Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 4th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

I shall speak briefly on Motion T1. It was a pleasure to listen to the noble Lords who have spoken to this important matter. One thing we all agree on is that there should be no checks or barriers along the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and certainly there should be no barriers between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. That is an equal assertion. Unfortunately, those of us from a unionist position sometimes feel that the concentration is very much on the north-south dimension and that the east-west dimension is almost forgotten or people call for the rigorous implementation of checks, which is a bizarre position to adopt when there has been so much passion. I agree with those who have argued that there should be no checks between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and vice versa.

As someone who lives just about 15 miles from the border, I understand the concerns. However, there are a couple of myths that need to be dispelled. First, we are talking about an international border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. It is a different jurisdiction for currency, taxation and fiscal rules. For goodness’ sake, even the road signs change from kilometres to miles. We have different voting systems. All these things matter, and it is wrong to dismiss the guarantees and agreements that were made in the Belfast agreement, as amended by the St Andrews agreement, because it enshrined the principle of consent and that the people of Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom so long as they voted that way.

The second thing to say gently to the House is that there were checks for immigration on the UK side and on the Irish Republic side of the border—not at the border because nobody wants to stay at the border—even before we left the European Union. I am looking at a tweet put out by the Garda and PSNI in 2018, which eulogises and praises a checkpoint near the Monaghan/Armagh border seeking those in breach of immigration law. There are many other examples we could give. Eight illegal immigrants were caught at a checkpoint in Dundalk just across the Irish border by the Garda Síochána after travelling via England and Northern Ireland. These checks are not done at the border but they are intelligence-led, so it is wrong to suggest that somehow any checks are contrary to the spirit of the Belfast agreement because that is exactly the sort of regime that will apply going forward as it did previously.

The final thing I will say, very briefly, is that—as I mentioned at the start—we must have the same considerations and the same passion and desire to avoid problems against the spirit of the Belfast agreement which has been evoked today and we must ensure that it applies east-west for strand 3 as it does for strand 2. In June 2021, the European Union, as published by the DAERA department in January of this year, was complaining to the UK Government that ferry passengers coming from Great Britain into Larne or Belfast, where there is no border at all—British citizens moving from one part of the United Kingdom to the other—were not having their luggage checked. If anything illustrated the detriment to tourism, for instance, which has been mentioned in this regard, there is an example.

Issues have been raised about people getting access to health and the protocol’s effect on medicines for UK citizens and Irish citizens coming from one part of the United Kingdom to the other. There are barriers to that, yet we do not hear the same concerns. All I am pleading for is balance and equivalence. If checks are wrong north-south, they are wrong east-west.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Motion L1 in my name and, briefly, to some of the other amendments before us. I congratulate the Government on Motion A and welcome the movement from them with respect to the Chagossian community—the Minister deserves credit for persuading the Government to move on that, as does my noble friend Lady Lister and many others for the campaign to advance this cause and issue. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, was right also to point out the efforts of Henry Smith MP who has worked exceedingly hard on this issue.

There will be a number of disagreements between us as we debate this Bill today, as well as many challenges to the Government and pushback—if that is the right phrase to use in the context of this Bill—asking the Government to think again. It shows the importance of how the Lords works to ask the Government to revise their legislation. This is an example of where the Government have responded positively to the various concerns that have been expressed. This shows Parliament at its best and, hopefully, with respect to other issues that I and other noble Lords will raise through our amendments, we will see the same happen elsewhere before the Bill becomes an Act.

On Motions B and B1, the deprivation of citizenship in certain cases, with proper safeguards, is an important tool of our national security. We do not believe that the Government have made the case for the suggested powers under Clause 9 to remove citizenship without giving notice. It remains our preference that the clause should be removed altogether; however, it is clear the debate has moved on from this. In that light, we strongly welcome that there has at least been some movement to introduce safeguards. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, whose work has improved the clause and has added much-needed safeguards into the process.

