Israel: Gaza

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Monday 23rd March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

Yes, my Lords.

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

My Lords, is it not clear that the Prime Minister, Mr Netanyahu, has now received a mandate for his statements that there would be no two-state solution agreed on his watch? If Her Majesty’s Government insist on their approach of finding a two-state solution, that will require the recognition of a Palestinian state, including Gaza and the West Bank, without the agreement of the incoming Israeli Government.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, as I mentioned earlier, Mr Netanyahu is in the process of forming a Government. He has made it clear that he wants a sustainable, peaceful, two-state solution, and there will be great pressure on him to achieve exactly that, including from this Government.

Russia

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

My Lords, like other noble Lords I thank my noble friend Lady Falkner of Margravine for tabling this debate. I will also say a word of appreciation for the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. She and I came into this House on the same day, 5 November 1996—an auspicious day to come into such a place. I have always found her contribution to your Lordships’ House something to be admired and appreciated. I know that, in her new position, that will not change.

It would be perfectly possible for me, as in previous debates on Russia, to speak about the human rights abuses, the lack of democracy and the totalitarianism of Mr Putin’s approach, and to criticise—indeed, condemn—it. However, those issues have already been aired in the debate, perhaps most notably by my noble friend Lady Falkner in her excellent introductory remarks. I am not sure that for me simply to repeat that would take us very much further forward. Nor would it give us very much guidance as to what we might do—not in our tactical approach to this dilemma but in our strategic approach to these large questions.

My noble friends Lady Williams and Lord Howell have pointed up some strategic dilemmas for this country which we must face, however unappetising they may be. Since the end of the Cold War, much of our strategy has been dependent upon maintaining our relationship with the United States of America and playing as full a role as possible in the developing European Union. The dilemma is that as the United States maintains a posture that is still to some extent informed by the Cold War and its increasing focus upon Asia—but also, sadly, by an increased retrenchment as it is decreasingly able to impose its authority upon many areas of the world for economic, political and military reasons—the European Union has signally failed to develop a common foreign or security policy. With the frankly naive notion that the extension of democracy would be welcomed everywhere it went, the European Union has extended into the east and has brought with it the cover not of a European security policy but of NATO. We all know that, were it not for the United States, there would be no NATO. The European Union countries have no capacity to project force or protect themselves without the United States of America. So far as Russia is concerned, as far as the European Union extends itself, NATO comes behind as the only realistic defender.

Ukraine is not just a buffer state to Russia. An extension of European Union relationships, treaties and involvement is seen as an extension of NATO. Ukraine also has many of the manufacturing units of Russia’s military capacity. Many Ukrainian factories still produce the materials that the old Soviets used. For that to become part of the orbit not just of the European Union but of NATO is wholly unacceptable not just to Mr Putin but much more widely in Russia.

We need to appreciate that notions that the extension of democracy, the European Union and all that we hold dear will be welcome is foolish and naive. Naiveté in these matters is often dangerous. While we are right to hold our critique, we must realise that we have miscalculated and misunderstood what the Russian reaction was likely to be, not only on Crimea and Ukraine but also on Syria. The result has already been nothing short of catastrophic for the whole of the Middle East, where the structures of stability have dissolved completely. We would do well to listen to the wise words of my noble friend Lord Howell, and take time to reflect rather than feel that we can jump to an immediate resolution to a vexing problem, which will be faced not only by us and our children but by our grandchildren, too.

Palestine: Recognition

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Wednesday 15th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness.

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

Do Her Majesty’s Government understand that many people not just in the region but in this country and, increasingly, in Israel itself believe that the only way to save a two-state solution, if it is not already too late, is to recognise a Palestinian state immediately, and that without that Her Majesty’s Government unintentionally may be contributing to the intractability of the problem rather than its resolution by giving a veto to one side through their policy on recognition?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, I understand my noble friend’s strength of feeling. I also understand that there is a lot of public concern and, indeed, more than interest—rather, engagement—in all of this. However, one has to say that the Middle East process itself has not failed; it proceeds. Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas continue to say that they are committed to a two-state solution. That is the way forward, whereas this country recognising Palestine now would not achieve anything. It would not remove the occupation or give everyone the opportunity to do what we need to do now, which is to focus on the people of Gaza and the rebuilding of it.

Palestine

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Wednesday 16th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

My Lords, we welcome the formation of a new interim technocratic Government for the Occupied Palestinian Territories. We feel that reuniting Gaza and the West Bank under a Government committed to peace is a necessary condition for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We have to be positive at all times; when we find a partner that agrees to the quartet principles, we should see it as a genuine partner for peace.

