Criminal Justice Bill (Tenth sitting)

Laura Farris Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)]

Clause 30 makes amendments to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to ensure that offenders who are convicted of coercive or controlling behaviour and receive a sentence of 12 months or more in custody are automatically managed under the multi-agency public protection arrangements. That will mean that the police, probation and prison services must assess and manage the risk of controlling or coercive offenders in the same way as violent, sexual and terrorist offenders. A range of agencies will also have a duty to help to assess and manage these risks.

This is just the latest development of the law on coercive and controlling behaviour. This Government were the first to formalise coercive control as a criminal offence under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. We extended it to apply even after the end of a relationship under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. In a number of different legislative vehicles, we have applied coercive control as an aggravating or, in some cases, mitigating factor for the purposes of sentencing. Today, we are adding it to the MAPPA arrangements in certain circumstances.

We are doing this for three reasons. First, it will build on what we have already done to ensure MAPPA is used for high-risk domestic abuse cases. We have strengthened the statutory guidance to require agencies to consider discretionary management under MAPPA in all domestic abuse cases. In the last reporting year, we have seen a 30% increase in the take-up of that offer. For that reason, we consider it appropriate to put it in the Bill.

Secondly, we also know that it is a significant risk factor for future abuse and that it is a known risk factor in domestic homicide, so this clause is pre-emptive. It will support the identification and risk management of perpetrators, thereby disrupting potential abuse, preventing revictimisation and protecting future victims.

Third, we are bringing coercive and controlling behaviour offences in line with other violent offences connected with domestic abuse. Perpetrators of other forms of domestic abuse, including threats to kill, actual and grievous bodily harm, attempted strangulation, harassment and certain stalking offences, are already eligible for automatic MAPPA management. We think that it is right to bring coercive control in line with those.

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[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

The clause makes a straightforward amendment that would provide for the automatic, rather than discretionary, MAPPA management of offenders convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship who are sentenced to 12 months or more. As a result, such offenders will be treated as category 2 rather than category 3 offenders for MAPPA purposes.

It should come as no surprise to the Government that we enthusiastically support the clause. Labour has committed to halving incidents of violence against women and girls within a decade. For far too long, those dangerous criminals have been let off and victims have been let down. Indeed, the multi-agency public protection arrangements were introduced by the last Labour Government in 2001 under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, being strengthened again in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those arrangements see the police, probation and prison services working together to ensure the proper management and monitoring of sexual or violent offenders. In a joint thematic inspection of MAPPA, I have seen them called

“one of the success stories of the criminal justice system”.

The inter-agency approach of MAPPA improves public protection by bringing together criminal justice organisations, as well as others, in a structured way to address and actively manage the behaviour of offenders who can sometimes be difficult to accommodate and who may pose serious levels of risk. Labour is in complete agreement with the Government that perpetrators of coercive and controlling behaviour should be brought more directly under the remit of MAPPA. As Women’s Aid said, this signals that the crime of coercive and controlling behaviour, which is central to so much domestic abuse, is being taken more seriously by the justice system. As it also points out, bringing CCB offenders automatically under the remit of MAPPA is particularly important given the links between coercive control and homicide.

For cases where there is high risk of domestic abuse, the active management and inter-agency engagement that MAPPA provides can be an effective response. However, a report by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in 2021 identified a lack of multi-agency management of individuals who posed the most significant risk of harm to women and girls through domestic abuse. As part of the inspection, HMICFRS asked forces to identify the five individuals whom they considered posed the highest threat to women and girls within the local force area. Of the 40 individuals identified, only three were being managed under MAPPA.

Additional guidance for category 3 offenders who are perpetrators of domestic abuse has been welcome, but HMICFRS noted in its 2022 MAPPA review that there

“is still not a clear enough pathway for those who pose a risk of harm through domestic abuse, particularly for those who commit lower-level offences over a sustained period of time but pose a real risk of harm to their victims through long-term abuse.”

The impact that the clause might have, while welcome, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, is relatively limited, given the number of individuals who have been convicted of coercive and controlling behaviour since the introduction of the offence in 2015. Fewer than 2,000 people have been convicted of that offence, and yet—I think this is probably one of the most important points that I will make during this Committee—the data from the crime survey in England and Wales estimates that 2.1 million people experienced domestic abuse in the year ending 2023. Not every case of domestic abuse will include instances of coercive and controlling behaviour, but given the centrality of such offending behaviours in many cases of domestic abuse the number of CCB convictions still appears very low. Since the provision will apply to that relatively small cohort of offenders, it is difficult to discern what huge impact it will have.

