Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Ahmad of Wimbledon
Main Page: Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and other noble Lords who spoke in this brief debate. In addition—to depart from my notes—for the first time I welcome the new Deputy Chairman of Committees to his position. It is certainly the first time for me stand at the Dispatch Box with him in his place.
From the outset I agree—I made this point clear in various debates at both Second Reading and in Committee—on the need for proper parliamentary oversight of sanctions regimes and I recognise the importance that noble Lords attach to this. That has been made very clear to me during Committee. Amendments 73 and 74 would require the draft affirmative procedure to be used for any non-UN sanctions regimes. As noble Lords know, the UK, through the European Union, imposes a number of sanctions regimes and measures that do not derive from the United Nations. These include, for example, sanctions against Russia over its illegal annexation of Crimea, and sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria.
In the future, it is likely—indeed, highly probable—that the UK would want to join its allies in imposing sanctions in circumstances where UN agreement is not possible. The noble Baroness, Lady Northover, talked about Ministers deciding. No, it would be Parliament deciding, requiring that these sanctions regimes come into effect only after the approval of both Houses of Parliament. In that way it would significantly undermine their effectiveness and make it harder for the UK to impose sanctions at the same time as international partners. Future targets of sanctions would be given forewarning of their designation, which would enable them to move their assets out of the UK and take other steps to nullify the effect of sanctions. This would undermine the credibility of sanctions as a foreign policy tool.
The Bill provides instead that the made-affirmative procedure, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, acknowledged, should be used for non-UN sanctions to ensure that measures have immediate effect, while still requiring the approval of both Houses within 28 days. This strikes the right balance between enabling the Government to act decisively and ensuring accountability to Parliament.
Amendment 75 would require the draft affirmative procedure for any regulations that suspend, revoke or amend existing sanctions. As the Bill stands, regulations that suspend sanctions are subject to the negative procedure. This is to ensure that they can be used flexibly to recognise an improvement in behaviour while maintaining a credible threat that sanctions would immediately be re-imposed in the event of backsliding. This approach has been used to good effect as part of international diplomacy—for example, in the context of the Iran nuclear deal. If the Government were unable to suspend sanctions without waiting for the express approval of Parliament, it would reduce our ability to swiftly deploy these options in support of foreign policy goals.
In addition, as suspension of sanctions has the effect of reducing restrictions on individuals, we do not consider that it requires the higher level of scrutiny required to introduce such restrictions by imposing non-UN sanctions.
As regards regulations to revoke or amend sanctions, the Bill provides that this may be done using the same procedure as was used to create the regulations in the first place. Regimes containing UN-mandated sanctions would be revoked or amended by the negative procedure, and UK-autonomous sanctions by the made-affirmative procedure. I do not see a reason why the revocation or amendment of sanctions regimes should require greater scrutiny than their creation.
Amendment 75A intends to require the draft affirmative procedure for all sanctions regulations that contain enforcement provisions as set out in Clause 16. I acknowledge that we debated Clause 16 on the first day in Committee. I listened carefully to the concerns expressed about the creation of criminal offences through secondary legislation. We are looking at and reflecting on these concerns.
Let me may say a word or two about the process we currently follow as an EU member state and what we envisage following the enactment of the Bill. For each of the current UN and EU sanctions regimes we currently implement through EU law, the UK has created the relevant criminal penalties through statutory instruments made under the negative procedure. Similarly, we expect that all the sanctions regulations created under this Bill will include enforcement provisions of some kind. We envisage one regulation for each country, setting out the purpose of the sanctions, the specific measures being imposed, and the corresponding prohibitions and offences.
This approach allows a degree of nuance when determining penalties. For example, a breach of sanctions that results in nuclear material being made available to North Korea is obviously very serious, whereas failing to supply information to the relevant authority might attract a less severe penalty. Each regime is different, meaning different offences and penalties might be appropriate. This principle was accepted by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Given that all sanctions regulations will include enforcement provisions, this amendment would require the use of the draft affirmative procedure in all cases, both UN and non-UN. For the reasons I have set out, we believe the correct approach is negative procedures for regulations containing UN sanctions and made-affirmative for UK-autonomous sanctions.
