Lord Bates
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Serious Crime Bill [HL]
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Lord Bates
“( ) After that section insert—
“18A Provision of information as to defendant’s interest in property
(1) This section applies if the court—
(a) is considering whether to make a determination under section 10A of the extent of the defendant’s interest in any property, or(b) is deciding what determination to make (if the court has decided to make a determination under that section).In this section “interested person” means a person (other than the defendant) who the court thinks is or may be a person holding an interest in the property. (2) For the purpose of obtaining information to help it in carrying out its functions under section 10A the court may at any time order an interested person to give it information specified in the order.
(3) An order under this section may require all or a specified part of the information to be given in a specified manner and before a specified date.
(4) If an interested person fails without reasonable excuse to comply with an order under this section the court may draw such inference as it believes is appropriate.
(5) Subsection (4) does not affect any power of the court to deal with the person in respect of a failure to comply with an order under this section.
(6) If the prosecutor accepts to any extent an allegation made by an interested person—
(a) in giving information required by an order under this section, or(b) in any other statement given to the court in relation to any matter relevant to a determination under section 10A,the court may treat the acceptance as conclusive of the matters to which it relates.(7) For the purposes of this section an allegation may be accepted in a manner ordered by the court.
(8) If the court makes an order under this section it may at any time vary it by making another one.
(9) No information given by a person under this section is admissible in evidence in proceedings against that person for an offence.””
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, in Committee there was a helpful debate on the provisions in Clauses 1 to 4, which relate to third-party interests in assets subject to a confiscation order. There was general agreement that the current arrangements for considering third-party interests are not sufficiently robust, allowing defendants to drag out and frustrate the enforcement of confiscation orders. The Bill addresses this by bringing forward the determination of third-party interests from the enforcement stage to the confiscation hearing and conferring new powers on the court to make binding determinations as to the extent of any third-party interests.
As part of this process, Clause 2 creates a requirement for the prosecutor to detail any known third-party interest in property associated with the defendant in their statement of information. That includes any interests that the defendant may have in companies, trusts, bank accounts and property. The defendant will then be under a duty to respond to every allegation in the prosecutor’s statement for which information has been supplied and the extent to which each allegation is accepted. Where an allegation is disputed, the defendant must provide full details of any matters relied on.
That is a very wide-ranging power, and the court may order the provision of any information from the prosecutor or the defendant that it believes it requires. The court may then use that information to make a determination at the confiscation stage as to the defendant’s interest in property. In making such a determination, the court will, by extension, also be ruling on the extent of any third-party interests in the relevant assets.
As my noble friend Lord Taylor said in Committee, there was general welcome for the provisions, but the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, questioned whether more could be done to address the problem. Having reflected on the debate, we agree that there is one further step that can usefully be taken further to enhance the court’s powers. Amendments 1 and 14 now provide the court with the power to order an interested person, such as someone making a claim against the defendant’s property, to provide the court with any information that the court believes necessary to determine the defendant’s interest in the property.
Conferring such a power on the courts will further strengthen the provisions to tackle bogus third-party claims. It is unlikely to be necessary for a court to order an individual with a legitimate claim to provide information—it is in that person’s interest to do so on their own initiative. The amendments are, however, aimed at individuals who are attempting to make spurious claims on behalf of—in all likelihood, in collusion with—a defendant to protect an asset from confiscation. Those individuals are unlikely to want to co-operate with the court by providing a witness statement unless compelled to do so. If a person fails without reasonable cause to comply with an order to provide information to a court, it may draw such inference as it believes is appropriate. Thus, for example, if a third party fails to provide information substantiating their alleged interest in property that the prosecution believes is wholly owned by the defendant, the court will be able to draw the conclusion that the property in question is indeed 100% owned by the defendant.
I trust that the House will agree that that represents a sensible addition to the court’s powers to ensure that the effective and timely enforcement of confiscation orders is not deflected by spurious third-party claims.
I will respond to Amendment 4, which is grouped, once the House has had the opportunity to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. For the time being, I beg to move Amendment 1.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, the Proceeds of Crime Act has been inadequately applied. There is no doubt that it could be better dealt with. As far as they go, the Minister’s amendments are to be supported—but they by no means go far enough. As a member of the Joint Committee on the Modern Slavery Bill, I strongly support the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Warner. However, it goes further than that. The Modern Slavery Bill is an important part of getting the proceeds of crime, but all of us in this House want to see criminals dispossessed of their assets. The Proceeds of Crime Act and all of the amendments go further than the Modern Slavery Bill. We do need something.
