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English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill Debate
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Main Page: Lord Banner (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Banner's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Grand Committee
Lord Banner
Lord Banner (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 222C is in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Grabiner and Lord Pannick. Noble Lords who participated in the House’s recent consideration of what was then the Planning and Infrastructure Bill will recall that we proposed an amendment to that Bill with a view to addressing the wide-reaching consequences for persons who acquire former public open-space land in light of a Supreme Court decision known as Day: R (on the application of Day) v Shropshire Council [2023] UKSC 8.
To recap, open spaces held by the local authority under the Public Health Act 1875 or the Open Spaces Act 1906 are subject to a statutory trust in favour of the public being given the right to go on to that land for the purpose of recreation. Section 123(2A) of the Local Government Act 1972 provides that the local authority may not dispose of any land consisting or forming part of an open space unless, before it does so, it advertises its intention to sell the land in the local newspaper for two weeks and then considers any objections received in response. Section 123(2B) provides that the sale of the land post-advertisement proceeds free of the statutory trust.
In the Day case, the Supreme Court held that, even when the decision to dispose of open-space land has not been challenged, and even when it was made many years or even decades in the past, a historic failure to comply with the advertisement requirements means that the statutory trust continues to exist and therefore continues to frustrate the beneficial repurposing or redevelopment of the land in question. Crucially, that is the case even if the land was sold in good faith by the local authority to a bona fide purchaser who was completely unaware of any procedural irregularity, even if there remains no dispute that the land was surplus to requirements when it was sold.
That is highly problematic; it means that the land that has been sold on the basis of an unchallenged decision that it is in the public interest to dispose of it—land that now has planning permission for beneficial reuse—is none the less permanently banned by the statutory trust and cannot be put to its intended beneficial use for which planning permission has been granted. Given that the advertising cannot be done retrospectively, the land may be blighted for ever.
This is causing considerable uncertainty in relation to land purchased in good faith from local authorities, sometimes decades ago. The evidence about whether the land in question had or had not been properly advertised prior to sale may no longer be readily available, particularly in historic cases. Land that may very well have been properly advertised is brought within the blight because of this issue, and this is holding up many developments across the country that already have planning permission.
My Lords, I had not realised that the noble Baroness was so much in favour of this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, made reference to consultation. The provision for consultation in the amendment is exceptionally thin and ill-defined. There is nothing here that I would recognise as getting in among the community and finding out what they care about and want. There is no provision for that kind of depth of research, particularly in the context of the issue we are talking about in Wimbledon, where the interests of those who actually live there, as opposed to the neighbouring borough, seem to be ignored entirely. There is nothing in the wording of this amendment to suggest that that will not continue to be the case. If this is an amendment which is to be proceeded with on Report, we will have a large number of amendments to it and a long debate.
Lord Banner (Con)
My Lords, I am thankful for the comments and to all the contributors to this debate. I emphatically endorse the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, that the issue this amendment presents is separate to the wider protections of parks and open spaces that are to be the subject of the review mentioned. The substantive content of the trusts in question, the protections they place on development spaces when the trusts are in force, are unaffected. The law in relation to registered parks and gardens, national parks et cetera are unaffected. Planning policy in relation to open spaces is unaffected. All those matters may be the subject of the future review.
This amendment concerns one issue alone, which is that the Local Government Act 1972 already allows for the relevant trusts to come to an end upon the sale of the land if there is advertisement of two weeks, which is half the level of advertisement that this amendment proposes for the context that we are dealing with. All that we are dealing with here is what happens either when the original sale was not advertised or the evidence is unclear as to whether it was. How do you rectify the situation? The answer is that you double the advertisement later. What possible complaint can there be that there is insufficient consultation of advertisement, when you get twice what the law already provides for to discharge the trust at the time?
I am sure my noble friend’s imagination is broader than that.
Lord Banner (Con)
Can I also clarify that this amendment is not just about Wimbledon, nor was the previous one? They were both fully ranging in relation to all such trusts in question. In light of that, while welcoming the Minister’s support in principle for the amendment, given that there is a degree of contention, I withdraw it now but will bring it back on Report.
English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Banner
Main Page: Lord Banner (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Banner's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Banner
Lord Banner (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 248 is in my name and in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Grabiner and Lord Pannick. Veterans of the early debates on this Bill and on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill last year will be more than familiar with the problem that this amendment seeks to address, but given the prospect of Divisions later and in light of the considerable misapprehensions that have been disseminated by opponents of the amendment, I need briefly to outline what it involves.
