Scotland Bill

Lord Brennan Excerpts

Tuesday 24th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brennan (Lab)]

My Lords, having had the privilege of serving on a board with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, for several years, I recognise his formidable debating skills but today’s was a star performance. As the second English contributor to this debate, I will take an English point of view about much of the content with which we should be concerned. Of the matters raised by the Bill that affect the role and future of the union, of particular importance are governmental structures, finance and potential adverse consequences.

First, on governmental structures, we have three devolved legislatures in this nation and the peoples of those three each have their own Assembly and devolved powers, and therefore their say through that Assembly in the exercise of those powers. The English have none of that. In addition to the fact that we have those three legislatures, each of them has significant differences one from another—sometimes all three the same and sometimes all three different. Now we have yet further changes to compound that: this Bill, giving the greatest powers to a devolved nation, in many ways, in the world; then the draft Wales Bill; and then the Northern Ireland (Welfare Reform) Bill that we will debate this evening. There was also the corporation tax Bill for that devolved legislature a few months ago. It is more and more change, none of it properly interrelated and with no cohesive structure. That is a recipe for a constitutional mess, to put it bluntly. Of course these decisions are political, but they must be responsibly political.

This unhappy state of affairs now frequently attracts the use of the word “asymmetry”. That is a refined, classical Greek word in origin which is extremely useful to describe a state of affairs that it would be embarrassing to describe in plain English. When I looked at the dictionary today, “asymmetry” not only means simple things such as imbalance of power or irregularity but also has one definition that I thought significant: a state of affairs in which there is an uneven distribution to the detriment of one. Which one might that be in the system I just described—Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales or England? Who knows? With this Bill, asymmetry takes on a yet more profound significance. This present state of affairs illustrates a fact we must recognise: there is no constitutional cohesion in the present union and this Bill further compounds that.

I have one final example on this question. There are 13 major powers in this Bill shared between the UK Government and the Scottish Government, including on energy and the like. How are they to be resolved? Under what system of co-operation are the two Governments required to engage? We do not know. The inter-governmental relations programme is as yet undefined on that issue. So let us have a care. We are here to look after the constitution of our country not just, as we should from time to time, to satisfy the devolution wishes of individual parts.

Secondly, on finance, I cannot conceive as a Member of this House passing legislation which involves such a vast tax-raising power without the Bill including the fiscal framework under which that power is to be exercised. It is a negation of parliamentary duty. The present state of affairs—let us look at it in the simplest constitutional terms—requires, first, fiscal sharing by us all; secondly, fiscal responsibility; and, three, fiscal accountability. In my view, those are constitutional principles that should be common to the nation. If in Scotland there comes a time when spending significantly exceeds the tax revenue or borrowing powers are so far exceeded that the Government cannot repay their debt, who is to rescue that position? Who bears the risk? That is a question that I ask of Scotland as of the other three countries in this kingdom. Probably it will be London and the UK Government who bear the risk—the risk of whether, how and when to bail out such a disaster.

Extending the Committee period and giving it an extra day is simply inadequate. This House is not asking for delay; it is asking for the participant Governments to exercise fiscal responsibility and present the results to this House for our decision.

Lastly, I turn to potential adverse consequences—I use the word “potential” because they can be avoided with proper parliamentary and governmental action. On the fiscal framework, an English taxpayer would like to know, as would the Northern Ireland and the Welsh taxpayers, what the liability is of those citizens to a Scotland that might go wrong in financial terms. It is so obvious that it is almost embarrassing to have to state it. Therefore, it is the obligation of all of us to ensure that those citizens receive the same protection as the Scots citizens receive in advancing their devolution.

Next, I turn to the no-detriment principle—and the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, having asked the question, answered it to his own satisfaction. He is waiting for the Minister to give his answer to what is a tough question. How we put into comprehensible and persuasive words that which all the experts say is unworkable is quite a parliamentary challenge, and he deserves our sympathy—but it is a significant point. Who carries the burden is what taxpayers want to know.

The third point is on inter-governmental relations. How is everything going to work? There is no statute and there is a memorandum of understanding affecting the present arrangements, which is being reviewed. Who is reviewing it, and when are they going to report? The Government say that they are going to update it, but when? If we cannot make it work, what is the point of the legislation?

Fourthly, constitutional instability has to be avoided, especially when it concerns England. It is a simple proposition: with 50 million people out of the 60 million, we have to pay attention. English votes for English laws is the barest of beginnings; it is not a conclusion.

Lastly, I was surprised to see a clause such as Clause 68 in a constitutional Bill, creating a Henry VIII power for the Government to present secondary legislation on behalf of themselves and, presumably, the Scottish Government, to this Parliament without the opportunity for us to vote against it. That is astonishing.

We have been told that this measure has to be delivered, and I agree—but it has to be delivered following proper parliamentary process. Haste based on a hasty political vow is not the foundation for sensible legislation; expedition tempered by prudence is. All that the House is asking in many of the speeches heard today is that, in the conduct of this Bill, we get the chance to debate and decide on everything, and then we can say as parliamentarians that it has been delivered.