I am not entirely certain, having listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that we need it in Amendment 4, but we certainly need either this amendment or a very strong undertaking from the Government that—side by side with implementing the government amendments to the Bill—they will consult. If there was a strong commitment to consultation before the Modern Slavery Bill comes in—bearing in mind that it is much broader than the Modern Slavery Bill—I would be content with that. However, if the Government are not going to give a strong commitment, I would find myself supporting Amendment 4.
Lord Bates
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Baroness and also my noble friend for their warm welcome to me in this role. I will do my very best to try to ensure that I answer as fully as possible the very serious points which they made.
I will commence with the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, and to some extent the points raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in relation to the Modern Slavery Bill. As these Bills were drafted and conceived, and as they move through the legislative process, they are seen very much as two parts of an attempt to address the problem of human trafficking and the gangs that seek to profit from that. They also seek to ensure that those gangs are unable to hide away the funds which they amass from the misery they afflict on others. On that we are absolutely united. I would also say to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that we set out a number of points in a detailed letter which was drafted and sent to his noble friend the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, on 7 October. A copy has been placed in the Library but it might be helpful, as part of my response to the debate, if I place some of the remarks from it on the record in this House.
In responding to Amendment 4, let me first say that we share the objective underpinning this amendment— namely, to further strengthen the effectiveness of the asset recovery regime provided for in the Proceeds of Crime Act. It is also worth noting at this point that, under this Government, more than £746 million of criminal assets have been seized through all four current methods of recovery, which in itself is a record amount. I know it is not getting anywhere near to addressing the full scale of the problem but it shows that the law enforcement of the courts is having some effect. Of course we want to do even better. One of the aims of the Government’s serious and organised crime strategy is to crack down on those who do not pay their confiscation orders. As part of this, the criminal finances improvement plan aims to look at ways to improve the recovery of the proceeds of crime.
The amendment calls for consultation on ways to strengthen the legal framework as set out in the Proceeds of Crime Act. Part 1 of this Bill is the product of just such a consultation. It already includes significant reforms to the asset recovery regime. I do not for a moment suggest that these provisions are the last word in terms of changes to POCA—if I may use that acronym for the Proceeds of Crime Act. We remain open to further constructive suggestions, which was very much what the noble Baroness asked us to do. We remain open to suggestions and to having a constructive dialogue over what improvements can be made with, among others, the National Crime Agency, police forces, the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service.
Let me turn to the specific proposals contained in Amendment 4. First, the amendment calls for a change in the test for securing a restraint order. Clause 11 already reduces the legal test for obtaining such an order from “reasonable cause to believe” that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct to “reasonable grounds to suspect”. This was a point that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, also touched upon. That will enable restraint orders to be secured earlier in an investigation. We remain at this stage unpersuaded of the case for removing the requirement to show that there is a real risk that the defendant will dissipate his or her assets. Such a test goes to the heart of the purpose of a restraint order. If there was no such risk, there would be nothing to be gained from seeking a restraint order.
Lord Warner
My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I have a question for him about his answer to me on restraint orders and third parties, which left me extremely puzzled. If he does not have the answer today, perhaps he could write to me. As I understood what he said—and I do not, in any way, disagree with it—restraint orders may well be taken certainly before someone is charged and possibly before they are arrested, because the investigation may give the police and the prosecution reason to believe that the people have considerable assets which may disappear at the point of arrest. However, as I understood him, he then said that it made no sense to make that restraint order deal with dissipation of assets to a third party. If the person does not know that the restraint order has been taken out because they have not been arrested or charged, what is to stop the courts including a provision about dissipation of assets which the person may have or subsequently engage in dissipation of? If the chap or woman does not know they have actually got a restraint order on them, I cannot see at the moment why it should not be drawn more widely to cover dissipation at the point when restraint is introduced. However, the Minister seemed to be saying that was not possible. If I have got it wrong, he can answer me now; if I have not, could he explain what the Home Office lore is on why that does not make sense?
