European Union Bill

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Monday 13th June 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

22A: Schedule 1, page 14, leave out lines 32 and 33

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, it would be possible to make a well founded and persuasive argument to get rid of all the provisions of Schedule 1. At this point, however, I will focus on one provision where there is an absolutely demonstrable, concrete, national, economic and industrial issue at stake. I hope I shall persuade the House, and indeed the Government, that there is more than good reason to think again about this element of Schedule 1. The House will be well aware that military equipment is one of the rare exceptions and exemptions from the single market. That is achieved by Article 346(1)(b) of the treaty, which states:

“any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes”.

That is an explicitly protectionist measure that allows individual member states to protect their own markets, as in generations gone by before the single market, or Common Market, were ever conceived of. It is an anomaly in what is otherwise a free market, and it is very difficult for some member states to give this up because they are protecting industries with considerable lobbying potential in their own countries.

I have no financial interest to declare in the British defence industry. When I became Defence Procurement Minister, I made sure that I had no shares in defence industries and that has remained the case. I have not developed any relationships with the defence industry since I left government. Indeed, it would have been impossible under the rules for me to have done so in the last year. I acknowledge an admiration for the British defence industry, which I was able in the course of my job to get to know extremely well. The technologies that it has developed over the years, many of which you cannot even talk about the existence of let alone describe the nature of, are extraordinary. We really are at the front line in this area of technology. It is not surprising, and a demonstrable fact, that the British defence industry is by far and away the largest in turnover in the European Union. In other words, we are the losers through this protectionism.

The EU market for defence procurement is roughly €70 billion, say £55 billion, or something of that order. Our own element in that is about £15 billion—say €18 billion—so we are talking about a potential market of some €50 billion to €55 billion. The French, who are very protectionist and make considerable use of Article 346, have about the same spend. The Germans and the Italians have rather less and are also very protectionist. Everyone else in the EU adds up to that sum. There is at stake a market for something like €55 billion, or £45 billion to £50 billion. Of its own nature and operating against the largest most productive sector in the EU, this protectionism deprives us of the opportunities for sales and therefore for employment and for investment, not least for sharing the considerable overheads of R&D with the Ministry of Defence, which is very much in the interests of this country—the interests of defence, the taxpayer and industry.

It might be thought—indeed, I hope it would be—that any rational Government, and I am sure that the coalition Government are in no sense irrational, would want to seize any opportunity that could be identified to deal with that anomaly in the single market. We have been pioneers in, first, opening the single market initiative under Margaret Thatcher and Lord Cockfield and, subsequently, in pushing through the opening of financial services, intellectual property and many other areas in which there was hesitation on the part of our partners in moving forward to implement the principles of the single market.

One would assume that it would be common ground between all the major political parties, in addressing the electorate in our own ways and in addressing the economic interests of the nation, to want to get rid of the protectionist barriers that face that particularly important industry. I think it would also be common ground to agree that the defence industry, perhaps after pharmaceuticals and biochemistry, is the area of manufacturing in which we have the greatest competitive technological advantages in the world market. It is very important, and we ought to be able to come, more or less, to a consensus on what should be done about it.

How do you generate an opportunity to get rid of a form of protectionism when certain member states find themselves subject to considerable pressures and lobbies and find it difficult to move? It is difficult for some of them to vote openly, clearly and decisively for the abolition of Article 346. As I said in Committee, and as all of us with experience of negotiations in any context will know, often the best way to solve a substantive problem or make progress on a substantive issue, especially in a complex negotiation where people have strong and differing interests at the outset, is by a procedural route. I gave the example of setting up a committee to solve the problem rather than taking a decision around the board table, the Council of Ministers, or whatever. The qualified majority voting system is undoubtedly a very useful weapon that has proved its worth over the past generation in achieving substantive progress through procedural routes.

I can see one or two noble Lords looking for the text of the provision in Schedule 1, so let me say that it is on page 14, the penultimate element in Schedule 1, and states:

“Article 346(2) (changes to list of military products exempt from internal market provisions)”.

