Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan

John Stanley Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

In the House on 21 March, the Prime Minister said in answer to a question from the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) about the current violence in north Africa and the middle east:

“I agree with the hon. Lady that there will be lessons to learn from the conflict for the future.”—[Official Report, 21 March 2011; Vol. 525, c. 707.]

I want to focus on one area where I believe that there is a very important lesson to be learned—arms export policy. That question arises because in the two years prior to the Arab spring, under both the current and previous Governments, arms export licences for weapons that can be used for internal repression were granted on an extremely wide scale throughout north Africa and the middle east, and those export licence approvals have been shown to have been grievously mistaken.

The policy was clearly stated on 18 February by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt):

“The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts or”—

this is the key policy statement—

“which might be used to facilitate internal repression.”

The recent Committees on Arms Export Controls report sets out quarter by quarter since the beginning of 2009 the details of the arms export licences that were approved in each period. That shows, for example, sub-machine-guns and sniper rifles to Bahrain, and components for semi-automatic pistols and sub-machine-guns, artillery computers, combat shotguns, intelligence equipment and small arms ammunition to Libya. Since the publication of that report, the latest quarterly report has been published, taking us up to the last quarter of 2010—in other words, to a matter of two or three weeks before the start of the Arab spring. It shows that even in that period we were exporting equipment for sniper rifles to Bahrain and components for combat aircraft, military equipment for initiating explosives and weapon night-sights to Libya.

If one Government statement reflects the over-optimism that has afflicted both the current and the previous Governments about the risks that are run in exporting certain types of weapons to authoritarian regimes, it is to be found in the 2008 annual report on strategic arms exports. There was a case study of a licence application for armoured personnel carriers for Libya, which concluded:

“There remain wider human rights risks in Libya, but it was judged very unlikely that these vehicles would be used to carry out abuses. As a result it was concluded, with reference to the Consolidated Criteria, that there was not a clear risk that these vehicles would be used for internal repression and the licence was approved.”

I think that conclusion was symptomatic of the policy followed by both Governments.

[Martin Horwood]

I strongly support many of the points that my right hon. Friend is making, and it is absolutely proper to raise this issue. However, we both welcome the fact that the current Government have revoked more than 150 such arms licences granted by the Labour Government, and we both welcome the fact that this Government are currently actively reviewing the whole policy of arms exports.

[Sir John Stanley]

That anticipates the point that I am about to make.

Britain was, of course, by no means the only country to engage in this degree of over-optimism and, as has been said, the Government have sought to retrieve the position. First, they have announced the revocation of a substantial number of arms export licences. Indeed, according to the latest figures, between 27 January and 9 March this year more than 150 previously granted arms export licences were revoked. That serves to highlight the scale of the previous misjudgment.

Why, however, are those revocations limited to just four countries—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain? Why have there been no revocations of arms exports to Syria, for example? Why, too, have there been no revocations of arms exports to Saudi Arabia, whose British-made armoured personnel carriers have rolled into Bahrain and are therefore complicit, as it were, in the appalling abuses of human rights there? Of course, I understand that Saudi Arabia is big money, is big oil, and is useful intelligence, but can the Government really justify such a blatant degree of inconsistency in their revocations policy?

Secondly, I greatly welcome the review of arms export licences, but it has been initiated only in relation to north Africa and the middle east, while recent events also suggest that there are serious questions to be raised about arms export licence policy for weapons that can be used for internal repression in relation to authoritarian regimes worldwide. Sadly, authoritarian regimes extend from the boundaries of the European Union to the very furthest east. There are too many authoritarian regimes in Africa and some in central and south America. The current review should therefore be extended to cover authoritarian regimes worldwide. The Committees on Arms Export Controls has recommended that, and I earnestly hope that the Government will accept that recommendation and the other recommendations in our report.

Western Balkans

John Stanley Excerpts

Tuesday 29th June 2010 Westminster Hall

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I spent most of last week in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a member of the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, alongside members of the Assembly’s Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security. I am pleased that, through whatever mysterious processes apply in this place, I have been given an early opportunity to share my thoughts and concerns with hon. Members.

