Queen's Speech

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 26th May 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, there was disappointingly little in the gracious Speech about the Government's future commitment to Afghanistan. Some indication of timescales would be helpful to inform Parliament and the public about government thinking. Perhaps in his response the Minister will be more helpful—not only on this but on the timescale for completion of the Strategic Defence and Security Review on which so much of the long-term future for the Armed Forces will hang.

When I was Chief of the Air Staff 25 years ago, the RAF had almost 90 stations, including some 28 main flying bases. Uniformed personnel totalled around 100,000 men and women. Today there are just 30 stations, of which only 14 are operational flying bases. Manpower, too, has fallen dramatically, and is now less than 40,000. In 1985, the RAF had 1,450 airframes of all types. Today's figure is just 700. In particular, there has been a large net reduction in operational fast-jet aircraft since 1985. A total of almost 550 has been reduced to less than 300, even allowing for the still-to-be-introduced latest Typhoon. On the maritime side, nothing is left of the 29 Nimrod mark 2s held in 1985.

The reductions in defence budgets over the past 25 years—from more than 5 per cent of GDP to a little over 2 per cent—account in part for this large-scale retrenchment: but within this overall reduction, the cost of some of the critical support activities of the Royal Air Force has increased relative to that of fast-jet, front-line numbers. Additional, more capable support helicopters—Chinooks and Merlins—have replaced the old Wessexes and some of the Puma fleet. Air transport, while still burdened with old and unreliable VC10 and Tristar airframes, has benefited from the increased capabilities of the large but costly C17s. Much improved surveillance capabilities, including airborne early-warning Sentries, have taken on a far greater global role than was possible with six very aged AEW Shackletons. In short, in the past 25 years, RAF effort increasingly has switched to the in-support role, at the expense of the more traditional fighter and offensive air power capability. A question for the future is whether this balance in the Royal Air Force is right: should it be moved even further to in-support roles or has it gone too far?

Those who advocate that there should be no further investment in Typhoon, for example, are taking the view that there is no call or need for adequate preparation to fight for and maintain control of the air. In the relatively benign airspace over Afghanistan and elsewhere on our recent expeditionary operations, the threat to our ground and seaborne forces of attack from the air has been negligible; but I and others who were in the services in the 1980s had a salutary reminder of the importance of effective control of the air. That salutary reminder was our experience in the Falklands.

While our air defences operated with great valour and determination, they were sorely tested by far-from-outstandingly equipped Argentinean air forces. Even though the Argentineans were operating from mainland bases at the extremities of their range, they bombed and sank four front-line warships and the “Atlantic Conveyor”, which went down with war-fighting stores, and all but one of the Chinook helicopters sent with the task force. Other ships were badly damaged and put out of action—the noble Lord, Lord West, can bear personal witness to that. At Fitzroy, the Welsh Guards were bombed while about to disembark, suffering a large number of casualties and 51 killed. Naval and Army units suffered because we lacked effective control of the airspace over our forces.

With our experience in the Falklands and the ever-present Argentinean aspirations to acquire them, the key to our ability to protect them is the safety and security of the airfield at Mount Pleasant. If that were to be seized by an Argentinean coup de main, we would no longer possess the capability to return in force by sea. Indeed with the capture of Mount Pleasant, the Argentineans would deny us any reinforcement of our available forces in the Falklands, and their aircraft would have a large forward-operating base from which to repel us. The Typhoons at Mount Pleasant, and a demonstrable ability to reinforce very rapidly by air from the United Kingdom, are the key deterrents to such an outcome. Nor should we overlook the requirements of today and into the future to police the skies around the United Kingdom. RAF Tornados and Typhoons have been scrambled regularly this year and last to investigate Russian long-range bombers operating close to our national airspace; and 9/11-style terrorist attacks from the air cannot be ruled out, either.

So what contribution do air forces make to strategic defence and security, including to expeditionary engagements? While boots on the ground have had a vital part to play in most of our recent overseas involvements, the cost in blood and treasure of prolonged major deployments and their support, particularly by much reduced front-line forces, places a considerable and worrisome strain on those involved. These levels of operation cannot be sustained indefinitely at our present, let alone a reduced, level of resources and capability. If this Administration aspire to a global presence, alternatives for the future need to be considered.

The contribution of air power—for some 17 years over Iraq between the two Gulf Wars—is an example of what can be done successfully and without being seduced into, or bogged down in, lasting and expensive operations on land. As we face the unpredictability and uncertainty of future threats, the inherent agility and adaptability of air platforms and their supporting systems should be treasured and encouraged.

Combat ISTAR is becoming one of the core competencies, providing assured intelligence and situational awareness not only to on-board offensive systems but to all types of operation by other joint forces. Indeed, the advantages can be spread to other non-military authorities and agencies caught up in an operation. Combat ISTAR is a fine contemporary example of how the inherent flexibility of air systems are re-rolled to engage in new defence tasks, giving greatly ongoing and added value to the original investment in these equipments.

In our more straitened circumstances, the case for reducing, rather than increasing, the number of ground forces, while maintaining an ability to contribute more widely and strategically by air and space, and by maritime, means to an allied expeditionary capability, should be weighed in the balance in the Strategic Defence Review. I look forward to learning that this Administration are taking such a structured and broad look at what options there are for our future strategic stance.