Legislation: Skeleton Bills and Delegated Powers Debate

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Department: Cabinet Office

Legislation: Skeleton Bills and Delegated Powers

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts
Thursday 6th January 2022

(2 years, 4 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Davies of Brixton Portrait Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
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My Lords, this is an important issue in terms of controlling the Executive and establishing the role for your Lordships’ House. I very much welcome the fact that this debate has been introduced by the noble Baroness. It refers specifically to skeleton Bills, but by incorporating the two committee reports the debate is somewhat wider. I do not make any apology for that.

I will use my brief time to highlight one specific issue identified by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee: that of the recent growth in the use of what the committee describes as “disguised legislative instruments”. This is dealt with in paragraphs 92 to 120 of its report. The committee provides various examples of this trend, but the common factor is that Ministers are being given the power to supplement primary legislation with what is, in effect, disguised legislation: instruments that are legislative in effect but not subject to parliamentary oversight. Examples have been quoted. The committee refers to

“powers to make a ‘determination’ … to determine ‘arrangements’ … to issue a ‘code of practice’, a ‘protocol’ or a ‘public notice’”,

and my major concern, to issue “directions”. The committee concluded that the

“the multiplicity of disguised legislative instruments is confusing to Parliament and to the public, and does not … promote the good law principles of law that is clear and accessible.”

The use of Treasury and other departmental directions in the context of the legislation on public service pension schemes sparked my concern, but I have subsequently come to understand that it is a wider problem, as highlighted in paragraph 101 of the committee’s report. It arises from Section 12 of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, which provides a mechanism for what is called the cost cap as a limit on employer contributions. It provides that the cost cap should be determined in accordance with Treasury directions.

We have just had the McCloud and Sargeant case, which the Government lost, and there is a very expensive remedy. The Government have decided, by using directions, that the cost within the cost control mechanism should be borne by the members. I do not wish to argue the case for or against that decision, but it is manifestly a matter of public policy, where Parliament should have appropriate oversight over such an important decision.

Although we need to understand that there is not a hierarchy of significance in terms of different forms of legislation, some directions have a bigger and more immediate impact on individuals, their income and benefits than some pieces of legislation. Yet we spend a lot of time on the legislation and do not even get to see the directions. This is surely wrong. I think that is in accordance with the committee’s conclusions. It sets out a simple principle:

“In the absence of convincing reasons to the contrary”,


these devices “should not be used.” Will the Minister let us know whether he shares the concern about disguised legislation? If so, what steps will be taken to limit its use?