Article 31 is central to the discussion. This is because it is obvious that the Government, in relation to Clause 11 and the following clauses, are seeking to interpret and apply their view of Article 31.

It has been suggested that we can ignore the convention because we must have regard to what people think today, but I am afraid that we cannot do that. We are a party to this convention: if we do not like it, the Government will have to recuse themselves from it and try to get other countries to change it. At the moment, however, the convention applies.

Article 31 says that no penalty shall be imposed on account of illegal entry or presence on a refugee who satisfies three requirements. These are the three requirements set out in Clause 11. The first is that the refugee comes directly from the territory of persecution. The second is that the refugee presents themselves without delay to the authorities. The third is that the refugee shows good cause for their illegal entry or presence. That is what Clause 11 is about. However, you cannot read Clause 11 on its own because the subsequent clauses all have some impact on it. In particular, Clause 36 is critical because it seeks to give a definition of coming directly from the territory of persecution.

Noble Lords will see from what I have just described that, although Article 31 says what the Government cannot do—that is, they cannot impose a penalty if those three requirements are satisfied—it does not go on to say that, if they are not satisfied, you can have a differentiation such as that in Clause 11. That is a matter of policy, and I can certainly see the force of the argument for saying that this division that has taken place in Clause 11 is sufficiently inconsistent with the definition of a refugee to make it improper.

There is a more fundamental point: Clause 36, referred to by my noble and learned friend, in seeking to define “coming directly from another country,” says that the requirement is not to be taken as satisfied if the refugee stopped in another country outside the UK, unless they can show that they could not have reasonably been expected to have sought protection under the convention in that country. There is no such qualification in Article 31, and it appears that the Government believe they can, through legislation, elaborate on the meaning of Article 31 in whatever way would best suit the current asylum policy of the day. This, I am afraid, is entirely misguided as a matter of law.

As an international treaty, the convention has the same meaning for each and every member state that signed up to it. It cannot bear different meanings for each member state, according to the policy of the Government of the state for the time being. In England and Wales, the court has, pursuant to its constitutional role of interpreting legislation and written law, held that a refugee may still come directly to a member state, within the meaning of Article 31, even if the refugee passes through one or more intermediate countries, if the final destination of the refugee has always been the state in which the asylum is finally claimed and the halts in the intermediate country or countries are no more than short-term stopovers. My noble and learned friend Lord Brown referred to his judgment in the Adimi case, which decided that very point.

On the global picture, to cut matters short—before I turn to the particular amendment—I am against the division, the separation, between group 1 and group 2 in Clause 11 because it depends on a requirement, or the failure to meet a requirement, which is directly contrary to the convention. Therefore, I certainly object to the division between group 1 and group 2 so long as Clause 36 stays in its present form, with its present definition of coming “directly”, on both logical and legal grounds—quite apart from the matter of general principle, which other noble Lords have mentioned, about the demeaning nature of distinguishing between two different categories.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, and I agree with his analysis entirely. I just wanted to ask him this question, which the Committee might want to know the answer to: if his view, and the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, is right, what would be the consequences of some of these cases—were the Bill to become enacted as it is—if they reached the courts?

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Strictly speaking, the legal position is that there is no basis for individuals to enforce the convention, but it is enforceable by other member states, which can complain that this country is not complying with its obligations. I would expect that that may well happen. So far as coming here illegally is concerned, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown referred to the Adimi case, which was about whether there was an illegal entry. He held that there was not, because although these refugees passed through intermediate states, they did in fact come directly. So, the individual is placed in a not very satisfactory situation, but the state can certainly be held accountable in the International Court of Justice, and that may well happen.

