European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill [HL]

Lord Clinton-Davis Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, this is our second debate in three days on the eurozone, but that is hardly disproportionate considering the huge potential threat of the crisis in the eurozone to the world economy. The measure before us is already well known and publicised and, indeed, is already priced into the markets, so anyone who thinks that what is being debated today will make a crucial difference to the eurozone crisis is under an illusion. It may be a necessary first step, but it is already priced into the markets.

The Minister gave a clear and lucid explanation of the Bill, and suggested that we should welcome the new permanent bailout mechanism not just for economic reasons, but because it replaces the EFSM, the first bailout mechanism, to which Britain had to contribute. I hope he will forgive me if I probe this argument a little further to find out how completely copper-bottomed it is. In practical terms, the new mechanism makes the EFSM obsolete; if you have the ESM, you do not need the EFSM. But as far as I can see, there is no legal assurance or guarantee that the EFSM has actually been abolished. The document, 407/2010, which is the instrument that set up the EFSM, is not repealed. There is no amendment in this treaty amendment to Article 122 under which the EFSM was set up. The treaty amendment does not say, as one might have expected, that there should not be financial assistance to countries that have over-spent or over-borrowed under Article 122, the original provision that obliged Britain to contribute. If this seems a little suspicious, paranoid or swivel-eyed to the Minister, perhaps he will forgive me simply because the use of Article 122 to set up the temporary bailout mechanism was, in many people’s opinion—including that of Madame Lagarde—an illegal use of it. The Government have always been coy about its legality, but given that she said that, we are entitled to be sceptical and to ask for further assurances.

Perhaps I may remind the Minister that the Council decision under Article 136 which set up the ESM says that member states whose economies are not in the eurozone “may decide to participate”. There is a little bit of daylight there but it is far from clear that we will definitely not be involved in this. I might also mention that there are other bailout provisions in the treaties which apply to non-eurozone countries. Articles 352 and 143 provide for bailouts to non-eurozone countries. They cover us, we have no opt-out and, of course, decisions are made by qualified majority vote.

I should like to ask the Minister one or two questions about the ESM itself. First, according to a document dating from 2011 on the European Central Bank website, the ESM could be used to buy sovereign bonds on the primary markets. I imagine that that is not now correct and that it has been overtaken. However, I should be grateful for the Minister’s assurance on that point. Secondly, again according to the ECB website, the debt of the ESM will be classified as the debt of EU institutions. It will not be classified as government debt and will not count as government borrowing, even though the ESM is going to issue securities and borrow from the markets, and even though those bonds are themselves guaranteed by the Governments of the eurozone. Can the Minister confirm that that is the case?

Thirdly, how confident is the Minister that the ESM will be able to maintain an AAA rating? The intention is to issue securities that are AAA rated, but because of recent downgrades, the ESM is now backed by only one large economy that has a universal AAA rating. This idea that a lot of Governments that have sub-AAA ratings can have their securities all wrapped up together and that those can then be described as AAA securities has a rather uncomfortable similarity to certain things that happened in 2007 and 2008, through the CDOs that led directly to the financial crisis.

Fourthly, perhaps I may ask the Minister about the capital of the ESM. According to the ECB website, this is put initially at €80 billion, rising to a callable amount of €620 billion. Again, this capital is being provided by countries in proportion to their GDP and populations. That presumably is something like 18% for Italy and 12% for Spain. But can Italy actually afford to make its contribution? Will the contribution be made in cash or in terms of guarantees? The whole mechanism seems rather like a lot of not very sound economies getting together to try to guarantee their own finances. Of course, at some future date Italy might very easily be in a position where it could not meet the capital requirement that was asked of it.

I have one or two comments to make about the current situation in the eurozone. I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Radice, who always speaks very eloquently and with a wealth of experience. He made the slightly familiar point that we were not being listened to—that was an implied criticism—and that we had lost influence. Perhaps listening is not the strong point of the eurozone Governments. They were not exactly prepared to listen when they were warned in the first place that this was an unworkable system that would lead to great financial problems. The noble Lord suggested that we must be constructive, get in there and be more influential. I am afraid that is a policy that has been tried and has failed many times before. I see no point in participating in, or at least reinforcing, a wrong policy merely in the interests of some chimera called influence.

[Lord Clinton-Davis]

What conclusion is the noble Lord coming to? Should we withdraw entirely from the euro?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Well, we are not in the euro, so that is not a point that leaves me in great difficulty.

The euro has been a disastrous experiment. It has brought nothing but grief and problems. What has been the achievement of the euro? What have been its consequences? Twenty-one neo-fascists in the Greek Parliament is one consequence. The system that was promoted in order to produce harmony has produced nothing but acrimony and xenophobia. The European Union used to boast that its great achievement was to underpin democracy in post-dictatorship countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, yet we have seen the political life of Greece being torn up by the demands being made of it by the eurozone.

The main force that is keeping the monetary union together is simply the fear of the consequences of it falling apart. As well as looking at the costs and dangers of it breaking up, it is only rational also to look at the costs of keeping it together, because they can continue to mount, even to the point of threatening the stability of the German economy. Germany has contributed something like €200 billion so far to shoring up the euro. It may find that it has to do more and more of this as the years go by.

The Bundesbank is now worried about what are called the TARGET2 balances. These are the claims that the Bundesbank has on the central banks of the peripheral countries, because the central banks have had to step in to fill the gap where the interbank, international, commercial market has withdrawn. The claims on the Bundesbank’s balance sheet in respect of the peripheral countries now come to something in excess of €500 billion, which is causing a lot of anxiety in Germany.

