Brexit: UK-EU Relations (EUC Report)

Lord Boswell of Aynho Excerpts

Monday 2nd July 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Boswell of Aynho]

That this House takes note of the Report from the European Union Committee UK–EU relations after Brexit (17th Report, HL Paper 149).

[Lord Boswell of Aynho (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the House having a few minutes ago considered the repeated Statement on the outcome of the European Council meeting, we now move to our debate on the European Union Committee’s report on UK-EU relations.

It was originally intended that the European Council meeting this past weekend would mark a decisive step forward in the Brexit negotiations. It was to be the meeting at which the withdrawal agreement would be signed off and the outlines of what will become the accompanying political declaration, setting out the framework for future UK-EU relations, would become clear. None of that has happened. I will not labour the point, but the result, as our report points out at paragraph 121, is that we now have only a matter of weeks, in practice, in which to finalise the framework for future UK-EU relations.

Noble Lords’ European Union Committee, which I have the honour to chair, has published more than 30 Brexit-themed reports since the referendum. Perhaps in company with others, we have reached, if not actually passed, the point of Brexit-fatigue, but the fact is that our relationship with the EU matters. It matters economically, it matters to our internal and external security, and it matters culturally and socially, so tonight’s debate could not be more timely. Apart from anything else, it gives us a chance to discuss what we expect from the Government’s forthcoming White Paper, which was originally planned for early June, and is now, we understand, to appear next week following what is widely reported to be a crucial gathering of the Cabinet at Chequers on Friday. I hope the Minister will be able to confirm tonight exactly when the White Paper will be published. I hope also that he will confirm that it will be more than a 150-page wish list or a copy-and-paste exercise merely regurgitating past statements. It has to have some bite.

If there is one point in our report that I would like to emphasise to the House, it is that the Government need to understand that there is no free lunch. If we want to derive benefits from a new relationship with the EU, we will have to pay a price. That may be an economic price—we may have to pay for access to specific agencies or programmes—or it may be a political price—we may need to compromise, for instance on allowing a continuing role for the European Court of Justice or even on free movement—or there may be a trade-off between the two, but there will be a price. That is the nature of any negotiation. You identify the benefits you want to achieve, you work out how much you are prepared to pay, and then you start talking. The greater the benefits, the higher the price you can offer. This applies as much to the EU as it does to the UK. The EU also has much to gain—access to the City of London’s capital markets; tariff-free access to the UK market; the maintenance of supply chains; and, as the Prime Minister rightly emphasised at the European Council, the expertise of our security services—and the EU will also have to pay a price.

I stress to the House that our report does not recommend a particular option for future UK-EU relations, and let me be clear that it is not a covert plea to reverse the referendum result. It is clear in the title of the report we have just issued that that is not our intention. There are different views within the committee, and we would, like Parliament as a whole—indeed, like the nation—find it difficult to agree on a single model. Where we do agree is that, as illustrated in the very simplified graphic on page 18 of our report, there is a continuum where benefits and compromises exist in balance. You cannot have all the benefits without the compromises, as the Government occasionally seem to imagine, nor can you demand all the compromises without offering the benefits, as some of Monsieur Barnier’s speeches sometimes might suggest.

I deliberately emphasise to the House the two-sided nature of the negotiation because, for obvious reasons, our focus in the report is largely on the Government’s approach. That is our job. We are a Select Committee of your Lordships’ House, and our job is to scrutinise the UK Government. I trust that those with analogous roles in Europe, in the European Parliament and in national Parliaments across the EU 27, are doing their jobs with equal vigour, and I will touch on that now.

It is striking that the European Parliament, building on the tightly defined role afforded it by Article 50—the withdrawal provision—has been more constructive and imaginative in its approach to future relations than other European institutions, for example the European Council or the European Commission. Maybe it is because parliamentarians collectively are more sensitive to the realities of people’s daily lives than Governments and civil servants, but whatever the reason, the European Parliament, in defending citizens’ rights, including the rights of UK citizens resident in the EU, and in using the language of partnership through its advocacy of an association agreement, has made a positive contribution, on which I hope we can all build.

As I said a moment ago, time is short. We have a matter of weeks in which to make progress. We need a breakthrough. Both sides need to realise that people’s lives, their security and their prosperity are more important than abstract red lines. I hope that next week’s White Paper will achieve that breakthrough. It will not be easy, and I do not underestimate the difficulty of balancing benefits and costs, particularly when you start to factor in the benefits that the UK could conceivably achieve by not entering into a structured relationship with the EU. This particularly applies in respect of trade, where the economic benefits of entering into a customs union with the EU need to be set against the benefits of negotiating trade agreements with countries outside Europe. While we understand the scale of that challenge, we are clear that the Government’s White Paper will be judged against a number of key principles. These are set out in paragraph 125 of our report and I will briefly run through them. First, will the White Paper focus on achieving real, tangible benefits from our relationship with the EU? We know that we are leaving on 29 March next year, so it is time for a new mindset. What is true of any major project or programme is true of these negotiations: you need to focus on achieving benefits from them.

