Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Blair of Boughton and Lord Dear

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my registered interests. I am advised that it is the correct procedure—in view of the hour, it seems a very appropriate procedure—for me to speak only once to introduce my objections to both Clauses 23 and 24. Clause 23 deals with the introduction of a new offence of police corruption and Clause 24 introduces a mandatory whole life term for the murder of a police officer or a prison officer while on duty. I spoke at some length at Second Reading on 30 June and I do not intend to do so again or to rehearse all the arguments I made then. However, it is probably necessary for me to make clear that I regard police corruption as a cancerous evil which is ever present and which I and other noble Lords who were police officers have successfully investigated. Even more directly, I give way to no one in my abhorrence of the murder of a police officer or prison officer while on duty, particularly, but not exclusively, because someone tried to murder me.

Noble Lords speaking in support of removing these clauses from the Bill will make their own points but my first covers them both. Curiously, although they cover significantly different aspects of criminal law, the two clauses are connected by a simple proposition: they are bad law and they are unnecessary law because they are symbolic legislation, which I have heard before in your Lordships’ House is normally a reprehensible idea. The purpose of this proposal is to strike them out. It is, of course, in the nature of a probing amendment which will not be pressed to a Division but it seeks to ask the Minister and, if I may so request, the Front Benches of other parties to explain—I hope, in some detail—why this symbolic legislation should be embraced. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has just spoken of gimmicks; there may be some right here.

As regards Clause 23, I am absolutely certain that there is simply no lacuna. There is simply no gap to be filled between the Bribery Act 2010, some residuary clauses in the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 and the common law offence of misconduct in public office. The Minister has just mentioned other offences in relation to the amendment just moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. That was part of his argument for why that amendment should not pass. Exactly the same position applies in this case. No investigator or prosecutor has ever suggested to me that there is a difficulty in framing a charge in relation to police corruption. Subsection (11) of the clause confirms that by insisting that this legislation does not affect the common law offence of misconduct in public office. If there is no gap in the law, why introduce some new legislation? I think that my noble friend Lord Dear will flesh out a number of other professions to which such a law could equally logically—or perhaps equally illogically—be extended, as I did at Second Reading. However, I should also point out that the offence created by this legislation is exceptionally broadly and loosely drawn and will bring with it pointless investigations and contested trials.

I have heard it said that the clause is being introduced as a response to previously uninvestigated allegations of corruption—there were plenty of previously investigated allegations of corruption—in the case of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence, and to the so-called “plebgate” events. I would only point out to noble Lords on all sides that it is normal to allow such investigations and court cases to come to an end before deciding to legislate further. Mr Ellison QC should now be allowed to finish his investigation; and the contested libel cases—I emphasise the plural—concerning who said what to whom outside 10 Downing Street should be allowed to come to court before judgments are made before introducing this sort of legislation.

Clause 24 is worse—much worse. It is not only unnecessary and populist but genuinely dangerous to the lives of police and prison officers—as I alluded to at Second Reading by quoting the case of Harry Roberts, who is still serving a life term 48 years after the murder of three police officers in 1966. There is simply no evidence of judicial complacency when sentencing those convicted of murdering a police or prison officer on duty.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who has appended his name to this Question on whether Clause 24 should stand part of the Bill, cannot be in his place, but I know that if he were here he would have reflected that, shortly after the abolition of capital punishment in 1965, a number of attempts were made to make an exception by retaining capital punishment for the murder of a police officer. These attempts were always defeated for exactly the same reason that I referred to at Second Reading and shall set out again briefly. If the murderer of a police officer has escaped from the scene, he or she will be aware that if this legislation is passed, he or she, if apprehended, will face life without parole. There is no incentive for him or her to surrender, and no further penalty can be given to him or her for killing more police officers. Why not entrap them? Why not go out in a deluded blaze of glory and take more hated police officers with them? It is “suicide by cop” as it is known. This measure is simply dangerous, unhelpful and totally misguided.

It is interesting only a small number of Back-Benchers are in your Lordships’ House at the moment—all of them former police officers, and all of whom object to this clause for that reason. I should be fascinated to hear why the different political parties support these clauses.

[Lord Dear (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Clause 23, although my comments could equally well apply to Clause 24. I accord entirely with the last remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Blair. I also remind noble Lords of my record in dealing with police corruption and malpractice. I emphasise the fact that I do not in any way diminish the seriousness, importance and reprehensibility of any abuse of office. Any corruption is reprehensible, particularly by those in authority. That of course includes police officers.

As has been said—and I will not go through it in detail—the current law is adequate and all-embracing. It captures all the possible misbehaviour and misconduct of those in public office, including police officers. The proposal does not add one jot to the armoury of offences that prosecutors can deploy. In fact, when reading jurisprudence at university, I well remember it being said that it was a universal truth that repetitious legislation—one offence after another, all dealing with exactly the same principle—was odious. I, too, would be interested if the Minister could tell us why it is such a good idea at the moment.

