Coalition Government: Constitution Committee Report

Lord Crickhowell Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Crickhowell (Con)]

My Lords, my first task is to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, for her admirable introduction and for the manner in which she has chaired the Constitution Committee during all the time that I have served on it. She has done so with great effectiveness, judicious fairness and sensitivity to the views of all members of the committee, whatever their political backgrounds. We are also fortunate to have been served by special advisers and policy analysts of outstanding quality and expertise and excellent clerks. I add my thanks to all of them.

I want to concentrate on collective ministerial responsibility and cabinet government, subjects on which we laid particular emphasis in our report. We did so partly because of the strength of the views expressed by our witnesses, academic and political. The Ministerial Code, Cabinet Manual and the coalition agreement all state that the principle of collective responsibility applies,

“save where it is explicitly set aside”.

The coalition Government’s programme for government specified five issues where the parties in the coalition might adopt different positions. They are set out in paragraph 68 of our report. The convention of collective responsibility is constitutionally important for two main reasons. First, the process of collective decision-making within government makes it more likely that better decisions are reached. The second is that it enables Parliament to hold the Government as a whole responsible for their policies, decisions and actions. Collective responsibility also imbues a Government and, indeed, Parliament, with authority. When the discipline it imposes is departed from, the authority is undermined.

We fully recognise, of course, that the parties in a coalition will not agree on everything and that from time to time they will differ. Any noble Lord who has attended this Parliament would find it very difficult to be blind to that fact. However, we say that,

“it is incumbent on ministers to seek to reach a collective view on issues wherever possible … Given its constitutional importance, the setting aside of the convention … should be rare, and only ever a last resort”.

We had hoped to discuss the issues with the Deputy Prime Minister before we concluded our deliberations but because of a family funeral that meeting could not take place. However, on 9 April, after the report had been published, the committee pursued the issue in the annual evidence session that we have with him. The Deputy Prime Minister said that one consequence of coalition government had been a,

“rejuvenation of collective decision-making and collective discussion within government, because you have to be open with each other if you are seeking to make decisions that bind two parties in a government”.

He spoke of,

“the rejuvenation of the Cabinet committee system”.

The committee did not seek to contest that view, although we had learnt in the evidence sessions that a great many potentially contentious matters are resolved in the so-called “quad”, a kind of inner Cabinet which seems to take a great many more decisions than the Cabinet itself. What we were concerned about was collective ministerial responsibility and the breaches of the convention as it had previously been understood.

In response to a question from my noble friend Lord Lang of Monkton, the Deputy Prime Minister told us that it was important that when decisions are arrived at collectively they are defended collectively. My noble friend commented that that,

“seemed to imply that there is no collective responsibility unless specifically agreed. The agreement of 2010 says that there is collective responsibility unless it is specifically disagreed. You seem to think that those statements are compatible. It seems to me that they are not”.

Replying, the Deputy Prime Minister said that it was,

“an almost academic suggestion that collective responsibility can apply to decisions that have not been taken collectively”.

When I took up the argument, the Deputy Prime Minister agreed that some issues had been anticipated but said:

“There is a second category of issues: issues that you cannot anticipate on which the government cannot come to a collective agreement”.

He cited the Leveson inquiry and the decision that he should speak and offer a different point of view alongside the Prime Minister. He told us that that decision was “formally agreed”. He reiterated:

“Collective responsibility is how decisions are discussed, decided upon and then defended when collectively agreed within government. Collective responsibility is not a doctrine that says that coalition parties cannot disagree with each other in public”.

We were then told that where the convention of collective responsibility had been set aside explicitly, the decision had been taken,

“formally … within Whitehall by the Cabinet Secretary, in consultation with me and the Prime Minister”.

I do not believe that I was alone in being surprised—perhaps I should say astonished—by that revelation. The decision to set aside the convention was apparently being taken not by the Cabinet but by the Cabinet Secretary after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. That, we were told, is what happened in the case of the Leveson inquiry. The Deputy Prime Minister said that these decisions,

“are vetted and overseen by the Cabinet Secretary”.

Surely, it is a remarkable new constitutional practice that decisions of this kind about an important constitutional convention appear to depend upon a decision of the Cabinet Secretary. The guidance given in the Scottish Ministerial Code shows that it is possible to handle these matters differently. It states that,

“all decisions reached by the Scottish Ministers, individually or collectively, are binding on all members of the Government. It follows from this that every effort must normally be made to ensure that every Minister with an interest in an issue has a chance to have his or her say—in an appropriate forum or manner—before a decision is taken”.

Exactly the same principle should apply in the rest of the UK.

What happens in practice? Does the Cabinet Secretary say to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, “Have you circulated papers to every Minister with an interest or had a meeting of the Cabinet to see if agreement can be reached?”. No, he certainly does not say that because he will know that nothing of the kind will happen. Or does he say, “Well, I have listened to this discussion and it is all too obvious that you can’t agree, and so I certify that there is no collective agreement”? I do not consider that this is a proper role for the Cabinet Secretary or an appropriate way of explicitly setting aside the principle of collective responsibility.

In any event, as we have heard, some of the most extraordinary breaches of collective responsibility have taken place without the supervision of the Cabinet Secretary or as a result of any formal proceedings. We have been told about the decision of the Liberal Democrat Party to vote in 2013 on an amendment to the Electoral Registration and Administration Bill delaying the review of parliamentary constituency boundaries in breach of a policy contained in the coalition agreement. It was taken personally by the Deputy Prime Minister who was angered by the withdrawal of the House of Lords Reform Bill.

My noble friend Lord Strathclyde, whose strong views have already been quoted, pointed out that the coalition agreement had been that the boundary review would take place in return for there being a referendum on the alternative vote. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who has also been quoted, said that the action,

“was wholly undermining of the process by which you should conduct yourself within government”.

He thought that departures from collective responsibility weakened the,

“authority of the Prime Minister and the Government”.

We also heard the strong criticisms made by Dr Stephen Barber about,

“the acquiescence by the Prime Minister to allow ministers to vote ‘against’ provisions in the Queen’s Speech”.

In paragraph 76, we give the reasons why so many of our witnesses believe that the abandonment of collective responsibility, other than in the most exceptional cases, is hugely damaging to good government. The unseemly row going on at present in and around the Department for Education is another example of behaviour damaging to good government. Is it really not possible to reach agreement on policy about the law concerning the carrying of knives without having a great public argument about it outside Cabinet committees? The committee strongly believes that,

“it is incumbent on ministers to seek to reach a collective view on issues wherever possible. Having reached a collective view, it is essential that they can be held to account for it … A proper process should be in place to govern any setting aside of collective responsibility. Such setting aside should be agreed by the Cabinet as a whole and be in respect of a specific issue”.

The process involving the Cabinet Secretary described to us by the Deputy Prime Minister after we had produced our report is not, in my view, a proper process. Whether the Deputy Prime Minister’s comments represent a collective decision taken by the Government, and for which they can be held accountable, is not known because, very regrettably, as we have heard and not for the first time, the House has been debating a report of a House of Lords committee to which the Government have failed to produce a response in the two months referred to in the Companion. I know that my noble friend who will respond to this debate will do his best to deal with the points that have been raised, but we should have been in the position where we could debate the Government’s response and not just our report. Perhaps, as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, has observed, there is no collective ministerial view about the conclusions reached by the committee.