There is perhaps a widespread temptation to believe that just because no significant violence is taking place in the western Balkans, the problems in the region have been solved, but that would be a serious illusion, particularly in relation to Kosovo and to Bosnia and Herzegovina, on which I will focus my remarks. With regard to the most difficult problems in those two countries, I say straight away to the Minister that the hardest nuts definitely still have to be cracked.

I will start with Kosovo. I want to refer to one or two security matters and then move on to the main unresolved political problems facing that country. As we know, the entire justification for NATO’s original involvement was, of course, based on security. We remember vividly the appalling violence that took place, which was mainly committed by Kosovo Serbs, and the spectacle of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians trapped in the mud on the Macedonian border. Since the conflict was finally brought to a close, NATO’s role there has been based on the security contribution that it can make. There are three questions that I want to ask the Minster against that background. They all relate to my basic proposition that having expended so much effort, time and money, and the lives of NATO service personnel, it would be a serious dereliction of duty if we underestimated or wound down prematurely our security presence through KFOR—the Kosovo peace implementation force—in Kosovo.

The plan is to reduce the KFOR presence from the present 9,500 service personnel to 2,000, or perhaps fewer, so my first question is this: will that be too severe a reduction in too short a time scale? We have reinforcements in the shape of three over-the-horizon battalions, but those are available on seven to 14 days’ notice, so my second question is this: is that period appropriate to ensure that if the worst starts to happen in Kosovo, reinforcements will arrive in time? My third question relates to information that I obtained in what was, I stress, an unclassified briefing. KFOR has been denied a particular intelligence capability as a result of NATO budget cuts. I shall refer to that in more detail when I speak to the Minister in private after the debate, but the question that I want to put on record is this: will that cut, which is motivated by financial concerns, expose KFOR to an unacceptable level of operational risk?

I will now address the critical political problems in Kosovo that remain unresolved. In my view, the foremost concern is Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo. I have been visiting the former Republic of Yugoslavia, now Serbia, for more than 30 years—since President Tito was in power. I am under no illusion whatsoever about the importance of Kosovo in historical, cultural and religious terms to the Serb people, but I must state clearly that, notwithstanding that background, it cannot be right for the Government in Belgrade to continue to support, establish and finance parallel political structures inside Kosovo, including the funding of local elections, which is creating an extraordinary position in which there are two mayors in some of the Serb enclaves, with one elected under the aegis of Belgrade and the other elected under the aegis of Pristina. The international community must make it clear to the Government in Belgrade that a continuing policy that subverts the elected Government in Kosovo is incompatible with progress towards EU and NATO membership, which Serbia wishes to achieve.

The second major concern relates to the process of international recognition that Kosovo has achieved and hopes to achieve in future. The progress thus far has been somewhat disappointing. Only 69 countries recognise Kosovo as an independent nation state, and that does not even include all 27 EU member states, as five do not recognise its independence. Those 69 countries represent just over one third of the members of the United Nations General Assembly. The hope is that, following the International Court of Justice’s judgment on Kosovo’s independence, which is expected shortly, there will be a breakthrough beyond the 69 figure. The key figure that needs to be broken is 100, because anything above that would mean that more than 50% of members of the General Assembly recognise Kosovo as an independent sovereign state. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure us that the British Government will do all that they can following the Court’s judgment, with many other countries, to ensure that the recognition of Kosovo passes beyond the figure of 100 so that majority support in the General Assembly is achieved.

My final key point, which is ultimately the most important one, is that the unhappy and unacceptable reality is still that north of the Ibar river, particularly in north Mitrovica, we effectively have a state within a state. It is an area under Kosovo Serb control where the writ of the Pristina Government does not run and where there is a wholly unacceptable degree of lawlessness—indeed, there is no effective rule of law to speak of. The European rule of law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, has thus far been a serious disappointment. It has an incredible number of personnel in the country—around 3,000—but has signally failed to establish an effective criminal justice system in north Mitrovica and the northern Serbian enclaves.

The situation in the court in Mitrovica is disgraceful and truly shameful as far as the international community is concerned. There is a backlog of 30,000 cases, and sadly EULEX has caved in to Serbian demands, including from Belgrade, that no local judges or prosecutors should perform in the court house in Mitrovica. As long as that situation continues, we are effectively dealing with a fragmented state, so I urge the British Government, with their international partners, to do much more to ensure that the rule of law is re-established north of the Ibar river. Only then will we end the current situation which, in my view, is almost akin to that in Cyprus. In theory there is a single integrated state, but a significant territory is outside the jurisdiction and rule of law of the elected Government.

