Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, as the tail-end Charlie, I will try to keep my remarks short so that we can go home to bed. At the core of this debate lies a very simple question: do we wish to fulfil the wishes of the 17.4 million people who voted to leave the EU and withdraw on 29 March? Obviously, as we have heard today and in preceding days and weeks, some people do not want to leave, period. While I totally disagree with them, I respect their honesty. We know where they stand. They will reject every deal. But if like me, who voted remain, you believe that the referendum result should be honoured, should we agree to this deal?

As we have been hearing, this deal is the result of indecision, muddled thinking and a failure to answer clearly the core Brexit question: what matters more, access to EU markets or parliamentary sovereignty? As a result, we have the backstop—a concept that we should never, ever have agreed to—and a political declaration that still leaves a multitude of questions unanswered. It is a gangplank into thin air, but the direction is a little clearer. We now know that it is attached to port, not starboard.

That said, let us not forget some very basic points about what we have before us. This agreement will ensure that we leave the EU on 29 March. We will then enter a transition agreement, at the end of which we will be out of the EU’s political union. Today’s payments to the EU will stop. According to the political declaration, we would have complete control over immigration. The UK would, it seems, remain close to the EU on the regulation of goods, but we would have more control over our services. The supremacy, but not the entire role, of the ECJ would be over, and we would be out of the common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy.

It is a compromise and, unsurprisingly, like most compromises it is disliked by both sides. There is a devil in the detail, but it is a devil we know. The core point is that it means we will leave the EU and enter a transition in just 80 days’ time. Contrast all that and those imperfections with the consequences of rejecting this deal entirely: a growing constitutional crisis, with Parliament demanding we must not leave without a deal; increasing economic turbulence; and growing pressure to have what I believe would be a highly divisive second referendum, or worse still, simply revoking Article 50. Maybe I am wrong and Parliament will suddenly accept the risks of leaving without a deal. Maybe those risks about the impact of no deal are just fear mongering. But on an issue of this magnitude, for me “maybe” and “fingers crossed” are not good enough.

That brings me back to my core point. If, like me, you believe that the imperative is to honour the result of the referendum, is it worth risking this chaos by rejecting this deal? I have a strong suspicion that the majority in the other place are prepared to take that risk, and next week they will reject the agreement as it stands. If this happens, and if the EU still does not budge and change the treaty, what then? If you want to honour the result of the referendum and leave the European Union; if you believe Parliament will defeat a vote of confidence and oppose leaving without a deal; if you agree on these points, then something will have to give here at Westminster so the withdrawal treaty is passed by Parliament. The only way I can see this happening is by building a solid parliamentary consensus around a position for the next phase of the negotiations that finally, honestly and clearly answers that basic question: what matters more, trade or sovereignty?

Given the parliamentary arithmetic, this might well mean acknowledging that the Prime Minster’s red lines—drawn up before the Cabinet had properly considered what it wanted to achieve, and before the Conservatives had lost their majority in the Commons—would now be preventing a deal and putting at risk the democratic imperative: leaving the European Union. There are a number of options being mooted. My preference, under this scenario, would be to be part of a customs union and abide by EU regulations for goods and agricultural products, as this will deliver on the core aim of leave voters—to take complete control of immigration while delivering free and frictionless trade. We would be in, for want of a better term, a common market.

The irony is that the basic building blocks of this position are there in the political declaration. I fully accept that this approach is not perfect. For example, it would probably mean we would be unable to strike trade deals covering goods on our own. But to coin a phrase, we cannot have our cake and eat it. If this deal is defeated next week, if the EU still does not make any concessions, those of us who prefer compromise to chaos and wish to honour the result of the referendum will need to put party interests to one side and put the national interest first, second and third. But as things stand, I support this deal. With all its imperfections, it will fulfil what I see as the democratic imperative: to leave the EU on 29 March and honour the wishes of 17.4 million people.

Debate adjourned until tomorrow.

Brexit: Economic Forecast

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

I do not think the noble Earl would be happy to be called a Tory by the noble Baroness. This policy will not make the country poorer. On every scenario, this country will continue to grow. A range of possible growth predictions is modelled in this analysis, but of course many other factors can influence economic growth, and this is likely to be a relatively small contributor to the overall economic growth. Of course, what would be truly disastrous would be a Labour Government, who would affect the economic growth of this country. We are proud of our economic record; we have delivered record low levels of unemployment for 40 years, the Government can be proud of their economic record, which will continue.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

I will agree with my noble friend briefly and then perhaps we can hear from the noble Lord, Lord Bridges.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

As we have heard, a number of my noble friends have been asking whether Article 50 might be revoked and making the case for this. Yesterday, the European Council’s top lawyer argued that Article 50 cannot be unilaterally revoked but would require the unanimous support of all EU member states. Do the British Government agree with the EU on this point?