Secondly, will the White Paper build on areas of mutual UK and EU interest? Those should be the quick wins. Thirdly, will it offer a realistic assessment of the costs and trade-offs that will be required if the benefits are to be achieved? The Government have spent much of the last two years assuring us that they want to retain many of the benefits of EU membership but without sufficiently acknowledging the cost. In the interests of even-handedness, I could say the same about the Opposition. That mindset needs to change.

Fourthly, will the White Paper express an inclusive vision of future UK-EU relations, commanding broad support? The inwardness of much of the discussion that has filled the press in recent months is, frankly, disturbing. Getting agreement within a Cabinet committee, or even within the whole Cabinet, is not enough. The country is deeply divided and simplistic majoritarian arithmetic is not sufficient. It was Daniel Hannan—most definitely not a remainer—who in evidence to us highlighted the narrow margin in the referendum and argued that a nuanced approach was required. There will always be diehards on both sides, but the Government need to set out a vision that appeals to the whole country: those who voted remain as well as those who voted leave.

Lastly, the White Paper needs to use the language of partnership. This is why the European Parliament’s support for an association agreement is welcome. The White Paper needs to reset the tone of the negotiations in order to start rebuilding the trust that has been so eroded in recent months. Then the onus will be on the EU to respond positively. Mr Barnier might disagree but the EU also has its red lines, and it will need to show flexibility. Simply insisting on the indivisibility of the four freedoms will not help the two sides to make progress.

I do not have time now to cover everything in our report. There is the specific and pressing problem of applying the principles of the future relationship to Ireland and Northern Ireland, which we touch on briefly but on which we published a comprehensive report as early as December 2016, and we remain firmly on the case. There are what might appear to be second-order issues that could derail the negotiations, as the recent disagreements over Galileo demonstrate. We also need to defend the interests of the Crown dependencies, Gibraltar and the other overseas territories.

I conclude with a final word from my own experience. No one should regard negotiations of this seriousness and complexity as a pushover but there are dangers in a bunker mentality, which both sides appear to have adopted. There is also a time for openness and even a degree of generosity of spirit. That time is fast approaching. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Boswell of Aynho]

My Lords, I note that we have more or less worn out the light of the summer evening and I think it would be fair to say that this debate largely speaks for itself. Nevertheless, despite the lateness of the hour, I want to make a brief but not, I hope, perfunctory comment about the contributions of colleagues. They have set out so well from the range of their different experiences the complexity and the urgency of addressing this problem. In thanking the speakers in the debate, I thank also colleagues from the EU Select Committee who have not spoken but who have contributed massively to the report, and, indeed our sub-committees which fed into our work and thoughts. Last but in no sense the least, I should like to record the dedicated and immensely professional work of our committee staff. Like everyone else, they are facing an unprecedented workload in these circumstances.

The debate has been a worthwhile exercise, and it would indeed be churlish if I did not add the Minister to my encomium, because he has closely attended to the debate. He has—not all Ministers do these days—stayed firmly on message, which is welcome. He has given us some specific information or confirmed the position on the White Paper. I was interested in his rehearsal and formulation of the association agreement and it was also interesting to have such a long and helpful exposé on security matters. We touched on those and no doubt will wish to return to them. But I will stress to the Minister tonight that the ball is very much in his court and that of the Front Bench to report to their colleagues and make sure that they are aware of the depth of feeling in this place, and in particular the urgency that we attach to the issue.

I offer for nothing one piece of domestic political advice to the Government Front Bench, which I can say now as a non-aligned Peer. The supreme test of statecraft, if at the moment you are looking just at the interests of the United Kingdom, is whether we manage to serve our people wherever they live within the United Kingdom and however they voted in the referendum. It is actually doing a job for people and not adopting any particular theories or interpretations of the past.

I will conclude by making the point that this has never been seen as a unilateral report; it is a call to both sides to get together on the negotiations. In terms of a successful negotiation, you need two to make a positive contribution to success. I would just say in conclusion that the time is fast approaching when it is in the interests of both the United Kingdom and the European Union 27 that we get on with the job: simply, action this day. I beg to move.

Motion agreed.