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is perhaps even more fragile and potentially more dangerous than that in Kosovo. The Dayton constitution was a huge success in so far as it enabled the appalling internecine fighting and bloodshed to stop. The fundamental problem, however, is that while the constitution, which is built on layer upon layer of blocking mechanisms protecting the sectional interests of the three major ethnic groups, was successful in bringing about an end to conflict, it is effectively unusable as a serious decision-making mechanism to deal with either NATO or EU membership.

Nothing illustrates that more than the issue of property, especially defence properties. NATO Foreign Ministers took an excellent decision at their meeting in Tallinn in April to offer Bosnia and Herzegovina the entry point for eventual NATO membership. They offered it membership action plan status subject to conditions, one of which is that it resolves the issue of ownership of defence properties. There are just 69 properties held by the entities—in other words, by the federation and Republika Srpska—the ownership of which should be transferred to the state. So far, it is wholly unagreed and there is total logjam, which poses the question: if the ethnic groups inside Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot agree the relatively simple and straightforward issue of the transfer of 69 defence properties from the entities to the state, what can they agree on in terms of imperative constitutional reform?

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have a stalemate, but it is worse than that—it is a stalemate over which is suspended a sword of Damocles. The sword is the powers that Republika Srpska has taken to hold referendums, and the threat is that those powers will trigger a referendum on secession. If that happens, and the referendum is carried and Republika Srpska secedes from the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina in its present form will collapse with unknown and unquantifiable consequences, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but elsewhere in the western Balkans. What can be done in this situation?

I do not believe that a new vista will open up after the forthcoming local elections in the autumn. That idea was put to us, but it is a complete illusion. Nor do I believe that it is realistic or reasonable to expect the current High Representative to use the Bonn powers as Lord Ashdown did when he was High Representative—that era is over. Two critically important policy steps need to be taken that would resolve the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As in Kosovo, the Government in Belgrade need to change their policy fundamentally. As long as Republika Srpska believes that, at the end of the day, Belgrade will finance, back and support it, it can go on being wholly negative towards constitutional change.

Most important of all is this: ultimately, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina must own their constitution and vote for the constitutional changes necessary to give them an effective decision-taking Government. We need to bring about a seismic change of attitude among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some might say that that is impossible; I most certainly do not. It is not impossible because the Serbs in Serbia, as shown in the previous major elections, have already achieved that seismic change in attitude. They voted largely to put the past behind them and look forward to EU and NATO membership. If Serbia can achieve that seismic change of attitude, surely it is possible for Republika Srpska as well. It will also require a major change by the international community, which will need to adopt a quite different policy from that adopted so far. It will need to offer much more carrot than stick, to offer incentives to get support for NATO and EU membership, and to bring more imagination, determination, skill and sensitivity to the negotiating process. I believe that that is the way forward, and it is the only way forward if Bosnia and Herzegovina is going to remain integrated, stable and, above all, at peace.

UK Policy on the Middle East

John Stanley Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Mr Deputy Speaker, I share the pleasure of the House at seeing you in the Chair, loss though you will be to the UK branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.

In the few minutes available to me, I shall devote my remarks to policy on the blockade. I start by making it unequivocally clear that I consider that Israel has a totally indisputable right to self-defence as a sovereign national state. Last year, I was able to visit Sderot with the Foreign Affairs Committee. One is left in absolutely no doubt whatever about the intolerable state in which those living in that community and others near the Gaza border are placed by the Hamas rocket attacks.

The reality is that in Sderot the warning time between the siren sounding and the rocket exploding is between 15 and 17 seconds, which means that there has to be a shelter within a few metres of where people are living. Shelters have even had to be dug underneath bus stops so that people queuing for the bus can go to them quickly. We were told by the Israelis there that, since the rocket attacks started in 2001, more than 800 Israelis had been wounded and 15 had lost their lives. That is 15 too many, but it is fair to point out that the number of those who lost their lives during the last Israeli incursion into Gaza was approximately 1,400—overwhelmingly non-combatants, including hundreds of women and children.