Lord Bates
I will, of course, take very seriously what the noble Lord said. I do not think that was exactly what I said, but I will check the record and clarify it if necessary. The point I was making was that if it was necessary to identify third-party interests at the restraint stage, which Amendment 4 seeks to do, that might alert people who are not unconnected to the person of interest that an investigation is under way. This might damage the prospects of bringing a successful prosecution. I was seeking to make a point of argument rather than a point of law or lore. However, I will read the record and clarify this, if need be, for the noble Lord.
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
“Orders for securing compliance with confiscation order
After section 97A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (inserted by section (2)) insert—15“97B Orders for securing compliance with confiscation order
(1) This section applies where the court makes a confiscation order.
(2) The court may make such order in relation to the accused as it believes is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the confiscation order is effective (a “compliance order”).
(3) The court must consider whether to make a compliance order—
(a) on the making of the confiscation order, and(b) if it does not make a compliance order then, at any later time (while the confiscation order is still in effect) on the application of the prosecutor.(4) In considering whether to make a compliance order, the court must, in particular, consider whether any restriction or prohibition on the accused’s travel outside the United Kingdom ought to be imposed for the purpose mentioned in subsection (2).
(5) The court may discharge or vary a compliance order on an application made by—
(a) the prosecutor;(b) the accused.(6) For the purposes of any appeal or review, a compliance order is a sentence.
“97C Breach of compliance order
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a compliance order has been made in relation to an accused, and(b) it appears to the court that the accused has failed to comply with the compliance order.(2) The court may—
(a) issue a warrant for the accused’s arrest, or(b) issue a citation to the accused requiring the accused to appear before the court. (3) If the accused fails to appear as required by a citation issued under subsection (2)(b), the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
(4) The unified citation provisions (as defined in section 307(1) of the Procedure Act) apply in relation to a citation under subsection (2)(b).
(5) The court must, before considering the alleged failure—
(a) provide the accused with written details of the alleged failure,(b) inform the accused that the accused is entitled to be legally represented, and(c) inform the accused that no answer need be given to the allegation before the accused—(i) has been given an opportunity to take legal advice, or(ii) has indicated that the accused does not wish to take legal advice.(6) If the court is satisfied that the accused has failed without reasonable excuse to comply with the compliance order, the court may—
(a) impose on the accused a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale,(b) revoke the compliance order and impose on the accused a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months,(c) vary the compliance order, or(d) both impose a fine under paragraph (a) and vary the order under paragraph (c).(7) The court may vary the compliance order if the court is satisfied—
(a) that the accused has failed to comply with the order,(b) that the accused had a reasonable excuse for the failure, and(c) that, having regard to the circumstances which have arisen since the order was imposed, it is in the interests of justice to vary the order.(8) Evidence of one witness is sufficient for the purpose of establishing that an accused has failed without reasonable excuse to comply with a compliance order.
“97D Appeals against variation or discharge of compliance orders
The prosecutor or the accused may appeal against a decision of the court under section 97B(5)—(a) to vary or refuse to vary a compliance order, or(b) to discharge or refuse to discharge a compliance order.””
Lord Bates
My Lords, these amendments follow up the debate in Committee on the new offence of participating in the activities of an organised crime group. Noble Lords will recall that in response to various amendments tabled at that stage by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, my noble friend Lord Taylor undertook to consider further the potential for the offence to capture the naive or unwitting participant.
I am pleased to say that discussions between Home Office officials and the Law Society, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and the Local Government Association have continued over the summer. As a result of those deliberations, I have tabled Amendment 20, which is similar but not identical to Amendment 21 put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. Both amendments would change the “reasonable cause to suspect” limb of the mental element of the offence. In Committee, noble Lords were concerned—
Lord Bates
Lord Bates
My Lords, my apologies to the House for the slight mix-up in the order. It is one of the things that happen when you take people out of the Whips’ Office and put them in a departmental office—they forget their day job. We were sharply reminded of it and I am grateful to noble Lords for their patience.
