Burma (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Wednesday 1st May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Chidgey (LD)]

My Lords, I am delighted to thank the Minister for opening the debate and for giving me the opportunity to contribute and talk about Guinea-Bissau, which lies in an incredibly complex part of Africa, given its history and the influences placed on it, not just by western, European colonialists but by Asia, by religion and by their own ethnic empires in the region. It is a real melting pot. The point is that here we are in the 21st century looking at sanctions on Guinea-Bissau specifically to try to influence the way it relates to the values we believe to be absolutely fundamental in a modern state.

We have to take into account that the political evolution of Guinea-Bissau, before and after independence, has been as troubled and turbulent as that of any country in the region. The armed rebellion against Portugal, the colonial power, began in 1956 with the support of Cuba and the Soviet Union—and China, which was almost unheard of in those days. Meanwhile, in the neighbouring Republic of Guinea, or Guinea Conakry, Ahmed Sekou Toure’s Government were choosing not to join de Gaulle’s post-colonial French community. This resulted in the immediate withdrawal of all French investment and assistance, creating an economic crisis. In the 1980s, I gained first-hand knowledge of the results of that situation.

Sekou Toure’s soldiers crossed into Guinea-Bissau to join the rebels fighting the Portuguese, and the rebels gradually took control of the country. In 1970, the Portuguese organised an attempted coup in Guinea Conakry, with the aim of releasing their troops captured in the fighting in Guinea-Bissau and then held in appalling prison camps just outside Conakry. They succeeded and withdrew, leaving the exiled Guinean troops they had accompanied to fight on alone. Those troops failed to reach the radio station in Conakry in time to prevent a warning being sent to Sekou Toure, the President, thus allowing him to evade capture and certain execution. Following independence, the ruling party in Guinea-Bissau massacred hundreds of thousands of local soldiers who had fought alongside the Portuguese. In Guinea Conakry, over 50,000 people were killed in massive purges. A third of the population fled to neighbouring countries and all French citizens were banished.

Against this background, the introduction of democratic elections in Guinea-Bissau in 1994 was almost bound to end in failure, culminating as it did in civil war. It is a matter of record that, since 1998, Guinea-Bissau has had 10 Prime Ministers and three elected Presidents, none of whom has been allowed to complete their mandate. Four chiefs of general staff of the armed forces have been removed by the military, two of whom were assassinated by fellow officers. With the latest crisis also being marked by military intervention, it is no wonder that, in December 2018, the UN Security Council warned that unless political actors in Guinea-Bissau demonstrate renewed good faith to hold,

“genuinely free and fair elections”,

the country is set to face a continuing cycle of instability.

According to the UN’s deputy special representative, David McLachlan-Karr, the recent elections were a very positive result for people, heralding the dawn of a new chapter for democracy in Guinea-Bissau. I note that in the SI, however, the Government acknowledge that the democratic process in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau remains uncertain. The SI needs to promote the rule of law and good governance and seek to prevent threats to democratic principles, and the Government plan to continue to hold Guinea-Bissau to account for any action that undermines the peace, security or stability of the country. This of course is very commendable, and much to be welcomed and supported.

We understand that the identity of designated persons targeted by the SI cannot be revealed in advance, to limit the opportunity for them to remove assets from the UK. However, if the Minister could advise us, it would be helpful to know the scale of the assets considered and an approximation of the number of designated persons there might be, given that Guinea-Bissau’s population is well under 2 million. Are they resident in Guinea-Bissau? Are there conspiracies of organised crime involved? How do the Government expect to monitor their activities and respond to their actions?

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, I too welcome the Minister’s introduction to these SIs, and his brevity. I also welcome the contributions from other noble Lords that related to policy issues. Whenever we talk about sanctions, there is a reason for them, and those reasons need to be clearly expressed. I therefore welcome the contribution of all noble Lords in that regard.

I shall raise specific points that arise primarily from the discussion in the other place, in particular on the Magnitsky clause and the question of human rights. During the passage of the sanctions Bill, we had a detailed debate on human rights, and it was this House that pushed for amendments to include that as a primary reason for sanctions. The Magnitsky clause is an opportunity to expand the scope of the impact of our sanctions.

In the other place, we heard quite a few reasons why we were not going to see anything on the Magnitsky clause in these SIs. It was a bit confusing. The reasons given included that we cannot act too rapidly, and that we have had various pieces of legal advice. Sir Alan Duncan also said that we have about 3,000 statutory instruments to get through, and that there is a risk of constant legal challenge. A different explanation seems to have been given by the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Foreign Secretary. When pushed, the Government seem to be arguing that we cannot do this because we are operating within the EU framework and cannot act independently. Yet we know that there are EU countries that have exactly those provisions—Estonia and Lithuania, to name two—where individual Russians who have committed human rights abuses are specifically named.

If Sir Alan Duncan, the Minister, is saying that that action is not consistent with the Government’s legal advice, perhaps the noble Lord the Minister can tell us exactly how and when it might fit properly within the implementation period. When pressed, Sir Alan Duncan said that it was difficult to forecast—that seems to be the position of the Government at the moment on this uncertainty. When pushed again, he said that it would be as soon as was practicable. That sounds like quite a short timeframe to me, because it ought to be practicable to do this. I hope the noble Lord will be more precise than the Minister in the other place.

I want to focus on the following questions. What are sanctions for? How do we measure their effectiveness? We have had previous debates on sanctions, and often we get a report from the Government which says that sanctions are effective because they have stopped X, Y and Z. We then have to ask ourselves what impact they are having: are they actually influencing the people committing all these things?

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is absolutely right. Stopping military leaders means stopping those who control not only the policy of Burma but the economy of Burma. We are not talking about individuals who simply have a role in government. Their influence and the way they have exploited the economy of Burma goes well beyond their military role. We need to address that. The idea that we should simply stop them going on a shopping trip beggars belief.