Defence in the High North

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 12th November 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this statement on the Defence Committee’s report, “Defence in the High North”.

The High North is a priority theatre for the UK, as well as a particularly challenging and hostile environment in which to operate. Russia is seeking to dominate and exploit the High North, potentially turning the region into a major vulnerability for the UK. The UK is a near neighbour of the High North. Indeed, parts of northern Scotland are closer to the Arctic circle than to the channel, while the strategically important GIUK gap spans Greenland, Iceland and the UK.

The region is changing rapidly. As temperatures rise and ice melts, new access routes are opening up, making the High North more congested and contested. Most critically, the High North is home to much of Russia’s strategic nuclear, naval and undersea sabotage capability and provides a base from which Russia can project military power into adjacent regions. That extends to UK territorial waters, where there has been a significant increase in hybrid threats to subsea critical infrastructure. In recent weeks, the Royal Navy has intercepted a Russian intelligence ship off the coast of Scotland.

Our report concluded that the UK has glaring capability gaps in the High North that leave us vulnerable. Without intervention, those gaps are set to widen, further weakening the UK along its northern flank. Evidence of low availability among frigates, destroyers and attack submarines raises serious questions about whether the UK can meet its High North commitments before new capabilities enter service.

The Ministry of Defence also has a serious gap in its anti-submarine warfare capability measured against its own military requirements. Currently, there are 11 frigates and destroyers in service. That is just over half of the requirement for 19 vessels. Of the required 13 frigates, eight should be fitted with towed array sonar for anti-submarine warfare. At present, this capability is limited to the remaining five Type 23s. That weakens the UK’s ability to respond to Russian submarines and underwater sabotage.

It is a worrying picture. The Royal Marines’ Arctic experience is a significant national strength, but it cannot compensate for shortfalls in the naval platforms needed to deploy, protect and sustain operations in the region. The Government are already rightly investing in the hybrid Navy and Atlantic Bastion, including the £90 million investment announced this week in new drones and sensors to counter undersea threats. We know that the Government are aware of the growing threat in the High North. Our concern is not that nothing is being done, but that the necessary capabilities will not be available fast enough. Given the critical role of anti-submarine operations in the High North, the Committee called on the Government to ensure that no further towed array-equipped Type 23 frigates leave service until they are replaced one for one by the new Type 26 vessels.

Addressing our own capability gaps is fundamental, but the UK must also be able to deploy flexibly to the High North, whether acting alone, with partners such as Norway, or through the joint expeditionary force or NATO. That brings me to the joint expeditionary force—the JEF—a UK-led force of 10 like-minded northern European nations. Although the JEF was originally conceived as capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict, its role has become increasingly focused on countering sub-threshold and hybrid threats, on the assumption that NATO would deter any escalation to warfighting. But with less certainty about the US commitment to collective NATO defence, the JEF’s comparatively limited capabilities could be seen as less of a deterrent. That could leave it exposed if an incident threatens to escalate.

We heard from some during our inquiry that the JEF was a “jack of all trades” and therefore master of no military tasks. The Government should therefore reassess the JEF’s contribution to European security. We welcome this week’s northern navies initiative as a step towards strengthening the JEF and aligning it more closely with NATO. The Government should also consider whether the JEF should focus more closely on the High North, particularly if Canada joins.

It is clear that Russia is not a future threat but a present danger. Failure to deter Russia in the High North would put subsea data cables and energy pipelines at risk in peacetime. In the event of hostilities, it would threaten the UK and its critical national infrastructure, including the nuclear deterrent. Atlantic resupply routes from the US would also be at risk. In conclusion, our report sets out the threat that Russia poses in the High North, and what the Ministry of Defence needs to do in response. It is now time for the Government to act with urgency to address those capability gaps and strengthen the UK’s defence of that critical region.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I congratulate the Committee and its Chairman on the production of such an important report. One section that most struck me was that beginning at paragraph 84 on submarine under-ice capability. I was surprised to learn that Astute-class submarines do not have the capability that their predecessors, the Trafalgar-class submarines, used to have. Can the hon. Gentleman tell us a little more about when that capability might be acquired, and can he throw any light on the fact that, as has become painfully clear over recent weeks and months, the existing Astute-class submarines, some of them very new, are not at sea? Is that a manning problem, is it a technical problem, or is it both?

[Mr Dhesi]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman, a former Chair of the Defence and Intelligence and Security Committees, for his perceptive and incisive remarks. Under-ice capability is key for the UK to effectively deter and defend in the High North. Unfortunately, we have allowed our under-ice capabilities to lapse precisely at the time when they are most needed. That is why a previous Defence Committee report advocated for the hardening of hulls. This report recommends that we rapidly re-establish those under-ice capabilities, because if we do not, Russia will not be deterred from its activities. In fact, it will be further emboldened, because we will not be able to protect those transatlantic supply routes.