However, Motion B1 from the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, raises further extremely important questions about Clause 9. I ask again: is it not the case that the Government must reissue existing deprivation orders that were made without notice under the processes now defined by—what I would call—the Anderson amendments? If a person is currently subject to a deprivation order but they have not been notified of that, when do their appeal rights start and finish? Can the Minister provide clarity on this? There are a number of questions and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, is quite right to point out through her Motion the various problems that still exist, notwithstanding the improvements that have been made. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response to the noble Baroness with respect to her Motion B1.

On Motion L and my Motion L1, the proposed arrival offence makes arriving in the UK to seek asylum a criminal act. We feel really strongly about this, as indeed your Lordships did. The Commons reason for disagreeing with the Lords over this offence is that

“the Commons consider that it should be a criminal offence for a person who requires entry clearance to knowingly arrive in the United Kingdom without such clearance.”

But do the Government genuinely believe that a person arriving in the UK and asking for sanctuary is a criminal act? That is what is suggested by this offence. At the same time, Ministers have repeatedly stated that they do not intend it to be used in all circumstances to which it applies.

A specific example of what we are talking about came up last week in the debate in the other place when considering a Ukrainian who had fled to the UK to join their family in the first few days after the appalling Russian invasion to escape the bombing and destruction of their home, but who had not completed a lengthy visa process. Under the Government’s proposals, that Ukrainian person would have been guilty of a criminal offence and liable to up to four years in prison. That is surely not what the Government want, but that would be the consequence of their Bill as drafted. Therefore, although that is a very emotive example to give because we all feel so passionately about that, that is exactly what the Bill does. That cannot be right.

The Government say that we need to ensure that there are safe and legal routes, and much of this has been driven by what has happened with respect to migrants crossing the channel. As Damian Green MP, a former Immigration Minister, asked of the Government,

“Home Office data confirms that 87% of those arriving by small boats in 2021 comprised nationals from Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen,”—[Official Report, Commons; 22/3/22; col. 199.]

but what safe route is open to them? I know the Government’s answer is that they should stop in the first country in which it is safe for them to do so, but if 87% are from those four countries—as the Home Office data itself says—what difference does the criminalisation of the offence of arrival make? The Bill does not make sense in this regard.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, as I say, Ministers have repeatedly said that this offence is intended to be prosecuted only in specific cases, such as where a person arrives in the UK in breach of a deportation order. If the Government’s intention is for those cases to be prosecuted, they should pass a law which says that. That is why we have tabled our amendment in lieu: to do just that. We have listened to Ministers and what they are seeking to achieve and have actually tried to find a way through. So, our Amendment 13B would provide a specific offence of arriving in the UK in breach of a deportation order. It is an example of the type of specific offence that Ministers can put into the Bill to achieve their desired outcomes. The Commons reason regarding the offence as drafted does not reflect the assurances or the policy intent expressed to both Houses by Ministers. For that reason, we believe that further action is needed on the issue—hence my Motion L1.

On Motions M and M1, the Government have ended up in a position where a person who saves lives at sea without co-ordination of that rescue attempt by the coastguard risks committing an offence. The Government’s answer is that a rescuer in that situation will have a full defence that they have gone to the aid of people in distress, which they are duty bound to do under international law. I accept that the change is not intended to lead to the prosecution of anyone who rescues lives at sea, and we recognise that the Government have moved some way during consideration of the Bill to put beyond doubt that a coastguard co-ordinated rescue is not in the scope of the offence. But we are still left with an unsatisfactory outcome and a lack of clarity on what should be included in the scope of the offence. We have this problem throughout the Bill, and this is yet another example of an offence capturing behaviour that should not be captured. The Bill does not clarify the position and the Government so far refuse in many instances to give us the clarity we need.

Turning to Amendment 20, tabled by my noble friend Lord Rosser, regrettably, we do not believe that there is more to be gained by insisting on sending it back to the Commons a further time. But the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, perfectly highlights the remaining issue and would be a simple and sensible addition to the Bill. We support it, and we ask the Minister to consider it seriously.

