Arms Exports

John Stanley Excerpts

Thursday 13th December 2012 Westminster Hall

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I warmly congratulate my constituency neighbour and right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Michael Fallon) on his deserved return to the ministerial firmament, and I extend to him my best wishes for his time in his important post.

I would be the first to acknowledge that quantity and size are no indication of quality, whether that applies to speeches in the House or Select Committee reports, but the report that we are considering is of unprecedented length. It is a total of 537 pages spread over two volumes. I suggest to the House that it is compelling reading, not least at bedtime, and I hope that Members have enjoyed devouring it.

The report breaks important ground in five particular ways. First, one of the most important legacies left to our Parliament by the late Robin Cook was that he was the first Foreign Secretary to take the commendable initiative of producing a report to Parliament and the wider public on the Government’s policy on arms exports. Those annual reports have certainly been of material help to the Committees on Arms Export Controls by providing us with background information.

For the first time, the Committees’ report subjects the Government’s latest report to detailed and extensive written scrutiny, and, for the first time, it publishes our questions about the Government’s annual report and the answers that we received, which are set out in annex 11 to the report. I hope that Members will agree that that is an important new source of information for the House and the wider public.

Secondly, one of the most important sources of additional information available to the Committees is the Government’s quarterly publication on the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills website of the approvals and refusals they have made on the arms export licence applications that they have received. In addition, the Committees receive a considerable amount of information on a classified basis. After significant discussion with the Government, we reached agreement on a format in which we can make public the non-classified information that we obtained, with our questions alongside the Government’s answers. Our latest report reproduces those questions and answers for the first time, from the first quarter of this Government’s responsibility, starting 1 July 2010, until the latest quarter for which we have information. That is set out in annex 1 to the report.

Thirdly, a key focus of our inquiry has been the extent to which the Government have approved exports of arms, ammunition and components that might be used for internal repression in countries where such a risk may exist. In our report, we have illustrated such exports. In annex 6, we published illustrations of such exports to Arab spring countries in north Africa and the middle east, and in annex 7 we published similar illustrations for exports approved to authoritarian regimes worldwide that are of human rights concern. I believe that that too will be a valuable source of information to the House and the wider public.

Fourthly, over the past year, I, as the Chair of the Committees, have had extensive correspondence on the Committees’ behalf with the relevant Secretaries of State, ranging from correspondence with BIS on its priority markets lists for arms exports to correspondence on brass plate companies and arms exports to a variety of countries, including Argentina. We agreed as a Committee that the entirety of that correspondence, including our questions and the Government’s replies, would be published in our report. The correspondence covers 120 pages in the second volume of our report, and it too is an important additional resource of information for the House and the wider public.

Finally, in the report, we scrutinise to an unprecedented extent the field of Government policy on international arms control issues relating to weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. We have scrutinised the Government’s policy on, for example, the arms trade treaty, sub-strategic nuclear weapons, the fissile material cut-off treaty and other issues. It is another important area of scrutiny that we will be taking further throughout the rest of this Parliament.

A few months ago, I was invited to the Bundestag in Berlin to give a presentation on the British Parliament’s scrutiny of arms export and arms control policies. After the presentation, a number of Members of the Bundestag came up to me and said that they were amazed at the extent of our questioning of our Government, and even more amazed that the Government gave us the answers to our questions. Next week, I have been invited to the National Assembly in Paris to make a similar presentation, and I shall not be surprised if the response from the French Deputies who attend is similar. The fact that this House’s degree of scrutiny is now attracting international attention from parliamentarians in other countries is a welcome and important development.

Turning to the Government’s policies, the Government have accepted our recommendations in a significant number of areas, and we are on the same track. In other areas, the Government—to put it as constructively as I can—have still to accept our recommendations, and we are in a degree of disagreement. I will cover both those areas if I may.

First, we are very glad that the Government have accepted that the issue of arms exports and arms control is of sufficiently great importance to warrant the direct involvement of the four Secretaries of State. The Government accepted our recommendation that the annual report that they make—the one initiated by the late Robin Cook—should be signed off not by junior Ministers, but by the Secretaries of State. In addition, last year and, I am glad to say, this year, the two principal Secretaries of State involved—my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Business Secretary— have decided to give oral evidence themselves to our Committees. They will do so next week in the context of our current inquiry.