[Lord Callanan]

I knew I would regret asking the noble Lord to come in on this one. He will be well aware that as the Minister responsible for this matter, I am unable to comment on the ongoing judicial process beyond saying that the UK will not revoke its Article 50 notice.

Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement Scrutiny

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Wednesday 31st October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

Of course we will make sure that the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, is fully briefed, as we will ensure that all Members of both Houses are fully briefed. When we have a deal, the Secretary of State will appear in front of the noble Lord’s committee, we will publish all the details of the deal and the appropriate economic analysis, and sufficient time will be made for debate in both this House and the other House before the meaningful vote.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, given the commitment by the Government to observe the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act and the process it follows—which, I believe, says that there should be 21 sitting days for Parliament to scrutinise the withdrawal agreement, as well as, obviously, the Motion that will need to be passed—what is the final date that the Government have pencilled in as the day by which Parliament must receive the withdrawal agreement if we are to leave, with it being ratified properly, by 29 March?

[Lord Callanan]

We have not pencilled in a final date. However, we are well aware—and have made the EU negotiators well aware—of all of the procedures that will need properly to be followed. The withdrawal agreement will be an international treaty but in the withdrawal Act, passed by both Houses, we are committed to the meaningful vote. We cannot ratify that Act without the appropriate say-so of Parliament in the meaningful vote and without the appropriate legislation being passed—and that will require proper scrutiny. The usual channels listen closely and are well aware of the timescales and constraints under which we are operating.

Brexit: Article 50

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

No, our negotiating position remains exactly as set out in the White Paper.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, back in June the Prime Minister assured us that the transition period in the withdrawal agreement would be time-limited, saying that it would give,

“everyone the certainty that this will not go on for ever”.

Last Monday, however, the Prime Minister told Parliament that we need,

“to create an option to extend the implementation period”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/10/18; col. 47.]

Given that the Prime Minister wants to bring certainty to the situation, how does the option to extend the transition do that?

[Lord Callanan]

As the noble Lord will be aware, the extent and length of the implementation period was agreed. It was green text in the withdrawal agreement. I understand that the possibility of extending it has been raised in the discussions in Brussels but no agreement has been made and discussions on such matters are continuing.

Brexit: EU Commission

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Wednesday 10th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

No I do not agree with the noble Baroness. It is an implementation period. We expect to agree the withdrawal agreement and the future economic partnership in the next few weeks—in the autumn—and the implementation period will be about implementing that deal.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, on Monday the Prime Minister’s official spokesman said that the Government would seek precision in the future framework—that is, the terms of the relationship between the UK and the EU post 2020. Will my noble friend therefore confirm that the Prime Minister will sign an agreement only if it sets out precisely and clearly the exact terms of trade in goods and services that will exist between the UK and the EU post 2020?

Brexit: Preparations and Negotiations

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Monday 23rd July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, who speaks such calm words of reason in a stormy sea. Before I start, I should draw your Lordships’ attention to my entry in the register of interests.

For the last few weeks, that line by WB Yeats has been ringing through my mind—

“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold”—

as I watched the political eruptions caused by the White Paper. I was not that surprised by what has happened. For months I have been arguing that the Cabinet must answer the question—perhaps the most important question—that Brexit poses: “What matters more: parliamentary sovereignty or market access?”. We all knew that any attempt to answer that question would trigger a political explosion, and so it has proven.

The White Paper is a compromise and, like all compromises, both sides feel aggrieved—some very aggrieved. I have some misgivings about the White Paper, not least the Heath Robinson approach to customs, but overall I support its approach. I think that remaining closely aligned to the EU on goods, but not on financial services, is a reasonable and balanced basis for further negotiation. Yes, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, the ECJ will still have a role and influence on our way of our life—for example, as regards the common set of rules. But I would argue that that is a price to pay—and worth paying—to guarantee free and frictionless trade. I wish the Government were a lot more honest about all this and would sell the White Paper for what it is: a pragmatic approach to the negotiations. It is not a deal, as some have said, nor is it an agreement. It is just that—an approach.

