British Sovereignty Protection (Chagos Islands) Bill [HL]

Lord Bellingham Excerpts

Friday 23rd October 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Meyer. Having been married to a former UK Ambassador to Washington, she understands what goes on in Washington. We should all listen carefully to what she said about the American Administration.

I support the Bill wholeheartedly and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Weir, not just on drafting it in a precise, accurate and impressive way, but also on his speech this morning. It encapsulates in very clear legal terms all the issues we have been talking about and are so concerned about. I will not go through all of them, but what the Bill says about sovereignty, the protection of the rights of the Chagossians, including their right to a referendum and, of course, the guarantees for the marine protected area are all incredibly important. But, as other noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, pointed out, the Bill, important though it is, should not be necessary, because the background, obviously, is the wholly discredited treaty: the Chagos surrender Bill.

I had a Question in the House recently, on 13 October, and I put it to the Minister that, first, the opinion that was given by the ICJ was indeed advisory. I also pointed out to her that, under Article 36.2 of the statute of the ICJ, which we helped to draft—her own officials will give her background on that—there was that specific initial exclusion for sovereign disputes between the UK and Commonwealth countries. As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, that was reinforced at a later date.

Under the other case, the UNCLOS case, the then Defence Secretary John Healey said in the House last year—in the first Statement on the treaty, in fact—that there was an imminent and immediate threat to the UK under the UNCLOS tribunal. We have already established very clearly that UNCLOS cannot rule on issues regarding military bases. I asked the Minister, on 13 October, to explain to the House why the Government believe that there is a credible and viable threat to the UK in terms of a binding legal judgment. I would give way to her now if she thinks there is a threat, but it would be very helpful if she can say to the House, when she winds up, that there is no legal threat to the UK whatever. Let us be very clear on that, because I do not think anyone now believes that there is any form of threat whatever.

In her reply, the Minister repeated what she has said many times before: that the previous Conservative Administration went for 11 rounds of negotiations—or maybe 12; I cannot remember—and, somehow, that makes it all the more justifiable that the new Government came in and immediately signed along the treaty terms. I point out to the Minister that the very fact that there were 11 rounds of negotiations leads me to believe that the previous Government, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, in particular, believed that they could not sign the treaty with the terms that were on the table. The terms of that treaty were just not acceptable, so we did not sign it, which is why the negotiations went on and, indeed, why they were paused by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, before the last election.

We have also heard Ministers go on about the UK’s reputation in the global South. I have been privileged enough to have two separate stints at the FCO. I have never heard the phrase “global South” mentioned; I think it is the concoction of a number of NGOs. Presumably, it refers to those countries in sub-Saharan Africa south of the equator. There is an idea that, somehow, if the Minister and her colleagues are doing a trade negotiation with Mozambique, Malawi or Madagascar, they will arrive in Maputo, Lilongwe or Antananarivo to meet their counterparts to sign a treaty and their counterparts will say, “Well done Britain, you’ve signed this treaty with Mauritius; we’re really impressed”. I know those countries pretty well and they do not respect signs of weakness; they respect strength. Frankly, the argument about the global South that was rehearsed many times by the previous Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, does not stack up at all. I hope that the Minister, when she winds up, makes it very clear and reinforces to everyone that there is no legal, credible, viable threat.

A very important part of the Bill is on the whole issue of resettlement. Fairly recently this year, on 16 February, four Chagossians under Misley Mandarin landed on the Île du Coin in the Peros Banhos archipelago. Two days later, two more Chagossians joined them. As we know, the BIOT commissioner launched a case to evict them, but failed in that case. It has now gone to appeal. The Court of Appeal has reserved its judgment; we are awaiting it. Something very interesting has happened in the meantime, because the BIOT commission, based in Diego Garcia, has been supplying the six Chagossians on the Île de Coin. They have set aside, I gather—the Minister can confirm this—£6 million to go on supplying the Chagossians on that island. The Foreign Office started by saying that this was an irresponsible, illegal act, and it deplored it. Now, and I find this commendable, it is supplying them with key provisions to reinforce the supplies that those six Chagossians have. Of course, they have access to plentiful numbers of fish and local crops, such as breadfruit.

It is good news that the Government, in the form of the BIOT commission, are supplying them formally—I applaud that. I understand that there are 42 more Chagossians immediately ready to go to Île du Coin, and there are another 300 who have expressed interest in going. We are moving pretty quickly towards having a viable population on those outer islands that could form a British Overseas Territory. That is something that I think many of us would be extremely pleased to see.

When I was appointed the OTs Minister in 2010, I asked the FCO to commission a feasibility study to look at the resettlement of the outer islands. It commissioned KPMG to do a full report. It came out in 2015, by which stage I had been sacked from the department. The report was very comprehensive. KPMG looked at different scenarios: first, a settlement of 1,500 settlers and, then, another option of 500 or 150. It concluded that it certainly was possible and viable for a settlement to take place in a number of those outer islands. It flagged the cost, which was going to come in at between £10 million and £20 million a year. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, pointed out, that is a tiny amount of money compared with the amount that we have committed, in principle, to give to Mauritius—it is a small sum of money by comparison. Therefore, the whole cost argument goes out of the window.