These amendments follow up the debate in Committee on the new offence of participating in the activities of an organised crime group. Noble Lords will recall that, in response to various amendments tabled at that stage by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, my noble friend Lord Taylor undertook to consider further the potential for the offence to capture the naive or unwitting participant. I am pleased to say that discussions between Home Office officials and the Law Society, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and the Local Government Association continued over the summer. As a result of those deliberations, I have tabled Amendment 20, which is similar but not identical to Amendment 21 put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. Both these amendments would change the “reasonable cause to suspect” limb of the mental element of the offence. In Committee, noble Lords were concerned that “reasonable cause to suspect”, as an objective test, could capture the unwitting or naive and that there might be instances where the “reasonable cause to suspect” became clear only with the benefit of hindsight.
In providing for a threshold of “suspects” without qualification, Amendment 21 certainly deals with the concerns about inadvertently capturing the naive or unwitting. By definition, these individuals will genuinely not have suspected, when they took part in the relevant activities, that they were participating in organised criminal activities, even if they had reasonable grounds to do so. But this threshold might also capture the paranoid who suspected that their conduct was contributing to the activities of an organised crime group, despite the fact that there were no reasonable grounds for such suspicion. Amendment 20 therefore also requires the suspicion to be reasonable. This adds an objective test—there were reasonable grounds for the suspicion—to the subjective test that the individual genuinely suspected, and it requires both to be met for the offence to have been committed. It therefore provides some further additional protection against overcriminalisation. The approach in Amendment 20 has been welcomed by the stakeholders whom we consulted over the summer.
I will respond to the other amendments in this group once the House has had an opportunity to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee. For now, I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
I welcome the Government’s response to this. My amendment seeks further clarity on the provision in Clause 44(8) which makes it,
“a defence … to prove that the person’s participation was necessary for a purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime”.
“Necessary” is narrow, which is right, but a,
“purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime”,
seems to me very wide. The example that came to mind at the previous stage was undercover policing, which is a contentious activity, although we heard from a report in the last day or two some good news on how it is conducted.
I am still puzzled about whether the phrase,
“participation … for a purpose related to”,
and not just,
“necessary for … the prevention or detection of crime”,
takes it beyond something that is acceptable. My amendment invites my noble friend to amplify the provision, if he is able to do so.
Lord Bates
I am grateful for the welcome that the amendment has received. I am mindful of the two questions, which I shall do my best to address. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the Bill already provides for a defence when the,
“participation was necessary for a purpose related to the prevention or detection of crime”.
We considered that that, together with raising the threshold for the offence to “reasonably suspects” and a requirement for any prosecution to be in the public interest, provided that additional safeguard. We therefore concluded that the general defence of acting reasonably is unlikely in practice to add any additional protection from overcriminalisation of this offence. However, in the light of particular concerns expressed about the position of the regulated sector specifically, we looked again at the need for a bespoke defence for the regulated sector.
Two aspects of the Proceeds of Crime Act have been raised in this context. The first relates to the obligation that members of the regulated sector have to report money-laundering carried out by another. This aspect is addressed in Amendment 22, which would provide a partial defence that would apply to a member of a regulated sector who took part in activities that he did not know or suspect to be criminal activities as part of an organised crime group. We believe that the additional dimension is there and that it provides a further protection for those who are involved in financial services. I am sure that is why the Law Society, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and the Local Government Association have welcomed the amendment as far as it goes.
On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I covered that in the previous answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, but I will come back to her with more detail in writing if necessary. I beg to move.
Lord Bates
“( ) In subsection (1)—
(a) after “ill-treats” insert “(whether physically or otherwise)”;(b) after “ill-treated” insert “(whether physically or otherwise)”.”
Lord Bates
My Lords, we now turn to the amendments relating to Clause 65, which clarifies and updates the law on child cruelty in Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. We had an informed debate on Clause 65 in Committee, during which a range of issues were raised in relation to Section 1 of the 1933 Act. In responding to that debate, my noble friend Lord Taylor undertook to reflect further on some of those issues over the summer. Having done so, we propose to make two further changes to Section 1.
