Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between John Glen and Rehman Chishti

Monday 14th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

8. What plans he has to consult partner countries in the middle east about a solution to the current violence in Iraq.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

16. What discussions he has had with his counterparts in the middle east about the situation in Iraq.

Foreign Policy (Soft Power)

Debate between John Glen and Rehman Chishti

Wednesday 1st February 2012 Westminster Hall

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

May I say what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Mr Bone? I declare an interest as secretary of the all-party group on the British Council and as a governor of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

The purpose of calling this debate is to focus on the role of soft power in British foreign policy and how it is to be used in defining country strategies. Over the past decade, Governments have become increasingly aware of the importance of soft power. I define that as the power to attract and co-opt alongside the hard power of traditional military and economic means of achieving foreign policy objectives. There is a growing acceptance that soft power is an important component of foreign policy and should be seen as a complement to rather than a substitute for hard power.

I want to talk about how there can be better integration between the different elements of hard and soft power. My impression is that, although different institutions work effectively on their own, they could deliver a lot more if they actively collaborated on a systematic basis in all countries where they operate.

I want to share some examples of Britain’s soft power assets, and then examine the need for the development of a co-ordinated vision for our foreign policy by addressing some of the practical realities and questions that surround putting that into practice. It is important to recognise at the outset that, compared with many countries, Britain has an immensely rich set of soft power institutions, resources and tools. In 2010, we were ranked joint first in the Institution for Government soft power index. In 2011, we were placed second, behind the USA. Soft power institutions, such as the British Council, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, Voluntary Service Overseas, the Commonwealth Foundation and the BBC World Service perform a valuable role in developing trusting relationships with overseas countries.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. On soft policy and achieving our foreign policy objectives, does he agree that a fundamental part of winning over people’s hearts and minds, as we have seen in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Libya, has been the work of the BBC World Service in communicating that we have a lot more that unites us than divides us?

[John Glen]

Absolutely. I will come on to speak about the World Service in a moment. All those assets deploy so much of what is great about this country: the English language, arts, education, and the values of civil society and democracy.

I pay tribute to the work—since, I think, 1934—of the British Council. It now works on the ground in more than 100 countries, particularly in strategic areas such as the middle east, north Africa and in emerging economies. It may be helpful to know that last year it provided more than 1.3 million hours of English language teaching, supporting 5 million English teachers across the world. It now uses digital broadcasting to reach 100 million students. In addition, it provides exams and qualifications, and links UK primary and secondary schools, universities and arts bodies with overseas institutions in long-term beneficial partnerships. Despite taking a 26% budget cut in this comprehensive spending review period, it has a clear resolve to continue its core work by continuing to win competitive education and development contracts.

As my hon. Friend mentioned, the BBC World Service also makes a massive and effective contribution to the development of the UK’s relationships abroad. It reaches 166 million people every week—through radio, television and the internet—in 27 languages, as well as English. Unlike the state-sponsored media of many of the countries in which it operates, its editorial independence ensures impartiality and objectivity. It is that professionalism and impartiality that generate trust and credibility overseas. The audience of BBC Arabic TV increased by more than 80% in recent months, including an increase in the online audience of 300% during the height of the Egyptian protests—clearly, it is a very powerful tool. Recent changes in funding streams and organisation will allow the World Service to work more closely with the domestic BBC, benefiting both the UK and other countries.

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy engages with political parties across the world. That work involves—I have done some of it—training party officials to develop their capacity to create policy, to campaign and to fulfil effectively their function as Government or Opposition parties in emerging democracies. That work builds up democratic institutions and understanding. It also generates long-term trusting relationships between those countries and the UK, and the individuals in those Governments and the UK. All these institutions leave a legacy and impact on the individuals who encounter them and inevitably lead many to develop a natural empathy, respect and affinity for our country.

As I suggested at the outset, given all that these institutions do, there is a need better to co-ordinate their work into an holistic vision for our foreign policy. We have to recognise—this is my experience of being a member of the Defence Committee and working for WFD—that different Departments and institutions naturally have varying perspectives on foreign policy and the status of our relationships with countries across the world. That includes the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, as well as soft power institutions such as the British Council and the BBC World Service. For example, the primary objective of DFID focuses on poverty and long-term development goals, but that might not always align with the immediate demands of a military intervention to secure a strategic objective for British foreign policy.

