Railways: Franchises

Lord Adonis Excerpts

Tuesday 9th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee]

My noble friend asks extremely good questions and that is the purpose of the Brown review which will look into the franchising system and report back to us by the end of the year.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, does the noble Earl agree, given the scale of the debacle we have seen on the west coast main line, that the responsibility of senior officials and Ministers should be examined in the forthcoming review? Is he aware that since last Tuesday the only steps that have been taken have been the suspension of three fairly junior officials and the establishment of a review under a member of the DfT’s own board, whose colleagues include all of the senior Ministers and officials of the department? Does the noble Earl agree that this is not a wise proceeding in public policy and it is probably not very moral either?

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I do not agree with the noble Lord. The first step that the Government have taken is to set up two inquiries. The first one, headed up by Sam Laidlaw, will look at exactly what went wrong. If there was ministerial failure, no doubt he will identify that.

[Lord Adonis]

Sam Laidlaw is a member of the DfT’s own board. Is the noble Earl not aware of that?

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, if there is anything wrong with the report, the noble Lord will be able to challenge me in this House on that very point. The first inquiry will look at what went wrong. The second inquiry will look at the wider franchising issues, as I said in response to my noble friend. We should be proud of our civil servants. I certainly feel honoured to be served by them. However, officials are human and can make mistakes, even big ones. Nevertheless, I want to make it perfectly clear that I retain full confidence in my department’s officials and I am more than content to account for their activities in your Lordships’ House.

Britain’s Industrial Base

Lord Adonis Excerpts

Tuesday 9th October 2012 Lords Chamber

Tabled By

[Lord Adonis]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their assessment of the strength of Britain’s industrial base.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, this is a time-limited debate and the time for all speakers, except for the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, at 10 minutes and my noble friend Lord Marland at 12 minutes, is limited to six minutes. I remind the House that this means that when the clock shows six minutes, it means that the speaker has already reached their permitted time.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, I first congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Marland, on his new post. He earned great respect for his work at DECC, and I know he will do the same at BIS.

I do not think that there is much dispute that Britain’s industrial base is too weak and too narrow. If that were not the case, we probably would not be in a double-dip recession and we would certainly not be in a crisis with 2.6 million unemployed, youth unemployment of more than 1 million and national income still significantly lower than before the 2008 crash. It is taking us longer to get out of this recession even than it did to get out of Great Depression of the 1930s.

Without a stronger industrial base, we face a bleak future, and I think we now all understand the need to be bold and explicit about this. Until recently, the words “industrial strategy” were unmentionable in polite society. They were regarded as a hangover—in all senses—from the disastrous 1970s and British Leyland. However, as Vince Cable put it in his Imperial College speech last month:

“We can have an industrial strategy by default or design. Ignoring this reality is not a policy—it is just negligence”.

He continued, and I agree with this too:

“But just as bad would be to approach all our possible interventions in an ad hoc way, subjecting every policy decision to a short term tactical decision. There is not a serious and successful major company in the world that would proceed in such an unplanned way”.

I agree, but that is precisely how we have been proceeding as a country for a generation, and it has to change.

In my experience, telling stories is more powerful than reciting statistics when painting a big picture. So I want to tell four brief stories. Yesterday, I went out on a boat to see the huge new Statoil wind farm off the Norfolk coast at Sheringham Shoal. When I was not being seasick, I was amazed at the size and scale of the turbines: 88 of them, across a huge stretch of sea, each rotor 350 feet in diameter, generating enough electricity for 220,000 homes. Sheringham Shoal is only the beginning: the plan for nearby Dogger Bank, which I previously knew only from weather forecasts, is for 3,000 of these giant turbines, with construction starting in 2015 if the finance can be put together by the development consortium.

This is green energy in action. By luck of geography, we have a greater opportunity to develop it than any European nation besides Germany and Denmark. It is a huge, growing industry in construction, design and maintenance, yet in industrial terms, we are seriously behind the curve. The Statoil project director told me that barely a fifth of the construction and assembly work for Sheringham Shoal was done by companies located in Britain. The turbines are made by Siemens and imported, and the foundations, the offshore cables, and a good deal of the work installing the turbines is done by overseas companies with little or no physical presence in the UK.

I was told by Statoil that infrastructure is another weakness, in particular the absence of superfast broadband on the Norfolk coast and terrible mobile phone reception. As for the huge Dogger Bank investment, uncertainty over long-term policy for renewable energy is a bigger issue. So we are in the midst of a green energy revolution yet new jobs and investment will be delayed and/or go abroad unless we get our act together as a country. This needs to start, crucially, by ensuring that Siemens builds its proposed £210 million turbine factory in Hull, the fate of which is now uncertain because of Government prevarication on wind energy.

Story two. Last week I visited Airbus at Filton near Bristol, part of the pan-European operation which has made Airbus so brilliant a rival to Boeing with its A320s, 330s, the soon to be 350s and the giant 380s. As well as its success in China, Airbus has taken the competition directly to the United States with a new factory in Alabama. The expertise in designing and making aircraft wings at Filton is second to none, just as the engine technology at next door Rolls-Royce is second to none.

Airbus itself is a fruit of industrial policy which dared not speak its name in the 1980s, when state loans made possible the A320, an investment which has been repaid many times over. Similar state industrial policy is now equally imperative in decisions surrounding the proposed BAE/EADS merger to create a military equivalent of Airbus. The Government cannot just leave it to the market. The Government are the market in this case. The critical requirements are that the UK should be an equal partner, not a subordinate one, and that the UK’s position at the heart of any military equipment consortium should be assured.

