Piracy (Somalia)

John Stanley Excerpts

Thursday 14th June 2012 Westminster Hall

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I am pleased to follow in the wake of my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway). We have been the beneficiaries of his naval and nautical expertise over the course of this inquiry.

I start, Mr Sheridan, by wholeheartedly endorsing your comments at the opening of the debate about the gross discourtesy that the Government have shown to the Committee by failing to make available a crucial document that had been promised by the end of April. We are grateful to the Minister for trying to ensure that the document appears before the end of the debate, but you will be first to appreciate, Mr Sheridan, that in such a complex and technical area, the Committee should have seen the document days earlier in order to study it and, if necessary, take advice from the Committee staff before the debate commenced.

Piracy is emphatically not a marginal, peripheral world issue. In my view, it is wholly central, above all on humanitarian and human rights grounds. Piracy is one of the worst forms of human rights abuse that we see anywhere in the world. Thousands of innocent seamen and seafarers have been taken hostage and held in captivity under intolerable conditions. Many have died, and nearly 200 people are in captivity today, some of whom have been exposed to torture, and threats of torture, in order to increase the degree of pressure for ransom money. This is a vile humanitarian abuse.

Equally important are the international maritime ramifications of Somali piracy. A few years ago, most of us would have said that piracy was relatively confined in sea terms; it was a risk in the maritime choke points such as, for example, the Gulf of Aden. As Somali piracy has developed, however, pirates have become more and more audacious, and more and more skilled. They have acquired mother-ships and dramatically increased the range of piracy. Piracy now extends vastly further in geographical or sea terms than at the outset of this malevolent trend.

If we were starting the report today, I would suggest to my Committee colleagues that we call it not “Piracy off the coast of Somalia” but “Piracy in the Indian ocean.” Piracy is a form of criminality that, if allowed to take root, has the potential to expand beyond the Indian ocean. We already have what appear to be copycat attempts off the west African coast, and pirates are a risk in the Caribbean. We are talking about an international maritime threat, which is why the issue is so important and why I believe that the Foreign Affairs Committee has done a considerable service to Parliament and the wider international community by producing this weighty and well-researched report.

All the manifold briefings that I have had on Somali piracy, both in the course of the inquiry and as a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s defence committee, have erred consistently on the side of considerable over-optimism and rose-tintedness. We have been told that we are getting on top of the problem, and figures are produced to indicate that that may be the case. We have been told that the numbers of merchantmen held hostage are going down, as are the numbers of ships that have been taken. However, those are not the key figures. If we honestly ask ourselves, “Is piracy paying?” only two statistics really matter. First, what is happening to the size of the ransom money being paid out? Secondly, what is the degree of risk to which pirates are exposing themselves?

The Committee, in our report, comes up unequivocally with the answers on those two key figures. With regard to the money, at the end of paragraph 111, we state:

“The latest information from Northwood HQ is that ransom payments in 2011 have already totalled $135m—a further substantial increase and a new record.”

On the ransom money test, we are losing comprehensively. The ransom money is going up; indeed, a new record has been set. On the risk test, there is a key sentence in our report at the opening of paragraph 74:

“Around nine out of 10 piracy suspects detained by forces engaged in multinational operations are released without trial.”

Nine out of 10 captured pirates are just released. Therefore, the honest answer to the question “Does piracy pay?” is yes, it does; it is a growing source of huge sums of money and it is largely risk free for those who engage in it. That is the point we are at, and it is singularly serious.

What do we do in this situation? Yes, in a perfect world, there would be an up-and-running criminal justice system in Somalia. There would be a splendid criminal justice system, with splendid courts, and those people would be put where they belong—in jail, for many years. However, that is an illusion. We will not be at that point for years.

On the naval side, as the Chairman of the Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South, rightly pointed out, the geographical scale of the sea operations is such that there is no conceivable prospect of being able to produce the massive armada of naval forces that would be in a position to respond quickly to a threat of piracy in such a huge area of ocean. Therefore, we are left with just one solution. We must put armed guards on the merchant vessels, and those armed guards must be in a position to ensure that not a single merchantman on the ship is taken hostage and the ship is not captured in any circumstances.

