Defence Reform Bill

Debate between Julian Brazier and Thomas Docherty

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Thomas Docherty]

I agree with my hon. Friend, whom the House will recognise is one of the experts on the Defence Committee on the issue of morale.

[Mr Brazier]

The hon. Members for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) and for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard) are both good friends and colleagues on the Defence Committee. However, may I suggest to the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife that what he is saying just is not right? What the reserves want is a strong voice of their own in a regular-dominated process. That is exactly what new clause 1 would give them and the Government have agreed to that. What they do not want is what is in new clause 3. Proposed subsection (2) states:

“Further implementation of the plans shall be halted 40 days after the laying of the report”

unless there is a resolution of both Houses. That would put yet another level of uncertainty into their thinking.

[Thomas Docherty]

I have huge respect for the hon. Gentleman, but I gently disagree with him. The reserves already have many strong voices in the British Army. He would agree that Major-General Munro is one of those strong voices. I think that the hon. Gentleman means that the reserves need stronger voices in the British Army.

I am sorry to disagree with the hon. Gentleman but, like many colleagues on both sides of the House, I think it is clear from present morale—I am not sure how it could be much lower—that our reserves are not being given adequate support. New clause 3, which is supported by respected figures on both sides of the House, would send a clear signal that we will not simply go along with the plans, come hell or high water, but that we want to see genuine progress.

Defence Reform Bill

Debate between Julian Brazier and Thomas Docherty

Tuesday 16th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

My hon. Friend has been misinformed about that. An impressive airborne cavalry unit that I visited in Kabul was one of a small number of units that had had the misfortune a few years ago of being part of the only experiment by the Americans in recent memory of trying to call people out for more than 12 months. The US has the same limit as us in the UK and has agreed never to repeat that experiment because of the painful experience. Such units operate on the same 12-month cycle as we do.

I do not say this to run down our reserve forces in any way, but when those forces were used as formed bodies, they served extremely well despite the handicaps they faced. One thinks of a company of reservists from the London Regiment, who in their time in Afghanistan were reputed to have killed 45 members of the Taliban. They got an incredible endorsement, which I quoted in the House, from their Brigade Commander, Brigadier—now General—Lorimer. I also think of my own former unit, which deployed a squadron that got three military crosses. However, I want to make the point that, in terms of yardsticks, we are behind the curve. I welcome all the Government’s efforts to move us up the curve, but we have to recognise that governance is an important part of this.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

I am slightly confused by the excellent answer that the hon. Gentleman gave to the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart). When he says that reserves in the US deploy on a 12-month basis, does he mean that their total call-out is 12 months and they are not doing 12 months in theatre?

[Mr Brazier]

They have almost exactly the same total span as us—basically, 12 months. Unlike us, they typically do three months’ work-up and nine months’ deployment—this is for formed bodies up to brigade level—whereas we do six months and six months, but it is still a 12-month limit. The Australians, who have sent a number of formed bodies to Afghanistan, do three months and three months.

I am explaining these points because it is worth looking at the difference in governance arrangements, some of which we set out in our commission report. In all three of these countries, the vast majority of reserve units are commanded by reservists, and the vast majority of those units are in brigades, also commanded by reservists. The National Guard has a whole mass of legislation protecting its special status. Australia and Canada do not have the same legal arrangements, but both countries have a set of widely accepted customs and practices that work in lieu.

That brings me to the main point that I want to put to the House. I suggest that there are four things—two pairs of things—we can do to redress the balance a little, all of which build on the spirit of what the Government are doing. The first two are about people. Sir Peter Wall anticipated our commission report with a very good move that has been pivotal in delivering progress when he announced overnight that he was creating a new post that has existed since time immemorial in Australia and Canada and in the National Guard in every state in America—a de facto commander of the TA in the shape of the Deputy Commander Land Forces. The Duke of Westminster was the first incumbent and General Ranald Munro is now doing the job. They are both fine reserve officers.

Sir Peter Wall said that that was a tied post, but there is nothing laid down anywhere to say that some future, less enlightened Chief of the General Staff, with a selection committee entirely composed of senior regular officers, and one token civil servant, should not at some future stage retire an existing two-star general and say “Here we have a reservist who can do the job.” That is the current arrangement with the reserves in the RAF. I propose that a list should be laid down of certain jobs that are tied to people, many of whom may be ex-regulars, who have for a number of years earned their living in the civilian world and served as reservists at the same time. The selection committee should include an outside element, perhaps the chairman of the Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations or the outgoing incumbent.

