Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Laura Farris and Caroline Lucas

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 28th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

The Bill is dangerous and undemocratic and has united a broad church of organisations in opposition. Even if all the Lords amendments that I rise to support today are agreed to, there would still be a huge amount in it that causes me concern. Our task today, though, is to try to improve what is before us.

Lords amendment 72 would play a key role in updating our existing hate crime laws to give our police forces and courts the vital tools that they need to tackle violence motivated by misogyny. By including sex or gender in hate crime reporting and sentencing, with exceptions for more serious sexual violence offences to ensure that sentences for them remain higher, it would give our police and courts the ability to track and hold to account those who target people for crimes purely because of who they are. As we have heard, selected police forces have already identified when crimes are motivated by hatred of someone’s sex or gender. They have already seen an increase in victims’ confidence to come forward and report those crimes.

The Government’s position is that making misogyny a hate crime goes against the Law Commission’s advice, but as the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) set out extremely eloquently, that is not entirely correct; the Law Commission was not commenting on the Bertin amendment. In line with concerns raised by the Law Commission about changing the burden of proof in relation to sexual or domestic offences, the amendment creates a carve-out whereby it would not apply to such offences. It uses the wording “sex or gender”, which is in line with the approach proposed in the Law Commission’s report on hate crime, and which would ensure that all crimes motivated by misogyny, or indeed misandry, are captured by the new law rather than leaving loopholes that could undermine the system.

This simple but powerful change would send an incredibly important signal. It would be part of the cultural change that we have been talking about. It would give women and girls the same protections that we give to others who are targeted solely because of who they are. It would show how seriously we take crimes motivated by misogyny. Frankly, the Government have been kicking the issue into the long grass for too long. It is time to step up and do the right thing by women and girls.

I will speak briefly to Lords amendments 114 to 116. As numerous organisations from Liberty to the End Violence Against Women Coalition and the Runnymede Trust attest, serious violence is a human rights issue. It devastates communities across the country and demands an evidence-based approach that works with, rather than against, those communities that bear its brunt. There is simply no evidence that serious violence reduction orders will protect communities from harm, however, and there is a wealth of evidence that they will sanction injustice and discrimination and risk fracturing public trust in public services and in the authorities. There is a risk that they will entrench the harms of ineffective, suspicion-less stop and search and that they will expand the injustice of the doctrine of joint enterprise, with a disproportionate effect on over-policed and marginalised groups, including young women experiencing domestic abuse and criminal exploitation.

It therefore seems entirely right and sensible that a robust pilot be carried out and that decisions to roll out SVROs nationally be informed by its findings and come before Parliament, as Lords amendments 114 to 116 propose. The amendments, which I support, reinstate democratic oversight of laws engaging rights and equalities issues and affirm the importance of an evidence-based approach to tackling serious violence.

I turn to Lords amendments 141 and 142. I have received emails from a number of constituents about how tens of thousands of women are being propositioned by predators offering free or discounted accommodation in exchange for sexual favours. Only one person has ever been charged for that kind of crime, because the law is woefully inadequate, leaving men to get away with sexually exploiting renters in need of a home. The Lords amendments specifically criminalise such landlords; they also implement financial penalties on websites and platforms. That is why they have my support.

[Laura Farris (Newbury) (Con)]

I will confine my remarks to Lords amendment 72. Let me to say at the outset that I understand the laudable intention behind it, but I want to explain why, with the greatest of respect, I believe it to be misconceived.

It was the murder of Stephen Lawrence that set the origins of hate crime in train. He was killed in 1993, and hate crime became a criminal offence in 1998 under the Crime and Disorder Act. There was some confusion about the chronology earlier, but it is set out in paragraph 1.3 of the final report of the Law Commission. A hate crime is not a stand-alone offence, but it elevates another crime, most commonly assault, to an aggravated offence under section 28 of the 1998 Act if the prosecution can show that the offence was motivated wholly or partly by hostility towards another group. In the following year, the Court of Appeal finessed the test that applied, saying, in The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v. Pal, that the prosecution must prove some demonstration of that hostility, most often a form of language that was used at the time when the crime was committed.

There are two reasons why I do not think that the amendment works in the context of violence against women. First, it sets the jury off down the wrong line of inquiry. Do we really want to legislate for a system that invites juries to judge the seriousness of an offence such as stalking, rape or domestic abuse through the prism of whether the perpetrator demonstrated hostility towards women? Even leading juries down that line of inquiry risks making acquittal more likely if they conclude that the defendant harboured no particular ill will towards women. When would we find examples of that kind of language? It would be much more likely in “stranger” contexts, and less likely when the victim had been on Tinder that night, had been out at a club or had been drinking, and this took place were behind closed doors—we know that that accounts for about 90% of serious sexual assaults—and we already have the greatest difficulties in securing convictions in such cases. Rape Crisis has said that

“the motivation of hostility is much more likely to apply to stranger perpetrators, and here we see the hate crime framework as propping up harmful myths about violence against women.”

My second reason concerns causation. Many offences against women are not motivated by hatred. Subtle, insidious factors are often at play—power, control, obsession, revenge, jealousy—none of which would meet the threshold for hate crime, but which are no less toxic or deserving of criminal punishment. In fact, we as a Parliament have worked collectively in the last decade to see the treatment of women through a more expansive lens. We recognised these complex causes when we passed the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, with its provisions on revenge porn and coercive control, and when we criminalised stalking in 2012. It is with that in mind that I am regretfully of the view that making misogyny a hate crime would be regressive rather than progressive, and would deliver less, not more, justice for female victims.