On Motions T and T1, spoken to by my noble friend Lord Murphy and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, there is a real problem here, notwithstanding the important points made by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds. We have been raising this issue for months; the border is still an afterthought, and we are seeking to clear the issue up at this juncture. The problem is that the proposed approach is not only unworkable but does not reflect the reality of those who live and work on the border at all.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

Leave out from “Amendments” to end and insert “13, 14 and 16 to 19, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reasons 13A, 14A and 16A to 19A, do insist on its Amendment 15, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 15A, and do propose Amendment 13B in lieu of Amendment 13—

13B: Page 40, leave out lines 5 to 9 and insert—
“(D1) A person who knowingly arrives in the United Kingdom in breach of a deportation order commits an offence.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I intervene briefly in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the remarks made by my noble friend Lady Lister. In doing so, I declare my interest as chair of the General Dental Council. In that capacity, I had a meeting with the British Dental Association earlier today, not specifically about this issue, but the British Dental Association is still very exercised by it.

I again pursue an issue I raised on Report, to which I have not seen a satisfactory response: the precise terms under which consent will be known to exist in respect of certain scientific procedures being carried out. For example, if there is to be a dental X-ray, will freely given consent be obtained from the individuals concerned? By “freely given” I mean not under duress. The reality is that young people who are fearful of not having their rights accepted are hardly likely to give their consent willingly. Can the Minister tell us exactly how we can be reassured that that consent will be freely given and that it will genuinely be the case that if somebody does not give consent that will not be in some way held against them elsewhere? The reason why this matters is that for a professional, whether a dental professional or any other professional, to carry out a medical procedure, including a dental X-ray, without that free consent is unethical and against all professional standards. It is an extremely important point.

Can we also have clarity about whether it will always be an appropriate professional who will carry out the necessary scientific assessment? If, for example, someone employed by the Home Office or some other agency carries out an X-ray or whatever without being an appropriate professional, that is a criminal offence. I would really like clarity on whether the Government have thought through these ethical and professional issues in terms of these clauses and in rejecting the amendment passed by your Lordships’ House that was moved on Report by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, before I move on to Part 5, I will speak briefly to Motion N1 on Part 4 and age assessments. I support the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and supported by my noble friend Lady Lister. I pay tribute to them for their work on this issue.

In the Commons, the Conservative MP Peter Aldous raised the concerns we have just heard of the British Dental Association on ethical, health and accuracy grounds about using X-rays for age assessment purposes. In response, the Minister could not even give a commitment that a dentist would be included on the planned oversight committee for the policy, as my noble friend Lady Lister has just pointed out. It seems to me that what is being asked is perfectly reasonable and moderate: that before a method is approved as somehow being scientific, advice is taken by experts in the field. It is remarkable that these concerns have to be raised.

I will concentrate my remarks on Part 5, but first I declare my interest as a research fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Rights Lab, and as a trustee of the Human Trafficking Foundation.

I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for pointing out, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have done, that it is quite remarkable that a series of changes to the modern slavery legislation is included in an immigration Act. That is unbelievable. I say to Conservative Members, indeed to all Members of this House, that the Modern Slavery Act 2015—I got it out and read it again—is a signpost piece of legislation of which we are all proud, and one of the legacies of Prime Minister Theresa May.

Throughout our debates and in the amendments that we are debating now, we are trying to improve a piece of legislation that should not be in here—but, having said that, we will try to improve it. For example, the House voted to remove Clause 58 in its entirety from the Bill. There was recognition of the dangers of penalising a victim for not meeting a deadline to disclose information. It can be difficult for a victim to even recognise themselves as a victim, let alone to process and communicate that trauma to a deadline.

The Bill provides that credibility will not be damaged where a person has a good reason for late compliance, but we struggled throughout the Bill to get certainty on what counts as a good reason. It was our belief that the authorities should not be instructed to consider a victim’s credibility damaged because they might have disclosed information about what they had been subject to—human trafficking, exploitation or modern slavery—a little late.

Therefore, we strongly welcome the step taken by the Government today to exempt at least child victims from this clause; we welcome the amendment that the Minister has just brought before us. I recognise that the Government have listened to some of the concerns raised and have moved some way on this issue. We are grateful to them for that. For that reason, we will not seek to vote again on Clause 58 today, since we have narrowed our focus to, as the Minister pointed out, key issues where there is still need for further movement from the Government.

