(12 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the change in position made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, between Committee and today regarding allowing Parliament to discuss the prosecution code without it being incorporated in a statutory instrument. It might help the Director of Public Prosecutions, the director of the Serious Fraud Office and the prosecuting authorities generally to have the views of Parliament expressed in a debate in Parliament before the code is finally adopted.
My Lords, Amendments 116DA and 116DB revisit an issue that we considered in Committee: namely, parliamentary scrutiny of a code of practice for prosecutors to support the DPA scheme. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, the issue has changed somewhat. In providing for a code of practice for prosecutors in relation to DPAs, the Government have been clear that the intention is to ensure consistency with other statutory provisions relating to guidance for prosecutors on operational matters. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to HSBC and the related US experience. As has been said previously, the DPA is a new addition to the UK system, and we will be looking to apply it at a future point. However, for now the Government’s position has been made clear.
The code of practice for DPAs, in the same way as the code for Crown prosecutors, will provide guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in making decisions and on key procedural and operational matters concerning DPAs. The independence of prosecutors is fundamental to the effective operation of DPAs. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate for the code for DPAs to be issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud Office. The Government have absolute confidence in the directors.
I hear what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay mentioned in support of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. However, the Government do not consider it necessary to make the code subject to parliamentary scrutiny. As DPAs become enshrined in UK law, I am sure that we will return to these issues. Indeed, the opportunity remains for any noble Lord to raise this issue through appropriate parliamentary procedures, be they QSDs or any other.
The approach to publication of the code provided in the schedule is wholly consistent with that under Sections 9 and 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 in respect of the code for Crown prosecutors. The code of practice for DPAs, both the first and any future versions, will be provided to the Attorney-General by way of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ annual report, and he will in turn lay it before Parliament. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not raise any concerns about this proposed approach for the code of practice. The code is an operational document that needs to be responsive to the context in which it operates. The proposed amendments would, in particular, restrict the directors’ ability to amend or update the code as necessary to reflect timely changes in the law or lessons learnt having utilised the DPA process. The key elements of a DPA are clearly set out in the Bill. The code of practice will support the operation of the process, and the directors have committed to consult on its contents.
Amendment 119A would introduce a new and very broad basis for corporate criminal liability. Currently, there is a statutory basis for dealing with specific offending on the part of corporate bodies, for example, statutory provisions exist for dealing with corporate manslaughter, bribery and regulatory offending, such as health and safety rules. There is, however, no legislation which expressly creates general criminal liability for companies. Wider corporate liability is founded upon common law rules which attribute liability to a corporate body where the conduct is on the part of the directors, officers and those who occupy roles at the corporate centre. However, reliance is often placed on individual liability where there are many punishments and sanctions available to deal with economic or financial wrongdoing. This is, to a degree, due to the fact that corporate prosecutions are much more difficult and complicated than individual prosecutions and furthermore cases often involve lengthy and costly investigations.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, also referred to this point in relation to the Bribery Act 2010. The extent to which the current law of corporate criminal liability can be improved upon by employing the new “failure to prevent” formulation incorporated in the Bribery Act 2010—which the noble Lord’s amendment seeks loosely to emulate—is a matter for long-term examination. As I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, appreciates, the Bribery Act has been in force for less than 18 months. It is appropriate to allow the provision in the Act to bed down before we examine the extent to which the formulation could be usefully rolled out into other areas. However, I assure the House that the Government are committed to ensuring that investigators, prosecutors and the courts have the right tools to address financial and economic crime effectively, as is evidenced by Schedule 17.
DPAs have been specifically designed to ensure that corporate bodies are held responsible for alleged financial or economic wrongdoing on their part by providing an alternative means of disposal and a broader scope of sanctions. We remain satisfied that it is correct for the Government to focus on offering an additional route for holding to account organisations that are willing to engage in the process or otherwise face prosecution rather than on the basis of the liability itself. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, also asked me to speculate on any level about the Sentencing Council and what it may arrive at. I am sure he appreciates that it would be totally inappropriate for me to speculate in that regard. In light of my explanations, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will withdraw his amendment.