The use of the draft affirmative procedure for UN sanctions regulations would mean that we would routinely breach our obligation to implement the relevant asset freezes “without delay”. Noble Lords may be aware that Part 8 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017—approved by this House—contains specific powers designed to bridge the sometimes lengthy gap between the adoption of measures by the UN Security Council and the entry into force of the corresponding EU legal Acts. The amendment would undo our recent efforts to accelerate our domestic implementation of UN sanctions. Given my explanation to the Committee, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, is minded to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for his response. The words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, come to mind: he said that we are not simply bringing EU law into domestic law and preserving it, but extending it—a lot. That is the key issue of concern to noble Lords in this House. I hear what the Minister is saying but we will keep coming back to this issue in other groupings. On Report, we will certainly make the voices of all noble Lords heard on this subject. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, for again raising the issue of parliamentary oversight, and to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I start with a confession: unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I did not go to bed last night thinking about the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill. I had a three year-old to contend with at that time, so I did not share that experience, nor did I dream about the Bill. Nevertheless, let me say at the outset that I accept the importance of scrutiny, as I have said, and before I come to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Collins, I shall address the point just made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, who spoke about his ministerial responsibilities when he was Minister for the Crown dependencies. His advice is something that I have continued to say to our overseas territories. I was his Whip at that time and I recall those conversations well. Equally, although the noble Lord, Lord Hain, is not in his place, in addressing these amendments I totally acknowledge the important points made in Committee about anti-money laundering and raised again in relation to the previous groups.
I shall address Amendments 75B, 76A and 76B together, as they have a single effect of changing the procedure for regulations made under Clause 41 of the Bill, which concerns anti-money laundering, to the so-called super-affirmative procedure. As we have discussed previously, the Government are committed to ensuring robust scrutiny of regulations made under the Bill. Any regulations made under this clause already have to be made under the draft affirmative procedure and require Parliament’s consent before they take effect. The sole exception to this is when regulations are made to add or remove countries from a list of high-risk jurisdictions in connection to which enhanced due diligence measures must be undertaken. Both the Financial Action Task Force and the European Union currently publish such lists. After the United Kingdom ceases to be a member of the EU, we will seek to align our list of high-risk jurisdictions with that published by the FATF. Part 3 of the Bill provides that regulations updating this list will be made through the made affirmative procedure. This will ensure effective parliamentary scrutiny of such changes, while ensuring that we can align promptly with international standards around which jurisdictions present high risks of money laundering or terrorist financing.
However, this amendment would go further. It seeks to impose the so-called super-affirmative procedure. This would require the Government to publish a draft statutory instrument, with a detailed explanation of its contents, and have due regard to any representations made within a 40-day or 60-day period, including any resolutions of Parliament, before seeking the consent of Parliament to the original or an amended version. I totally appreciate the need for parliamentary oversight, but I believe that this amendment is unnecessary. I assure noble Lords that the Government take parliamentary scrutiny seriously, reflected in the fact that regulations under this clause are already under the draft affirmative procedure.
The Bill will already increase levels of parliamentary scrutiny above and beyond the status quo. We—and other Governments, regardless of party—typically make anti-money laundering regulations through the negative procedure. The Labour Government did this when transposing the third EU money laundering directive through the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. A similar approach was taken earlier this year when we transposed the fourth EU money laundering directive through the money laundering regulations 2017. As noble Lords will be aware, the implementation of the 2017 regulations followed a 12-week policy consultation, followed by a four-week consultation on the draft regulations. Consultations of this type are usual practice for significant changes to regulatory regimes, such as those relating to anti-money laundering.
The Government always pay close attention to the views of parliamentarians, and of noble Lords in particular, on anti-money laundering. In last week’s debate on the Bill we talked about the anti-corruption strategy, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, acknowledged, we published yesterday. In it we reaffirmed our commitment to establishing a public register of the beneficial ownership of overseas companies which own UK property. The Government will publish a draft Bill to this effect in this parliamentary Session, allowing an opportunity for pre-legislative scrutiny. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, asked about the strategy. I assure him that the Home Secretary, as a senior member of the Cabinet, will personally chair a new economic crime strategic board to drive forward action in this regard.
When changing the UK’s anti-money laundering framework after leaving the EU, the laying of regulations through the draft affirmative procedure will allow Parliament and the relevant committees sufficient time to look at the draft before it is debated or comes into effect. I also remind noble Lords that the regulations will be subject to an affirmative resolution in both Houses before they come into force. These measures, along with changes to the Government’s processes for bringing forward secondary legislation, will go further to addressing the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, raised earlier this year in relation to the process by which the money laundering regulations 2017 were brought into force.