But, in many respects, these points are irrelevant quibbles, for the White Paper appears to have been rejected by the Labour Party as not going far enough, and by scores of Conservatives and others as going too far. That is even before the EU gives us its considered views. So, what should we do? First, just as members of the Cabinet have had to come out from their trenches and drop their positions, I would hope the European Union does likewise. Both sides need to understand the pressures that the other side is under. The Prime Minister has compromised; I hope that, in the spirit of sincere co-operation, the European Union now does likewise. For there is a risk—a very real, growing risk—that inflexibility, combined with a miscalculation, could trigger a sequence of events where things really do fall apart. And that need for flexibility applies here too.

Let us not forget the overriding aim of the next six months: to secure in the withdrawal treaty the transition and the clear heads of terms about our future relationship with the EU. The closer we get to the end of this year without an agreement on the transition, the more businesses will accelerate implementing their plans for no deal. Some of those decisions may be irreversible. As important is the need for clear heads of terms in the treaty. Having agreed to pay the divorce bill, and quite possibly signed a backstop agreement, we may find that the EU will have an even stronger hand in the next phase of the negotiations. As I have said before, if all we get is meaningless waffle in the treaty, and we have no clear sense of the future framework for our relationship with the EU, next year we will be forced to walk a gangplank into thin air. We cannot afford more years of uncertainty, but to get that clarity means engaging constructively, now, with the EU, on the basis of the White Paper.

I hear what some say: “The Government have already made too many concessions and we should not use the White Paper as the basis for any negotiation”. Implicit in this argument is the view that falling back on WTO terms, the so-called no-deal option, is preferable to the approach set out in the White Paper. I share the views of those who believe that, in a negotiation, one should always be able to walk away. I have written before of my fear that the Prime Minister would become handcuffed to the negotiating table, forced to make one concession after another, as no deal is not an option. I know that few in this House agree with me on this so, rather than debate again and again its merits, let us remember that prime rule of politics: learn to count.

As things stand, is there a firm, cast-iron majority in the other place to allow the Prime Minister to walk away from the negotiations? The answer is no. What is more, are the public aware of what implications a no-deal outcome would entail? Are businesses fully briefed and fully prepared on what to do? The answers are no, and no again. If the situation does not change at all, in Parliament and in the country, let us imagine that the Prime Minister now took a truly inflexible position. If we reach a point where the EU asks us to choose between being in a customs union and agreeing to an FTA which puts a hard border in the Irish Sea, what option would the Prime Minister have but to sign?

I ask those who balk at this train of thought and refuse to concede to any further negotiations on the basis of the White Paper, claiming it would be a betrayal of the referendum, to confront political reality. The White Paper provides us with the only path to follow. We have only just now begun to confront the choice between parliamentary sovereignty and market access. Let the European Union and ourselves see if, and where, further compromise is necessary—by them and by us. In this long hot summer, cool calm heads are needed. Otherwise, there is a real danger that Yeats’s words will become a reality.

EU Exit: Future Relationship White Paper

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Thursday 12th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

This is concerned with the border between the United Kingdom and the rest of the EU, whether at Dover/Calais or the Northern Ireland/Ireland border. That is principally what we seek to address with these proposals.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend and his colleagues on the White Paper. I entirely agree with the thrust of it, the balance of it and, at long last, that we have grasped the need for compromise and being honest about the challenges that we face. In that spirit, therefore, I urge him and his colleagues to be honest and transparent about the consequences of the compromises contained in the White Paper, specifically about the role of the ECJ. Yesterday afternoon, I received an email from one of our colleagues in the Conservative Party, Mr Brandon Lewis, who said that the plan and proposals at Chequers meant that we would control our laws. It is apparent, when you read paragraph 42 on page 93, that the CJEU—the European Court of Justice—will continue to have a role in the interpretation of the laws and regulations of this country. I urge my noble friend to be honest about that, so that we can go forward together as a country, united and clear about our direction.

[Lord Callanan]

I thank my noble friend for his comments. These judicial areas are complicated, so perhaps I should briefly set out our position for the House. Where we have a common rule book and there is a dispute between the UK and the EU, the Joint Committee, by mutual consent, or an independent arbitration panel will be able to ask the CJEU to give a binding interpretation of a common rule. If we are allowed to participate in EU agencies, the Prime Minister has already said that we will accept the remit of the ECJ in the application of the rules of those agencies, but that is far from the overreaching impact that the ECJ has at the moment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Spicer (Con)]

My Lords, I enter one word of caution. The choice might not be between Parliament and Ministers, but between Ministers and civil servants. To change it to “necessary”, one has to use judgment about that word just as much as the previous one.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I make a small contribution, having been at the birth of the Bill—if one can be a midwife to a Bill. I always saw the purpose of the Bill as delivering the orderly withdrawal of this country from the European Union and ensuring that we have a coherent statute book on the day we leave. I do not want to detain your Lordships, but as I said at Second Reading and as I still believe, it is imperative that we get the balance right between the powers of the Executive and parliamentary sovereignty. As the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, so rightly said and others have commented, if we take the view that the referendum vote was about Parliament taking back control, it hardly seems right that excessive control be given to Ministers of the Crown.

