Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 4th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It is perfectly obvious that the Commons reasons tell us that it agrees that the legislation should be compliant with our international obligations. The Minister has just told us that everything that we do will be compliant with them. I regret that a number of us take the view that these provisions do not so comply. The decision will ultimately be made by a court. If the Commons is right, that is well and good—fine, there would be nothing to argue about—but, if we are right and the view of the Commons is wrong, the judge would be bound by this legislation to disapply the convention and the protocol. No one would be able to say, “Ah, but the Commons reasons say that it is compliant”. The Commons reasons will not be in the legislation.

It is very simple: we respectfully suggest that the Commons should be asked to think again and reflect on the consequences if the advice that it is receiving is wrong and the advice that we are suggesting is right, and to avoid the problem that its own expressed legislative intention—that the legislation should be compliant—will prove to be wrong. It is very simple—all doubt can be avoided by this amendment.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, my focus in this group will be on Motion C1 of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I crave your Lordships’ indulgence to make one or two introductory remarks.

There could never be a good time for this particular Bill, but we can quite sure that there could hardly be a worse time. Make no mistake: the Bill will affect our standing on the world stage. It seems to me fairly obvious that the Bill was drafted with one particular major objective in mind: to make asylum seeking in the UK as unattractive as one can, to deter and discourage as many prospective refugees from coming here as one can and to refuse such claims as one can.

Of course I recognise that we have special refugee resettlement schemes for a number of substantial groups from around the world, from Syria, Afghanistan, Hong Kong and now—if, alas, somewhat delayed—Ukraine. I also recognise that there is a real and growing problem with a number of refugees—not, of course, those profiting from these schemes—so desperate as to risk their lives in the tragedies of crossing the channel. The draconian measures proposed here will not solve that problem and are not justified—as if aspiring refugees will henceforth say to each other, “Don’t bother coming to the UK. It is very unwelcoming and inhospitable. Just read this Bill”. I do not believe that for all the world and, frankly, I regard it as entirely fanciful. Unless noble Lords believe that this will solve the problem, we should continue to resist at least the most objectionable of the measures being promoted.

As to these, coming to Motion C1, my focus as an ex-judge who used to decide quite a lot of these asylum cases is above all on the legality of these proposals. I truly believe, as do many others, that several of these provisions flagrantly breach our obligations as interpreted by the UNHCR, the body responsible for that under the convention. That is why Motion C1 is all-important. Several later clauses in this part of the Bill purport to define or redefine our obligations under the convention. Of course, as my noble and learned friend Lord Judge says, the Government assert that they do so absolutely fairly and that they give effect to the convention, but that is not the view of a great number of respected bodies besides the UNHCR, such as the Bingham Centre, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and so forth.

On Report, we passed the amendment which Motion C1 is designed to replace and effectively reproduce. Having passed it, we did not go to the lengths of voting down the individual substantive clauses that redefine all the various ingredients of our obligations under the convention. Instead, we inserted that amendment and that is what we must do again. The Government’s objection to it is no more and no less than that it is not necessary, because they are going to comply with the convention anyway. I always think that the weakest grounds for objecting to any clause is that it is not necessary. I respectfully suggest that here it is crucial. I must explain why and noble Lords must forgive me as I do so.

On 28 February, during Report, the Minister then promoting the clause of the Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, rightly said of the proposed new clause—the Baroness Chakrabarti clause, if I may call it that—that it

“potentially leaves the nature of obligations and terms under the convention open to the interpretation of the courts, removing the certainty that we are trying to achieve.”

I then intervened before the Minister sat down, because that rang a great red bell with me. I asked whether I rightly understood him as saying by that that, without this amending provision, the courts would be excluded from considering whether the Bill correctly implements the convention obligations. That he confirmed, rightly observing that the courts

“are not there to go behind legislation”.—[Official Report, 28/2/22; col. 609.]

As I suggest, we then wisely passed the amendment introducing the new clause by 218 to 140, a majority of 78.

We come then—I am anxious not to bore the House, but it is necessary to get this point across—to the Commons debate on the Lords amendments on 22 March. That makes depressing reading when you consider how cursorily—and, dare I suggest, superficially —our various amendments, passed after long, painstaking hours, were summarily rejected. Here, one finds that, in response to the suggestions of some Members that it would indeed be a good idea to leave the amendment in, because some of us were saying that the legislation would otherwise be in flagrant breach, the Minister said:

“I … make the crucial point that we have an independent judiciary in this country, and it is open to people to bring points of challenge where they believe that there are grounds for doing so.”


This the Minister described as a

“cornerstone … evolved over centuries”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/3/22; col. 185.]

I do not for a moment suggest that the Minister was intentionally misleading the House, but the plain fact is that, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, had rightly agreed at Report, Mr Pursglove was quite wrong to suggest that there was no need for this amendment because the courts would anyway deal with the challenge to the legislation based on suggested non-compliance. I repeat: the amendment is vital. The courts otherwise cannot go behind the definitive clauses in the Bill and would have to apply them, compliant or not. Without this clause, the lead argument is pre-empted and foreclosed, as the substantive clauses operate, if I may use the term, as ouster clauses of the courts’ jurisdiction. I urge your Lordships not to accept them.