I am interested to hear from the Minister about any additional provisions that her Department has been looking at in preparation for the Bill in relation to MAPPA and perpetrators of domestic abuse, particularly if it has looked at other measures that would make individuals who have committed domestic abuse MAPPA-eligible, because repeat perpetrators of this appalling violence against women and girls too often get away with their patterns of criminality and go on to commit more violence and cause more harm.

As I said, we fully support the clause and will vote with the Government, but we fear the level of impact that it will have. The criminal justice system is in crisis, and the Government are completely failing to address the shocking levels of violence against women. As with much of the Bill, we do not oppose the measures, but we are left wondering if these tweaks are all that the Government have to offer a system in crisis.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and for supporting the clause. In answer to his final criticism that we have abandoned women and girls, the Serious Crime Act that created the offence of coercive, controlling behaviour received Royal Assent in February 2015. With respect to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, it predates her arrival in Parliament, but we created that criminal offence and we have been evolving its implementation since.

[Jess Phillips]

Will the Minister give way?

[Laura Farris]

I will make some progress. I want to respond to the points raised by the shadow Minister. [Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Order.

[The Chair]

You do not need to apologise, but we are more freewheeling in Committee. If the hon. Lady wants to come back in later, she can.

[Laura Farris]

The provision has been welcomed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. She said:

“This provision will help to ensure that perpetrators are properly managed in the community and victims can be kept safe from further harm. The Commissioner welcomes this provision and will continue working with the government to develop proposals for the effective management of perpetrators.”

In answer to the hon. Lady’s question, in the data we have, which is from 2022, 566 people were convicted of coercive control, and it is estimated that, as she suggested, around 200 would be serving 12 months or more and would have been eligible for MAPPA management. We simply make the point that the MAPPA framework is used for the most serious offenders; whether it is a sexual, violent or terrorist offence, people qualify for MAPPA if their sentence is one year or more. We are not doing anything unorthodox or irregular in having that criteria in relation to coercive control.

I will respond to one of the shadow Minister’s final points. He asked whether there was provision for other forms of domestic abuse to fall under MAPPA management —the answer is yes. We strengthened the statutory guidance to clarify that MAPPA management can be considered by the relevant agencies in all domestic abuse cases. I hope that answers his query.

[Jess Phillips]

I did not find the piece of paper from Refuge, but I knew it would be about 200 people. Just to make it clear for the record, in one ward in my constituency there will be 200 violent perpetrators of domestic abuse. To the Minister’s point that she did not wish to take my intervention on the piece of legislation that was passed, I will never, ever criticise this Government on that. They have passed lots of legislation, so the skins of goats have had lots of words written on them. It means absolutely nothing—pieces of words on goat skin mean absolutely nothing if they are not then properly resourced, managed and implemented in our communities. The women in refuge accommodation speak of little else than what a nirvana it has been recently under this Government.

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Extension of polygraph condition to certain offenders

[Laura Farris]

I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 31, page 26, line 23, at end insert

“(and, in the case of a service offence, the corresponding offence is not so specified).”

This amendment provides that, for a service offence, the corresponding offence must also not be specified in Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 38.

Government amendment 39.

Clause stand part.

[Laura Farris]

Amendments 37 to 39 are not technical amendments, as my brief says; they are amendments that extend the operation of clause 31 to Scotland. I will be scolded by my officials if they do not agree, but that is what the amendments do.

Clause 31 ensures that categories of offender who were previously out of scope for polygraph testing are brought into scope. It ensures that there is express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who pose a risk of sexual offending or who committed historic offences connected to terrorism.

Polygraph examinations are used, most importantly, to monitor compliance with licence conditions, and the information obtained during testing is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans. They have proved to be somewhere between 80% and 90% effective and have been used successfully by the probation service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. More recently, they were extended to terrorist offenders under the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. Provisions in the Domestic Abuse Act also enabled the Secretary of State to commence a three-year pilot of mandatory polygraph testing on specified domestic abuse perpetrators.

[Jess Phillips]

Will the Minister give way?

[Laura Farris]

I have not really started, but yes.

[Jess Phillips]

I just wondered whether that pilot had started.

[Laura Farris]

I don’t—[Interruption.] Yes, it has.

The clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It extends eligibility to those who are serving multiple sentences where the index sex offence will already have expired. To give a rather grim illustration of what that might look like, if somebody is sentenced for convictions of rape and murder, by the time of their release the sentence for the sex offence will have expired, and they would therefore not automatically qualify for polygraph testing without the extension that the clause provides.

The clause also extends polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who have received non-terrorism sentences. At this point, I want to pick up on what Jonathan Hall told the Committee in evidence just before Christmas. This measure could apply, for example, in the case of someone who was convicted of conspiracy to murder but whose offences were an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or were committed for the purposes of terrorism, if they committed their offences before the relevant legislation came into force.

The way in which we make that assessment will depend on the judge’s sentencing remarks. If, in sentencing, the judge made an express reference to the offending being in the course of terrorism, the extension provided by the clause would make polygraph testing applicable. We define this cohort as historical terrorism-connected offenders, and the polygraph testing licence condition is currently unavailable as a tool to manage the risk that they pose, although it would be available for an individual who commits the same offence today.

The intention of the clause is to fill the gap and provide more effective risk management in the community. I reassure the Committee that that does not mean that the person can be recommitted to prison. It is an assessment of their licence conditions. It affects their risk management. If it should later transpire that they have breached licence conditions, they could be recalled, but not by the polygraph test alone. As a whole, the clause will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who pose a risk of sexual offending and those who committed historical terrorism-related offences.

[Alex Cunningham]

In his evidence to the Committee, Jonathan Hall said:

“In fact, if you look at the wording of the Bill, the Secretary of State will be allowed to be ‘satisfied’—not beyond reasonable doubt, just satisfied—on exactly the same test that currently applies to judges”

in determining whether the test should be taken. He went on to say:

“There is obviously a fundamental issue there, which I can expand on, but there is also a really practical issue, because what is a terrorism offence is not always very obvious.”—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 66, Q170.]

He was clear that the clause might not have all the bolts and washers that it needs to be totally effective.

Nevertheless, I thank the Minister for introducing the clause. As she said, it will allow the polygraph condition to be imposed where the Secretary of State considers that an offender convicted of murder

“poses a risk of committing a relevant sexual offence on release”,

and where an offender is

“serving a relevant custodial sentence in respect of an offence who…at an earlier time during that sentence was concurrently serving a relevant custodial sentence in respect of a relevant sexual offence”.

It will also extend the use of polygraph conditions for terrorist offenders by enabling the Secretary of State to extend polygraph conditions to offenders where the Secretary of State is satisfied—just satisfied: this was the issue that Jonathan Hall was concerned about—that the offence

“was, or took place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or…was committed for the purposes of terrorism.”

Labour supports the clause. Where polygraph conditions have proved to be effective with certain offender cohorts, we should certainly be enabling the courts to impose such conditions to improve public protection. The extensions included in the clause are sensible additions to the scope of polygraph conditions.

We are also happy to support the Government amendments to the clause. They clarify some matters in relation to service offences and offences with alleged terrorism connections in Scotland. I would be interested if the Minister could share any additional recent evidence that she may have of the effectiveness of polygraph conditions on public protection, particularly if there are any ongoing assessments by her Department of the current use of polygraph conditions in England and Wales. Conducting polygraphs can be an expensive and time-consuming process, so I am sure the Minister will agree that we need to ensure that there is a robust evidence base to show that expanding the conditions will contribute further to public protection.

Although we support the clause, I am left to ask the Minister: is this all there is? Offender management has been in disarray for years, especially following the failed structural reforms through which the Government have dragged it. The Public Accounts Committee said that the probation service was

“underfunded, fragile, and lacking the confidence of the courts.”

That was even before the additional serious challenges that it has faced throughout and following the pandemic.

The chief inspector of probation noted that the high-profile independent reviews into the supervision of the likes of Damien Bendall and Jordan McSweeney found

“broader systemic issues in both cases which we are seeing time and time again, both in our local probation inspections and thematic reviews. These included: overloaded practitioners and line managers with well above their target workloads; significant delays in handing over cases from prison to community probation staff, resulting in last minute and inadequate release planning; and incomplete or inaccurate risk assessments. This is the case at both the court stage and start of supervision, with very inexperienced staff being handed inappropriately complex cases with minimal management oversight.”

That is the reality of our probation service today. It is another criminal justice agency in deep crisis.