If I may now descend from the wider view to the narrower, I want to deal with a point I have raised in relation to Clause 11(3) and other similar clauses which impose a requirement on a refugee. The requirement, as it were, or even a breach of it can be overcome if

“they can show good cause for their unlawful entry or presence”,

and there are other provisions saying that this can happen where there is a “reasonable” expectation of something happening or where something is “reasonably practicable”. In all those cases, I have sought to table an amendment which says that, in deciding what is good cause, practicable or reasonable, the immigration officer should take into account any protected characteristic of the refugee within the meaning of the Equality Act which is innate or immutable. I do not want to get too involved in the legality of those terms; basically, that is relevant under decisions in our law to people who claim to be a member of a particular social group. Being a member of particular social group that is being persecuted is one of the categories of refugee in Article 1 of the convention, so I do not want to spend too much time on that. There are nine protected characteristics in the Equality Act, but only some of those will be innate or immutable.

That expression, “innate”, is used in the Bill itself in describing the meaning of a particular social group. Your Lordships will find it in Clause 32, which also expressly states that a

“social group may include a group based on a common characteristic of sexual orientation”.

I want to take up that point to explain why I suggest it is necessary that wherever there is a reference to reasonable cause, reasonable expectation or what is practicable—as I have said—there is an express statement in the Bill that the fact that the refugee has a protected characteristic which is innate or immutable should be taken into account.

I want to take the case of LGBTQI+ people to illustrate the reasons why. First, experience has shown that, all too often, difficulties arising from a characteristic such as that have not been taken sufficiently into account. The approach to LGBTQI+ refugees has often been woefully inadequate and misguided. It was not until the 2010 decision of the Appellate Committee of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) that it was established that the Home Office could not refuse an asylum claim from a gay man or lesbian simply on the basis that if they could reasonably be expected to act discreetly in their home country, rather than live openly with their sexuality, they would not suffer persecution. Therefore, it was only some 12 years ago that the Home Office, which fought HJ (Iran) right up to the highest court in the land, was obliged to accept that its approach to LGBTQI+ refugees, in the words of then Supreme Court Justice Sir John Dyson—later Lord Dyson and Master of the Rolls—frustrated

“the humanitarian objective of the Convention and”

denied LGBTQI+ people

“the enjoyment of their fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.”

Secondly, it is well known that LGBTQI+ refugees face a large number of practical difficulties in claiming asylum. I will address these in due course, when we come to the relevant clauses in the Bill, to show why there has been a failure to satisfy a particular requirement. In the case of Clause 11(2)(b), the issue is whether they presented themselves without delay to the authorities and can show good cause for their unlawful entry. This is the question of clandestine exit. As I have said, it applies also to abused women in abusive relationships coming from a conservative religious community. They cannot go and buy a plane ticket. They cannot indicate in any way in these countries what the reason for their seeking asylum is. The result could be honour killings, stoning or being thrown off a wall, so they keep their characteristics as far as possible to themselves. It is not surprising that they are slow to report themselves or that their routes here are clandestine.

Finally, on this point, the Home Office’s own statistics show the extent to which claims by LGBTQ+ asylum seekers have been wrongly rejected by immigration officers. Experimental statistics published by the Government in August 2019 on lesbian, gay and bisexual asylum claims show there was an initial decision grant rate of 29% in 2018. However, 38% of appeals relating to LGBT asylum applications were allowed in respect of applications made in 2015-18. These published statistics are qualified in some respects but, in broad terms, they reflect the reality of a substantial proportion of successful appeals. That is why, in my suggestion, wherever we see in this Bill as currently framed any reference to good cause, those with protected characteristics that are innate or immutable must be protected by an express reference on the face of the Bill.

[Lord Lea of Crondall (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I think the House would be grateful if somebody, in one sentence, expressed appreciation for the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham. No one doubts that, over the past 50 years or so, he has been a beacon of liberalism within his party. The point he made in this connection is that there is a great dilemma facing us all. Apart from climate change, the dilemma is that, for governance systems in parts of the world—Africa is the continent that springs to mind—we will have to have a new arrangement for crossing the Mediterranean whereby we do not get into all these problems, which are getting worse. That speech is not easy to make, but I just want to say that the honesty and the examination of the dilemmas we all face has been a credit to this House.