The Government, after a long delay—I have to say that they were continuing the policy of the previous Government—have performed what the Chairman of the Committee rightly pointed out is a complete U-turn, a very welcome U-turn, and have accepted the policy of placing armed guards on UK-flagged ships. However, that can be only half the policy. It is not enough to say that we will put armed guards on the ships and create a new form of arms export licence that enables weapons to be supplied to them. I have, not least in my capacity as Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, a number of detailed questions about that form of licence, but I shall be delivering them in writing to the Minister. I will not take up hon. Members’ time with them now.

It is not enough to say that we will allow armed guards and will have a licensing system to get the appropriate weapons and ammunition to them. We must have in place the right, requisite rules of engagement, and that is where I believe that the Government are seriously falling down in policy terms. The Government’s position appears to be that we state the policy—we say that we are in favour of armed guards—but we will not give any help or support with regard to the circumstances in which lethal weapons can be used. I refer hon. Members to what the Government say on page 5 of their response:

“It must remain for shipping companies and private security companies to agree between themselves upon the guidance on use of force within which armed guards are to operate.”

That, to me, seems to be a very serious cop-out. I do not believe that the Government can responsibly say that we have a policy of putting armed guards on British-flagged merchant ships and then refuse to accept any responsibility whatever for describing the circumstances in which those armed guards can use their weapons.

When I look at how the Government try to justify the policy, I have to say that it does not stand up as far as I am concerned. The Government’s justification, also on page 5 of their response, is that

“the introduction of government-prescribed rules on the use of force would blur the distinction between private maritime security personnel as civilians only acting in the context of self-defence, and military personnel who may be authorised to use force for other reasons.”

My first point is that armed military personnel are used and have been used with considerable regularity to board and to be on board civilian ships in a variety of circumstances, so the Government have ample experience of that; and in all those circumstances, those armed military personnel have rules of engagement, so the Government have in their possession rules of engagement that deal with the type of situation we are discussing.

I would question the Government when they say that the armed guards on British-flagged merchant ships are acting only in the context of self-defence. I do not know whether that is meant to imply the armed guards’ own self-defence. They have a much wider role. Their key role is, of course, to protect and ensure the safety of all the civilian crew members on board the ship and, in the process, ensure the safety and retention of that ship under the control of the crew’s master and the ship’s crew. That is their wider role.

In those circumstances, when the Government have abundant expertise in the area and, as a matter of course, have rules of engagement that they apply to service personnel who have to go on board civilian ships, and given that the Government now have a clear policy in favour of armed guards going on to British-flagged merchant ships, it seems to me to be wholly incumbent on the Government to accept the necessity of making clear what the rules of engagement are.

I come back to the conclusion that the Committee draws in paragraph 37. To me, it is the single most important recommendation in our report. It should be read in full, but I shall quote just the key sentences:

“The Government should not offload responsibility onto ship owners to deal with the most difficult aspects of handling private armed guards…The Government must provide clearer direction on what is permissible and what is not. Guidance over the use of potentially lethal force should not be left to private companies to agree upon. We recommend that the change of policy be accompanied by clear, detailed and unambiguous guidance on the legal use of force for private armed guards defending a vessel under attack.”

I urge the Minister to accept that recommendation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bellingham]

Yes, indeed. It is about a graduated response, and about the members of the armed detachment using their intelligence. If they believe that they or the vessel they are protecting is threatened, they can of course use force. They would probably start by firing a warning shot. If the skiff then disappeared, all well and good, but if it came closer and it was obvious that there were weapons on board, it is perfectly clear from the revised guidelines that the armed guards would not have to wait until a shot was fired at them or in their direction. We go a long way to giving the clarification that is need.

[Sir John Stanley]

As the Minister is aware, his Department employs private armed security guards in a number of locations around overseas embassies and high commissions. Will he make available a copy of those rules of engagement to the members of the Committee?

[Mr Bellingham]

My right hon. Friend was a senior Minister and had a distinguished military career, and he has stayed in many embassies and high commissions. He will know the work done by the armed guards, who we often employ from companies such as G4S. I will certainly consider whether the document can be made available.