I notice that Mr Jeremy Wright MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, said:

“The public expect the police to act with honesty and integrity at all times”.

He went on to say that the Government felt that the best way to proceed was,

“to create a new offence of police corruption that applies solely to police officers”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/14; cols. 1020-1.]

He said that this would be alongside the existing, broader common-law offence of misconduct in public office. The new offence in the Bill carries a maximum sentence of 14 years. Misconduct in public office carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The safety net is there.

Police (Complaints and Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Blair of Boughton and Lord Dear

Tuesday 11th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

My Lords, I need to start by saying that I fully support the Bill. However, I have two caveats that I have already outlined to the Minister and to which I hope he will respond in a while. In asking the Minister about these two matters, I am not trying to weaken the Bill but to strengthen it. Put simply, it would be helpful if this House was to demonstrate that it understands that police officers themselves need to believe in the provisions of the Bill. They will best do that if they believe that the provisions are fair.

I was not at Hillsborough; I was not involved in Hillsborough; but I have no illusions about it. I am on record recently as describing in the Times what happened at Hillsborough as appearing,

“to be the most egregious example of deliberate dissimulation in the history of the British police”.

When I read the right reverend Prelate’s report, I felt thoroughly ashamed of my profession. So, like all noble Lords, I wish the IPCC and the future coroner well with all their efforts. I have no illusions about Hillsborough.

However, it is vital to remember that although the Bill is occasioned by Hillsborough and the tragedy and failures there, it is not only about Hillsborough. Until and unless these provisions are repealed, they will provide powers to the IPCC and other organisations working under IPCC supervision that will cover all their investigations now and in future. I need to declare a rather unusual interest: I think I am safe to believe that I am the only Member of your Lordships’ House who has been interviewed by the IPCC as a witness. I have a personal duty to try to help get this matter right for the future. I shall say something briefly about both clauses.

I do not think that there are any noble Lords with a military background currently in the Chamber but if there were, they would recognise something that I am about to say. Servicemen and women are always uneasy at being interviewed by military police. It is the same for serving police officers when faced with people investigating complaints against the police. The powers in Clause 1 compel serving officers to attend as witnesses. We seriously need to distinguish between witnesses and suspects. I am not sure that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dear, about strengthening the idea of cautioning all police witnesses. Remember that all police witnesses if cautioned will be told, “You are not obliged to say anything”. We want them to feel obliged to say something, so we have to distinguish between witnesses and suspects.

[Lord Dear]

I was not saying that all police witnesses should be cautioned, only those who are being interviewed for very serious offences, which is what the Home Office Select Committee said.

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. What I took him to be saying was that all police witnesses in serious cases should be interviewed under caution. Perhaps we can agree to get the definition of that right.

If we are talking about witnesses, it would be extremely unlikely that the Police Federation or any other representative body would be able to provide detailed legal advice to those officers, let alone a lawyer, so they will be going into the interview room accompanied only by a friend. We need to dispel the kind of uneasiness that they will be feeling. My suggestion to the Minister is that, when closing the debate, he makes clear his expectation that police officers being interviewed as witnesses by the IPCC investigators should be given the maximum disclosure of information—that is what proposed new Section 19F(3)(c) should mean.

In no way should a compelled witness have any cause to fear, as he or she enters the interview room, that he or she will be tricked. These are witnesses, not suspects. If they are suspects, they have to be treated differently. If they are witnesses, they must be treated with obvious and visible fairness. Whatever happened at Hillsborough, the men and women now serving in the police service deserve no less than that.

I entirely agree with the purpose of Clause 2. However, some IPCC investigations and those by its predecessor body can be—and have been—very long. Careers are put on hold and the pressure of such an investigation can sit at the back of the mind month after month, year after year. When, after such a long time, the investigation is finished and an officer is exonerated—if he or she is—they are largely entitled to expect that that is and will remain the end of the matter.

I therefore ask the Minister to make clear his expectations of the IPCC that the words “exceptional circumstances” in proposed new Section 28A(1), in relation to opening a closed inquiry, not only mean what they say but refer only to circumstances in which new evidence appears to have arisen or the level of public concern makes it imperative for the case to be reopened. Cases should not be reopened capriciously nor for political advantage. It is not enough for the Minister to emphasise that it is important that IPCC resources are not to be misused in this way. The majority of officers in England and Wales deserve no less than a statement today that fairness to officers is also a consideration.

Putting it bluntly, a police officer—like any other free citizen—has the right to refuse to assist the police in an investigation, but I also believe that any police officer who does so should forfeit the right to be a police officer. I want all police officers to believe that full compliance with the inquiry is their professional duty and I want their predecessors, now retired, to believe that their pride in their previous profession should also make them want to assist the inquiry. To do that, we should try to ensure that the working practices of the IPCC, outlined in this Bill, make fairness clear and obvious. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.