On bribery and corruption, I am glad to say that the Government, in their response, have given us an “unqualified” assurance that if they become aware of corruption in arms deals, they

“will take appropriate action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010.”

That is a very welcome assurance from the Government.

On cluster munitions, the Committees strongly endorsed the position taken by the Government in resisting attempts to water down the cluster munitions convention. As the House knows, such an attempt was made by a number of the major holders and manufacturers of cluster munitions, including the United States, China and Russia, which put forward what was called draft protocol 6. The Committees strongly endorsed the British Government’s decision to reject draft protocol 6 and to avoid any watering down of the cluster munitions convention.

When the Government are making military and security equipment available by export as part of a British overseas security and justice assistance programme, the Committees recommended that their official human rights guidance should be much stronger to draw the attention of officials and, indeed, Ministers to the need to adhere very closely to the procedures and policies on arms exports. I am glad to say that the Government have responded in favourable—positive—terms to that recommendation.

The most important single issue on which we finally managed to reach agreement with the Government was Government policy on arms exports in relation to areas and countries where arms might be used for internal repression. It took considerable correspondence and questioning, but we got there in the end, when the Foreign Secretary gave evidence to the Committees on 7 February this year. That oral evidence exchange is so important—so fundamental—that I want to read out a brief extract from it. It is the key extract. The Chair said to the Foreign Secretary:

“As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Government’s position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: ‘The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.’ Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt?”

The Foreign Secretary replied:

“That is still the policy. The ‘or’, as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.”

The Chair then said:

“It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, and I am glad that you have acknowledged that.”

Therefore, the British Government’s policy is that they will not issue export licences for arms that might be used to facilitate internal repression. That is a very strict but very necessary policy in this area.

I have set out the areas where we are in agreement with the Government. I now turn to the areas where we are not yet in agreement. The first is extraterritoriality. The Committees see no good reason why a British person—an arms broker, say—should be able to carry out an arms export deal from overseas to, say, an embargoed destination that would be a criminal offence if carried out in the UK, and enjoy complete immunity from prosecution in this country. The Labour Government conceded that extraterritoriality was appropriate in this area, but conceded only part of the way, so the situation today is that some arms deals overseas in relation to certain types of arms are within the scope of extraterritoriality, but others are not. That is, in my view, a wholly anomalous position.

For example, small arms and light weapons are within the scope of extraterritoriality; heavy weapons are not. Unmanned aerial vehicles—UAVs—are within the scope of extraterritoriality, but manned combat aircraft, whether fixed wing or rotary wing, are not. Long-range missiles are within the scope of extraterritoriality, but short-range missiles are not. The anomaly is glaring and should not be continued. Extraterritoriality should be extended to the remaining items on the military list as the Committees have recommended.

On torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment, the Committees recognise that the Government appear to have taken effective steps by way of temporary action to stop the export from the UK of drugs that are to be used for capital punishment executions in the US, but given the seemingly endless delay in the EU carrying out its promised review of the EU’s so-called torture regulation, we do not understand why the Government are still so reluctant to introduce national legislation in the UK in this important area. Perhaps the Minister can shed some light on that.

On trade fairs, the Committees were highly critical of the fact that illegal goods, such as torture equipment and cluster munitions, were found being marketed at the last defence and security equipment exhibition, held in London in September 2011. It was not the first time that had happened. In addition, that marketing material was found not by the organisers and supervisors of the event, but by visitors walking round the exhibition.

The Government’s response to our criticism was frankly extraordinary:

“The Government does not agree with the Committees’ conclusion that the two instances of promotion of undesirable materials via exhibition stands at DSEI 2011 are evidence of a lax approach to enforcement.”

If that evidence is not clearly evidential of a lax approach, I do not know what is.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Chairman of the Committees will be aware that was not the first time it happened, but it is important to place it on the record. There were similar incidents at previous defence exhibitions four or five years earlier. Promises were made that the situation would be improved. There are clearly outstanding issues that raise further questions about scrutiny and enforcement.