I want to make a few additional points. I think that the Committee was looking for clear but comprehensive rules of engagement, and we have not gone as far as it would have liked. That is, first, because companies must seek independent legal advice. Furthermore, merchant shipping can be subject to multiple jurisdictions. On board a UK flagged vessel, persons are subject to UK domestic laws; they may also be subject to different domestic jurisdictions and equivalent laws depending on the offence committed, the nationality of the person taking the action, the person against whom the action is taken, and whether such an action takes place in international or territorial waters. It is not straightforward, and it can be incredibly complicated. I do not like to see advice saying that it is up to the court to decide, because it brings to mind the debate in the previous Parliament on what force a household can use to defend its property: time and again Ministers would say that it was up to the court to decide, but actually we did not want householders dragged into court. However, in the unfortunate event of such a case going to court, it is up to the law of the land in that particular state or jurisdiction to determine whether the force used in the unique circumstances of the case was lawful.

That is why we have not gone into the level of detail that the Chairman of the Committee would perhaps like to have seen. We have not laid out rules of engagement and rules on the use of force that cover every single eventuality. There has to be a graduated approach, and we must take the realpolitik view that every single circumstance and occasion will be unique. To be too prescriptive would be a mistake.

In addition to producing our national guidance, we—I say “we”, but it is more or less my hon. Friend the Shipping Minister—have played a leading role in the development of international guidance on the use of private armed security personnel for our leading role in the contact group. After detailed work within that body, the contact group has handed its conclusions to the IMO to develop further, and such international guidance will be made available. As I said, this is work in progress and further work is going on, first, on the national guidance that I mentioned and, secondly, on the accreditation process. That is very important. I congratulate my hon. Friend on that work and I hope that he carries on working tirelessly on this agenda.

I think it has been widely accepted that a combination of more robust naval activity, industry self-protection measures and the use of private arms security personnel have all contributed to the reduction in the number of successful hijackings in the Indian ocean, but such activities at sea are only part of the answer. We should not lose sight of the fact that the way to combat piracy is obviously on the land. That point was made by the Chair of the Committee, the hon. Member for Cheltenham and the right hon. Member for Warley. We must look at the political strand, and I will come on to that in a moment in response to the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), but in terms of sustainable solutions on the land, one of the things I was very keen to discuss with the shipping industry—it also featured in the London conference on Somalia—was what we can do to reward those communities, villages and small towns that have driven the pirates out. For example, in Puntland and Galmudug, the local militia have taken control of coastal communities that have previously been subjected to pirate activities. Those communities need to be rewarded, and rewarded quickly. That is why we have worked very hard indeed with the shipping industry, which I am pleased to say has been very proactive on that score, and been able to make some progress.

I am very pleased to say that when the Secretary of State for International Development was in Garowe, he was able to open a new fish market for which money was provided by his Department. We have also, for example, established new youth club facilities in parts of Puntland and looked at projects to increase existing capacity for vocational training and help similar training facilities in parts of Puntland and Galmudug. I am delighted that the UK Government have come up with £2 million for those projects, which has been matched by a $2 million pledge by the four shipping companies that are also very concerned and interested in that agenda. We are very keen to ensure that money goes into those communities that have successfully driven away the pirates.

I should also point out that as well as those fast impact schemes on the land, it is incredibly important that those pirates who are caught are taken for detention, prosecution and then imprisonment. Part of the problem with catch and release was, first, the difficulty of getting a robust prosecution package and, secondly, the question of where to take the pirates. In answer to the point made by the right hon. Member for Warley about whether we would take pirates to the UK, yes, of course we would. If UK citizens or service personnel were injured by pirates, of course, we would look at the evidence and we would consider bringing them to the UK for detention and prosecution.

The most important thing is to ensure that we build up regional capacity for detention, prosecution and imprisonment. I am absolutely delighted that more pirates are now being brought to justice. We recently agreed a new memorandum of understanding with the Government of Tanzania, under which UK naval assets will be able to transfer suspected pirates caught at sea for prosecution in the Tanzanian courts. That has been followed as recently as last Friday with the signature of our Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Mauritius on a new MOU between us and the Government of Mauritius, which will put UK money into Mauritian prisons and ensure that the Mauritian Government will be able to take more suspected pirates for detention and prosecution. Most important of all, the point being put to us by all these countries is that they will detain pirates and prosecute them, but they do not want to go to the expense of imprisoning them; they believe that those convicted should be imprisoned in Somalia or Somaliland.