It seems clear that if Greece leaves the euro—whatever we think about that, there seems to be a distinct stench of inevitability about it—a €500 billion firewall is not going to be sufficient to stop contagion. It may be enough to deal with one country but will not be enough to deal with several. I noticed—and the noble Lord, Lord Radice, picked up on it—that Finance Ministers, including Mr Schauble, have been saying that Greece’s departure might be difficult but not fatal. We must hope that they are right but it would not be the first time if they are proved wrong.

I certainly feel a degree of sympathy with Spain and the situation it finds itself in. Spain ran a perfectly responsible policy before the crisis and actually spends, as a proportion of GDP, somewhat less than we do as a country. The historic yield it pays on its debt is something like 3.6%, but today in the markets it is having to pay something like 6%. Spain cannot remain solvent if interest rates remain at these levels, as they are likely to do for some time to come. I say “likely to” because it seems very probable that the rates on sovereign debt will never return, in the near future, to the level they were at before the crisis began.

At the moment, we have a complete stand-off between Greece and Germany. Greece is, I think, overplaying its hand by threatening to bring the whole pack of cards tumbling down. At the same time, German public opinion is, I believe, hardening. Mr Hollande, for all that was said, will find this very difficult to move, as German public opinion is extremely resistant to further bailouts. The one thing that some people think could be done to ease the situation—the noble Lord, Lord Radice, referred to this—would be if Germany had higher inflation. To my astonishment, Mr Schauble referred to this. It may be the one thing that would help the eurozone but the one thing that would turn German public opinion absolutely against the euro is if it had to put up with inflation of 4% or 5%. That would be anathema to the German people. For all Mr Schauble said, I do not believe that is the course that Germany is going to follow.

The question is: which will blink first—Germany or Greece? My guess is that neither is going to blink, and therefore we will have a chaotic, unplanned exit from the euro. Greece and its politicians say they do not want to leave the euro, but clearly they need a third bailout and are very likely to default again. Greece may not want to leave, but what it is demanding is not on the table and is not available. If the second election produces the same result as the first, the eurozone has to grasp the nettle and show the door to Greece.

The truth about this mess and this situation we are in is that every option is unpalatable. Breaking up the euro carries dangers, while soldiering on risks the danger of hugely escalating costs. However, the worst option of all is the third one, which is that the crisis has no end and we have this sapping away of confidence. People talk about the need for a growth package, but growth depends above all on confidence, and as long as this crisis goes on, we will not get confidence and we will not get growth. It is time that the eurozone made some hard choices. Winston Churchill once said, “We have to face reality or reality will face us”. It is time for the eurozone to decide to face reality, however hard that may be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clinton-Davis]

Some time ago, the noble Lord, Lord Howell, explained the purposes and effects of the Bill, and I wholly approve of the intentions that underlie it. It is a technical Bill, but I want to speak about other matters and I am not the only one to do that.

We have had the voices of doom and gloom from the noble Lords, Lord Lawson and Lord Lamont. The noble Lord, Lord Lawson, spoke of arrogance and irresponsibility, and he knows what he is talking about because that explains the whole purpose of his chancellorship. His period of office was not exactly crowned with glory. I think that writing off the European Union as he has done is irresponsible in itself. Our job is to save it, not drown it.

I approved very much of what my noble friend Lord Radice said, especially his remarks concerning the relationship between this country and the eurozone. The Bill has to be regarded against the background of the current crisis affecting the eurozone, and we cannot be immune from its possible deleterious effects. Of course, the crisis directly involves Greece. Ireland, Italy and Spain are also involved, and it would be idle to pretend that the entire European Union is not affected; of course it is.

Some argue that the euro is bound to fail—a scenario which I refuse to accept. Talk of that kind will inevitably lead to the collapse of the euro. I am rather more optimistic about its prospects of survival. Some argue that Greece will have no alternative but to leave the euro and possibly the European Union. I hope that that will not happen. It is, of course, for the Greek people to decide their country’s fate, but to pretend that Britain would be unaffected and that contagion is remote is idle to contemplate.

Others contend that this scenario is to be averted if at all possible; that there is a duty on all members of the European Union, including ourselves, to rescue the European Union from its present plight; and that the Union with all its accumulated funds can and must overcome its present woes. In all this, of course, our country is pivotal and is inevitably involved. As a convinced supporter of the European Union with all its blemishes—what institution does not have any?—I continue to believe that the previous Labour Government were right not to join the euro, but that cannot mean that we can be just a non-playing bystander in the whole enterprise.

Notwithstanding that we face global instability, we now need the EU and we should strive to make it a success. We should support Presidents Obama and Hollande at the recent G8 summit in their quest to concentrate much more on growth, on a stimulus package and on promoting employment. In other words, budgetary solvency and the maximising of growth must be our equal priorities. Unhappily, the policies of the coalition are bewilderingly confused. At home, we have a programme of strict austerity; abroad the coalition urges the acceptance of the Obama formula—ineptitude writ large—and vividly illustrated by its desire during the recent French presidential campaign to shun Hollande, who won, and support Sarkozy, who lost.

To desert the European Union, to quell revolt on the part of Conservative Back-Benchers, and to hector the European Union from the sidelines does not amount to a realistic policy. Surely no Lib Dem could support that endeavour. An increasing number of allies are now calling for economic growth. Of course, Germany finds it difficult to forgo its past, and we have to sympathise with that dilemma, but somehow the European Union must develop, grow and tackle the deficit. This is a conflict that we cannot afford to lose and I do not think that we will, despite the voices of gloom and despair.