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

My Lords, I very much welcome my noble friend’s announcement of the British Government’s approach, which appears to chime with the approach of the Obama Administration. However, part of the agreement is that there should be subsequent elections in the Palestinian Territories. Is my noble friend further prepared to recognise that the outcome of those democratic elections, if they are held in a free and fair manner, should also be respected, and that whatever Government or Governments emerge from that should continue to be part of any negotiating process?

Libya: Arms to the IRA

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Tuesday 25th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

I thank the noble Lord for having given me the opportunity to discuss the matter with him briefly yesterday. I know that he has been involved in this matter for much longer than I have. As he is aware, the Minister with responsibility for Libya has written to him, informing him that we are currently assessing all these matters, including the very specific ones to which he referred. I was involved in discussions on this matter earlier this week. I assure him that we will write to him in due course to provide much more clarity on the issue. The Government’s position has been, and will continue to be, that we want to develop a sustainable and effective partnership with Libya to enable us to resolve all issues, including that of the horrendous terrorism which resulted in huge tragedy for individual families.

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

My Lords, the previous Government set up a small unit in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to facilitate the discussions that the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, and others were having to try to address this question not just in respect of specific victims in Northern Ireland but of economic benefit for the whole of the United Kingdom from the Libyan sovereign fund. We now have even more to offer than at the time of Gaddafi, when we could offer economic co-operation in exchange for reparations. Now, there is the opportunity to help rebuild civic society, democratic structures and the proper administration of justice in Libya. We have much to offer the Libyan Government. I trust that my noble friend will look again at the revitalising of that small unit in the FCO to facilitate these kinds of discussions.

[Baroness Warsi]

As the noble Lord will be aware, some progress was made in relation to this matter at a time when Gaddafi was coming in from the cold, as it were. The noble Lord will be aware—as will other noble Lords—that Libya has been through a horrendously difficult period in its history. There has been huge change in Libya and there have been two national transitional Governments. Only two weeks ago, there was a further change in the leadership at the top, with Prime Minister Zeidan standing down, marking another transitional period in Libya’s history. We are working with Libya while it is going through this incredibly difficult period, but I will bear in mind the noble Lord’s comments.

Ukraine

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister had to leave for a few minutes and just spoke to me. Even in her absence, I want to pay tribute to her opening speech, which was extremely helpful and certainly laid down the approach that the Government are understandably taking.

Many other noble Lords in this debate have pointed out that what the President of Russia is doing is at worst illegal but certainly running roughshod over the wishes of people and the security and stability of the wider region. I would not add very much to the debate if I simply repeated those kinds of sentiments. Instead, I will take a different approach but I want to make very clear in doing so that, while I seek to understand some of the mistakes that we have made in the West and some of the understandings that Mr Putin and his colleagues have in the East, I do it not in any sense to excuse what he is doing but because, if we do not understand it a little better, we may continue to make even worse misjudgments than we have done to date. I rather suspect that some noble Lords will find some of the things I say uncomfortable and maybe even disagreeable, including colleagues on my own Benches.

First, it is extremely important for us to be clear about the difference between tactics and strategy. We are debating the question of Ukraine and the particular situation with Crimea. This is about a tactic of Mr Putin’s, not a strategy. The strategy is a wider issue. I have not heard much being said—except perhaps by the noble Lord, Lord Soley—about the wider approach that Mr Putin is taking and what drives him. I will come back to that in a minute.

On the tactical question of Ukraine and Crimea, we need to be very honest with ourselves. For example, when noble Lords say that it is for the people of Ukraine to decide their future democratically, it is manifestly clear that the people of Ukraine are not of one mind. The problem is that they are absolutely split down the middle, so democracy as we talk about it simply will not work. That is part of the reason we have this problem. It is not going to work, so let us not use phrases like that, which might be very reassuring in this Chamber but are meaningless in the real world outside. One of my noble friends talked about how important it is to be responsible in this Chamber because things that are said here might do damage outside. There might be some element of truth there but, frankly, I do not think many people in Russia listen to this Chamber. It has very little relevance to most of them and the way they see things. The influence it has is modest in our own country and even more modest more widely.

