Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland

Lord Bew Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bew]

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, for securing this debate. She is well known to be a good friend of Northern Ireland and her work in bringing about this debate is yet another example of what a good friend she is to the Province. I, too, should like to recall briefly the struggle to set up the IMC. I very much agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Trimble. The truth of the matter is that the IMC was not enthusiastically received in the early days of debate by the Northern Ireland Office or the Irish Government. It is hard to recall that now because it has been so successful.

I should like to pay tribute in particular to Michael McDowell, a former Nieman fellow at Harvard and recently an official at the World Bank, who from his position in a Washington think tank kept No. 10 Downing Street under siege with regular e-mails arguing vigorously for the establishment of the IMC in the months leading up to its appointment. Today, I was talking to Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s chief of staff at that time, who recalled honestly the weight and significance of Michael McDowell’s constant advocacy. It is important to pay tribute to the work that he put in on that absolutely crucial issue.

Turning to the report itself, I should like it to be understood in your Lordships’ House that the report is not an answer to questions about where Northern Ireland is now and how we move it forward. It is instead an answer to the different question: what was the modus operandi of this body? As the IMC was a unique body, it may be important to describe how it worked. The report is an attempt to answer that question, rather than being in any real sense prescriptive about the future of Northern Ireland, and it is entirely right that that should be and is so. There are a number of conclusions to the report where members of the commission outline what they think are the key lessons.

Perhaps slightly impertinently, I should like to add a further lesson, which one should draw from the experience of the IMC—that is, a willingness to take it on the chin. The degree of criticism and abuse that the IMC received, particularly in the earlier years, was quite remarkable, as well as the strong refusal of many people in Northern Irish society to accept that it could perform a viable role or could be considered to be, in any sense of the word, independent. One of the remarkable things about the report is the way in which it quotes from some of those testimonies, including an article in the Irish News, the leading nationalist newspaper in Belfast, on 29 November 2008, which stated:

“In reality, British intelligence operates through deceit, dishonesty, murder, blackmail, double-crossing, cheating, conniving and downright thuggery. It may sound harsh but there is simply no other way to run an intelligence service. Their use of loyalist paramilitaries and informers beat the PIRA. So the intelligence agencies will tell the IMC whatever it takes to bolster support for the current political administration. That is what intelligence services do, which means that the IMC, and other opinions based on supplied intelligence are effectively worthless”.

That is a common enough comment from this period. It is a mark of the calibre of the IMC and the people who served on it that it reprinted that quote. They took this kind of thing on the chin because that was what they had to do and then carried on with their work in a steady way.

Finally, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, would not mind that we should mention the names of the other members of the commission: Joe Brosnan, of the Department of Justice in Dublin; Dick Kerr, an important figure in American intelligence; and John Grieve, who had such a distinguished career in our police service.