On the point of broader consultation, I reassure noble Lords that the Government regularly speak to interested stakeholders when considering changes to policy or process. I am confident that this will remain the standard practice in matters of this kind, where the Government are dependent on banks, businesses and other stakeholders to ensure effective compliance. With that explanation, I hope the noble Lord is minded to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his comments, but I think all noble Lords will be concerned. We are moving from one type of regime to another. The fact of the matter is that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has said on numerous occasions, EU directives go through a very detailed process of democratic scrutiny—at European level and, of course, at domestic level. We know in advance what those directives contain and we debate them fully, and we have the opportunity, through our representation in Europe, to challenge elements of them. All that is going to disappear when we leave the EU. We want to know that we are not giving up that democratic accountability to simply place everything in the hands of the Executive. I am rather disappointed, to put it mildly, with the Minister’s response. I assure him that we will be tabling amendments on Report, particularly with regard to Clause 41, which will ensure that there is proper accountability and scrutiny.
I assure the noble Lord that I am listening very carefully. I did the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, an injustice when flicking through my notes. As noble Lords can probably hear, my voice is deeper. That is the result of telling your children to wrap up warmly on Wimbledon Common but not following that advice yourself. Nevertheless, I listened to the points made by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, very carefully. I will consider carefully the points the noble Baroness has raised in Committee, particularly on having a framework, and I recognise the importance of the points raised by the noble Lord—I hear his strength of feeling. I will respond to these issues, as I have said. Some of these concerns have been raised in the Delegated Powers Committee’s report, which we will respond to shortly as well.
I thank the Minister for those additional comments but they still do not change my concerns. I would welcome whatever further consideration he gives them and ask that we have what he has to say in plenty of time before Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this amendment is a useful reminder that the Brexit process needs to reflect the devolved nature of the United Kingdom. I take this opportunity of looking at this amendment to make certain observations more broadly and, indeed, to go back to the previous group where the Minister referred to a UK property register. He will be aware—and if he is not aware, he will no doubt be told by those sitting beside him—that the United Kingdom property register covers the whole United Kingdom via three separate registers. Indeed, two of those registers come from jurisdictions which voted by a majority to remain in the EU. Plainly the Minister does not intend to give ammunition to those who wish to withdraw from the UK. This Bill, and this part, are aimed at enabling withdrawal from the EU. That is one objective. There is a body of people who will find ground for complaint in more or less anything that in some way does not take account of the separate nature of various bits of the United Kingdom. With that small warning, I commend this amendment, and leave it at that.
My Lords, the Bill provides powers to be used in pursuit of the UK’s foreign policy and to ensure our national security. Under the UK’s constitutional settlement, these matters are reserved to Westminster. This Bill is accordingly one that is so reserved.
The amendment would, in effect, give the devolved Administrations the right to veto legislation related to UK foreign and security policy. This is contrary to the devolution settlement between Westminster and the devolved legislatures. Devolved legislatures do not have any right to veto measures where they relate to matters of foreign and security policy, including decisions of the UN Security Council. Any such amendments can arise only as the consequence of the sanctions themselves. Their primary purposes will always be a reserved matter.
I reassure noble Lords that during the preparation of the Bill the devolved Administrations were fully consulted on this point and they have not disagreed with our assessment that the Bill is reserved. The amendment would rewrite the devolution settlement, and I am sure that was not the intention behind it.
On the observation and implementation of international obligations within the competence of the devolved Administrations, while they have the power to legislate to implement measures required as a result of international obligations entered into by the UK, that does not provide them with any right to veto UK measures for the purposes of foreign and security policy, including measures negotiated and agreed by the UK in the UN. As I have already said, we have consulted extensively with the devolved Administrations on this very point and they have not disagreed with the Government’s assessment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that response which was along the lines that I anticipated. Yet again, it is an argument for generally limiting the powers in the Bill so that the concerns that I have expressed would be lessened. I thank noble Lords for their support. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I will speak briefly. I am no expert on the relevant legislation that is being repealed under this clause, but I have spoken to those who are, and the response I have had is one of shock. Legislation that went through both Houses of Parliament, with great care, debate, consideration and amendment, is now being swept away, to be replaced by a regulatory power, which, again, is not bounded in any way. It could be identical or it could be completely different, but it is not discussed or laid out anywhere in this legislation.
In the past we have talked primarily of powers that have come through a democratic process in Brussels: through the European Parliament’s scrutiny, consultation and voting processes, and through votes of the Council. In this case, we are talking about sweeping away, to be replaced by regulation, significant legislation that came through this Parliament in a democratic process. I do not understand, nor have I heard any explanation, why the Government are choosing to take this route.
