Brexit: Devolved Administrations

Lord Bew Excerpts

Thursday 25th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord McInnes, for securing this debate. I listened with great interest to noble Lords who spoke about the thesis of a power grab and the argument in the Scottish and Welsh Administrations.

The tone of the debate has been subtle, conciliatory and very helpful. However, I add for the sake of balance that I think that our Library briefing would have been improved by a reference to the article submitted to the These Islands forum by an Oxford don, D H Robinson, entitled, Continuity, Devolution, and the EU Withdrawal Bill. There is a slight tendency in the briefing for quotes on all aspects of this problem to head off towards the “Oh, woe is me” tone. Therefore, perhaps a moment of balance is required.

Regarding the problems of the missing leg of devolution—the fact that there is no devolution in Northern Ireland—I wish to take up something mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord McInnes, when he referred to the LucidTalk poll. I understand exactly what drove him to comment on that at this time. Like him, I voted remain, largely because I thought that leaving would be destabilising for the union—and indeed, I think that it has been destabilising. But it has not been destabilising in quite the way that the noble Lord suggested on the basis of that poll. What it has done is enrage the most moderate Irish nationalists on both sides of the border. It is indisputably a problem. My fears on that, and my support for remaining in the European Union on that basis, have been entirely justified.

However, there is no weakening in support for the union among its supporters. In the last general election, the pro-EU Ulster Unionist Party took a terrible hit while the share of the vote for the Democratic Unionist Party—the Brexit party—went up markedly. The most reliable poll in Northern Ireland, the Life and Times Survey, taken after the referendum, shows that the numbers of those supporting the union and those opposing it remained more or less where they were previously. The LucidTalk poll asked participants, “What do you feel about a hard Brexit?”. The truth is that every citizen in Northern Ireland believes that a hard Brexit means that when they try to drive to Dublin Airport en route to their holiday in Marbella, they will be stopped by a soldier. If you ask people that question, you will get a response which reflects their nervousness. However, I do not think that that is a very likely proposition. So, if the noble Lord will forgive me, that is my comment on his remarks on the LucidTalk poll.

However, there is a point—already referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, when he talked about paragraph 49 in the progress report—which is now making the return of devolution important. The agreement made between the Prime Minister and the European Union to allow the development of talks includes an ambiguous paragraph. Until now, Stormont has not contributed to the debate on Brexit. My view is that it would have had little to say and that, until now, we have not lost so much because of this problem, but that we will start to lose out very soon unless we get a return of Stormont. That is because in the preferred solution in paragraph 49—which is ambiguous and a fudge—the UK Government promise, in the absence of wider solutions which might otherwise be negotiated, to,

“maintain full alignment … which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement”.

There are big arguments about what that means. As far as I can see there is no common agreement between the UK Government and the European Union about what the word “alignment” means. Some, like Andrew Neil, believe that it is purely local in its significance, for example when it refers to Ireland, while those like the well-known economist David Blanchflower believe that it is a wider understanding between the European Union and the UK. However, there is no doubt or ambiguity about the central role in this formulation of the protection of the 1998 agreement—the Good Friday agreement, which set up Stormont. What is not in doubt is that the heart of the agreement is that the current north-south arrangements, which envisage certain points of harmonisation or alignment, or whatever word you want, by agreement between north and south, will continue and will be the core of a resolution of this question. However, if there is no Stormont, the commitment in paragraph 49 becomes ethereal indeed. There needs to be a working Stormont and there need to be the models of consent and agreement that have developed quite effectively over the last 19 years. The north-south arrangements have been remarkably uncontroversial. However, Stormont needs to be in place for this compromise to have any meaning at all.

I conclude by wishing the new Secretary of State good luck in her work in trying to bring about the return of devolution, because it is now very important. She has some cards. The promise of a reduction in corporation tax for Belfast could be significant, and the great advantage that the Irish Republic has had in this matter is now under threat from the increasing and intense militancy from France, Germany and the European Commission against the Republicans’ tax arrangements. You could also have a more level playing field in the island of Ireland. That must be an attraction for the return of the devolved Assembly.

Even in the event of a failure to negotiate, it is not just a question of saying that the British Government are against joint authority—which they are. The Government must make it clear that they do not have in their mind’s eye any form of future settlement that is a conversation between two Governments but from which unionists are excluded. Although I do not believe—for reasons that we in Westminster are all aware of—that it is in the British Government’s mind’s eye, I do not think that the Irish Government fully understand that. They have to do that for two reasons: first, so that the nationalists do not believe that they can sit on their hands and will then be rewarded by something that they can call joint authority; and secondly, because the unionist community will have to make concessions in areas such as Irish language, and they need to have the confidence to be able to do that.