We discussed all this at Filton. But just as pressing to Airbus were its skills requirements. Last year the company had 1,500 applicants for 86 apprenticeships. Yet despite this number, it could not recruit enough school-leavers with B grades or better in A-level maths and physics required for its higher level apprenticeships. Partly to tackle this it is sponsoring the proposed Bristol University Technical College which will specialise in engineering for 14 to 18 year-olds, but far broader action is required to supply its skill needs.

It was the same story when I visited Jaguar Land Rover’s state-of-the-art facility at Gaydon near Warwick last month. Again, a brilliant success story both in technology and products, including the new Range Rover. JLR benefits from a deep partnership with the University of Warwick, which my noble friend Lord Bhattacharyya has done so much to forge over so many years. But again, real concerns over skill levels, too small a pool of engineering graduates from which to recruit—JLR told me that by its estimates the UK is producing only half the number of graduate engineers that it needs—and too few would-be apprentices with the right skills.

Another key issue for JLR is its supply chain, too little of which is local or even British. Yet British suppliers are finding it hard, if not impossible, to secure the patient finance they need to expand and the new inward investors likewise. The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders published a devastating report in June specifying how the growth of supply chain companies in Britain was being constrained by access to capital and lack of sectoral and regional expertise on the part of the banks.

My fourth story is from my experience as Secretary of State for Transport in the previous Government in awarding contracts for new trains. This is a big potential source of jobs and value to UK plc which will get steadily bigger as rail travel grows and HS2 is constructed in the next decade and beyond. The state is the procurer of these trains. To paraphrase Vince Cable, its contract decisions constitute an industrial strategy by default or by design, and if it is not by design then that is pure negligence. The issue is simple: because of past negligence, 21st century Britain—amazingly—no longer has a domestically owned rail manufacturer. There is only one international company, Bombardier, which even makes trains in Britain. So, as Transport Secretary, I decided to have an industrial policy by design in respect of the £4.5 billion contract to supply the successor trains to the Intercity 125s. To cut a long story short, this is what we did: Hitachi, the most experienced high-speed train manufacturer in the world, now into the seventh series of Japanese bullet trains, won the contract and agreed as part of the deal to build a factory in Newton Aycliffe in County Durham, not far from Nissan, another great Japanese inward investor in transport manufacturing. The present Government stuck with the contract, the factory is being built and there will be more than 700 new jobs.

Now I had hoped that this would be the beginning of a coherent industrial strategy to build up domestic rail manufacturing. Alas, the present Government awarded the next rail contract for the new Thameslink trains to Siemens without securing UK manufacturing. This was serious negligence. If Siemens can build a wind turbine factory in Hull, and can even be persuaded by the Russian government to build a train manufacturing plant in the Urals in order to get state contracts, it ought not to have been beyond the wit and ingenuity of Her Majesty’s Government to have secured a factory in return for the £1.4 billion Thameslink order. The failure to do so was a major failure of public policy which must not be repeated with the forthcoming order for Crossrail trains.

So, my Lords, four stories. What are the lessons for industrial strategy? It is that the fundamental planks of a modern industrial strategy are skills, technology, innovation, procurement, infrastructure, finance, and supply chains. We need a strong and dynamic private sector aided by a strong and dynamic state in all seven of these critical areas. The state needs to act strategically, not tactically. It needs to act overtly, not covertly. In short, we must end the negligence of the past and get real about building an industrial base capable of delivering the jobs and companies that Britain needs for the future.

Railways: High Speed 2

Lord Adonis Excerpts

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, the international rule of high-speed rail is that everyone wants the stations but no one wants the line. England is no exception, and the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, has been honest enough to admit that he certainly does not want the line anywhere near him. He wrote in the Spectator recently:

“I admit I am biased ... I have walked and ridden over the Chilterns all my life”.

I was not biased as the Secretary of State for Transport. The previous Government proposed HS2, and the present Government are carrying it through because it is the best decision for the infrastructure of the country. This is for two reasons. First, it is false to suggest that there is a choice between building HS2 or saving billions of pounds by not doing so. I fear that that is wishful thinking. The real choice is whether to build HS2, to treble inter-city capacity between London, Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds, or instead to carry out successive patch-and-mend upgrades of the four existing main lines from London to the north, ultimately spending more money for less capacity. The cost-benefit analyses show a strong business case for HS2. But it is equally important to consider the alternative. What would need to happen if there were no HS2? On this, Network Rail's assessment is clear:

“Even modest demand growth causes problems and significant rail enhancement is needed … train lengthening beyond 12-cars would have major implications for terminal stations and signalling systems. Further incremental enhancements at key locations may provide some capacity but not enough to be sustainable for the long-term and not where it is most needed”.

There is no need to gaze into the crystal ball. It is only four years since the last upgrade of the west coast main line referred to by the noble Viscount was completed. It cost £10 billion, and that £10 billion did not price the cost of a decade of chronic disruption to passengers as open heart surgery was performed on a Victorian railway operating at capacity.

There is a second compelling argument for HS2. By using 21st century technology, rather than trying to squeeze yet more out of what by the 2030s will be a 200 year-old railway, you get a transformation of capacity, speed, reliability and passenger service all in one. That is why most advanced European and Asian countries, with an economic and physical geography similar to ours, have already built high-speed lines to link their major cities. The claim that London to Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow are distances too short for high-speed rail is quite unfounded. The world's most successful high-speed lines are between Paris and Lyons, Frankfurt and Hamburg, Tokyo and Osaka, Rome and Milan, distances comparable to those between Britain's major conurbations. Britain is right to be following suit.