My second recommendation on people is that we must address the issue of reserve primacy for unit-level command. I am not asking that we have reservist brigade commanders, like all these other countries, although we do already have reservist deputy brigade commanders. In 2011, a week before we published our report, the military secretary’s department broke completely new ground by announcing, unbelievably, that whereas other countries have 80% to 90% reservist commanders, and historically we have had 40% to 50%, 24 out of 30 of the reserve commands were to go to regular officers. I have to say that I was so angry about this that my fellow members of the commission had more or less to tie me down.

The subsequent year—2012—the department did something that was arguably even worse. Although it put the word out that it wanted more reservists, it applied a de facto reverse quality filter and made such an unreasonable demand with regard to man training days for TA commanding officers that most of the people with the best jobs said, “I’m not putting in for that.” The result was a great deal of unhappiness with some of the command awards. The generation who will take on those units—the two years between recruits mean that this relates to almost every Territorial Army unit—are not necessarily the kind of people who would have been selected if the process had been similar to that which is used abroad.

The good news is that the new military secretary is working very hard on this and trying to sort it out. A strenuous effort is being made to encourage and develop good-quality people to be the next generation of TA commanding officers. None of this, however, is laid down anywhere. I think that TA primacy—which, incidentally, exists in the Royal Naval Reserve—should be formally laid down.

That brings me to my last two points, which are on the RFCAs. I was delighted that the Government adopted in their Green Paper our report’s recommendation for an annual report from the RFCA Council on the state of the reserve forces. It was right that the Secretary of State saw that first and I was glad when he published the Green Paper for Parliament. Unfortunately, it was then suddenly announced in the White Paper that, rather than having a wider remit, the report should focus on progress with integration and that it should stop when integration is completed in 2018. That was not our recommendation. It is after the political spotlight has moved on that the role of this independent report will be most important.

It is worth remembering that when Haldane set up the reserves, who served so bravely six years later in the first world war, he gave to the County Associations—the forerunners of the RFCAs—a large part of the budget as well as the responsibility for managing recruitment, basic training and property. Today the only responsibility left to the RFCAs is the control of property, which they do vastly more effectively than the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, with less than a third of the percentage overhead. They also make use of all the free expertise available from the people on the individual regional councils, including estate agents, lawyers and entrepreneurs.

For the past 10 or 15 years, the RFCAs have been handicapped in that work because, despite the fact that they own most of the estate, they are no longer allowed a free hand to manage it properly. They are constantly subject to trying to drive deals. For example, in Yorkshire an excellent deal with a local supermarket that would enable essential renovation work to take place has been on hold for several years. Now that the basing plans are sorted out, I think we should put in legislation the role of the RFCA as owners of most of the property.

In summary, the word “integration” is at the heart of this. The Government are committed—in a welcome plan that I strongly support—to the integration of regular and reserve components. We have tried assimilation and it failed. The findings of our commission’s report on an assimilated structure with no separate chain of command for Army Reserve—in fact, the structure did not even include a reserve branch at Land Command; it just had a few people scattered around—were dismal. Integration is about recognising that each service has a separate ethos. Someone who serves as a reservist and does something else for their main living has a different ethos. The White Paper says a great deal about moving from being service personnel to providing capability—I strongly support that—but in order to make it work we have to hardwire certain structures into the system, and I believe that this welcome Bill offers us that opportunity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

Let me begin by following up on the point made by the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff), who said that ex-Ministers probably should not boast about their achievements. I say gently to the ex-Minister that if they do not do the boasting, there is probably no one else who will do it on their behalf.

I think we have been greatly served over the past two decades by a succession of good, generous and genuine procurement Ministers, not least Lord Gilbert who so sadly passed away just a few short weeks ago. The spirit of the debate on both sides of the House is testimony to the fact that we believe that providing our men and women who serve so bravely with the correct equipment is an issue on which we should not make too much of a party political point—although Members will forgive me, as we are in Parliament, for making some observations in my speech.

