Short-Term Holiday Lets

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Monday 8th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Earl raises an important point about consultation. The regulations, when they are issued, will be subject to an affirmative order. In developing the guidelines and the subsequent regulations, we are working very closely with London local authorities to ensure that all the points and concerns that they raise are covered.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

I am not sure that the Minister has answered my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours’s question. The Minister referred to anti-social behaviour measures and said that they were for persistent bad behaviour. How does this apply in a short-term let of two weeks, four weeks or even a month?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

If the noble Lord so desires, I can write to him in detail about the full provisions of the Act, which I am sure he knows well—I think that he participated in the legislation. The Act also provides for community triggers, for example. This will for the first time give victims and communities the right to require agencies to deal with persistent anti-social behaviour. I am quite happy to provide chapter and verse on those orders to the noble Lord.

Stephen Ward

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Thursday 16th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I have great respect for the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy. If certain records are held for another 100 years or so, may God grant him a long life.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

I do not think that the Minister has really answered my noble friend Lord Richard’s question. We are talking about evidence that was given in public, and the Government—the archives—now hold material relating to that, possibly transcripts of it. For some reason, a decision has been taken that, because of sensitivity, these cannot now be rereleased to the public. What are the criteria for deciding why something which is already in the public domain should be suppressed in the future?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, the Government have considered the published guidance. Indeed, the Information Commissioner’s Office has also given guidance that the disclosure of any personal data still will breach the data protection principles, even after that has been disclosed in an open court. Having considered this guidance and the relevant information, the Government have decided—I have made that quite clear—not to release the partial records of witness evidence at this time.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Again, I totally understand and respect the noble Baroness’s position. She is correct in saying that, often, the people who may be forced into a marriage would be unaware of the situation. The point she raised about parents is also well made. However, as the legislation stands, they would not have given their “full” consent, which means that they had the capacity to give that consent. I see that the noble Lord wishes to speak.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

The point here is not the consent but whether coercion has taken place. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, put it very clearly: for an offence to be committed, both paragraphs (a) and (b) have to apply. It is not a question of whether consent has been given or not under paragraph (b) but a question of whether or not there has been coercion. This will not necessarily be coercion. It may simply be suggestion, which I do not think counts as coercion. The context is that you have to do both (a) and (b), so there has to be either the use of “violence” and “threats”—which does not necessarily have to happen—

“or any other form of coercion”.

However, this will not necessarily be coercion. I will carry on explaining the point to allow assistance to come from the Box. It is an extremely important issue.

There is the question of coercion, which leads to somebody entering into a marriage, and the question of consent. I think we all agree that people with limited capacity will not be able to give consent. However, that, in itself, does not create an offence, because they may not have been coerced. A highly suggestible person with learning difficulties may simply have been told, “This is going to be nice, you are going to enjoy this and this is going to be fun. So-and-so is going to look after you and take you to the cinema”. I do not know what the form of suggestion might be, or how it might be put, but that is the context in which it would happen. It is not the same as coercion—that is the difficulty. As far as I can tell—the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, put it very clearly—you need both coercion and the failure to consent before you have committed an offence. That is why my noble friend Lady Thornton’s amendment is so important.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their interventions and will return to that point before I conclude my comments. The point is well made and understood, but I will continue while I await clarification. My understanding on this issue is that any person taking part in a marriage would have to give their consent. The view is that, if no consent is given, it would not be deemed to be a valid contract. However, as I said, I will clarify that point in a moment.

I turn to Amendments 87A and 87B tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tonge. I shall explain that these amendments relate to the process by which a young person aged 16 or 17 may consent to the marriage. Following the Committee stage, I have had the opportunity to meet the noble Baroness and I welcome the opportunity again to discuss this important issue today. These amendments would make it an offence for the parent or guardian to consent to a marriage of a person or persons before the age of 18 unless the written consent of both parties to the marriage has been obtained. The offence would also extend to marriages contracted outside the UK.

I understand that the noble Baroness is concerned that under the current law parents may give consent to force marriage on a 16 or 17 year-old who may not wish to marry. However, I do not believe this amendment is necessary because the law already provides adequate safeguards for children who are aged 16 to 17 and are entering into marriages.

The law in England and Wales, as contained in Section 2 of the Marriage Act 1949, provides that if a marriage, be it civil or religious, is solemnized and either or both of the parties is under the age of 16 that marriage will be void. If the child is aged 16 or 17, Section 3 of the Marriage Act 1949 requires the consent of the child’s parents or guardians, unless the child is a widow or a widower.

I appreciate that Amendment 87A seeks to add additional safeguards to the current law rather than preventing the marriage of 16 and 17 year-olds outright. However, I consider that the additional need for the written consent of parties is unnecessary. If any person is forced into a marriage without their consent, the provisions in this Bill which will make it a criminal offence to seek to force someone to marry will apply regardless of the age of the party concerned. In addition, any forced marriage would be voidable under Section 12(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 on grounds of lack of valid consent.

If someone is being forced into marriage, it is foreseeable that they could be forced to provide written consent. Therefore, I do not believe that this provision would achieve the noble Baroness’s desired effect of preventing forced marriages. However, I understand totally the noble Baroness’s concerns and I share her desire to ensure that we do everything we can to protect 16 and 17 year-olds—as well as others—from forced marriage. In regard to the points made by the noble Baroness, I will keep the provisions in the Bill under review and, as we have previously discussed, consider the issue of how the legislation is currently drafted to see whether there is something more that we can return to at Third Reading.