I heard a lot said—very sensibly, rationally and thoughtfully—about the economic issues and the energy drivers. Those are not the things that drive people in situations of conflict—otherwise we would never get into wars. In wars, everybody loses: economically, socially and in every other way. Wars do not come about because of some kind of weighing up of the calculus of economic benefit. When I listened to a number of things said about energy, trade and economic sanctions, my first thought was that that will not make any difference to Mr Putin and his colleagues because they do not make judgments on that basis. They make judgments on the basis that they believe that their great country has been humiliated and set aside by the West for a long period and they are trying—successfully —to fight back against that. That is the driver, not the economy.

The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, was, as always, excellent. One thing that he pointed out was the interconnectedness of everything. He has often rightly drawn our attention to that. That makes it very difficult to make economic sanctions work, because there are always ways around them, especially if you have an enormous country and other countries, including other members of the Security Council, prepared to play ball with you.

Let us look at the attitude of Mr Putin. It is always important to know your enemy to understand what you are dealing with. When we talk about the war in Afghanistan, we think about our intervention when we were there—at least, the most recent one. Russians think of the previous Afghanistan war, the one in which we backed the mujaheddin, sending huge amounts of weapons and materiel—and backing Osama bin Laden, of course—in order to get them out, one of the last great humiliations at the end of the Cold War. I may be wrong, but I perceive that Mr Putin is riding on the back of a nationalist tiger and saying, “We’re going to put this right in various places”. I could see it in the quartet dealing with the Israel-Palestinian problem when, for all the loud talk coming from the UN, the EU and the United States about who would talk to whom, Russia was happily talking to Hamas and Hezbollah all the way through. They just ignored what the other three said.

When we came to Syria, particularly after the intervention in Libya, it was absolutely clear from the beginning that Mr Putin was saying, “This is my red line. And, by the way, I am going to stick with mine. Now let us see what you do with yours”. What did we do? We drew lines in the sand, which is very convenient because you can always draw more lines in the sand and rub the other one out with your foot. The same mistake has been made with regard to Crimea: saying that this or that will never happen. I do not think it will be much reassurance to say that we stuck to our view in regard to the Baltic states and, three generations later, they got their freedom. That will not be much reassurance either to people in the Baltics now or to anyone else who might reasonably be fearful. Why? Because now we do not make much of a difference.

I come to the European Union. I am a strong supporter of the European Union, but I remember many arguments with some of my Liberal colleagues over the question of widening or deepening the Union. In my view, you could either deepen it and make it a real political Union—at that stage, I was very keen to do that and have a Europe of the regions rather than a Europe of nation states, and I still think that it may well have been possible—or you could widen it and make it in effect a glorified free trade area. My belief was that if you tried to do both, you would make for disaster, and I think that that is what has happened. We will not talk about the economic aspects of it, but the political aspects are that we have allowed the further widening of the European Union and encouraged others to join it because we saw it as a democratisation of the east and of the south of Europe and beyond, but at the same time many of us who supported that were talking about the importance of developing a foreign and security policy and a defence posture. How on earth could that have been seen by Russia as anything other than bringing forward military, foreign and security policy closer and closer to its borders? Was it ever going to be accepted?

[Lord Lea of Crondall]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but if you take the case of Serbia and Kosovo—and it is true of many countries, surely—the Copenhagen criteria and other criteria, including the economic criteria for joining the EU, have been prized and highly sought after. That is not just skin deep; that is strategic—to use the noble Lord’s word—thinking. I ask the noble Lord to reflect on this idea that widening has had no real impact and not been a proper function of the European Union. I disagreed with Jacques Delors on this very point: I believe that widening and deepening have actually gone together.

[Lord Alderdice]

My Lords, that is precisely the problem which I am identifying. If we try to widen it out to states that Russia sees as being within its purview and at the same time insist that what we want is not merely a trading bloc but a political union with a common foreign and security policy, and with defence implications down the line, how could Russia see that other than as more than an economic free-trade and democratic area? It could only be perceived as a threat. We are reaping some of the problems of that approach.

We are at a dangerous place if we become more aggressive and at a dangerous place if we do not. I am reminded a little of the problem that I perceive in the policy that some of my noble friends on these Benches have espoused regarding nuclear weapons. The approach that is recommended by some says, “We won’t actually send out submarines with weapons on them unless there is a threat. We’ll keep them going out and end our continuous at-sea deterrence”. So if we find a situation now where these submarines are supposedly out and there is a threat—in a few months’ time there might be a greater threat, possibly on the Baltics or possibly somewhere else—at what point do we judge that the danger is sufficient to bring them back and put in the weapons? Is it now? Is it in a month’s time? Are we already too late? If you do that, would it not increase the militarisation of a problem that we already believe we should be de-escalating? We are in a serious problem and there is no easy answer to the dilemma that we are in.