[Rehman Chishti]

My hon. Friend talks about the work of DFID, one aspect of which is education and its link to our foreign policy. We gave Pakistan £650 million for education to provide people with opportunity, aspiration and a life away from sectarian violence. That has implications for our own security—the training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan were linked to the terrorist attacks in London in 2005. DFID’s work on soft power foreign policy—giving people hope, opportunity and aspiration through education—provides a diversion from sectarian, ethnic terrorist tendencies.

[John Glen]

I am not in any way seeking to criticise any individual player; my core argument this afternoon is about the co-ordination between those contrasting perspectives. When I went to Islamabad last autumn, DFID’s massive contribution was very clear.

Any one of these perspectives—development, diplomacy, military or culture—need not displace the others. Rather than picking one, or one being the lead, the challenge is skilfully to harmonise and develop a single, shared vision for our foreign policy. My experience in Afghanistan—in the DFID compound and then talking to people from the FCO and various military leaders—was that they all had a different perspective. What seemed to be lacking sometimes was a desire to integrate fully different views. If one had a clear development goal, it was very easy to find that goal in conflict with a military objective. Rather than seeing those different views as a barrier, the Government need to work systematically to synthesise those complementary perspectives and refine overall policy definition.

There are some excellent examples of where that already works in practice. The stabilisation unit, which is owned jointly by DFID, the FCO and the MOD, brings together expertise from those Departments with police and military personnel. It despatches task forces to conflict-stricken areas—for example, Afghanistan—to develop political processes, reduce conflict and violence, and provide a basis for future development. It remains unclear why the unit should be taken out of Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

The challenge to achieve the systematic co-ordination of different departmental perspectives on a large scale is compelling. We must identify different perspectives where they exist across Government. That will mean undertaking the difficult task of recognising where a departmental mindset is preventing co-ordination and collaboration with another Department’s activities, perhaps between the FCO and DFID. No doubt some Departments and organisations will need to make compromises to agree a comprehensive strategy for the greater good of diplomatic and long-term relations in a region or country.

It is also desirable to aim for a closer working relationship between soft power organisations and the Ministry of Defence. As the ongoing work of the British Council in Libya has shown, soft power institutions can build relationships of trust ahead of and after military intervention in a country. If that approach can be developed in respect of future military interventions, it could ease the work of the armed forces, particularly when working alongside civilians. Working with soft power institutions and making use of diverse expertise could aid the MOD in defining viable exit strategies, rather than just asserting that those will exist. The institutions that I have mentioned have a more nuanced understanding of cultural barriers and attitudes of populations on the ground and can probably more reliably estimate what will be achievable by military means.

We need to recognise that Foreign Office diplomats, wonderful though they are, are not the only actors in British diplomacy. Although diplomats achieve much for British trade and political understanding, arm’s length bodies, such as the WFD, working to build civil society and government infrastructures and developing strong relationships with emerging political parties, do much to develop trust and credibility where Britain’s historic ties are less strong or apparent.

Our diplomacy must allow soft power institutions to play a more significant role in maintaining mutually beneficial, positive relationships throughout the world. As I have emphasised, the key challenge is overcoming ingrained departmental mindsets and historic positions to harness the complementary perspectives and resources of an increasing range of diverse institutions, especially arm’s length soft power organisations.

We must put in place effective leadership, accountability and co-ordinating procedures throughout our institutions to enable what I am arguing for to work properly, and to define a sophisticated foreign policy strategy that serves the interests of the UK optimally across the globe. That will mean determined effort from Ministers and senior civil servants to put vested interests aside, and the instincts of the budget holder being left at the door as each Department recognises that others have something meaningful to contribute. It will also mean having difficult but vital discussions about our vision and objectives with individuals who may have a different starting point at the outset.

It is only through a determined approach of that type that the UK can maintain its unique standing in the world and make best use of these enormously powerful resources and assets that our great country possesses.