Open spaces held by a local authority under the Public Health Act 1875 or the Open Spaces Act 1906 are subject to a statutory trust in favour of the public being given the right to go on to that land for the purpose of recreation. The Local Government Act 1972 provides at Section 123(2A) that the local authority may not dispose of any such land until it advertises its intention to do so in a local newspaper for two weeks and considers any objections received in response to the advertisement. Where that process has been followed, Section 123(2B) provides that the sale of the land post-advertisement then proceeds free of the statutory trust. That is the existing law and there is no controversy about that.
Where the advertising requirements have not been followed, however, the effect of the Supreme Court’s judgment in a case called Day is that the statutory trust continues to exist after the land has been transferred, no matter how long ago that was and notwithstanding the absence of any challenge to the decision to dispose of the land, even if the purchaser was in good faith and was completely oblivious to the issue. Given that the advertising cannot currently be done retrospectively, the land is then permanently blighted by the trust and cannot be repurposed, no matter how strong the public interest in doing so. This issue is causing damaging uncertainty in relation to land purchased from local authorities in good faith, sometimes decades ago, even where the advertising may actually have been done, because in some cases the sale happened so long ago that the evidence about whether the land in question was properly advertised prior to the sale may no longer be readily available. This is holding up many developments across the country that already have planning permission.
The amendment has been wrongly characterised as being only about the high-profile Wimbledon case. That is untrue. Indeed, the All England Lawn Tennis Club recently won its High Court case concerning whether a statutory trust ever existed in the first place over land on which it has planning permission to expand. So, as things currently stand, the amendment is in fact academic for that case. It is, however, of real importance more widely.
The amendment would fill the gap in the current law in relation to any procedure to remedy the situation where the former open-space land has been disposed of without advertisement, and then is permanently blighted by a statutory trust, without there being any corrective mechanism available in the law. It would do so with the necessary safeguards to ensure that, before former open-space land could be released from such a trust, there was an open process in which the public could participate.
In summary, the freehold or leasehold owner of the land in question must apply for a statutory trust discharge order. The application would then be subject to publicity requirements, including site notice and advertising in the local newspaper for four consecutive weeks—double the existing provision for advertisement—which, if complied with at the time of the sale, would mean under the current law that the trust was already extinguished. That would remedy the original failure to advertise, meaning that there was no consultation deficit.
The four-week period having been followed, there would then be a public law decision as to whether or not it was in the public interest to discharge the trust, having regard to all comments received from members of the public, and indeed from any local authority in question that may respond to the consultation. There is provision for regulations that may provide for additional procedural safeguards, including the potential for a public inquiry in some cases if that was judged to be appropriate.
The safeguards would not simply be procedural; they would also be substantive. In deciding whether the public interest test was met, the Secretary of State must have regard to the following: nature conservation, the conservation of the landscape, the protection of public rights of access to the relevant land, the protection of archaeological remains and features of historic interests, development proposals relating to relevant land, and economic, environmental or social benefits that the order would facilitate if made. Only if, having had regard to all those considerations, the Secretary of State was rationally satisfied that it would be in the public interest to discharge any statutory trust may he legally do so. These safeguards would ensure that those statutory trusts that are otiose and serve to frustrate the public interest would no longer blight the land in question following the due process while maintaining any such trusts where there are justified social, environmental or other considerations.
Importantly, the amendment would leave untouched the substantive protections provided for by statutory open-space trusts. All it would do is provide a procedural mechanism for remedying a failure to advertise the disposal of such land.
It is also important to stress that the amendment would leave untouched the planning policy protections for open space. They are set out in paragraph 104 of the National Planning Policy Statement and I outlined them in Committee. It is very difficult to get planning permission under that policy for open-space land, even if it is currently disused and even if it is in private ownership.
Other substantive protections would also be unaffected, such as the law relating to national parks, commons and greens, and public access rights. Given that the substance of this range of protections would be unaffected by the amendment, there is no need for its coming into force or its operation to await or be affected by the promised review of open-space protections.
There are various amendments to my amendments. In the interests of politeness, I am not going to comment on any of them. I beg to move.
Lord Banner (Con)
My Lords, I agree with and endorse the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Grabiner, Lord Pannick and Lord O’Donnell, my noble friend Lord Fuller and the Minister in their responses to the various speeches opposing Amendment 248 or advancing amendments to it. I am very conscious of the hour but I have three short points in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, who suggested that the advertising process may not be appropriate.
First, the principle of advertising is already enshrined in the existing law, as I outlined. It is sufficient to discharge trust if done at the time. There is no basis for criticising the principle of it. Secondly, it is not retrospective—that is wrong—as the statutory trust discharge order would be prospective. Thirdly, the noble Baroness asked what the consequences are. There is one consequence, which is to serve the public interest, for that is the test posed by the amendment.
I can reassure my noble friend Lord Lucas that I shall buy every single strawberry that I consume for the rest of my life. With all that in mind and for the reasons I have already given, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 248.