Lord Berkeley of Knighton
Main Page: Lord Berkeley of Knighton (Crossbench - Life peer)Whatever one’s views on wind farms—I confess I am not an enthusiast for them—it is absolutely essential that the process by which permissions are given and projects are undertaken are seen to be fair and take account of all objections and environmental and other interests. This example is about a particular wind farm development in some respects, but it is also about the rule of law and our attitudes to the rule of law.
The fact of the matter is that this whole saga arose because of the Viking project in Shetland, with over 100 turbines, where there was considerable local opposition. The project is being promoted by the Shetland Islands trust, which has got the oil money—and a large number of the trustees are councillors in Shetland—together with Scottish and Southern Energy. They are the people who are promoting this project. There was very considerable local opposition to this project, but the council decided that it was not conflicted, even though the Shetland trust was a party to the development. As a result, there was no public inquiry. The Scottish Ministers in the Scottish Government gave the project the go-ahead. Some local opposition sought judicial review of that decision, which went to the Court of Session, which is the equivalent of the High Court in England.
Former law officer, Lynda Clark, after three months of deliberation and a well argued and clearly very considered opinion, which I have read and is freely available, concluded that this proposal was unlawful because it did not meet, as my noble friend has said, the requirements of Schedule 9 to the Electricity Act 1989, which makes it clear that anyone who is planning on producing a power plant which includes a wind farm should have a licence from Ofgem before planning approval can be granted. When the judge asked the parties to the development who had the necessary consent, none of them had, and the project had to go back to square one.
When I was a Secretary of State—and for as long as I have known—the principle has been that when a judge reaches a conclusion as to the state of the law, that is the law until such time as it is subject to an appeal. What happened next is an absolute scandal. The Scottish Government then decided that they disagreed with the judge in her opinion and that they would go ahead anyway. In a letter signed by Catherine Cacace to John Campbell QC, the Energy Consents and Deployment Unit said:
“Scottish Ministers note that the Court has found that an application for consent under section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 can only be made (and so granted) where the applicant at the time of making the application either holds a licence to generate electricity or is exempt from that requirement”.
It goes on—wait for it:
“Scottish Ministers’ position is that they disagree with, and have appealed, the decision … The decision on the legislative interpretation runs contrary to the established practice relating to the handling of applications for consent which has been in place both north and south of the border for many years … Our intention is therefore to continue to operate in accordance with the practice … and to deal with current applications on that basis”.
In other words, “We will ignore the law”. It goes on to say:
“Scottish Ministers consider that the balance of public and national interest is in favour of continuing with the current approach until the appeal has been determined, in particular because of the need to continue to support the economy and our renewable energy ambitions”.
So their renewable energy ambitions trounce the law of the land. That is very undesirable and unprecedented —as far as I know; I see a noble Lord sitting on the Front Bench who is familiar with both the law and Shetland. I can think of no other case. The normal practice would be to stay any development until such time as an appeal had been considered. What I very strongly object to about the amendment is that it would take away the legal position that has been established for many years, and which has been confirmed by the court, in a retrospective manner. It would create a situation in which any Tom, Dick or Harry could apply for permission to establish a wind farm—or, I guess, any other form of generation. Those tests about their ability to meet environmental and other requirements under the legislation would then be applied to them.
This is an undesirable development, by both the Scottish Government and my noble friends. The proper procedure here would be to at least wait for the appeal. It is certainly quite wrong for the Scottish Government to continue in this way. If you look at it from the point of view of the objectors, they have gone to a judicial review, won their case—and everyone knows how difficult it is to win a case on judicial review—and the Scottish Government are just saying that they are going to ignore that. Should this House to seek to overturn the effect of that judgment, when people are talking in terms of the need to support “our renewable energy ambitions”? Our renewable energy ambitions must carry public consent. This is no way in which to proceed. I have strong objections to the amendment, and I hope that my noble friend will reject it.
My Lords, earlier this evening, I found myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, about transparency. I feel even more strongly about this issue. It seems that we are challenging the rule of law. I know that a lot of people in this country feel that their ability to object to something is often overruled by big business and large amounts of money, and that they do not really have a voice. The Government promoted a Localism Act which is often in conflict with what they wish to see for energy generation.
The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, mentioned an argument which planners are always throwing back at objectors: “Well, they wouldn’t do it if it didn’t make sense and they didn’t know what they were doing”. I repeat: Mammon has a role to play here. The objectors must be allowed to put their point of view. If you are now going to insult them by saying, “We are even going to take judicial review and the law away from you”, where does that leave them?
My Lords, it is some little time since I did applications for power stations in Scotland; the last one was about 35 years ago. However, I have some understanding of the way in which these matters were approached.
As your Lordships know, in order to generate, transmit or supply electricity you must have a licence and there is a pretty good reason for that. Section 36, which my noble friend mentioned, provides for an application for consent to construct or operate a power station. Of course, a wind farm is a generation system which amounts to a power station. In order to operate that you must have a licence, or have an exemption from a licence, usually because the power station you want to operate is very small. It does not seem very strange to require that as a condition for applying for a station. It would seem a little odd that the relevant authorities could grant consent for a station if you were not authorised to operate it. It could happen, I suppose, but it seems a little unlikely. Therefore it is not at all surprising that it is assumed in the definition of the conditions for consent that that would be so.
Schedule 9 to the Electricity Act 1989 is a set of requirements for the protection of the environment, basically, which a person—it is described in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson—who is either a licence holder or exempt for a licence must take account of in his proposals. It is pretty obvious that the proposals are for the construction of a generating station and that you would therefore be a person who would have a licence to operate the generating station if, in fact, it is agreed and consented to by the relevant authority.
The judgment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Clark, which is well reasoned and a little longer than my speech so far, is just to that effect. Schedule 9 starts with the condition that you are either a licence holder or exempt and then you have to ensure that your proposals, in effect, do not damage the amenity, or the environment. That is the crux of this and I find her reasoning rather convincing. In fact, it is what I always understood. As I say, it is a long time since I understood it, but it was my understanding at the time. The last application I made, as it happens, was for Torness power station, which was the last nuclear power station to be built in Scotland and is now coming near its decommissioning. I was under the instruction of the noble Lord, Lord Tombs, who was at that time the chairman of the South of Scotland Electricity Board, whose station it was. Anyway, so far as I have an interest in this matter it is a very aged interest and it has nothing to do with finance or anything of that sort.
In my submission, it seems that what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Clark, who was a law officer in the previous Government, has decided is right. However, it is, of course, subject to appeal and as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, the appeal is to be a reclaiming motion, strictly speaking, in the Scottish terminology, and to be heard by the Inner House of the Court of Session in February. The rule in relation to sub judice does not apply when we are discussing legislation, so we are free to discuss this matter, but I think that the judgment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Clark, is extremely cogent and I will look forward to hearing what happens on appeal. In the mean time, that is the highest assertion of what the law of Scotland is, and, indeed, for that matter, anywhere else where the same rules apply. In the law of Scotland the Supreme Court of Scotland, the Court of Session, has decided that to be the fact. Therefore it is highly undesirable for this House to alter that position at this moment. It seems pretty sensible that before you get consent to erect a power station you should be qualified to operate it. As I said, that is the crux of the decision. I therefore hope that the Government will not accept this amendment, which is not very well placed from the point of view of logicality.