Trident Alternatives Review

Debate between Liam Fox and Danny Alexander

Wednesday 17th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Danny Alexander]

I will happily give way after I have made a bit more progress.

According to the review’s description of alternative postures, those options could include operating fewer Vanguard submarines, ending CASD for less frequent patrols, and unarmed patrols.

Of course, coming down the ladder depends on judgments that we make about future threats and our legal and international obligations. I should make it clear that adopting a non-continuous posture means accepting a different calculation of risk from that which existed during the cold war. However, I consider it imperative for us to update our calculation of risk. If CASD is an insurance policy, we are paying too high a premium for our needs.

[Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Danny Alexander]

I am going to make some more progress.

The 2010 national security strategy considers state-on-state nuclear war to be a second-tier threat. The argument that a current adversary would take the opportunity to target the UK during a period when no boat is covertly deployed and to launch an overwhelming nuclear strike against Britain is not supported by any analysis that I have seen.

[Dr Fox]

Will my right hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Danny Alexander]

I am going to make some progress—oh, I am sorry. I will give way to the former Defence Secretary.

[Dr Fox]

What level of threat assessment would require us to go back up the ladder and reinstate CASD, and how quickly could that be done if it had been abandoned at this point?

[Danny Alexander]

As my right hon. Friend will know, the first question is a matter of political judgment for the Government of the day. As for the second, it would depend on which of the alternative postures was adopted. They would all be designed to allow us to surge back to the so-called focused deterrence, which would sustain a continuous posture in response to our needs.

The reality is that in the current circumstances, and for the foreseeable future, the ultimate guarantee does not need to sit on a hair trigger. We can afford to go much further in de-alerting our nuclear deterrent. The option of non-continuous deterrence does not threaten current security, and by changing postures we can reduce cost at the same time. For example, ending CASD and procuring one fewer successor submarine would make a saving of about £4 billion over the life of the system.