I have a specific question for the Minister, which he may wish to consider, on the reserves and the territorial extent of the provisions. The explanatory notes state that the Bill’s scope on reservists will extend to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man—so, to Crown dependencies—but do not mention the overseas territories. It is my understanding that Bermuda and Gibraltar raise TA units, and it would be helpful if the Minister could explain why the provisions will not extend to Gibraltar and Bermuda. I know that the Minister is already thinking carefully about the answer he will give me.

There has been some suggestion that the budget is now balanced, but unfortunately the Defence Committee’s view has been that as the Secretary of State has consistently refused to show us the books, we have no way of upholding that judgment. The Prime Minister—he is only the Prime Minister and not Lynton Crosby, so he is not actually running the Government—has said that his preference is for a real-terms increase from 2015 or 2016, but there is some confusion about the date he meant. Perhaps the Minister will explain what will happen if there is no real-terms increase. Will the books go out of budget? This returns me to my exchange with the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire. If the books are balanced only in the event of a real-terms increase beyond 2015, I am afraid that we shall have another black hole, whether the Minister likes it or not.

I am something of a sceptic when it comes to a GoCo, for a reason that the Minister heard me give only last week when he met members of the Defence Committee representing both sides of the House. There are three reasons for the overruns and programme delays that have led to some of the biggest procurement problems in the last 20 years: those involving the Type 45 destroyer, the joint strike fighter and the Queen Elizabeth class carrier.

First, there is the conspiracy between the defence industry and the services. The industry wants the work and the services want the kit, so they artificially drive down the cost that they declare to Ministers for each project. Surprisingly enough, once the main gate decision has been reached, the costs start to rise to fairly extreme levels. We also see decisions being pushed to the right. As was pointed out by my right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State, Labour must take some responsibility—our hands were not entirely clean in this regard—but it is not a new problem.

Secondly, there is the chopping and changing of programmes. We saw that when, following the strategic defence and security review, a carrier decision was changed in favour of a sea variant. After £100 million had been wasted in 18 months, the new Secretary of State made the correct decision to return to the B variant, but unfortunately we are where we are, and, regrettably, the taxpayer is down £100 million. Thirdly, there is the problem of immature decision making on the part of the MOD and the services. They do not necessarily understand what their requirements are in the longer term, and that drives up costs.

The GoCo will not solve any of those problems, but strong ministerial leadership would help to alleviate at least two of them, if not all three. I hope that the Minister will explain how the MOD will tackle the buy-in conspiracies, the chopping and changing, and the lack of mature decision making.

As was made clear by my hon. Friends the Members for Hartlepool (Mr Wright) and for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard)—and, indeed, by the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot)—the Committee feels quite strongly about the research budget. We spend only 1.2% of the defence budget on research and development, and not all that money is going to United Kingdom companies. We are, in effect, subsidising other nations. The Defence Committee has an aspiration—it cannot be described as a pledge—to reach a spending level of 2%, and, crucially, we think that that money should be spent on UK companies. We must support our own companies, as the Americans and the French do. We should welcome an update from the Minister on the progress of, for instance, the remotely piloted aircraft programme. I understand that Sentinel will not be funded beyond 2015, and it would be helpful to understand the implications of that now.

May I press the Minister to say more about how two programmes will be dealt with under either GoCo or single source? I will not make my speech about Trident today, because we shall have a three-hour debate on the subject tomorrow, but it would be helpful if the Minister could explain how the common missile programme will be dealt with, in practical terms, under the new arrangements. I should also like to know how the joint strike fighter programme will be dealt with, given the genuine concern that has been expressed by our closest ally about GoCo and the new arrangements.

I am slightly disappointed that the Bill contains no provision to tackle the “revolving doors”. The Committee is concerned not just about the revelations in The Sunday Times about generals and admirals leaving on a Friday afternoon and popping up in the defence industry on a Monday morning, but about the more general policy. I am not specifically criticising the Bill here, but it would be helpful if the Minister outlined what steps he intends to take, so that we avoid this culture and what appears to the Committee to be an unhealthy relationship between some of our senior military leadership and the defence industry is tidied up.