The first is to clarify that the behaviour necessary to establish the ill treatment limb of the offence can be non-physical. In Committee the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, argued that as well as clarifying that the offence can be committed where the consequences of the behaviour in question are psychological, as Clause 65 already does, further amendments should be made to clarify that the offence can be committed by way of non-physical—for example, emotional—ill treatment and neglect. The Government’s view is that a failure to provide for a child’s emotional needs is beyond the neglect element of the offence, as a result of the House of Lords judgment in R v Sheppard. However, we consider that the ill treatment limb of the offence can relate to non-physical cruelty and Amendment 39 makes this explicit.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, we have come back to a clause that was much debated in Committee. While we very much welcomed Clause 65 and the change to make clear that it is a crime to inflict cruelty which is likely to cause psychological suffering or injury to a child, we also supported amendments tabled at the time by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and called for by various children’s organisations, to further update the offence. As I understand it, those organisations, and indeed we ourselves, welcome the amendments that the Government have tabled and the explanations they have provided.
However, I would like assurances on a couple of issues. First, our original amendment further defined the scope of the offence by adding the words “physically or emotionally ill-treats, physically or emotionally neglects”. As the Minister has said, the Government have now tabled an amendment to clarify that the behaviour necessary to establish the ill-treatment limb of the offence can be non-physical, and we welcome this.
Another change relates to Section 1(2)(b) of the 1933 Act which makes specific provision about liability for the child cruelty offence in circumstances where a child under the age of three has suffocated while in bed with a drunken person. Again, the Government have listened to the Committee amendment and extended the provision to cover circumstances where the person is under the influence of illegal drugs, and it applies also where an adult suffocates an infant while lying next to him or her on any kind of furniture or surface. Again, this is welcome.
The Committee amendment would also have removed the reference to unnecessary suffering, which somehow suggests that the suffering of children may otherwise be necessary, and replaced it with a reference to serious harm. We understand the Government’s concerns that the overall impact of the amendment would be to raise the threshold of unnecessary suffering to serious harm, but we would like to hear more of the Government’s thinking after having given further consideration to the Committee amendment. We would like assurances that the difficulties with the term “unnecessary suffering” will be sufficiently addressed while also making sure that the threshold for harm is not raised.
Finally, the Committee stage would have defined the word “wilful”, which many have criticised as too difficult to interpret. Here, the Minister said that the Government felt that the concerns raised would be best dealt with through guidance rather than by amending the legislation. In the light of that, we would like reassurances on the following points: namely, that the police and others within the criminal justice system will be made fully aware of the change in law so that they understand the impact of psychological abuse; that guidance and directions will directly address the case-law definition of “wilful” to secure absolute clarity, including on the inclusion of “reckless state of mind”; and that that will be communicated to all parties. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide the assurances that I seek.
Lord Bates
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I will seek to answer all the points they have raised as best as I am able. I will be mindful as I do so that I am relatively new to this field, in which many of your Lordships have immense and deep personal knowledge and experience. We therefore want to give that every possible attention and consideration. I will follow no particular order, but will try to follow through some of the points that were raised.
The first point was raised by my noble friend Lady Walmsley, who asked about Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act; in fact the amendment is directed at any person who,
“has responsibility for any child”,
or is otherwise “legally liable to maintain” them. It therefore goes beyond that narrow definition of parental supervision to something much wider: to those who have responsibility for the child.
I turn to the extreme religious practices that were referred to by my noble friends Lady Walmsley and Lady Benjamin, and other noble Lords. As my noble friend Lady Walmsley explained, Amendment 41 seeks to amend Section 1 of the 1933 Act to make it an offence for any person to allege that a child is possessed by evil spirits or has supernatural harmful powers—the unacceptable practice sometimes referred to as “witch branding”. I am aware that my noble friend proposed similar amendments during the passage of last Session’s Children and Families Bill and has been in correspondence with the Department for Education regarding her concerns.
I share my noble friend’s commitment to safeguarding children from this and all other forms of abuse. A belief system can never justify the abuse of a child. We need to ensure that children are not subjected to abuse, or left vulnerable to potential abuse, because someone alleges that they are possessed. However, the Government believe that the current law is sufficient for this purpose. It provides adequate protection for children from the type of abuse that this amendment is trying to prevent. While the existing legislation does not specifically mention communication of a belief that a child is possessed by evil spirits, the current offence of child cruelty already captures ill treatment or other conduct by a parent or carer that is likely to cause a child unnecessary suffering or injury to health.