However, I am persuaded that we need to look seriously at our strategic defence posture. I do not believe that what we have at the moment, which was largely defined on budgetary issues after the last election, is serving the purpose of seriously understanding how we deal with the chaos in the wider Middle East, across the north of Africa and below it and, increasingly, in eastern Europe. These are questions which this Chamber needs to come back and explore fully and thoughtfully because they are strategic threats, which we can ignore until the time when they come back to haunt us. Some of our friends, brothers and sisters closer to Russia, are already finding the past coming back to haunt them.

Syria and the Middle East

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Thursday 27th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alderdice]

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for obtaining this debate and for introducing it with such a helpful scan of Syria, the Middle East and north Africa. I draw to the House’s attention my registered interests in the region, particularly in trying to deal with conflict in the region.

Many noble Lords have picked on a number of particular countries in which they have a special interest or concern. That is a very appropriate thing to do in the context of this debate, but I shall take a line directed by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. He pointed out the need for us to have a clearer strategic approach to understanding the problems of this region. While it is true that the same thing is not happening in every country in the region, something is nevertheless happening in the broader region and we need to understand it. We need to evolve and develop our own way of addressing the problems.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, has directed us to three issues: Iran, when he said that he hoped our Government and others would maintain some progress and momentum in dealing with the nuclear question; relationships with Saudi Arabia; and containing the Syrian problem. I shall start with the last of those issues.

From the very start I cautioned against any kind of military intervention in Syria. I said that it seemed to me that the internal problems were not amenable to our engagement and resolution and that what was critical was to try, in so far as possible, to limit the spread of the developing disorder and chaos. Part of the process of doing that is to try to give support to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey—a front-line country which has been mentioned a few times in this debate but which has perhaps not received as much attention as it deserves as a NATO ally that has engaged very thoughtfully in this situation. The Government have put a substantial amount of money, time and effort into giving support, perhaps particularly in Lebanon and Jordan but also in Turkey. We had the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey here a week or so ago and he welcomed the assistance that has been given. This is very important. It is one of the positive and constructive things we can continue to do and where we can continue to give a lead.

I am afraid that when the question of military engagement arose the Government seemed to jump with much too great an alacrity to agree despite the bad experiences that we have had with it over some time. Why was that? I have the impression that “engagement” seems to be seen in military and force terms, and that much of our foreign policy seems to be a matter of “Let’s see what our American colleagues say and give them as much support as possible”. In fact, on some issues—particularly the Israel-Palestine question—that is the answer I have received when I asked officials at the Foreign Office what precisely is our policy. “We will wait and see what John Kerry says, we will wait and see what happens, and then we will support it”. Of course one wants to support one’s friends, but you are not a terribly useful friend if the only thing you have to say is, “I agree with Nick”. It is really rather important to say, “I hear what you say and I am sympathetic to it but here’s another perspective”. When it came to dealing with problems in my part of the United Kingdom, our friends in the United States were perfectly capable of taking a very different line from Her Majesty’s Government and, in the end, helpfully so.

Therefore the notion that one might take a slightly different view or have another perspective is not an unhelpful thing; frequently it is a very helpful thing. We should inevitably have a different perspective from the United States, not least, of course, because of our long history in many of these regions, especially the Middle East itself; but particularly because the United States is coming as the only superpower and we are coming from a very different perspective of having limited power, but substantial understanding. At least, that was the case in the past.

What kind of perspective can we bring and what kind of strategic approach can we increasingly develop? The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, talked about Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other. He and other noble Lords have indicated also that these are not allies; that in fact they see themselves very much as competitors for hegemony in the region and also, incidentally, with Turkey. If we are going to maintain relationships with both of them, perhaps we can make a useful contribution. It has been mentioned that Russia is the only member of the P5+1 that has relationships with both sides in the Syrian context and therefore has a very special role.

That is the first lesson we need to learn in our strategic approach: that it is important for us to maintain channels of communication with as many sides as possible in all these problems. It is not helpful for us to line up behind one side or the other—and not only because we frequently appear, ultimately, to pick the wrong side, although that is a good reason in itself. If you are not a real powerhouse, then the power you can bring is your capacity for relationship and communication. A great deal can be achieved if we can use the relationships we have had in the past and others that we develop as time goes on in order to play a particularly useful role. We have fallen down on that. I hope that the Minister will be able to encourage us that the increased investment of money and resources in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will help us increase our communication with all sides. That will mean taking political risks and having more political openness.

