Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Tuesday 27th November 2012 Lords Chamber

The Minister is frowning at me, but I was hoping that he might at least see his way to considering these amendments further. It seems a sensible way forward to have a more appropriate governance structure for such an important role. I beg to move.

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

My Lords, I shall support this amendment simply by reflecting on my own experience. I will be very brief. I served at a senior level, although not as commissioner, in the Metropolitan Police when there was no police authority. I also served when there was a police authority. With respect to the noble Lords who served on that police authority, some of whom are present, I did not always agree with them. However, in terms of strategic principle, to have a senior police officer—as the director-general will be—running a large, complex and controversial law enforcement organisation with no statutory advice from any outside body around him or her is dangerous in the modern age. As the noble Baroness has just said, it is not just dangerous for the director-general; it is dangerous for the Secretary of State.

Let us assume for a moment that the investigation which came to be known as “cash for honours” had occurred at a time when no police authority existed in London. As commissioner, while my service was investigating what had or had not happened inside No. 10 Downing Street—presided over by a Labour Prime Minister—I would have been reporting direct to a Labour Home Secretary, rather than to a more variegated body. The difficulties, temptations, pressures and politics of what that would, or could, have been like are pretty obvious and unpleasant to contemplate. What this amendment is suggesting is not a police authority. I am not at all precious about the detail of some of the appointments laid out in the different clauses; I just believe there is no need to mirror the PCC arrangement so recently announced in this kind of central body.

This amendment is less vital to me than Amendment 14, about counterterrorism functions, to which we will come shortly, but my experience suggests that a board of this sort would be an advantageous addition to the NCA, the director-general and the Secretary of State, and I commend the amendment to the House.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I, too, support this amendment. Having been a member of the police authority to which the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, reported, I confirm that we did not always agree with the views that he put to us or the proposals that he made—but that was a healthy tension; there was a healthy process of governance. When I was chair of that authority, on three separate occasions a proposal was brought to the police authority by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, in his previous incarnation, which was rejected each time, and in the end a modified proposal emerged, which I think was better for London.

That was a relationship of dialogue and openness. What the Government are proposing in the Bill will be very different. There will simply be the director-general, who will report to the Home Secretary, and the Home Secretary will have the powers to set the strategic direction, the general way in which the organisation operates and, of course, have the power to hire and fire. There will be no scrutiny of that, no external validation and no one else sitting round the table—it will be a one-to-one relationship.

One of the fundamental principles of British policing, ever since Sir Robert Peel started the whole process, is that there should not be direct political control of the police service. What we have here is the creation of a potentially incredibly powerful national policing body that will report to a single politician, with no other people sitting around the table when directions and advice are given.

The advantages of my noble friend’s amendment are that it puts a layer between the Home Secretary and the director-general—a governance board—but also that the governance board has several people and interests represented. That does not absolutely prevent political interference because I am sure that the Home Secretary may on occasion phone the director-general and there will be direct dialogue, but it provides a governance structure that is a safeguard against the distortion of operational priorities for political purposes.

The noble Lord, Lord Blair, referred to the difficulties that he might have faced in respect of cash for honours. At the time of that investigation, there was a Labour chair of the police authority—it was not me; that was after my time, although I was still on the police authority—and I know that that Labour chair came under considerable political pressure from Labour Party colleagues about that investigation. Quite properly, he did not intervene on those matters; indeed, he defended the operational decisions of the police. But even had he been minded not to resist that political pressure, he had around him 22 other members of the police authority calling him to account and saying, “Actually, this must be allowed to run its course, right or wrong”. Here, there will just be the Home Secretary relating to the director-general in private, with no one else around the table able to say, “Is this appropriate or not?”.

It is a profoundly dangerous structure. I am sure it is being done for the best of all possible reasons and we will be told how efficient it is. But I have yet to hear anyone say that the SOCA board has been a waste of time, that it has not added value or that it has not improved the governance of the Serious Organised Crime Agency—none of those points has been put.

Instead, we are offered this direct-line relationship between the director-general and the Home Secretary. It is extremely dangerous. Even if the current Home Secretary and her successors have no intention of ever crossing that line and trying to intervene in the operational decision-making of the director-general, they will be open to the allegation that that is precisely what they have done. That weakens the position both of the director-general and of Ministers. For that reason I believe that the Bill’s proposals are profoundly dangerous, and I support my noble friend’s amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

My Lords, I declare my registered interest in policing. Last week, during the debates on the Justice and Security Bill, a number of noble Lords expressed the sentiment that national security is the first duty of government. I agree with that point of view. I put my name to this amendment because I believe that Clause 2 directly affects national security and so, in my view, is more important than any other clause in this section of the Bill.

