(5 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is absolutely right. We need to improve how we deal with whistleblowers and the legislation around them. We must also insist that regulators, which already have access to sanctions, deal with these issues robustly. There is a cultural problem in the FCA in dealing with this. That must be addressed, and it can only be dealt with by the leadership of the FCA.
The most egregious case I have dealt with over two years as co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking is that of Sally Masterton. She was a senior risk manager at Lloyds. In 2013 she wrote a report called “Project Lord Turnbull”, which highlighted the fraud that was concealed at HBOS before the takeover by Lloyds. She identified a billion-pound fraud—these are not small numbers or small issues, which is perhaps why they are swept under the carpet. She was asked to set out her findings. She produced the report and gave it to her superiors. This was happening at the same time as a police inquiry into the low-level fraud that was happening at HBOS. She was then suspended and prevented from working with the police, despite the fact that the police had said in an email that she was vital to the investigation. She was later constructively dismissed.
She was then discredited. Lloyds wrote to the FCA to discredit her, effectively saying, “This person is a rogue employee. They are not a cogent witness.” The FCA accepted that without any investigation. That was in 2013. Five years later, Lloyds apologised to Sally Masterton, saying that she had been disgracefully treated for five years and admitting that it had tried to discredit her all the way through that process—imagine what those five years of her life were like. The FCA told Lloyds to intervene because she felt she had been terribly mistreated. Andrew Bailey himself had met Sally Masterton and determined that she had been disgracefully mistreated. Lloyds apologised to her and came to a financial settlement with her, but the FCA did not sanction anybody in Lloyds for that mistreatment. That is incredible.
All the FCA keeps telling me is that there is another investigation going on—Linda Dobbs’s investigation of Lloyds’s reporting of information before and after the HBOS takeover—but that is unacceptable. The FCA has already established the mistreatment, yet it will not move forward to sanction the people responsible. Under the senior managers regime, these people, including the chief exec, could be sanctioned, fined or banned. That is exactly what should happen.
My hon. Friend is making a very relevant point, and it applies to my constituent who suffered reputational damage following his whistleblowing about the High Speed 2 project. I am sure my hon. Friend will come on to talk about what either the FCA or another body can do to provide protection for whistleblowers and restore their reputation.
My hon. Friend is right. The FCA has a huge opportunity. It should regulate without fear or favour, but that is not where we are. It constantly looks over its shoulder at the banks and seeks to defend their reputation by concealing the truth, rather than robustly investigating these issues.
I asked Andrew Bailey four times a simple question in connection with this issue: did he follow the processes set out on the FCA website for how it deals with whistleblowers? Sally Masterton’s case was supposed to be referred to his team within five days and then go through the proper process. Did he do that? He has not responded to that question four times. It is totally unacceptable.
Sally Masterton says in her protected disclosure to Andrew Bailey:
“This is the tenth time that whistleblowing issues have been raised with you and ignored”,
over a period of five years. That is despite the fact that the FCA itself, in communication within the FCA, has admitted her report was well drafted and presented, and one FCA person said to another:
“I see a couple of potential risks…We may get challenged as to what we”—
the FCA—
“did about this report when received or LBG’s treatment of Mrs Masterton”.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman makes a strong point. We should thank the Treasury Committee and its Chair for their work.
As I said, these issues are not restricted to RBS. Many will also be familiar with the HBOS Reading scandal, where former bankers and their advisers were jailed for a total of 47 years in 2017 for activities that took place over a decade earlier, prior to the takeover by Lloyds in 2008.
I have recently been sent by one of those convicted, Mr Michael Bancroft—this was kindly facilitated by my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi)—hitherto unreleased documents, including the Project Lord Turnbull report, authored by Lloyds senior manager Sally Masterton, which alleges that senior managers within the bank were aware of the fraud prior to the takeover and the £14 billion Lloyds and HBOS rights issues, yet they took clear, deliberate and documented action to conceal it. Let us be clear: if this is true, it could potentially make the rights issues and the takeover fraudulent. Those named as culpable for non-disclosure in the report include chief executive Andy Hornby, chairman Sir Dennis Stevenson, former CEO James Crosby, corporate CEO Peter Cummings, and the auditors and reporting accountants, KPMG. The all-party parliamentary group will have a full copy of the report and Members will be given access to it. Status, seniority and background cannot be a barrier to justice or to holding to account those who are ultimately responsible for the devastation caused to so many lives and to the wider economy.
Those papers, which will be made available to the APPG, mention the actions of the auditors, KPMG. Will KPMG be included in the investigation, and should it be the subject of a further debate in this place?
They should certainly be included in the wider investigation, which is what I will call for shortly.
The Project Lord Turnbull report raises significant questions. Was there deliberate concealment of the scale of the fraud within HBOS and Lloyds? Who was party to the concealment? Crucially, did the concealment result in significant loss to bank shareholders and to subscribers to the rights issue? We see conflicts of interest in the report and in many other places. They include the auditors, KPMG, giving HBOS a clean bill of health in February 2008, only a few months before its collapse; the audit watchdog, the Financial Reporting Council, seeing no reason to investigate this audit; and the fact that four of the 10 members of the FRC board are partners at KPMG and that it is chaired by former Lloyds chairman Sir Win Bischoff, who oversaw the £14 billion rights issue.
Our all-party group sets out clearly what steps we now need to take. We need an investigation into the serious concerns raised against Lloyds and HBOS. The FCA must build a reputation as a regulator that acts without fear or favour. We need a new primary dispute resolution mechanism, potentially in the form of a financial services tribunal, which also sets aside the statute of limitations. We need a review of the structure of our financial crime agencies in the light of the evidence now before us to ensure that our system of justice is fit for purpose. Finally, the only way in which we can resolve the deep-seated cultural problems in our banking sector and remove the conflicts of interests that are so prevalent is by way of a full public inquiry.