I shall focus on the critical issue of getting building supplies into Gaza to rebuild the area. One needs to go to Gaza to see at first hand the scale of the destruction that has taken place. We saw huge numbers of homes that had been shattered. We saw the hospital in Gaza City that had been burnt out with incendiary phosphorus Israeli tank shells. We went to a large industrial estate spreading over many acres where not just an isolated factory or warehouse had been destroyed, but every building had been razed to the ground and flattened—a scorched earth policy. I am at a loss to know why the Israelis believe that depriving hundreds, if not thousands, of Palestinians of viable employment and driving them into the hands of Hamas can be in Israel’s interest, but that was the policy that was followed.

The policy is justified on the grounds of security, but that argument simply does not hold water, for the simple reason that Hamas has all the building materials it wants. Hamas controls the tunnels through which come all the cement and steel reinforcing rods it wants. Hamas can build bunkers to its heart’s content, so the security grounds do not hold up. However, a huge rebuilding programme is needed for the civilian population of Gaza.

This morning, on the “Today” programme, I heard what was said by the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair. If we are to reach a position where the Israelis agree that a limited amount of building supplies linked to UN projects can go into Gaza, it will certainly be a step in the right direction, but that does not go far enough. Among the 1.5 million population of Gaza, large numbers of people need building supplies, but they are not part of a UN project. People want to rebuild their homes. People need to rebuild their farm buildings, their businesses, factories or warehouses, to create a viable economy. I point out to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary that, if the proposal is to allow in building supplies only for UN projects, I hope the Government will say that we should go wider than that. There is no security risk in increasing the amount of building supplies going into Gaza to private individuals and private companies, provided that all those supplies are subject to the right of search by the Israelis.

I fully accept that the Israelis have every right to ensure that no weapons go into Gaza. We insisted on the same right in Northern Ireland. We did our utmost, with varying degrees of success, to prevent the IRA from getting weapons by sea from countries such as Libya. The Israelis have every right to interdict weapons and explosives, but I hope the Government will take a robust attitude and make every possible case for allowing the free flow of building supplies to Gaza. Hamas has all the building supplies it wants. There is no security case for stopping building supplies, which are critical in allowing the people of Gaza to rebuild their lives and their businesses.

European Affairs

John Stanley Excerpts

Thursday 3rd June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. Bosnia is one of the major issues that I will discuss with the European High Representative, Baroness Ashton, this evening. I will say more on the issue in a moment.

I wish to update the House on the British nationals caught up in the incident in Gaza and improve on the information that was given yesterday. The latest information I have is that 34 British nationals were involved, not 37 as I informed the House yesterday. Two of those who were reported as missing do not appear to have been in the flotilla, and we are seeking to confirm that. Another was a duplicated name with different spellings. All the remaining 34 are now accounted for. One British national was deported directly earlier in the week, 32 have arrived in Turkey and one, who is a dual national, has been released and is in Israel with family. Of the 32 who have arrived in Turkey, one has returned to the UK and 31 remain there. We are offering assistance through our consulate general to British nationals who seek it.

As I said, Iran will be on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda. We remain extremely concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has failed to suspend its nuclear activities in line with UN Security Council resolutions, has shown no serious intent to discuss its programme with the international community and has failed to address the outstanding concerns of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For those reasons, we are pursuing—as we speak—new sanctions, and a draft resolution is now being discussed at the UN Security Council. The EU has agreed to take measures to accompany this process and we will work hard with our EU partners to ensure that we take strong measures that have an impact on Iran’s decision making. The House will be aware that on 17 May Iran, Brazil and Turkey announced that Iran had agreed a deal to supply fuel for the Tehran research reactor. While that deal, if implemented, could still help to build confidence in Iran’s intentions, it cannot do so while Iran’s other actions show a complete disregard for efforts to engage it in serious negotiation, such as continuing to enrich uranium up to 20% despite having no apparent civilian use for that material.

A comprehensive diplomatic offer has been made to Iran and remains on the table. The EU High Representative, Cathy Ashton, made it clear in her statement of 21 May that we stand ready to meet Iran at any time to discuss its nuclear programme. The onus is on Iran to assure the international community of its peaceful intentions and to enter into negotiations. Until it does so, we have no choice but to continue to pursue the path of sanctions. The House will need no reminding of the risks associated with nuclear proliferation in the middle east. The pressure placed on Iran must be peaceful, multilateral and legitimate, but unless it is intensified, the opportunity to change Iranian behaviour on this issue may be lost.