My Lords, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the White Paper that preceded the Bill, in which we noted that the terrorist threat has evolved since the enactment in 2010 of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act—TAFA—which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, just referred to. We need to ensure that UK counterterrorist sanctions powers remain a useful tool for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. We therefore propose to use the Bill to establish a common approach to designations under counter- terrorism and country sanctions regimes, including the asset-freezing powers set out in Clause 2.
My Lords, these exchanges show some of the dilemma of dealing with this issue. I ask a fairly simple question when I look at these things. Why should a financial services organisation decide to base itself on some microdot in the Caribbean to provide its services? Once you ask that question, you begin to wonder whether it is to avoid the kind of rigour and inspection that they get in more well-established centres. As I said in my earlier intervention, I worked for three years with the Crown dependencies, ably aided by the Minister, in his then capacity as a Whip. I made two points. One, which I mentioned earlier, was my advice to them to make sure they answered the various questions put to them with full candour and transparency. I pay tribute to the Justice Committee under the chairmanship of my noble friend, who put forward a range of suggestions. Another point was that the British Government should get their act in better order. Sometimes, the job was to make sure that, when getting this dealt with, Whitehall departments were sufficiently accessible and aware of the particular status of the Crown dependencies.
During those three years of experience, I was impressed by the qualities of the Civil Service and the representatives of the Crown dependencies in dealing with these issues. That does not take away the fact that they, and we, have to face the fact that, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, it is our reputation that is at stake. I had nothing to do with the overseas territories, but there is a qualitative difference which needs to be looked at between their standards of supervision of financial services and those of the Crown dependencies. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the Isle of Man and Jersey. I hope they are both addressing what it is that has landed them on that list. That is something for their processes, because this is damaging to them, although there may be other jurisdictions within the EU which could not bear too close examination.
This is in our national interest. It is not us playing the neo-colonial or trying to order them about. We are defending our national interest when jurisdictions are seen as British Overseas Territories. When I had to learn that very peculiar lesson, the first thing I was told was that we joined them; they did not join us. The difference in constitutional relationship is because they were part of the Duchy of Normandy that conquered us. Nevertheless, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man have to understand that their meeting the highest standards is going to be a legitimate interest of the British Parliament and British Government, in defence of Britain’s reputation.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this important debate. As we have heard, the UK is responsible for the foreign affairs and security of both the Crown dependencies and overseas territories. That is the constitutional position. Our long-standing practice is that we do not generally legislate for these jurisdictions without their consent. This point was well made, in the context of the Crown dependencies, by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. Sanctions are tools of foreign policy, or are used to protect our national security. It is clear that the overseas territories and Crown dependencies must follow the UK Government’s foreign policy, including the sanctions we apply. I assure noble Lords that the Foreign Office has discussed this with the overseas territories and Crown dependencies and they also accept this central point of principle.
There are currently two ways in which sanctions are implemented by the overseas territories and Crown dependencies. The UK legislates directly for the majority of these jurisdictions through Orders in Council. Other jurisdictions legislate for themselves, but follow precisely the sanctions implemented in the UK. This model is well established and respects the rights of these jurisdictions.
The Bill is drafted in a way that reflects this reality. It is consistent with the current implementation model for UN and EU sanctions as well as measures under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010. It allows those jurisdictions that wish to follow UK sanctions through their own legislation to continue to do so. It also allows the UK to legislate directly for certain overseas territories as appropriate.
With regard to anti-money laundering laws, all the Crown dependencies, and each of the overseas territories with a significant financial centre, subscribe to the international standards for anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing set by the Financial Action Task Force. They are assessed in their own right for compliance with these standards and have responsibility for implementing them within their own domestic frameworks.
The Government, of course, retain an interest in ensuring that the Crown dependencies and overseas territories have robust anti-money laundering regimes. As noble Lords are aware, and as I stated in a previous debate—this point was raised with the overseas territories at the recent joint ministerial council—we are already working very closely with those jurisdictions which do not already have national company beneficial ownership registers on establishing such registers or similarly effective mechanisms, and ensuring that information held on these can be shared in near real time with UK law enforcement authorities.
I remind noble Lords that we legislated earlier this year, through the Criminal Finances Act, to establish a statutory review of how these arrangements have been implemented. This will take place before 1 July 2019 and will inform any further debate about the effectiveness of measures relating to beneficial ownership in place in individual Crown dependencies or overseas territories. We should also recall that full implementation of these arrangements will put these jurisdictions ahead of the international standards in this area, and ahead of the approach taken by many G20 countries and individual states of the United States.