[Sir John Stanley]

The hon. Gentleman makes a wholly correct point. I said in my remarks that that exhibition was not the first time, and he is entirely right to reinforce the point.

We continue to be in disagreement with the Government on whether there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to an authoritarian regime while criticising their human rights performance and abuses. To the Committees, it is blindingly obvious that if the UK is trying to land a major arms export contract in an oppressive regime country, the chances of its doing so will be materially diminished if Britain, at Government level, gives a high profile to criticisms of human rights abuses in that country. The temptation will be to make those criticisms sotto voce in private. The conflict is inherent, although that is not to say that we should necessarily give up on pursuing particular export contracts, but the Government would do better to stand up and acknowledge the inherent conflict in their position, rather than trying to pretend that no such conflict exists.

I turn to the Committees’ response to the arms export review, which the Government carried out in the wake of the Arab spring, of exports to the middle east and north African countries. The review resulted in a wholly unprecedented number of revocations of arms export licences: a total of 158, way beyond anything that has occurred in response to a single international event hitherto, as far as I know. I do not in any way criticise the Government for making those revocations; indeed, I applaud them for doing so. It was the correct decision in the wake of the Arab spring in the countries concerned.

Where we differ from the Government is in our judgment over whether the original decisions to grant those export licences were correct. The licences included sniper rifles to Bahrain, equipment for armoured fighting vehicles to Mubarak’s Egypt and military communications equipment to Gaddafi’s Libya. The Government’s position is that none of those exports—items that have now been the subject of revocations—represented policy misjudgments. Our Committees’ position is that when the judgments were originally made, at least some were seriously flawed. Our report therefore recommends that the Government apply a more cautious judgment to weapons and equipment that can be used for internal repression when they are to be exported to oppressive and authoritarian regimes. The Committees’ position is the right one for the Government to adopt.

Our final point of disagreement with the Government is over our recommendation that the review of arms exports to the middle east and north African countries should be extended worldwide, to review extant export licences to authoritarian countries and those of human rights concern, as listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its latest human rights report. The Government initially responded:

“Although this review was originally commissioned in response to events in the Middle East and North Africa, any conclusions will apply to our procedures for arms exports to all countries.”

To say that the lessons learnt from the middle east/north Africa review will be applied to all other countries is not the same as the Committees’ recommendation that the review itself be applied to authoritarian countries and countries worldwide where there are significant human rights abuses. When the Foreign Secretary came to the Committees on 7 February this year, we pressed him at considerable length on that point. Although he said:

“I did not agree with the recommendation of the Committee.”,

I am glad to tell the House that the Committees, by pressure of questions, achieved the review that was the original subject of our recommendation.

In our most recent questions, we put to the Government:

“Is the Government satisfied that none of the extant UK arms export licences worldwide, in addition to those to the countries specifically referred to above”—

the middle east and north African countries—

“contravenes:

(a) The Government’s stated policy on UK arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees’ 2012 Report, or

(b) either the UK’s Consolidated Criteria for arms exports or the Criteria in the EU Council Common Position on arms exports?”

The Government replied:

“The Government is satisfied that none of its extant licences contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression, the Consolidated Criteria or the Common Position.”

The Committees got there in the end, but the Government would have done better to accept our recommendation initially, rather than having to carry out a review in response to our questioning.

Lastly, I have three specific questions to put to the Minister. If he or one of his ministerial colleagues wishes to reply in writing subsequently, I will entirely understand. The first question concerns the arms trade treaty. The next attempt to reach agreement will be in March next year. Thus far, the negotiations have all been subject to the consensus principle—the principle of unanimity. I fully understand that it is often necessary to adopt the consensus principle to begin a drafting process. However, I must flag it up that continuing adherence to that principle will almost certainly be the kiss of death to the conclusion of an arms trade treaty. I have been wracking my brains to think of a single significant multilateral arms trade agreement to which everybody signed up, and I cannot think of one. If we had had the consensus principle, we would never have had the non-proliferation treaty, the land mines convention or the cluster munitions convention. Will the Government tell the Committees in what circumstances the British Government would be willing to abandon the consensus principle to get the arms trade treaty agreed by the great majority of countries in the United Nations?