I had many misgivings about this issue, and I am most grateful to noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for sparing the time to talk to me about it. I have considered it. Your Lordships need to consider it in the round—the round being all the other limitations that currently exist on Ministers—and, most importantly, the amendment my noble friend the Minister is making to this point, which I believe addresses many of the concerns. All I ask your Lordships at this point is to consider this: are the Government acting in a reasonable way to ensure they have the powers necessary to deliver a smooth and orderly Brexit? That is the simple question in my mind. I believe that the Minister has moved enough and that he should be given our support. I completely understand the views of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and my noble friend Lord Cormack on this point. I fear we just differ now on how far the Government have moved.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (LD)]

My Lords, I chair the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee of this House. We have been having a lot of conversations with regulators about appropriateness, as the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, has rightly pointed out. But words matter. The distinction in legal terms between “appropriate” and “necessary” is quite profound if you are a regulator—both EU and UK regulators—that has a duty to put in place a workable legal framework. While I completely agree with most of what the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said, and I understand that he rightly wishes to bring power back to Parliament, there are instances where regulators need to adapt and to have legal certainty to adapt.

I will give the House one small example. I should say that I am speaking for myself as the chair of the committee because the committee has not come to a settled view on this, having had discussions very recently. But we are told that the amendment would lead to increased litigation and therefore legal uncertainty in relation to the meaning of “necessary”. This would impact a large number of different areas of financial services regulation. It may be hard to argue that it is strictly “necessary” to extend protections but if, for example, you take securities collateral held within the EU, absent an FTA—if we have to revert to WTO rules—we would need to treat collateral held by UK firms in EU systems in the same way as collateral held by UK firms in systems outside the EU. If you took away discretion from the Minister and you had to define this as “necessary”, you may have to restrict the protection to collateral held in UK systems only. That would put UK firms at a disadvantage.

Finally—this is slightly technical—redenominating values and thresholds from euros to sterling may be appropriate in a UK regime because most UK firms’ balance sheets are denominated in sterling. However, it could be argued that it is not “necessary” to do so ahead of the UK’s exit from the EU. Litigation would take time while the courts determined whether the Minister had acted under “necessary” or “appropriate”, but in financial crises time is not something regulators have at their disposal. I just ask noble Lords to bear that in mind. I have not come to a definitive view myself but it is important to put that on the record.

Brexit: European Council and Commission

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

We are pursuing many of these multilateral agreements in a whole range of areas, including trade agreements, and we are confident that we have enough time to complete those negotiations.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

Perhaps my noble friend could clarify a point from the Statement yesterday. In the Statement, the Prime Minister said that,

“we remain committed to the agreement we reached in December in its entirety”.

A little later, she said, on the Northern Ireland border:

“I have explained that the specific European Commission proposals for that backstop were unacceptable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/3/18; col. 524.]


Which is it: do we accept the agreement in its entirety or do we not?

[Lord Callanan]

I thank my noble friend for his question. The Government are committed to the avoidance of a hard border, including any physical infrastructure or related checks and controls. The UK’s intention is to achieve these objectives through the overall EU-UK relationship. Should this not be possible, the UK would propose specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland.

Brexit: Transition Period

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Wednesday 31st January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

The two main differences, and the reason that we need to construct an implementation period are, first, the ability for us to sign and agree trade deals with third countries, and, secondly, to agree and sign a trade deal with the EU, which is legally impossible as long as we are a member.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I hate to say it but my noble friend continues to refer to this period as an “implementation period”. For there to be an implementation period there needs to be a treaty to implement. Under my reading of Article 50, it is impossible for us to negotiate a treaty during the process of Article 50. We can conclude that only after March 2019. Does my noble friend agree that that is the case and that we should stop using the phrase “implementation period”? It is a transition during which we will negotiate the final treaty.

[Lord Callanan]

I thank my noble friend for his helpful question. As he well knows, Article 50 makes it clear that the withdrawal agreement needs to take account of the future relationship so that we will know the terms of our new partnership with the EU by the time of our exit. This is the basis on which we have to work.