The second thing is to deepen our knowledge and understanding of many of these areas. Before I came to this area of work, a quarter of a century or so ago, I harboured the notion that our Foreign Office was far and away the most knowledgeable, understanding and sophisticated organisation of its kind anywhere in the world. However, the more I got involved and the more time passed, the more I found myself becoming rather disappointed. I found that it was increasingly inward-looking and not frightfully interested in advice, understanding or experience from others outside the service itself, including from parliamentarians, and that because of that it developed a kind of groupthink about what was actually happening that frequently was not very well informed by understanding.

I will give noble Lords an example. There has been an assumption for quite a long time—although we are not of course the only country that makes this mistake—that when engaging in countries that have conflicts going on in them, it is key to identify the social and economic drivers because those countries are rational actors, operating in their own best interest. That is simply nonsense. They are devoted actors, frequently acting in ways that are not in their best social and economic interests. The more deeply they are embroiled in conflict, the more they act not on social, economic and power values, but on what one might describe as sacred values. I do not mean religious values, but values that transcend best social and economic interest. There is lots of research in this area to show that that is not just some kind of airy-fairy notion; it can be measured and described and it affects the way we act. For example, in a situation of that kind the notion from outside would be, “Put some more money in and that will help to oil the wheels”. Not only does that not help the situation, it frequently makes it worse—first, because people react very badly when the things that are important to them are couched in monetary terms; and secondly, because frequently all you do is increase or even create a context of corruption, as there is a whole lot more money around than people can properly cope with.

It seems that we have a capacity to use historic understandings and relationships and a devotion to these kinds of issues that will deepen our understanding—and understanding is one of the things that this country can bring to the party. The noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench knows well how much British counsel, in its deepening of understandings, has frequently helped us to understand these things and engage in a much more constructive way.

The third element, with which I will finish, is that we need to come with a capacity to learn from others in our engagement with them. For example, in working with folks in Tunisia I was struck by the remarks of Sheikh Ghannouchi from the Muslim Brotherhood, who said that you cannot create a democracy simply by having elected structures if you do not have a culture of democracy and a culture that develops all that is necessary for liberal democracy. He is right, yet for decades we have very rapidly brought in institutions based on our experience, and are surprised when the whole thing falls to pieces.

The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, referred to the Enlightenment. That was not a light that was switched on and which suddenly enlightened us, but something that took not just decades but centuries of painful emergence. Perhaps that tells us something about what is happening in that region. However, we also ought to be prepared to learn not only how it really is in some other places but how it might be better for us. There are things about the way in which we deal with our economy in which we depend entirely on monetary values. In some of those countries they are trying to develop an economics based more on community values. We cannot only contribute; we can also learn, not just in the context of this debate but in our engagement with those who are living in such terrible circumstances.

North Korea

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Wednesday 18th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Lord may well be aware that Chang Song-thaek was closely involved with China. At the time of the execution, China issued a statement but said that it was an internal matter for North Korea to deal with. The noble Lord is right that this is an incredibly unpredictable regime. We engage with human rights in North Korea in so far as we can, but he will also be aware that North Korea has refused to engage in any form of meaningful dialogue on human rights.

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, has regularly and rightly brought our attention to this matter in terms of the internal implications within North Korea. However, I think that the situation is now coming to the point where the whole Korean peninsula is at risk and there are wider elements. Did the Prime Minister in his engagement with the Chinese raise this wider question of whether the problems within North Korea are now in danger of spilling into the wider peninsula and perhaps even beyond?

[Baroness Warsi]

My noble friend will be aware that there are six-party talks which deal with the issue of the wider peninsula, which involve China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US and North Korea. We are not a party to those talks but we feel that that is the best forum to take some of these discussions forward.

Afghanistan: Women’s Rights

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

My Lords, we are indebted to the noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson of Abinger, for bringing this matter to our attention. Our involvement in Afghanistan over the past number of years gives this country an especial responsibility. It is often not difficult to convince people that when things are bad they should engage. However, we must always be extremely careful that when we disengage we do not leave a situation which rebounds into something which is worse than before we got involved. One of the first principles one teaches young doctors is: first, do no harm. One of the great dangers is that we have raised the expectations of democrats in general and women in particular in Afghanistan. There is a real danger of a reaction against that, and those who followed our lead and took our encouragement being the ones who will suffer most.