My second question is about the fissile material cut-off treaty, and the issue is similar. The drafting of this much-needed treaty has, as we know, been deadlocked for years in the conference on disarmament in Geneva, again because of the consensus principle, coupled with the India and Pakistan nuclear situation. In answers to the Committees, the Government said that their policy is to keep responsibility for drafting that crucially needed treaty in Geneva, notwithstanding that there has been deadlock for years. Will the Government at least set a deadline for the start of the drafting of that treaty in Geneva? It is a matter of judgment what the deadline should be. I would offer one of, say, the end of calendar year 2013. Will they at least consider setting a deadline? If no drafting takes place, the obvious next step must be to take the responsibility for the drafting back to the United Nations. Alongside that question, will the Government tell the Committees what action they are taking within the P5, all of which basically support a fissile material cut-off treaty, to maximise pressure to secure progress on that treaty?

My final question is about unmanned aerial vehicles or drones, and it is in two parts. First, are the Government entirely satisfied that existing arms export control legislation applies fully to drones, and their technology and components? Secondly, can we be assured that the British Government will resist the attempts being made by members of the missile technology control regime to reduce the control it exercises on the proliferation of drones and drone technology? Are the British Government standing up firmly and clearly against any loosening of controls on proliferation in that area within the missile technology control regime?

In conclusion, I do not wish the House to take away any other impression from my speech but that the Committees are determined to continue to improve and strengthen their scrutiny. However, I believe that the scrutiny that the Committees have achieved and—I stress this—the transparency that the Government have shown in response to the Committees’ scrutiny are now as high, if not higher, than those of any other Parliament and Government in the major arms-exporting countries. That is a situation with which I believe we, in the British Parliament, can be satisfied, although as I said, we will try to improve our performance still further.

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[The Minister of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Michael Fallon)]

I repeat hon. Members’ welcome to the Chair of the Committees, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley), and thank all those who contributed to our short debate. I thank my right hon. Friend in particular for all the work he does in chairing the Committees and for his kind words at the beginning of the debate.

Since becoming the Minister with responsibility for export controls, I have become acutely aware of the challenges posed and the passions aroused by the export of strategic goods. On the one hand, we want to give export licence applications the fullest scrutiny to ensure we do not license anything that would be used for internal repression or would fuel conflict or breach an embargo. We also want to be as transparent as possible about our activity in this area, in recognition of the strong parliamentary and public interest. On the other hand—the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr Wright) recognised this—successive Governments, including this one, have been committed to a strong defence and security industry, which helps to meet not only our own defence needs, but the needs of other states.

[Mrs Linda Riordan in the Chair]

We are also committed to growth in exports, including of defence and security equipment, as a key element of our prosperity agenda. This requires us to operate a fast, efficient export licensing system that facilitates responsible exports while imposing the minimum regulatory burden on business. As Members who have spoken today fully understand, every case is assessed on its own merits against the consolidated criteria, taking account of all the relevant facts available to us at the time. These are often, as I have learned over the past few months, difficult decisions. Circumstances change and new information comes to light, and where it does, it is right that we should review our original decisions.

I will deal with as many of the issues raised today as I can, and if I am unable to respond to certain questions I will ensure that responses are forwarded to Members shortly afterwards. I shall deal with the issues raised about the Arab spring, some changes we are making to the Export Control Organisation, enforcement and transparency, and the arms trade treaty. If time allows, I will then deal with some of the more specific questions addressed to me. I cannot promise to answer them all.

The unforeseen events of the Arab spring—I take the point made by the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) that we should perhaps no longer call it that—posed a stern challenge to our strategic export controls, in particular ensuring that British equipment was not used for internal repression. Our export licensing system allowed us to respond quickly to changing facts on the ground. The Government reacted swiftly to events. We reviewed extant licences to the affected countries and moved quickly to revoke licences where the changed circumstances meant they were no longer in line with the consolidated European Union and national arms licensing criteria.