The provision does exactly the opposite of what I suggest is the obvious thing to be done in the national interest. It makes it impossible for us to agree to, let alone to propose, QMV to decide the future of that derogation from the single market without a referendum. We are putting a ball around our own necks, we are shooting ourselves in the foot, with that provision. It makes no sense at all. Where we have an interest in liberalising trade—I think I would carry a number of people on the opposite side with me in saying that we surely do—and where that means might be the only way to make progress in the area, as has proved to be the case in other similarly difficult areas in the past, we are preventing ourselves from doing so.

We all know that if a British Minister is not allowed to agree and says, “Well, we've got to have a referendum beforehand”, that in effect denies us the chance to seize the opportunity rapidly. It might need to be seized there and then, because if it is not you have lost it. You have your interlocutors in a favourable frame of mind in a particular situation when they agree to resolve the question through QMV. That element in Schedule 1 is entirely perverse. It goes in exactly the opposite direction from that in which any responsible Government would want to go. It is contrary to rationality and good sense; it is directly contrary to the national interest.

The Government have been very statesmanlike in saying in the course of our debates that they will listen to new arguments, that their minds are not closed. Both noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Howell, have said that in answer to me and to other noble Lords. I am sure that that is true, because they are both sophisticated men of the world who know that one always needs to look carefully at these things. When you have a schedule of 56 items, it is almost certain that something somewhere will have crept through when it should not really be there, and it needs to be looked at again.

I claim no monopoly of wisdom in this matter, but I raise it because, as I said, I have a background in this subject and I was struck very forcibly on reading the text of the Bill. I hope that on the basis of the considerations that I have just set out there will be scope to reconsider this important matter. It is important for a major British industry which I think we all wish to support in every way we can. I beg to move.

[Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne]

In moving his amendment, the noble Lord has not explained to my satisfaction, or perhaps to the satisfaction of others, why the removal of these two lines from the text of the Bill, which would result in QMV rather than a veto on the protectionism of military products, would assist the development of the free market, as he and I wish to see. From my experience in Brussels, sometimes sitting in the chair on common security and defence policy debates, it was very clear that some member states—particularly some of the smaller and newer ones—wished to pursue protectionism to an extent that would have been extraordinarily unhelpful both to the defence of the European Union and to the wider defence policies of countries such as the United Kingdom. In other words, we need the veto and I cannot understand why the noble Lord wishes to remove it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Perhaps I may try to help the noble Baroness. Of course I did not suggest that adopting QMV in this case would guarantee that we would solve the problem. I said that the problem had not been solved until now but an opportunity might arise to solve it via QMV. Many problems that were solved by QMV did not prove to be solvable when each individual member state was put on the spot with a requirement that it make an explicit and public declaration and hold a public vote in favour of a change, particularly when the change was to remove protectionist support for a domestic industry. I am saying simply that it would be quite perverse to deny ourselves the opportunity of using QMV as an instrument. Of course, there is no guarantee that it would work, but that is no reason for not trying it or keeping it open as an instrument that we might need.

[Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne]

My point was purely that from my experience and that of others in Brussels, a number of member states wish to keep protectionism. As the noble Lord has already clearly indicated, it is in Britain’s interests to have an open system, and in the case of the defence of the European Union and beyond it is in all our interests to have an open system. I cannot see how QMV will assist an open system when Britain may need a veto.

Since the noble Lord was involved in the defence industry at an earlier stage in his political career, the European Union has widened immensely. Some of the newest member states have had a significant interest in keeping protectionism moving in the defence industry, with some of them having very large interests in it. The contracts are massive; the potential for dealings that are less than transparent is huge, as some of the biggest contracts on the globe are before individual member states; and one of the great strengths of the potential of the EU common security and defence policy is an open system of military equipment, which would stop the protectionism to which the noble Lord rightly refers. I have failed to be convinced so far by what the noble Lord has said about the loss of the veto and the introduction of QMV.