One of the great anxieties for many people is that, despite the change in political institutions, the resilience of an old culture is so strong that it may overwhelm all the achievements that there have been. As the noble Baroness has pointed out, there are some things which have improved significantly: political engagement by women, even at a relatively senior level, albeit in smaller numbers than one would like to see; political involvement through elections; and, of course, education, which the noble Baroness also mentioned. Recently, when the UN Women deputy executive director for policy and programme, John Hendra, visited one of the governorships, the governor there pointed out that 12 years ago there were two girls in school in the 12 schools in his governorship, and now there were 10,000; and in the country as a whole, that number approaches 3 million, as the noble Baroness has said.

These are positive things. In fact, they are essential if there is going to be further development. At the same time, however, we are very much aware of the high level of violence; not just the almost traditional, tragically cultural, violence that there has been, but very specifically targeted killings of, for example, senior female journalists and government officials. That makes it quite clear that any woman who speaks out or stands up is regarded as a target for those who want to turn things back and attack the position of women. This is a serious problem and the question for us must be what we can do.

The noble Baroness has pointed out that, as a donor Government we have some, albeit perhaps modest, leverage. That is one of the reasons I was rather disappointed in reading the last monthly monitoring report to which I had access, that of October 2013. Although there is mention of political and educational issues, both very positive, there is very little else about what DfID and our other government departments are doing in support of organisations which are protecting the rights of women.

Almost more troubling to me was the account of the trilateral meeting in Downing Street on 29 October, where the Prime Minister met President Karzai of Afghanistan and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. Pakistan is not a country that has particularly distinguished itself as a protector of women—absolutely the contrary in recent times. So I ask myself why we are not engaging more with India. There have been difficulties and some horrific incidents in India recently, but the people, the politicians and the Government of India regard those as dreadful aberrations that must be stopped, which is a very different thing from those countries that regard them as culturally congruent.

This neglect of India as a key partner is something that goes right back to the beginning of the engagement. I remember talking to both senior American security officials and senior Indian army officials about whether we had consulted India in any way before the invasion of Afghanistan. The answer was that we never even thought about it. Here is our ally, with 1 million men under arms, just across from Afghanistan, which could make a real difference and have real leverage; but we do not seem to be engaging with it. When we leave, we may have some little leverage and involvement, but India will be there. Can the Minister say what we are doing to engage not just with Pakistan—which is perfectly reasonable and appropriate—but with India to ensure that, in the region, there is leverage there to ensure some maintenance of the possibilities for democracy in general and the position of women in particular? India, as a country, at least recognises the importance of this matter even if it does not always have a perfect record—no country does, I suppose—in dealing with these kinds of questions.

I have a real fear that that any improvements we achieve in Afghanistan and some of the other places where we have intervened may be short lived. It is not just that we might return to the status quo ante but that there might even be a reaction against them. Along with the noble Baroness, I seek reassurance from the Minister about our involvement with those who are likely to have positions of responsibility—not just those who are currently in government but those in the Taliban. Those of us who were advising engagement with the latter some years ago were told it was a nonsense, but of course in the end it was an inevitability, not a nonsense. We should try to find some way of ensuring that they understand that, if their country is to benefit as part of the community of nations, it must measure up to some of these important requirements that the community of nations now rightly recognises, in particular on the position of women.

Syria

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Tuesday 8th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Lord raises an important point but I need to be clear on this issue. There are two parts to what has been discussed over recent months, on the political track. The Government have always been clear that the matter will be resolved politically, but the specific incident relating to chemical weapons and on which the will of Parliament was listened to was a separate situation. Noble Lords would accept and agree that the Assad regime’s now voluntary destruction of deadly weapons in the form of chemical weapons is an important step that has vindicated the threat of military action by the United States. We would not be in this position if the Assad regime did not anticipate that some military action would be taken.

[Lord Alderdice (LD)]

My Lords, the position, as I understand it, of Her Majesty’s Government, the American Administration and our ally, Turkey, has been from the start that any settlement would involve the removal of Mr Assad as President. Given the UNSC decision, does the noble Baroness accept that if he proceeds to dismantle chemical weapons and thus obey the one institution that the UN Security Council has agreed, it may be difficult to sustain that position?

[Baroness Warsi]

The Geneva communiqué clearly says that there should be a transition Government with full executive powers, which, among other things, will reflect the will of the majority of people in Syria. It is not for us to set those preconditions but we cannot anticipate a situation in which Assad remaining would be conducive to a settlement that would be acceptable to the people of Syria.