This demonstrates the benefits of the co-operative relationship that we have established with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. These jurisdictions are self-governing and take their compliance with the FATF standards very seriously. The anti-money laundering regimes of each of the Crown dependencies have been evaluated since 2015, with overseas territories, including the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, both scheduled to be evaluated in the coming year. The commitment of these jurisdictions to international standards in this area is the best way to ensure that they continue to have robust anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes. As I said in the previous debate in Committee, this is a point we have once again emphasised in all our communications, and it was emphasised by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in her recent meeting with the overseas territories. These are long-standing arrangements.
The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, talked about progress and moving forward. We are moving forward positively and I have already talked about the results. In this regard, I do not believe that these amendments are needed. I am sure noble Lords would not wish to jeopardise the achievements that we have seen thus far, which have come from direct co-operation and working with these jurisdictions, and the progress that has already been made. With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for his response. However, I am a little disappointed. We should not apologise for taking the lead in trying to build confidence globally in financial standards. We should not be in any way apologetic about leading the way because London is a global financial centre—
My Lords, I do not think I apologised in any sense, and nor should we—I agree with the noble Lord. We are leading the way and we are proud of that. We have to put this into context. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, talked about the important relationship with Crown dependencies. I have talked about the relationship with our overseas territories. They legislate in many areas. The relationship does not just work; the strength of relationship allows us to make the progress we are making. Britain is leading the way and our overseas territories and Crown dependencies have shown substantial progress in this respect. Perhaps other G20 countries have a lot of catching up to do. We are leading in this respect.
I apologise to him. The noble Lord who is also a Minister—I of all people should know that—means well in his intentions and assurances. From experience in the Executive, we reach for the legislation and read it as it is. My anxiety is that unless we get it right in the Bill, we will give the Executive huge powers. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, when we voted to leave the European Union, we never intended to do anything other than leave the European Union. We did not intend to change completely the balance of the constitution and give the Executive that degree of extra power. I am talking not only about this Bill, but the whole balance of the constitution. This is happening because everything is necessarily having to be done in a hurry. The oddity about this Bill is that it is an early stage Brexit consequential. It is not adequate in the balance it has struck between the Executive and the legislature. If this Bill has got it wrong, then things will get worse as the pressure builds on parliamentary draftsmen, Ministers and policymakers. We must stand firm as a House to send a message that future Bills must be more accurate than this one in terms of the balance between the Executive and the legislature.
I support the amendment of my noble and learned friend Lord Davidson and my noble friend Lord Collins because it is inconceivable to me, in the light of the number of changes that we have sought, that everything will be put right on Report. The Bill should be time-limited for five years so that the Government have to come back with a further shot at it. We will need this sort of Bill indefinitely, but the balance in this one is so badly wrong that I think a separate clause is appropriate.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords—indeed, noble and learned Lords—who have taken part in the debate. I acknowledge the points that have been raised on this amendment.
Turning to Amendment 85, it will not surprise the noble Lord that we do not believe that there should be a sunset clause in the Bill. Whatever the nature of our future relationship with the EU—I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, meant when, not if, we leave the EU; he may choose to clarify otherwise—the powers in the Bill will be necessary. We will need them to comply with UN obligations and we will need autonomous powers to be able to create, amend or lift sanctions to address a wide variety of national security and foreign policy challenges. It is true that the design and scope of sanctions has changed over the years, but we need the power to implement sanctions as part of our diplomatic toolkit, which will not go away.
I also acknowledge and appreciate the point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that all noble Lords, irrespective of the approach and mechanisms, agree with the principle that this Bill is required. I also acknowledge, as I have done in Committee, the important role of this House in the scrutiny of legislation. In the responses I have given on which we are not agreed, I hope it is clear that there are areas that the Government will reflect on and return to. In that respect, I hope to meet with noble Lords in the intervening period before Report to see how we can bridge some of the challenges and differences that have been raised.
Further, I assure noble Lords that we are committed as a Government to getting this legislation right. The Bill is designed to ensure that we can continue to use sanctions appropriately—I know that is a principle accepted by all noble Lords—in response to future global developments and challenges, and to provide that the right safeguards are in place for the use of those powers, which I also respect. I am immensely grateful for the active contributions of noble Lords in helping us to do this.