Turning to the application of such a provision to marriages contracted outside the United Kingdom, there is no legislation in England and Wales on this issue and matters of recognition of such marriages in England and Wales are for the courts to determine. However, I consider that the courts already have the necessary powers to provide adequate safeguards for children entering into marriages outside the UK. Generally speaking, the validity of a marriage contracted outside the UK will be governed by the law of the country in which it was contracted. However, if there were questions as to the capacity or age of one or both parties to such a marriage, the courts in England and Wales could refuse to recognise the marriage for the purposes of England and Wales law.

I therefore consider that the need for the written consent of parties is unnecessary in respect of marriages contracted outside the UK. We also do not believe that applying this sort of provision to marriages contracted outside the UK would be practical or appropriate. For example it would, in our view, be extremely difficult to enforce.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 87B, which seeks to make identical provision to Amendment 87A in respect of Scotland. This is a devolved issue, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, underlined.

Perhaps I may turn to the issue just raised on Section 109. The Forced Marriage Unit carried out a full review of the cases dealt with in relation to victims with learning disabilities and mental health issues and could not find any cases in which there was no element of coercion. Where there is an element of coercion, we do not wish to criminalise the behaviour concerned. Rather, the appropriate recourse is for the individual to apply to the court for the marriage to be declared void under Section 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Wednesday 4th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I suggest that between Committee and Report I meet my noble friend to address her specific concerns, which I hope will help with clarity and understanding at the next stage.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

Does the noble Baroness agree that it might be helpful if the Minister, in writing to her, sets out a precise list of what is required and explains why it would not be possible for that list to be laid in regulations so that it is clear what information is being referred to? The way in which it is written at the moment seems extraordinarily broad.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I agree with that. I was going to press my noble friend a little on whether the Information Commissioner has been consulted. I hoped that there might be time for inspiration to flow across half the length of the Chamber but I do not think that it has.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Monday 25th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, but if the desire is to give all this freedom to local authorities, I am still not clear why Clause 56 is needed at all. As has been pointed out, Clause 55(8)(c) states, “must … specify the period”, so you cannot just say, “We’ll just whack it in and see what happens”, and Clause 57 allows for variation. While I am on my feet and so as not to interrupt later, in case the Minister does not have the answer in his notes, I would be interested in his response to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, as to the objection to changing “must” to “may” in Clause 56(5), so that there might be a less onerous process for the renewal of orders.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I never object to any noble Lord interjecting and asking questions. I have sought to explain why a defined period is specified in Clause 56. I shall certainly take back the suggestion on this matter made by my noble friend Lord Faulks and speak to officials. However, Clause 56 provides a key link through from Clause 55 to Clause 57 and sets out quite specifically the details behind the order. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee on the understanding that I will further consider Amendment 55A.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Tuesday 12th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Freedom charity. I apologise to the Committee for not being present for the earlier part of our discussions on these topics due to a commitment at the Department of Health.

This is an important principle. If the Minister is planning to respond by saying that the issue is adequately covered either in the clauses we have before us or elsewhere in legislation, I urge him to think again before giving the Committee that response. It needs to be made absolutely explicit that a forced marriage is not valid where there is any question at all that the person being coerced into marriage and who has entered into it does not have capacity. That capacity may be related to age—elsewhere in our legislation there has been all sorts of discussion about capacity and age, and some of the girls concerned are of a very young age—or it may be related to learning difficulties of various sorts. We therefore need to make it absolutely explicit in the legislation that this is intended to cover those circumstances where the individual concerned does not have capacity.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for her amendment. I also thank my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece and the noble Lord for their contributions. The noble Lord alluded to the Freedom charity, which carries out notable work in this field, and I acknowledge his work and engagement in that arena.

Marriage without consent or the capacity to consent is totally unacceptable. Clause 108 specifies that an offence is committed if the perpetrator uses coercion and believes, or ought reasonably to believe, that their conduct may cause another person to enter the marriage without free and full consent. A person who lacks capacity to enter into marriage is incapable of providing free and full consent to marriage. In the cases that have come to the attention of the Forced Marriage Unit, some form of coercion has invariably been involved in forcing a person who lacks capacity to consent to a marriage. The new offences would therefore cover this behaviour.

Although I totally understand the noble Baroness’s concerns and those of other noble Lords, the definition of the new offences in Clause 108 already captures in practice the types of cases intended to be covered by this amendment. I take on board the point that the noble Lord made about looking specifically at this issue. Certainly, between Committee and Report we will look at the issue once again in the context of Clause 108. However, I assure noble Lords that Clause 108 is intended to capture that particular element. Marriage is voidable under Section 12(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 on the grounds that,

“either party to the marriage did not validly consent to it, whether in consequence of duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind or otherwise”.

The issue was also raised of a vulnerable person getting a decree of nullity. The procedure to do so is available and a person can apply for a decree of nullity by filing a petition at any time after the marriage ceremony. If the application is not opposed, there is unlikely to be a court hearing and the person will not have to attend court. Following the petition, the court will issue a decree nisi and, following this, the applicant can apply for a decree absolute. The Family Procedure Rules make provision to ensure that these matters are straightforward for unrepresented applicants. However, having said all that, I fully acknowledge the points made by noble Lords about the special circumstances that they have mentioned. Having explained the scope of Clause 108, I hope that the noble Baroness is minded to withdraw her amendment.