Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Debate between Julia Lopez and Lord Beamish

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 8th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Julia Lopez]

I am pleased that the Bill has returned to the House from the other place and for the chance to speak to it. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman) for his tremendous work in bringing it through the House earlier in this Session and in the last.

The Bill will create one of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world. It will protect networks, even as technologies grow and evolve, shielding our telecoms critical national infrastructure both now and for the future. As the House will be aware, the Bill introduces a stronger telecoms security framework, which places new security duties on public telecoms providers and introduces new national security powers to address the risks posed by high-risk vendors.

I will briefly summarise the changes that have been made to the Bill. Lords amendments 1 to 3 were tabled by my colleague in the other place, Lord Parkinson. Lords amendment 4 relates to reporting on supply chain diversification and Lords amendment 5 relates to reviewing actions taken by Five Eyes nations regarding high-risk vendors. I will speak first to Lords amendments 1 to 3.

The important role of parliamentary scrutiny has been raised in debate throughout the passage of the Bill. In the other place, particular attention has been paid to scrutiny of our strengthened telecoms security framework. In its report on the Bill, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee noted that the new codes of practice were central to this framework, as they will contain specific technical information for telecoms providers. The Committee recommended that the negative procedure should be applied to the issuing of codes of practice. We carefully considered the Committee’s recommendation over the summer, and tabled amendments 1 to 3 in the other place to accept them.

The amendments will require the Government to lay a draft of any code of practice before Parliament for 40 days. Both this House and the other place will then have a period of time to scrutinise the code of practice before it is issued. These amendments demonstrate that we have listened and that we are committed to every aspect of the framework receiving appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. I commend these amendments to the House.

I will now speak to Lords amendment 4, regarding diversification. This amendment would place an annual requirement on the Government to report on the impacts of their 5G telecoms diversification strategy on the security of public telecommunications networks and services. It would also require a debate in the House on that report. The Government cannot support the amendment for two reasons. The first objection relates to the flexibility necessary for diversification. A reporting requirement of this nature is restrictive and premature. This is an evolving market that is rapidly changing, and we need the flexibility to focus our attention where it will have the greatest impact. While our focus is currently on diversifying radio access networks, once that part of the mobile network has been diversified we will move on to focus on other areas. Committing to reporting on specific criteria would limit us to reporting against the risks as we find them today and would not afford us the flexibility that diversification requires.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I am very interested in what the Minister says, because one of the major themes, and one of the big failures of the 5G debacle over Huawei, is the fact that we do not have diversification in the network. How will the Government be able to do a stocktake every year so that we as parliamentarians, and others, will be able to judge that what is being said about a commitment to diversification, which is in a lot of policy papers, is actually happening in practice?

[Julia Lopez]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his comment. Hon. Members will be able to raise in the normal way, through parliamentary questions, scrutiny at oral questions and Committee work, what we are doing in this area. We are reporting regularly on some of our diversification efforts and some of the money that we are spending from the spending review.

[Mr Jones]

I accept that, although the current Government’s response to parliamentary questions these days is sometimes lacking. What benchmark, then, will the Government use for ensuring diversification? I accept that the Minister is the Minister today, but there will possibly be a future Minister—she will not be there for ever—so how are we to judge that we are actually going to get that diversification? Without that, we will end up as we have done now, with a network that is market-led and diversification is not in the market.

[Julia Lopez]

I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s concerns. We are committed to reporting to the House on a regular basis, but we do not want to limit ourselves on specifically what we will be reporting on in technological terms, because this is a rapidly evolving marketplace and we need to make sure that we have the flexibility to deal with particular infrastructure challenges as and when they come along.

My sense is that this amendment is intended to hold the Government’s feet to the fire on delivering their diversification strategy. If that is the case, a reporting requirement of this nature is unnecessary. This House and the other place already have mechanisms to hold the Government to account through parliamentary questions, as I said, and through the various Select Committees that can ably scrutinise this work. That is the appropriate way for scrutiny to take place.

Our second objection relates to focus. This is, first and foremost, a national security Bill. It is intended to strengthen the security and resilience of all our public telecoms networks, be they fixed line or mobile—2G, 3G, 4G, 5G and beyond. While the Government’s 5G telecoms diversification strategy has been developed to support that objective, it is not the sole objective of the strategy. This is market-making work. It is not a panacea to raise the security of our public networks. Moreover, the current scope of the strategy is not to address the entire telecoms market but to diversify a specific subset of it. The amendment extends the Bill beyond its intended national security focus and creates an inflexible reporting requirement on a strategy that will need to continue to evolve. We have been insistent on this position, and that is why I ask that this House disagrees with Lords amendment 4.

Lords amendment 5 would require the Secretary of State to review decisions taken by Five Eyes partners to ban telecommunications vendors on security grounds. In particular, it would require the Secretary of State to review the UK’s security arrangements with the vendor and consider whether to issue a designated vendor direction, or take a similar action, in the UK. I welcome the intention behind the amendment, which demonstrates that those in all parts of this House and the other place take the security of this country and its people incredibly seriously.

However, while we support the spirit of the amendment, we cannot accept it for four reasons. First, the House will recall that the Bill will provide the Secretary of State with the power to designate specific vendors in the interests of national security for the purpose of issuing a designated vendor direction. In clause 16 there is a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may take into consideration when issuing these designation notices. That list illustrates the kinds of factors we proactively consider on an ongoing basis as part of our national security work. A decision by a Five Eyes partner, or any other international partner, to ban a vendor on security grounds could be considered as part of that process, so this amendment would require us to do something that has been part of the Bill from the outset.