Pension Industry

John Stevenson Excerpts

Tuesday 21st February 2012 Commons Chamber

[David Mowat]

I thank my colleague for that intervention. I was just about to say that the average pension pot for the people in the sector I mentioned is of the order of £35,000 a year. That is enough for a pension of about £1,500 a year.

The third segment of potential pensioners are those for whom no provision whatever has yet been made. The Government are correctly trying to reach them through auto-enrolment. This segment contains the most unsophisticated consumers who need the most protection.

It is right, as the industry says, for people to save more, but when their funds are eroded by unnecessary costs and when annuities provide such poor value, many people in these groups say, “why bother?”. Up to a point, they are right, but this is the tragedy: we must save more, yet the Government have not put in place the environment that is necessary for effective saving. What that means in policy terms is that the Government are inheriting under-pensioned retirees, with all that that means for social security, despite the fact that the Government spend £33 billion a year in pension tax relief. This tax relief that should be subsidising retirement prosperity is, frankly, being siphoned off to fund managers through investment and annuity overcharging. I shall talk first about the fund management industry and then about annuities.

The Financial Services Authority has recently published statistics estimating that 31% of pension pots go in charges or fees. Clearly, the decision on which pension to purchase is, along with buying a house and buying a car, one of biggest decisions in people’s lives, yet they do it from a position of ignorance. The reason why the market does not work is that there is a massive asymmetry of information between providers and buyers and therefore of buyer confidence.

The area is complex, but the whole problem is compounded by an opaque fee structure, which is indicated by the types of charges relating to pensions—entrance charges, platform charges, annual charges, exit charges and, indeed, churn charges. Some of these appear in published overall cost figures and some do not. For example, the churn charge is not included by pension fund managers in the cost structure of what they call the TCR—transitional corresponding relief—ratio of a fund. This can be responsible, according to Money Management, for changing a 31% figure into a staggering 53%. That means that 53% of the money going into pension funds goes in charges. If we examine the average degree of churn in a pension fund, we find a rate of 128%, meaning that every equity in it is churned every seven months. Warren Buffett takes the view that equity should be held for a lot longer than that. Frankly, holding it for something like seven months is simply not right.

[John Stevenson (Carlisle) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this is one reason why the pension industry never really embraced stakeholder pensions, as they would effectively put a cap on the amount the industry could make out of pensions?

[David Mowat]

I am coming on to stakeholders and to caps. I want to ask the Minister some questions about those issues.

The industry defends itself by saying that active funds are worth paying for, claiming that higher charges are fair enough if better returns are secured, but the reality is that no correlation has ever been published to show a relationship between charges and returns. The consultants Lane Clark and Peacock recently issued a report to demonstrate that. Even if there were such a correlation, the fact that the charging regime is so opaque means that the punters could not get to grips with it in the first place. One of the many consequences is that this industry has failed to consolidate. I looked at a platform provider this morning and found that I could have bought 5,000 funds. There is no reason for that other than the fact that this industry has not been exposed to market forces.