The Government are amending Section 1 through Clause 65 to make it absolutely clear that physical and psychological suffering or injury is covered by the offence. In addition, we are now making one further clarification in respect of the “ill treatment” limb of the offence to make it explicit that the behaviour amounting to “ill treatment” can be non-physical as well as physical. Those changes will make it even clearer that conduct of the type described by my noble friend’s amendment is capable of being dealt with, as we believe it is, under the Section 1 offence.
Where the conduct in question could not be covered by the offence of child cruelty or is not committed by a parent or carer, it could be caught by other criminal offences depending on the circumstances of the case. I am aware that Department for Education officials had earlier discussed the issues around witch branding with the Crown Prosecution Service, which makes any decision on whether a prosecution should be pursued. I understand that my noble friend has been sent a copy of the CPS guidance for prosecutors; this is an area with which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is also concerned. The guidance illustrates which legislation and which offences could be considered in different circumstances. I believe that it covers all the situations where a child might face potential harm, including those situations where the perpetrators of potential harm are third parties, such as “rogue pastors”.
Our approach should be to ensure that the scope of the current legislation is better understood to ensure that it works as it should. We will certainly engage in conversation with colleagues in the Department for Education and with other officials to do this. We must also raise awareness among the relevant communities and faith groups. That is a very important part of combating this problem: not only catching the offences when they happen but supporting work to raise awareness. I am sure my noble friends are aware that the Department for Education is part of the national working group on the issue, which published an action plan in 2012.
The department is funding two organisations, AFRUCA and the Victoria Climbié Foundation, which work with black and minority ethnic communities on safeguarding issues. In addition, part of the Department for Education grant to Children and Families Across Borders has been used to produce an online application to raise awareness of issues relating to witchcraft and spirit possession, which was launched earlier this year. This issue is an ongoing concern for the Department for Education and the Home Office, and I know that they will value enormously my noble friend’s input into developing an appropriate response.
My eagle-eyed noble friend Lord Swinfen spotted a potential gap in the existing law. The relevant wording is that the person would need to have been in possession of the drug that they had taken and of which they are under the influence. There would need to be evidence that the person was in illegal possession of that drug immediately before taking it. My noble friend highlighted that point and thought that it could be an area that a skilful barrister might be able to argue his way round. That may be the case and we will have to see how it is tested. However, that is the test which is required under existing law.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his welcome of the amendment. He asked about replacing the reference to “wilfully” with the word “recklessly” or defining it as meaning that a person with responsibility for a child foresaw that an act or omission regarding that child would be likely to result in harm, but nonetheless unreasonably took that risk. There is a well established body of case law that sets out the meaning of the term “wilful” in this context. It clearly provides, among other things, that “wilful” already implies an intentional or reckless state of mind.
We are concerned that inserting a definition of “wilfully” into Section 1 of the 1933 Act would risk creating uncertainty in respect of the significant number of other existing offences subject to the “wilful” mental state; for example, the offence of wilfully neglecting a person lacking mental capacity under Section 44 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 being taken forward in the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill. For these reasons, the Government cannot agree to the proposed changes. That said, I reiterate the assurance given by my noble friend Lord Taylor in Committee—namely, that Ministry of Justice officials are liaising with the Department for Education, the Crown Prosecution Service and the police on whether any updates or revisions to the relevant guidance would be necessary to ensure that the effect of Section 1 of the 1933 Act, as amended, including the correct understanding of “wilfully”, is clearly understood and appropriately applied by front-line professionals.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made another point about whether the term “unnecessary” actually needed to be there as some considered it archaic and not relevant to modern times and wished for it to be deleted. Others want to use “serious or significant harm”, with “harm” defined broadly, to include “the impairment of physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development”. It seems to us that the overall impact of such a change would be to raise the threshold of “unnecessary suffering” to “serious harm”.
Lord Rosser
I think I had accepted what the Government had said: if you use the words “serious harm”, it would raise the threshold. However, I asked for assurances that the difficulties with the term “unnecessary suffering” will be sufficiently addressed rather than just being left. I had accepted the Government’s point that if you put in “serious harm” you might end up raising the threshold, but that still does not address the issue of the reference to “unnecessary suffering” with the implication, almost, that there can be such a thing as necessary suffering as far as children are concerned.