It is easy to knock civil servants. Politicians have never lost a vote by having a go—[Interruption.] Except in Cheltenham, where I suspect that if a politician knocked the civil servants, they would probably lose quite a lot of their votes. On the whole, however, knocking civil servants is not a difficult gig, and successive Governments have perhaps been guilty of doing that. I think we must recognise the contribution made by our civil servants, however, as we would not have a procurement programme or a functioning defence industry without them. I hope the Minister will say that this is not going to turn into an exercise in beating up civil servants.

I cannot see anything in the Bill about how the pay and conditions for those for whom Bernard Gray wants greater flexibility will be set. The Defence Committee is very concerned that Mr Gray may be seeking to have the power to set the pay and conditions for his management team without ministerial buy-in. Will the Minister explain how he will ensure that there will be ministerial accountability for all the pay and conditions awarded to Mr Gray and his team? We understand the argument about increasing competitiveness, but we must not get into some of the situations that have developed elsewhere, with personal contracts and off-the-books arrangements and tax avoidance, such as for the chief executive of the Student Loans Company. Will the Secretary of State still have to sign-off all individual packages, or does the Minister expect that to be delegated to Mr Gray and his successors?

On the point about invitation to negotiate, it is my understanding that we have seen a slippage from July to August. Can the Minister confirm whether that is indeed the case, and does he understand the concern felt by me and many other Members across the House in respect of the aspirational timeline he has set and the possibility that it will become harder to meet the deadlines? I might not attribute this to the same cynical reasons as the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire, but can the Minister assure us that if the date has indeed been moved, there will be no rushing of the later stages to get us back on track?

I appreciate the sentiment behind the aim of trying to transfer financial risk from the MOD to defence contractors, but does the Minister accept that in reality that is impossible, partly because we are talking about buying kit for our men and women serving on the front lines? The MOD will have to own and take accountability for those decisions, therefore, and any slippage or risk will ultimately be borne by the politicians, not BAE or Babcock or whoever else. I am also yet to be convinced that there is a practical way of transferring the financial risk, because. given the types and the size of the contracts, in the final analysis the MOD will still have to be the underwriter for those projects.

I have asked the Minister this question before, but I did not get a clear answer, so I will ask again: which country does he hold up as a good example of defence procurement? We often hear about the bad examples, but I have yet to hear that there is any good example. Perhaps the Chinese, for the obvious reason they tend to chop people’s heads off when it goes wrong? Which country would the Minister hold up as doing procurement well? The United States has some of the worst examples of procurement. We need only to look at the strike fighter to see that. That project’s costs have increased 100% in the past 10 years, from $100 million per airframe to $191 million.

[Mr Brazier]

Sweden, a country of just 8 million people, developed its own fast jet fighter. Its defence industry has an astonishing record of not only using high-quality equipment but finding diverse civil applications for many of its products.

[Thomas Docherty]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; he has made that point about Sweden to the Defence Committee as well. I take on board the point that he is making about the Saab Gripen. My understanding is that the Swedes would say that they procure less badly than us or the United States; they would not say that they were a great procurer. The hon. Gentleman is probably right, however, and he has probably helped the Minister to avoid doing some homework. Sweden might be a reasonable example, although it does not have a fantastic track record on procurement schemes.

Let us bear in mind some of the problems that we have coming down the road, including the strike fighter. I apologise to my colleagues on the Defence Committee for having been something of a sceptic about the whole procurement system. An example can be seen in air-to-air refuelling. The A-variant of the strike fighter, which the US air force, Australia and most of our European allies are procuring, uses a probe and drogue refuelling system, whereas the B-variant and the C-variant, which we and the US Marine Corps are buying, use a boom refuelling system. Unfortunately, the two systems are not compatible with each other, so if the RAF were to win its argument for the A-variant, it would have to retrofit the Voyager tankers to enable them to be refuelled. That is an example of the UK, the US and others not being joined up, and it is absurd that we have got into such a situation. I shall not rehearse the arguments about the carrier, but the Defence Committee found that there had been an “immature understanding” of the decisions on the strike fighter and the carrier, and that not enough detailed work had been done before decisions were made. Will the Minister tell us how he is going to fix that problem?

There is a great deal to commend in the Bill. The fact that we have heard supportive remarks from the Opposition Front Benchers and from Back Benchers, who are not always sympathetic to the Secretary of State’s arguments, bodes well for the legislation. We all wish the Bill God speed.