The Metropolitan Police currently has—and has had for many years—primacy for counterterrorist law enforcement in all parts of the United Kingdom, including Scotland and Wales, although not Northern Ireland. The roles of the commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations—who, by agreement, is the ex-officio chair of the ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee—and of the National Coordinator of Terrorist Investigations, who are all Metropolitan Police officers, are understood and accepted by chief officers of police throughout the land, and by our colleagues in the security services and the Special Forces.

A whole regime of counterterrorist units outside London and national procedures has been developed, including the ceding to the Metropolitan Police of ultimate responsibility for CT executive operations. This is an effective and tried and trusted regime that allows for the transmission of intelligence and decisions about surveillance, interception and arrests to flow from the very local to the global, and vice versa, without crossing organisational boundaries—the curse of arrangements in so many countries, including the United States.

However, along with the noble Baroness, that is not the case that I make today. The decision as to arrangements for counterterrorist policing, including whether they should be passed from the Met to the NCA, is not a matter for the police or even for ex-commissioners of the police, but for Parliament. However, I suggest it should not be done this way. I understand the super-affirmative procedure laid out in Schedule 18, and it has many checks and balances, but it is essentially passive. It does not require debate in depth. The kernel of my argument for deleting this clause is that nothing is more important than national security, and in my lifetime no change more significant than this in the policing arrangements to protect our nation has ever been contemplated. A change in the NCA’s responsibility may be right, but it may not be. Lives—lots of lives—may depend on this piece of legislation. Such a decision deserves primary legislation, to allow the suggestion to be scrutinised, debated and amended by both Houses of Parliament.

Moreover, I am suspicious of the motivation behind such a change even being contemplated. He has been mentioned already in your Lordships’ House today, but from the very moment he entered office in 2008, the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, began to speak to me, as commissioner, and to others, about the anomaly of the police of London having responsibilities outside London; not only for counterterrorism but for investigations in UK overseas dependent territories and the protection of prominent persons, including the Royal Family, wherever that might be. He and his senior advisers wanted those duties removed. The reason for that was not economy, or the security of London, but so that he and his successors had the untrammelled ability to select and dismiss the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police without reference to the Home Secretary, who currently recommends the person to be appointed to that post to Her Majesty the Queen. I do not know where this idea has come from. I do not know whether the current idea is in some sense about tidying up—a conviction on the part of the Government. However, if it has entered government thinking in order to satisfy a mayoral ambition, that would be wrong both in practice and in principle. I would be grateful to be assured by the Minister that such ambition has no place in this legislation.

As I said at the beginning, I am not here arguing the case for the status quo, nor for change, but merely because I know—having spoken to them—that senior police officers who have current responsibility for these matters believe that the maximum public scrutiny should occur of the reasons for and against such a change. They are owed no less. The people who do this have a very dangerous and responsible job. They believe with me that, “It ain’t broke, so it doesn’t need fixing”.

[Lord Condon]

My Lords, I support this amendment. However, I must say at the outset that I am not interested in turf wars between the Metropolitan Police and the new NCA; I am not interested in protecting the status quo or over-arguing that it should remain with the Metropolitan Police. But I am passionately engaged in the constitutional issues which have been set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, in moving the amendment. This is a hugely important matter that deserves primary legislation rather than an affirmative order, however comprehensive that seeks to be. I had the role for seven years of worrying about terrorism nationally. I worked very closely with all the agencies involved here and abroad. History tells us that more than 80% of terrorist incidents in this country happen in London. The fight against terrorism is as much about hearts and minds as it is about laser-like operations to combat terrorism. That hearts and minds approach involves great co-operation with local communities; in the London context, that has involved working with the Islamic community, with the mosques, the schools and the integration of neighbourhood policing in that preventive role. In London, therefore, there is a very inter-connected prevention and detection response to terrorism which has been built up over many years and in response to terrorism which has emerged from all around the world.

As I say, I am not interested in a turf war or in arguing for the status quo. However, this is hugely important for this country. The Constitution Committee has isolated why this is so important and why primary legislation is more desirable than the super-affirmative process. I support the amendment passionately.