In 2011, 162 export licences were revoked: 72 for Libya, 35 for Bahrain, 43 for Egypt and a few for other countries. Those revocations show how seriously we take the guiding principle of responsible export controls. Given the significant changes in the region, it is right and reasonable that risk assessments should be updated and, in some cases, lead to a change in decision where the licence is no longer consistent with the consolidated criteria. The evidence suggests that the system is working, not failing, and does not, of course, mean that the original decisions were flawed in the context of the prevailing conditions at the time they were made.

On the performance of the Export Control Organisation, its primary target—the hon. Member for Hartlepool picked up on this—is to process 70% of standard export licences in 20 working days. I am pleased that the organisation has consistently been hitting this target in 2012 and is on target to achieve some 71% this year, despite a substantial increase in case load. It is true that ECO fell slightly below the 70% target in 2010 and 2011, following a 25% and an 11% increase, respectively, in its case load in successive years. However, the 70% target being met prompts the question of the other 30%. The ECO has a supplementary target to process 95% in 60 working days, and it has also been hitting that target, the year-to-date figure being 96%. However, given that 60 working days equates roughly to three months, this implies that 5% of licence applications—roughly 800 a year—will take longer. Of course, any delay in processing a licence application is regrettable. Cases that take longer are, overwhelmingly, those that raise sensitive political questions on which Ministers need to be consulted. Such cases can also involve possible diversion concerns or the risk of the goods being used against our troops.

I am concerned that the implication that some 800 licences per year are going to take longer is becoming harder to justify. The pace of international trade is increasing and exporters need to be able to respond faster when they win an order. Furthermore, we need to bear it in mind that, as a Government, we are urging companies to raise their exporting game as part of the growth agenda. That places additional pressure on us to deliver timely decisions. The ECO is looking further to improve its performance targets.

On using open individual export licences to replace and reduce the number of standard individual export licences, as part of the Government’s improvement project within the export control services, the ECO intends to improve the process of applying for OIELs. That does not mean that the Government will relax their risk assessment of OIELs, but we wish to address the current situation because exporters are being deterred from applying for OIELs by shortcomings in the process.

In the industry evidence session on 3 December, we heard a call for a UK continental shelf OIEL, and I am pleased to announce that such an OIEL has now been designed to meet industry’s requirements and save the need for multiple SIEL applications from a number of companies. The new OIEL authorises the export of controlled items for use in offshore installations and associated vessels within the UK sector of the continental shelf, and is valid for five years.

The ECO has also introduced improvements to its advisory services. The control list classification service replaced the ratings enquiry service in 2011. We advise exporters, if they are unsure whether their goods need an export licence, that they may either self-rate or make use of the advisory CLC service. To assist in self-rating, the ECO provides three tools that are designed to help exporters to identify the rating entry number of their particular goods on a UK strategic export control list.

First, the CLC search tool is available via ECO’s SPIRE—shared primary information resource environment—export licensing database. It is designed to help exporters search previous rating assessments made by the technical assessment unit. By using the tool, exporters can get an indication of whether their items are listed on a control list and what the rating entry for their particular goods might be. The search tool is designed to work in conjunction with the goods checker database, a separate website that enables exporters to perform key-word searches on the specific wording of the UK strategic export control lists.

Secondly, if exporters are unable to self-rate, they can make a CLC service request online, via the SPIRE database. It is a non-statutory advice service that does not amount to the issuing of an actual licence but advises exporters of the rating entry of their goods on the strategic control lists. Finally, a recent enhancement to SPIRE provides that the ratings of the goods appearing on an SIEL will be provided with the SIEL when it is issued, enabling the exporters to build up a picture of their licensable and non-licensable goods.