--- Later in debate ---

The chance of a future Government agreeing to give up this veto in practice is vanishingly small. The chances of this being proposed as a separate one-off move are zero. A remote possibility is that it could be put forward as part of a package of transfers of competence and powers to the EU, however undesirable it seems to us at present that it should be so. That would be the sort of event where people rightly want and expect their say. If denied their say people would feel that, once again, powers were being transferred without adequate public accountability. For those reasons, although I salute the feeling and validity of half of the noble Lord’s argument, I hope that he respects my half of the argument and I ask him to consider what he has said and withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I am deeply grateful for the consideration which the House has given to my amendment and for the warm and supportive words of the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Triesman, and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who seized on an argument that I was about to deploy myself in response to the noble Lord, Lord Howell. I will address the points of the noble Lord, Lord Howell, in a moment and bring my remarks to a conclusion by addressing the Government’s response. I am grateful too for the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson. Frankly, I did not understand her argument that somehow possession of veto was going to help us in any circumstance in advancing the cause of reform of Article 346. I shall correct her on a practical point: she says that since I was involved with defence there have been a lot of changes in the world, including the end of the Cold War. I think she is going back to the time when I was a defence spokesman in the Conservative Party. My experience of defence in government ended 13 months ago, in May last year.

I always enjoy the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, to these debates. He deployed an argument today which I have heard him deploy in other contexts. It is, “If it is such a good idea, why not have a referendum and you will win it? The public will support you”. I am not sitting close enough to see whether he has a twinkle in his eye when he says it but I think he has. He knows as well as I do that there is no prospect of having a referendum on a subject as esoteric as Article 346. If we have a serious opportunity to change it, it is no use saying to our partners, “For once we have got the chemistry right—there is an opportunity to go for QMV on this, and then maybe there will be a consensus and we’ll get some reform. But sorry, chaps, you’ve got to wait for two, three, four, five or six years, when it is particularly convenient for us to have a referendum with a whole package of measures”. Even then, as I have said before in these debates, it would be quite unsatisfactory for the British electorate to do their homework on a whole series of rather technical matters. It is just not practical politics. The noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, knows more about politics than I do; he has been involved in politics longer than I have, and I am quite certain that he had his tongue in his cheek when he said those things.

I move to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, on behalf of the Government. He started off by saying that Article 346 had been in the treaties in one form or another—of course, it had different numbers—since 1957. What is new is the idea of having a referendum on a change. That is brand new. It has not come in yet—it is in the Bill before us. That is what I want to change. It is not an argument against changing this new measure that the instrument that we might want to use to reform Article 346 is now under threat from a new provision in this Bill, so it would be sensible for us to remove that threat. I do not think that there is a logical argument there against my proposal.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I really wondered how serious the noble Lord, Lord Howell, was when he said that it may be in our interests to prevent protectionism to have a veto, because then we could stop our partners from being even worse protectionists than they were before. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out, in that case the noble Lord, Lord Howell, would have logically opposed the whole single market programme. It would not have made any sense at all. So the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, and Lord Cockfield were actually doing something very dangerous in threatening greater protectionism by agreeing to have qualified majority voting in the Single European Act.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, tried to justify that approach with the distinctly implausible suggestion that different rules applied to defence. I do not think that different rules applied to defence; I think that the argument is rather different from that. That is why, for two reasons, I think there might be an opportunity to achieve QMV, if only the British Government have not deprived us of that opportunity in advance, ab initio. First, there is a positive incentive on Governments to reduce the costs of their defence procurement—and protectionism, as we know, is extremely expensive. If they opened their markets they would be able to purchase more cheaply, given a measure of defence capability. When I was the Defence Procurement Minister—and I was very proud of this, because I did it for the first time—I introduced a unilateral open market in the EU. I said, “Sorry, we’re going to buy the cheapest and the best, wherever it is. We’re not going to be protectionist”. It is only when there is inequality of quality and price between the British supplier and non-British supplier that I will favour the British supplier. I made that absolutely public, and it was what I operated on. For example, I bought the 42-millimetre cannon for the Scout vehicle and potentially for the Warrior upgrade from France. Why? Because it was the best. The French were obviously delighted. There was no quid pro quo. I said to my French colleague, Laurent Collet-Billon, “You know, you and I must do something”. He said, “Of course, mon cher collègue, we will see what we can do”. But of course nothing has come through. Unless we do something about this protectionism, it will probably not.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