This leads us to Motions S and S1, which focus in greater detail on child victims of trafficking. We are talking about children here, and my Amendment 27B would put in the Bill that the best interests of the child must be primary in all decisions about child victims. I do not understand why that is not a reasonable thing to include in the Bill. Also, it would not allow slavery and trafficking notices to be served on a victim under the age of 18. You could have a child of 12 or 13, or even younger, being given an information notice to be complied with—not late notice now; they will not be penalised for that—and being required to present an information notice about the circumstances of their trafficking. It is ridiculous that we are asking children to do that.

My amendment would also exempts children from restrictions under Clauses 61 and 62, so that they have access to additional recovery periods if they are re-trafficked and are not covered by public order provisions. It would provide that child victims can have leave to remain, to give them time to access support as well as supporting prosecutions against their traffickers. Finally, it would ensure that the burden of proof for a child victim to enter the NRM is not heightened by the Bill, so that no extra barriers are put in place to a child victim being recognised by the system.

It is worth pointing out again that child victims constituted 43% of the referrals to the NRM. That is what we are talking about—nearly a majority of those referred to the NRM were children. The Office for National Statistics says that, in the UK, 24,675 children have been referred to the NRM since 2009—a frankly unbelievable figure. That is why it is so important that, although the Government have moved on this, there must be more done to protect children and child victims of trafficking.

Our original Amendment 27 provided that a trafficking notice could not be served where a person had experienced exploitation while they were under 18. In the Commons, the Minister, Tom Pursglove, said when a trafficking notice was served on a person the precise timeline or date of their exploitation would not be known, so it would not be possible to exempt people based on when their exploitation took place. In light of that, we have amended subsection (2) of our proposed new clause to specify that a trafficking notice cannot be served on a person under the age of 18. In these cases, there is no question that the exploitation took place while this person was a child, because they are still under 18 years of age.

Another argument put forward by the Minister in the Commons is that our clause provides protection for children yet not for other victims. Of course, we are seeking to provide specific protection for children; that is the responsible way to make law. It is crucial to recognise that the Government have now moved to exempt children in respect of Clause 58 so that, as I have said, they will not be penalised. That is important for two reasons. I am hugely grateful to the Minister for the concession; it also shows that the Government now accept that in certain cases it is right to recognise child victims for what they are—exploited, traumatised children—and to exempt them from the provisions of this part. We do that in every area of law; we provide differently for children than for adults. It is important that we do the same with respect to modern slavery; we are asking the Government for further concessions on that.

It is most important that we resolve the part relating to Motions Q and Q1 as well. The anti-slavery commissioner has said that the Government’s proposals make it harder to prosecute people traffickers. The Government recognise that it is common for victims to be criminally exploited and so have a criminal record as part of their exploitation. Our replacement for Clause 62 therefore seeks to protect children and adults—all victims of slavery—against being penalised for having been at some point criminally exploited.

The key issue raised by Ministers about our original amendment is that it did not provide a definition of who could be considered a threat to public order. So, our Amendment 25B provides that a person is considered a threat if they have been convicted of a terrorism offence; it also requires the Secretary of State to consult within a year on whether further offences listed under Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act should be added to this definition. In other words, we have made an important concession in that we understand the need for a definition and that the Home Office is debating what that definition should be. Rather than hold up the Bill, let us have a situation where, within one year of this Act coming into force, the Government must come forward with a consultation on whether a person convicted of any offence listed in Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, other than a terrorism offence, should be considered as presenting

“an immediate, genuine, present and serious threat to public order”.

We have tried to be reasonable, but we say to the Government again that excluding victims of trafficking from the NRM on the basis that at some point they have had a minor conviction for a crime does not recognise the reality of the situation in which these victims find themselves.

To conclude on this, I say to the Minister that if he were a victim of slavery, he, like me, would in many instances be forced into criminal action. As it stands, the Bill will penalise those people and prevent them from getting the support that should be given to them under the NRM. That is not acceptable. It is not in the spirit of the Modern Slavery Act, nor what the Government themselves would want to happen.