[Sir John Stanley]

May I go back to what the Minister said earlier when listing, country by country, the number of arms export licence revocations following the Arab spring—or whatever we choose to call it? Does he not agree that the number of arms export licence revocations for Saudi Arabia stands at precisely zero, albeit at the time of the Arab spring Saudi armed forces crossed the causeway into Bahrain and took over guarding essential infrastructure facilities, thereby releasing Bahraini forces who carried out serious human rights abuses that were rightly condemned around the world? Does he not agree that it is not surprising that within the Committees and much more widely, we wonder whether, if Saudi Arabia were not such an important area for arms exports from the UK, a different revocation policy towards the country might have been followed?

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[Sir John Stanley]

I am grateful to you, Mrs Riordan, for allowing me to speak a second time and give a brief conclusion. I am grateful also to all the right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part in this significant and well-informed debate.

The hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) made a first-rate contribution, with the wealth of experience and expertise that he brings to bear. He referred to my predecessors as Chair of the Committees. Roger Berry made a first-rate job of chairing it, but I also want to mention a former colleague, Ted Rowlands, who was the first Chair of what was then the Quadripartite Committee, now the Committees on Arms Export Control. He, too, did a first-rate job as the first Chairman of this important combination of four Select Committees.

The hon. Member for Ilford South rightly highlighted Syria, and I stress that the Committees gave specific attention to Syria in our report, which can be found at page 150. In addition, following a written question about what, if any, extant arms export licences to Syria from the UK existed, I received a reply in March revealing, much to my surprise, that at that point nine such licences were extant. Indeed, they are listed in our report. Subsequently, I asked the Government for an explanation for each and every one, and that explanation has been put in the public domain.

The hon. Gentleman also raised some important looming issues, as much for foreign policy as for arms export control, in relation to Syria, and he was right to do so. I regard him as one of the most well informed, perhaps the best informed, Member of the House on Sri Lanka, and we should take careful note of what he said on that subject today.

The hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) made an excellent contribution. She has been a diligent and well informed member of our Committees. She said of the objective that we are trying to achieve on the arms trade treaty that she wants the strongest possible treaty, signed by the maximum number of countries, and that is the position of the Committees on Arms Export Controls and, I believe, the Government.

The hon. Lady referred to Israel, a country that features in our report. Following the recent violence both into Gaza by the Israelis and, equally important, out of Gaza by Hamas into Israel, I tabled a written question asking for a list of all extant arms export licences from the UK to Israel. That question has now been answered. The list is very interesting, and it has been placed in the Library where it is available to the hon. Lady, all hon. Members and the wider public.

The hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr Wright) referred to brass-plate companies, extraterritoriality, and important issues about the need for a heightened assessment of risk, particularly on weapons that can be used for internal repression, at the point when those export licences are being considered for a decision. I agree with all the points he made.

I take a somewhat more sanguine view than the hon. Gentleman of the prospects for the arms treaty. If it had not been for the consensus rule, we would have an arms trade treaty now. Not everyone would have signed up, but by the last day of negotiations in New York in July, 90 countries had said they would sign up to that text. The question comes back to how long we will persevere with the consensus rule, and I believe that it will be a central policy issue for the British Government and others. It is absolutely the case that the best is the enemy of the good; if we hang on grimly to the consensus rule, I fear that what would be much better than we have now, which is absolutely no arms trade treaty, might slip from our grasp. I hope the Government will closely ponder that key policy issue.

I am grateful to the Minister for his concluding remarks. He gave us a lot of useful additional information about how his Department is trying to improve processing and performance when dealing with arms export licence applications.

In response to my representations yet again to end the gap in extraterritoriality, the Minister rehearsed the Government’s all too familiar line. They suggest that it is a major step that will unleash enormous bureaucracy, and so on, but I highlight the fact that we deliberately put in our report a list of all the existing legislation where extraterritoriality already applies: annex 2 lists a total of 29 pieces of legislation. They may be ancient pieces of legislation, which include offences against the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, and the offence of bigamy, but if those offences warrant extraterritoriality, for goodness sake, surely export sales involving arms from overseas that would be a criminal offence if carried out in the UK must be eligible to qualify for the extension of the extraterritorial legislation for which we asked.

I am grateful to all colleagues who contributed to the debate, and I hope it has served a good purpose for the House and the wider public.

Question put and agreed to.