A properly functioning probation service—I will say more about this on a later clause—is essential to keep the public safe by managing the risk of offenders in the community. The Government have brought yet another justice Bill before us and have given themselves another chance to improve the probation service and provisions around offender management. The Minister will probably talk about the new investment in the probation service, but we have to set that in the context of the huge cuts that the service has suffered since the current Government came to power in 2010. They have missed a lot of opportunities with this Bill. As I said on the previous clause, the offender provisions in the Bill are so slight that their impact will be negligible.

We are seeing a Government who have simply run out of ideas and are not doing enough to keep our communities safe. Although we fully support the clause, I again put on record our disappointment at the lack of ambition that the provisions show when our justice system is in chronic and intractable crisis.

[Laura Farris]

On Jonathan Hall’s comments, there are two points to make. First, given his expertise, it is relevant to consider what he said about polygraphs in general, which is that

“polygraph measures for released terrorist offenders are a good thing.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 64.]

You asked for an updated example of where polygraph testing had been instrumental, and he gave an example—in fact, I do not think it had been used—when he said:

“I was in favour of polygraph measures after Fishmongers’ Hall. It was partly on the back of one of my recommendations that polygraph measures were brought in. They always, or at least for a long time, existed for sex offenders. You will recall Usman Khan, who was clearly a very deceptive man. My view was that polygraph measures could be useful.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 66.]

It is difficult to prove a negative, but they were brought in shortly after that.

[Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)]

Can the Minister clarify whether the polygraphs are administered by the private sector or the statutory sector? Given that we have had some startling problems with technical issues in the private sector of late, it would be interesting to know who is responsible for the polygraphs.

[Laura Farris]

Polygraph conditions are set by the Secretary of State.

[Carolyn Harris]

Yes, but what about the company responsible for provision?

[Laura Farris]

Can I come back to you on that? The shadow Minister talked about the categorisation of former terrorist offenders, and I hope I can answer his point.

We have made the point, and I hope it was clear, that those who were convicted of an alternative offence where there was a strong belief that there was a terrorism connection—it is a small cohort—were convicted before the counter-terrorism law came in. They would have been convicted separately. Politicians are not making a random adjudication of whether an offender should be classified retrospectively as a terrorist. It is about looking at the sentencing remarks and what the judge, who heard all the evidence and sat through the trial, made of that offender.

It is a fair challenge. I know that it is quite an irregular provision in law to have, effectively, a retroactive clause. However, when you look at the failings that applied in the Fishmongers’ Hall case, there is a very strong public interest in ensuring that we maximise and extend the protection of this provision in a way that the public would find reasonable. When you refer back to sentencing remarks, you can be reasonably confident that you are—

[The Chair]

Order. I gently remind members of the Committee, from Ministers down, that when you use the word “you”, you are referring to me. You must refer to the hon. Gentleman either by his constituency or by his title, otherwise I might get a bit worried about what I have been up to.

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[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, although I am not sure that I completely followed it.

To answer the point about who administers the polygraph testing, it is the probation service.

The hon. Gentleman asked about resourcing and funding. We have injected extra funding into the probation service, as he acknowledged: it is now getting an extra £155 million a year. In the past 12 months, there has been a recruitment exercise that brought in over 1,500 new recruits. That is on top of the 2,500 since 2021, so in the past two and a half years alone we have added 4,000 people to the service and given it some increased funding. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman’s questions.

Amendment 37 agreed to.

Amendments made: 38, in clause 31, page 26, line 31, after “applied” insert

“(and was not an offence in relation to which section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 would have applied if paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of that section were omitted)”.

This amendment excludes, from inserted subsection (4BB), an offence tried in Scotland where it was alleged but not proved that the offence was aggravated by having a terrorist connection.

Amendment 39, in clause 31, page 27, line 4, leave out “(4BB), (4BC) and” and insert “(4BA) to”.—(Laura Farris.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 37.

Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Confiscation

Amendment made: 40, in clause 32, page 27, line 8, at end insert—

“(2) In Schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences: Northern Ireland), after paragraph 9A insert—

‘Offences relating to things used in serious crime or vehicle theft

9B (1) An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (articles for use in serious crime).

(2) An offence under section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (electronic devices for use in vehicle theft).’”—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment adds the offences created by clauses 1 and 3 of the Bill to the offences listed in Schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences: Northern Ireland).

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 62, in schedule 4, page 119, line 18, leave out paragraph 25.

This amendment would remove the risk of dissipation as a condition for the making of a restraint order.

Schedule 4.