Lord Bates
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his clarification of his position, which I certainly accept. In this context, I refer him back to the reassurances given by my noble friend Lord Taylor in Committee, to which I referred previously. That guidance, and the understanding of how the rules should be applied by front-line professionals, will, of course, be taken very seriously indeed. We want to make sure that people understand that thoroughly.
In response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, about the age of 16 or 17, young people aged 16 or over are lawfully able to be married, and are generally deemed capable of living independently of their parents. Those under the age of 16 are generally more vulnerable and dependent on those who care for them. For this reason, we believe it is right that Section 1 of the 1933 Act is focused on protecting persons under the age of 16. I realise that there is a campaign—if I may call it that—or movement that seeks to change that through the UN convention but, at the moment and in this context, we feel that 16 is the right threshold.
I have tried to address most of the points raised by noble Lords in response to my moving the amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Bates
“( ) In subsection (2), in paragraph (b)—
(a) after “to bed” insert “or at any later time before the suffocation”;(b) after “drink” insert “or a prohibited drug”.( ) After that subsection insert—
“(2A) The reference in subsection (2)(b) to the infant being “in bed” with another (“the adult”) includes a reference to the infant lying next to the adult in or on any kind of furniture or surface being used by the adult for the purpose of sleeping (and the reference to the time when the adult “went to bed” is to be read accordingly).
(2B) A drug is a prohibited drug for the purposes of subsection (2)(b) in relation to a person if the person’s possession of the drug immediately before taking it constituted an offence under section 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.””
Lord Rosser
I certainly do not intend to repeat the arguments that have already been made in Committee and on Report in favour of this amendment. As the Minister will well know, in his response in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, accepted that proposals to strengthen the impact of child abduction warning notices had the support of the police, legal experts, representatives of local agencies, young people who had been affected by sexual exploitation, children’s charities and others. The then Minister undertook to consider carefully the benefits of putting these notices on a statutory footing and how such a statutory scheme might operate. He indicated that the Government were committed to examining the case for placing child abduction warning notices on a statutory footing but said that, while the Government may not have completed their review by Report stage, he would update the House on progress. I may have missed a letter but I am not aware of the Government having completed their review.
Among the issues that the then Minister felt needed to be considered were whether it was appropriate for the police to impose an order or injunction, breach of which is a criminal offence; the test for the grant of an order; the prohibitions or restrictions that might be attached to an order; the penalty for breach of an order; and the reference in the amendment requiring a child to have been found two or more times in the company of the person to be made the subject of an order. On these issues, which were raised by the then Minister in Committee, as far as I am aware, we await the Government’s conclusions. I am assured that all those groups and bodies interested in this specific issue are happy to work with the Government to resolve these points.
Lord Bates
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for tabling this amendment and for giving me the opportunity to put on the record some of the developments that have occurred over the summer, since my noble friend Lord Taylor addressed this issue in Committee on 15 July. I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Walmsley on the work of the committee that produced the report. I have had an opportunity to see and to review it. It produced some disturbing material and we need to get that material and that evidence into the policy process. I will set out what we are doing in response in my remarks.
We can all agree that child sexual exploitation is a horrendous crime; the Government are determined to stamp it out. We have seen this from the dreadful events in Rotherham, as highlighted by Professor Alexis Jay’s report, where there were appalling failures by the council, the police and other agencies to protect vulnerable children. We were all sickened to read about the victims in Rotherham and the horrific experiences to which they were subjected. Many have also suffered the injustice of seeing their cries for help ignored and the perpetrators not yet brought to justice. Our priority must be the prosecution of the people behind these disgusting crimes. Where there has been a failure to protect children from abuse, we will expose it and learn from it. I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for again articulating the case for putting child abduction warning notices on a statutory footing. We note that there is support for this position from the police, legal experts, children’s charities and others.
Police forces are tackling child grooming for sexual exploitation. This is clear from the increasing number of these cases before the courts and the significant sentences being handed down to perpetrators. There will always be more to do. The Home Secretary has written to all chief constables to ask them to take on board the lessons from the Jay report into the failings of Rotherham, and from the rolling Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary inspections into how forces are protecting children.
Amendment 42 is an important contribution to this debate. The existing non-statutory child abduction warning notices are issued by the police. That is entirely appropriate where breach of a notice is not, of itself, a criminal offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, reminded us, in Committee, my noble friend Lord Taylor undertook to examine further the case for placing child abduction warning notices on a statutory footing. I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for affording me this opportunity to update the House.