As the noble Lord was responsible for the posting of the aircraft carrier orders, why were they not submitted to bids from all round Europe? Why were the bids all placed with British shipyards in this country?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

As a matter of fact, I would be very proud to take credit for those particular contracts, but that contract was let before I came into my job in the MoD. However, I did manage to save that project when it was under very severe threat, in similar circumstances as last year. But unfortunately the new Government decided to throw in the project and deny us carrier strike capabilities for at least the next 10 years—disastrously so. Let me answer the question hypothetically, therefore, and say what I would have done had I been there at the time. Undoubtedly, I would have been delighted to have had those carriers procured on the best bid from within the European Union basis, as long as it was reciprocal and we had some chance of getting an order for a French frigate from a British shipyard. It has to be reciprocal. That was a particularly big order, and the protectionism the French afford to their shipyard, the Chantiers de l’Atlantique, is particularly great, so there would have been a situation in which competition would have been completely false.

I would have been delighted to have had the opportunity to procure on a common EU basis because that would have enabled us to bring the costs down further and it would have meant that our yards, over time, would have done very well. If you just look at two—the Type 45 destroyer and our submarine-building capability in Barrow—I am convinced that they are the best in the world, including the United States, when it comes to building very sophisticated warships. We would have done very well with that solution.

As I said, there are two reasons why there is a chance of Article 346 being reformed. It is particularly unfortunate, therefore, that we should be about to make it much more difficult for that to be achieved through QMV, if that seems the most likely way forward, which I think it is. The second argument is that, unlike us, our continental partners always have a sense of guilt in acting in a non-communautaire fashion. They are signed up to the principle of the single market. They find it very difficult and embarrassing to argue for derogations, though of course they do so when they are under great political pressure. Therefore, it is the sort of situation when agreeing to the intermediate stage of going to a QMV decision-making process has some hope—I do not put it more strongly than that—of achieving the substantive change that we all want.

I put to the Government, in my last comment on the subject, that when you have some realistic hope of something—it does not matter whether it is 20 per cent or 50 per cent or 70 per cent or even 10 per cent—but there is no downside, logically you do it. In this case there is a real hope of moving forward. There is no possibility whatsoever of extending the list under Article 346. The list is already far too great, as somebody has already said in the debate. Nothing that could conceivably be argued to be military materiel is not currently included, and this clause has been used to cover things like trucks, notably in the case of the Italians—I do not mind embarrassing them by mentioning this now—who claimed that because they were military trucks they were military materiel. There is no chance; I am quite convinced that the European Court of Justice would rule out any further use of Article 346 because such a use would no longer be consistent with the description in the article itself.

There is no downside. I ask the Government to look at that point again. There is a potential upside through using QMV, and the stake is important. This is a major national industrial interest for one of the major British industries in which we have a worldwide capability. There is a direct benefit to us—the taxpayer—as well, because if we can expand the sales which carry the overheads, including R&D, of the British defence industry, it will mean that we can achieve given levels of military capability from that industry when we procure from them at lower cost. It will be a win-win situation if we can break through here and we would be very foolish to deny ourselves any opportunity or instrument which made it even slightly more likely that we would achieve that.

On the basis of that, you would expect me to put my amendment to a vote. However, I am conscious that we are after dinner and that the Whip has been withdrawn, so there may be an uncharacteristic result from any particular vote, and I am also anxious not to take up too much time. We have already had a very good debate. I think I have said enough and colleagues have said enough. I trust to persuade the Government to look at this again. The noble Lord, Lord Howell—I am very grateful for this—was kind in his remarks about my intervention and he said that there were strong arguments on my side, though he said there were strong arguments on the other side as well. I understand that. That indicates to me that despite what is in the Bill the Government are a little bit more open-minded, perhaps, than one might have thought at the beginning of this debate. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 22A withdrawn.