The Government have also made it clear that we believe that the European Union must sharpen its focus on the western Balkans—as my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) said—until all the countries of the region are irreversibly on the path to EU membership. Achieving this and helping to turn the page decisively on the painful chapters of the region’s past will be a major test of what the EU can accomplish in world affairs. An EU without the western Balkans would for ever have a disenchanted and disillusioned hole near its centre. The western Balkans matter to stability and prosperity in Europe, and we cannot afford to ignore developments there, especially the current lack of progress in Bosnia, which demands sustained international attention. I yesterday attended the high-level meeting of EU and western Balkan Foreign Ministers, and set out our support for a clear strategy of firm action from European countries, as well as concrete steps by the countries of the region. We will work actively and intensively with our European partners, the High Representative and the Governments of the region to take this work forward in the coming months.

The issue brings me to enlargement more generally. In Britain, we have had a strong consensus on the principle that widening the European Union is a good thing, and I hope that that will continue. Widening of the European Union must go along with the rigorous application of the entry criteria. The Government will continue to champion the European Union’s enlargement, including to the western Balkans and Turkey. We will be assiduous in working with Ankara and other member states to resolve outstanding issues.

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that continuing peace and stability in the western Balkans cannot be taken for granted, and does he also agree that the constitutional changes necessary in Bosnia and Herzegovina are critically important to enable that country to progress its accession to the EU?

[Mr Hague]

I very much agree. It cannot be taken for granted that the problems have been solved. The 5+2 conditions necessary for the closure of the office of the High Representative have not yet been satisfied. As I have often said, I believe that European nations will have to be more forceful about this, and we will have to be prepared to push as well as pull some people in the western Balkans towards EU membership.

Gaza Flotilla

John Stanley Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Another 29 right hon. and hon. Members are seeking to catch my eye, and the debate to follow this statement is very heavily subscribed, so I need short questions and short answers.

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that those of us who were able to enter Gaza in the aftermath of the last Israeli incursion could only come to the conclusion that there had been a wholly disproportionate use of lethal force of very, very dubious legality? Does he agree that there has now been a repeat of precisely that? What will the British Government do to try to ensure that there is not the same repetition again and again and again?

[Mr Hague]

Hopefully, I covered that point in my statement. I referred to the actions that have been taken by Israel as appearing to go beyond what was warranted or proportionate, and I weigh those words very carefully. I also said that that is unacceptable and that Israel must act with restraint and in line with its international obligations, so we have given a very strong message to Israel. In the conversations that I had with the Israeli Foreign Minister and that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had with the Israeli Prime Minister, there could be no mistaking how strongly we feel. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley) adds force to how we feel.

Foreign Affairs and Defence

John Stanley Excerpts

Wednesday 26th May 2010 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the maiden speech of the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi). She may be interested to learn that my first parliamentary campaign took place close to her constituency, in Newton. I am sure that the whole House will have noted the important point—this runs contrary to misplaced and prejudiced stereotypes—that she has been most warmly welcomed in her constituency, as has been confirmed and vindicated by her electoral success. She clearly has great knowledge of her constituency and we very much look forward to hearing more from her on future occasions.

May I also say to my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) what a great pleasure it was for me to be in the House to hear his speech? When we met in the House shortly after he had been elected, he reminded me that we had met before and that he had come to my office in the Ministry of Defence to be interviewed as my military assistant. With the utmost courtesy and civility, he reminded me that I had failed to select him. He referred to Winston Churchill, who, as we all know, wrote in the front pages of each of the volumes of his great history on the second world war “magnanimity in victory”. My hon. Friend undoubtedly has magnanimity in abundance and I know that he will make a most valued contribution, both in his constituency and in this House.

Like other right hon. and hon. Members, I am delighted that my right hon. Friends the Members for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr Hague) and for North Somerset (Dr Fox) are in their respective posts. Their appointments were widely anticipated, but they are, none the less, very encouraging and reassuring for those on this side of the House; we wish them well in their roles.