The other point that KPMG made in its report—I certainly urge the Minister to find a copy of it; maybe a précis of it is in her folder—is that, if the Government puts up this money for supporting this resettlement, there may well be a flow of private sector money coming after it. If there were a sensible programme of restructuring the settlement and making sure that we had a viable, interesting commercial offer to the private sector, I suggest that a lot of private sector money would flow after the money put in by the Government.

Another point raised by KPMG touched on some of the strategic points that have been made already on defence. The report said that settlement on the outer islands could compromise the security of Diego Garcia. This was 15 or 16 years ago, and since then there has been a major reappraisal of the security of the base, because it is now in range of supersonic and hypersonic missiles. Indeed, Iran fired one at Diego Garcia—it fell short. That base is under threat of missile attack from the north, so the obvious place to put systems to counter potential missile strikes is on those islands to the north of Diego Garcia—Île du Coin and the other northern islands. What better way to secure those islands than to have them part of a settled British Overseas Territory?

China has launched a phase of activism in the Indian Ocean. I certainly would not trust Mauritius not to allow Chinese presence on those outer islands. Certainly, if there were any intrusion by a third party through settlements on those islands, that would do far more damage to the future security and safety of the base than anything else that might happen.

I will look at two final points that have cropped up in our discussions this afternoon. One is around sovereignty and the right of Chagossians to have a referendum to decide their future, which is incredibly important. The other is around environmental protection. One of our most important marine protected areas was launched by the then Foreign Secretary David Miliband in 2009, and it is securing an incredibly important part of the UK’s biodiversity. In fact, David Miliband said at the time that 40% of the UK’s total biodiversity is around those islands.

There is also a chance now for this Government to right the wrongs of 1967. Under a previous Labour Government, the Chagossians were evicted; they were taken off those islands, and their dogs and other pets were gassed. I hope that, almost 60 years later, this Government will do two things: accept this Bill and then tear up this totally discredited treaty.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Winterton of Doncaster) (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Weir, on securing this Second Reading debate and bringing forward his Bill. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate for their contributions, which certainly reflect the deeply held views about this issue among noble Lords. I will try to address as many of the points raised as I can in my response.

Before I do that, I will once again set out the vital importance of the base on Diego Garcia. As noble Lords have heard on many occasions, Diego Garcia is a key strategic military asset for both the UK and the US which has protected our shared security for nearly 60 years. The base enables the rapid deployment of operations and forces across the Middle East, east Africa and south Asia, helping the UK to combat some of the most challenging threats we face, including from terrorism and hostile states. Diego Garcia’s unique strategic location grants us real military advantage across the Indo-Pacific. Put simply, the base makes an essential and irreplaceable contribution to keeping the British people safe and protecting our global interests. Many noble Lords have raised the issue of the legal rationale and arguments behind that. I am sure noble Lords will accept that the base has been operating at increasing risk for decades: UK sovereignty has been challenged, and international courts have already made decisions that undermine our position.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

How can an advisory opinion by a court, which can under no circumstances lead to a binding judgment by a court, undermine the security of the base? I do not understand that.

[Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Lab)]

I will come on to address that issue. Let me first return to what I was setting out, which is that, because of the legal position—which, as I say, I will come back to—negotiations were started by the previous Conservative Government. There were 11 rounds of talks, conceding the principle of UK sovereignty and establishing the model of direct payment to Mauritius to lease back Diego Garcia.

When they came to power in 2024, the Labour Government inherited a draft treaty that was close to completion and a political context in which the risk to base operations had never been greater. Nevertheless, the Government were able to secure much stronger provisions in the treaty to protect the base well into the next century. I should say that in drawing this up, the UK and the US worked hand in glove in developing the treaty, and we continue to work together. When the Diego Garcia treaty was signed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer, we had US support. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, said, it is clear that the US, through President Trump, has taken a different view, so we will continue to work together, as has been made clear by both the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister. We need the support of both Mauritius and the US to find a solution that works for everyone.

The noble Lords, Lord Callanan, Lord Lilley, Lord Bellingham and Lord Hannan, asked why we are handing over sovereignty on the basis of a non-binding legal opinion. This is not just about a legal judgment; it is about the long-term safety and security of the UK. The only way to maintain the base safely in the long term is through this agreement. There is no alternative, whereby we just hang on to the base without an agreement. The previous Conservative Government tried to do that under Boris Johnson and when that failed, they started the negotiations.

I accept that there are those who argue that we should ignore the legal challenges, but there is no question that we can do that. Doing nothing is simply not an option and threatens the UK’s safety. Some argue that there are carve-outs and exemptions that the Government have missed. We have heard these arguments before, and I am afraid we have to reject them. On the ICJ exemption, although the 2017 amendment does indeed mean that the International Court of Justice cannot rule on disputes between the UK and Commonwealth countries, this is not the only viable route to a binding judgment and not the one we consider most likely.

With regard to the UNCLOS—