Finally, on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord McColl, I pay tribute to the noble Lord for the work that he has done on this over so many years. It is an important amendment; frankly, it is disappointing and unbelievable that the Government have not accepted his effort to ensure that people get the support they deserve for 12 months. I hope that your Lordships will support the noble Lord, Lord McColl, as we will, if it comes to a Division.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

At end insert “and do propose Amendment 25B in lieu—

25B: Leave out Clause 62 and insert the following new Clause—
“Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection
(1) This section applies to the construction and application of Article 13 of the Trafficking Convention.
(2) A competent authority may determine that it is not bound to observe the minimum recovery period under section 60 of this Act in respect of a person in relation to whom a positive reasonable grounds decision has been made if the authority is satisfied that it is prevented from doing so—
(a) as a result of an immediate, genuine, present and serious threat to public order, or
(b) because the person is claiming to be a victim of modern slavery improperly.
(3) For the purposes of section (2)(a), a person is considered as presenting an immediate, genuine, present and serious threat to public order where the person has been convicted of a terrorist offence.
(4) The Secretary of State must, within one year of this Act coming into force—
(a) prepare and publish a consultation on whether a person convicted of any offence listed in Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, other than a terrorist offence, should be considered as presenting an immediate, genuine, present and serious threat to public order for the purposes of section (2)(a); and
(b) lay a response to the consultation before each House of Parliament.
(5) In subsection (3), “terrorist offence” means any of the following (whenever committed)—
(a) an offence listed in—
(i) Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code (terrorism offences: England and Wales), or
(ii) Schedule 1A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (terrorism offences: Scotland and Northern Ireland);
(b) an offence that was determined to have a terrorist connection under—
(i) section 69 of the Sentencing Code (in the case of an offender sentenced in England and Wales), or
(ii) section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (in the case of an offender sentenced in Northern Ireland, or an offender sentenced in England and Wales before the Sentencing Code applied);
(c) an offence that has been proved to have been aggravated by reason of having a terrorist connection under section 31 of the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 (in the case of an offender sentenced in Scotland).
(6) Any determination made under subsection (2) must only be made—
(a) in exceptional circumstances,
(b) where necessary and proportionate to the threat posed, and
(c) following an assessment of all the circumstances of the case.
(7) A determination made under subsection (2) must not be made where it would breach—
(a) a person’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights,
(b) the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Trafficking Convention, or
(c) the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
(8) For the purposes of a determination under subsection (2)(b) victim status is being claimed improperly if the person knowingly and dishonestly makes a false statement without good reason, and intends by making the false statement to make a gain for themselves.
(9) A good reason for making a false statement includes, but is not limited to, circumstance where—
(a) the false statement is attributable to the person being or having been a victim of modern slavery, or
(b) any means of trafficking were used to compel the person into making a false statement.
(10) This section does not apply where the person is under 18 years at the time of the referral.
(11) Nothing in this section affects the application of section 60(2).””

--- Later in debate ---

Motion S1 (as an amendment to Motion S)

[Lord Coaker]

Moved by

At end insert “and do propose Amendment 27B in lieu—

27B: Insert the following new Clause—“Slavery and human trafficking: victims aged under 18 years (1) Where a competent authority is making a decision in relation to a person who is aged under 18 years, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration.(2) The Secretary of State may not serve a slavery or trafficking information notice on a person who is aged under 18 years. (3) Section 61 of this Act does not apply in cases where either the first reasonable grounds decision or a further reasonable grounds decision made in relation to a person relates to an incident or incidents which occurred when the person was aged under 18 years.(4) Section 62 of this Act does not apply in cases where a positive reasonable grounds decision has been made in respect of a person which relates to an incident or incidents which occurred when the person was aged under 18 years.(5) The Secretary of State must grant a person leave to remain in the United Kingdom where a positive conclusive grounds decision is made in respect of a person who—(a) is under 18 years, or (b) was under 18 years at the time of the incident or incidents to which the positive reasonable grounds decision relates.(6) Guidance issued under section 49(1)(c) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 on determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking must provide that, where the determination relates to an incident or incidents which occurred when the person was aged under 18 years, the determination must be made on the standard of “suspect but not prove”.””