Over the summer, Home Office officials have worked with policing colleagues to examine the issues in more detail. Discussions have taken place with colleagues representing the National Policing Lead for Child Protection, the national policing co-ordinator on child sexual exploitation, the CEOP—Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre—command of the NCA and the College of Policing. While, in some cases there may be merit in the statutory offence of breaching child abduction warning notices, it has become clear through these discussions that the effectiveness of the current system is in its simplicity and non-bureaucratic process. Such notices are intended to disrupt predatory behaviour and stop access to a vulnerable child. They are often a useful step along the path towards more formal orders, and it is suggested that the immediacy of these notices could be inhibited by the need to apply for an order from the court.
Existing non-statutory child abduction warning notices are issued by the police. That is entirely appropriate where breach of a notice is not, of itself, a criminal offence. As my noble friend Lord Taylor indicated in Committee, it would be an unusual step to invest directly in the police—rather than in the court—a power to impose what amounts to a restraint order or an injunction, breach of which is a criminal offence. Compare, for example, restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which are granted by the courts. Other civil preventive orders such as serious crime prevention orders and gang injunctions, which are dealt with elsewhere in the Bill, are also subject to judicial oversight. We will continue to consider carefully with policing colleagues their views on the potential use of a statutory notice and whether, in their view, further changes are required better to protect children.
It is important to note here the wider work taking place across government to protect children. The Home Secretary is chairing meetings with other Secretaries of State to look at what happened in Rotherham. We will consider the findings of Professor Jay’s report and consider what the state at every level should do to prevent this appalling situation happening again. The meetings will build on the existing work of the Home Office-led national group to tackle sexual violence against children and vulnerable people, which is bringing the full range of agencies working in this area together better to protect those at risk and create a victim-focused culture within the police, health and children’s services. In July, the Home Secretary made a Statement about the sexual abuse of children, announcing the establishment of an independent inquiry panel of experts in the law and child protection to consider further whether public bodies and other non-state institutions have taken seriously their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse. The inquiry panel will be chaired by Fiona Woolf.
Given what I said, there is still more work to be done on this issue to find a position that balances the need of police forces to be able to take appropriate, effective and timely action when required and the need for safeguards, including appropriate judicial oversight. On this point, we still need to be convinced that making the change does not affect the simplicity, speed and unbureaucratic nature of the existing process. I hope and expect that we will have completed our consideration of this proposal before the Bill completes its passage through the House of Commons. I will, of course, notify the noble and learned Baroness and other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate of the outcome of our consideration of this issue. Indeed, I would add that, given the level of expertise in this House, it would be extremely useful if interested noble Lords would join me in a discussion with officials and other representatives so that they can see some of the responses we have already had about data, and the number of notices that have been issued and their effect, soon after the conclusion of our deliberations today, and certainly in the next few weeks. That will ensure that we can draw on the input and expertise of this House.
I know that the noble and learned Baroness would have liked to hear something more definitive in my response today, but I ask her to bear with us and accept that the intentions of Her Majesty’s Government are those of all noble Lords: we are absolutely resolute in respect of this heinous crime. I hope that she will agree to withdraw her amendment at this stage.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I thank all those who have taken part in this short debate and the Minister for setting out the thought processes of the Government, together with those who have been advising them. I am not entirely happy, as the Minister would expect. Perhaps I may start by saying that it is not the police in Rotherham who I was talking about because they failed the children. It is the police who do not fail children in other parts of the country and are issuing the child abduction notice who are concerned about its ineffectiveness. That, I think, is the point. I understand the advantages of an immediate notice and I can see that it is a disadvantage that an immediate notice necessarily has a statutory backing. But I wonder if the Minister could take away what I was thinking about while I listened to what he said. It may be that if the notice is immediately disregarded, one ought then to be looking at some sort of statutory notice that would make it a requirement to go to the magistrates’ court because it would be the second time. What you want to do is catch the groomers before they become child abductors and rapists. It is this early stage that the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, and I are particularly concerned about. However, I would welcome the opportunity to take part in any discussions, as I am sure would the noble Baroness—she is nodding—so do please ask us to take part. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.