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was entirely right to go to the United States on his first overseas visit within a couple of days of taking up his appointment. I do not know whether Secretary Clinton found him as personally captivating as she clearly did the right hon. Member for South Shields (David Miliband), but whether she did or not, my right hon. Friend was entirely correct to make his first port of call overseas our most important and reliable ally.

In this House, I am sure that we do not forget that others talk the talk about being allies but that when it comes to the heavy lifting, the tough operational situations and the risk of casualties, it is again and again our American allies who walk the walk with us. I hope that that will remain the foundation of our foreign policy and defence policy through this Parliament.

That brings me to Afghanistan. I am very glad that the Gracious Speech coupled the references to Afghanistan with those to Pakistan. The two are inseparable. The success of the Pakistan authorities and military in the badlands of Pakistan—in North and South Waziristan, in the federally administered tribal areas or FATAs and in North West Frontier Province—is inextricably related to the degree of success that we can achieve in the remaining badlands controlled by the Taliban in Afghanistan. We, above all, learned in Northern Ireland that one cannot have any real prospect of success in dealing with cross-border counter-terrorism if one deals with only one side of the border.

The previous Government made an important step in the right direction approximately a year ago. The Select Committee on Foreign Affairs was in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the then Prime Minister was in those two countries at the same time. He announced a programme of bilateral assistance to Pakistan to help it to deal with its terrorist problem. In his opening remarks, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary referred to building on our bilateral relationships with Pakistan and I urge most strongly that our bilateral co-operation with Pakistan should be built on and that additional resources should be provided for it. It is fundamental to the degree of success that we can achieve in Afghanistan.

The further point that I want to make about Afghanistan is that there is one somewhat sobering lesson to be learned from the past 10 years or so, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again and again, we have undertaken operational responsibilities and commitments and have been unable to deploy the necessary resources to discharge those commitments fully. In doing so, I believe that we have seriously let down our brave servicemen and women. If anybody was in any doubt about that, I hope that they saw the “Panorama” programme last Tuesday, which showed what enormous and intolerable pressure our counter-IED teams in Afghanistan have been put under as a result of an insufficiency of trained personnel to deal with that threat.

There is much speculation in the press that we might be asked to take on Kandahar, and I want to make the point to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence that if we are going to take on that responsibility, I trust that we will do so only if we are absolutely satisfied that we have the resources and equipment that our forces need to take on that area, which is the historic heartland of the Taliban.

Let me turn quickly to the middle east. Governments may change but the policy has not. The wording in the Queen’s Speech on the middle east:

“In the Middle East, my Government will continue to work for a two-state solution that sees a viable Palestinian state existing in peace and security alongside Israel”

is, I am sure, virtually identical to that in Queen’s Speech after Queen’s Speech.

Although a viable Palestinian state remains the goal, and although that policy remains unchanging, what is changing is the situation on the ground. The prospect of a viable Palestinian state is steadily receding because the Palestinian state is now divided into three. There is Gaza, which is effectively a prison, there is East Jerusalem—a semi-prison where there is relentless Israeli pressure to increase the Israeli population and decrease the Palestinian population—and there is the rest of the west bank, where the viability of farms and businesses owned by Palestinians is being jeopardised all the time by Israeli security requirements. I urge my right hon. Friends to do everything they can to try to bring home to the Israeli Government the fact that the policy that they have been pursuing for years of effective de facto annexation of East Jerusalem and the west bank will produce not long-term security for Israel, but long-term insecurity.

On the non-proliferation treaty, I want to cover one aspect that has not been covered so far. In a previous Conservative Government, we achieved what I believe to have been the most significant nuclear arms reduction since nuclear weapons came on the scene—the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty of 1987, in which the entire class of ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 5,500 km down to 500 km was scrapped. That agreement between the United States and Russia meant there were zero such weapons on either side. We now have the possibility of completing that process with shorter-range nuclear weapons, and I ask my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench to put that on their agenda. Those weapons are an anachronism, but they exist by the thousand: there are approximately 5,000 in Russian hands and some 1,100 in United States hands. If we were able to get those numbers down to zero and zero for intermediate-range weapons, we ought to be able to do the same for short-range weapons.

I wish my right hon. Friends the Members for Richmond (Yorks) and for North Somerset and the whole Front Bench well in resolving the very major foreign policy and security issues that we face. Above all, I wish them well in keeping the people of this country safe.