Iran (UK Foreign Policy)

John Baron Excerpts

Thursday 6th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

The hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) and I are grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for agreeing to the debate. The hon. Gentleman and I are joint chairmen of the all-party parliamentary group on Iran. Flagged on today’s Order Paper is the report on Iran from the Foreign Affairs Committee, published in July. I know that the whole House will be grateful for that.

The debate comes at an important moment. In less than three weeks, on 24 November, the deadline for the current phase of the E3 plus 3 nuclear negotiations with Iran will be reached. Before I say more about those negotiations, let me put the debate in context. Here in the United Kingdom, too little is either known or understood about Iran. With a population of 77 million, it is second in size only to Egypt in the wider middle east, but it is much more prosperous than Egypt. It is “middle income” on the United Nations’ GDP measure, ahead of Bulgaria, which is a member of the European Union. Iran has a distinguished three-millennium civilisation, with as many connections, cultural and political, to Europe as to its southern and eastern neighbours. Its language is Indo-European. The words “Iran” and “Aryan” share the same root. Although it is Muslim, it is Muslim in its own singular way, through its practice of Shi’ism. It is a great mistake ever to suggest to an Iranian that Iranians are Arabs. It may sound counter-intuitive today, but traditionally lran’s strongest links in the region had been with the Jewish communities of the middle east.

Iran’s relationship with the United Kingdom has over many decades been close but difficult. “Behind every curtain you’ll find an Englishman,” goes one familiar saying in Farsi. From an Iranian perspective, one can appreciate why. From the late 19th century onwards we saw relations with Iran in mercantilist, neo-colonialist terms only. Iran was divided into spheres of influence by Russia under the Tsar and the United Kingdom. In the early part of the last century, highly preferential terms for the D’Arcy petroleum company, the forerunner of BP, were extorted from the then Government. Subsequently, we were instrumental in removing the Qajar dynasty, putting Reza Shah on the throne. We jointly occupied Iran with the Soviet Union for five years from 1941 to 1946. We and the United States then successfully conspired to remove the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953.

We then continued this rather dismal record by propping up the Shah even when there was every indication, if only we had recognised it, that he was heading a decadent and decaying regime which was highly likely to collapse. A year after the Islamic revolution came the Iran-Iraq war, in which by common consent Iraq was the aggressor and Iran the victim, but the west, including the UK, sided with the aggressor.

At the end of this week we have our Remembrance Sunday, when we remember the fallen who gave their lives for us in two world wars. Those wars are part of the definition of contemporary Britain. Similarly, we understand nothing about Iran if we do not understand the deep and still contemporary trauma that the Iran-Iraq war inflicted on Iranian society—the near-million killed and the sense of isolation which that war reinforced as one western nation after another, the UK included, unworthily supported Iraq. With that isolation came the sense that Iran could rely only upon itself.

Despite its complex and difficult relationship with the United Kingdom, the US and other western nations, Iran principally looks west, not east or south, for its future. Of course, there are those in the system who define themselves against the “Satans” of the west and who have a vested interest in the status quo, including in sanctions, but there are many, many more who want a normal relationship with the west. It was that demand that lay behind President Rouhani’s surprising victory in the presidential elections in June 2013, and there are, indeed, more American PhDs in President Rouhani’s Cabinet than in President Obama’s.

In the 1980s—and under the cover of mutually rebarbative, but carefully controlled, rhetoric—the one country from whom Iran gained some understanding, and very significant arms supplies, was Israel. David Menashri, of Tel Aviv university, one of Israel’s foremost experts on Iran, subsequently commented:

“Throughout the 1980s, no one in Israel said anything about an Iranian threat”

to Israel. He continued:

“The word wasn’t even uttered.”

That, however, was all in the days of the cold war.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I am listening intently and with great interest and I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. However, he will perhaps agree that it was not just a question of the election of President Rouhani; there have been attempts in the past by Iran to reach out. While accepting that mistakes have been made by both sides in this difficult relationship, one only has to think of immediately after 9/11 when the Iranians reached out, and the early days of Afghanistan when they tried to help and did, indeed, help, but were rebuffed by the “axis of evil” speech by President Bush, for example.

[Mr Straw]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. I was heavily involved after President Khatami reached out to the United States in the moment of need. Iran provided significant practical help, without which it would have been far more difficult to remove the Taliban and to retake Kabul. Iran got no thanks for that, however. It was unnecessarily rebuffed by the United States at the time, as it was during the 2003-05 nuclear negotiations. It was also rebuffed when it sought a comprehensive bargain with the west. I am afraid that that prospect was greeted in parts of the United States with suspicion. In my view, there was a worry that if a deal was struck that resulted in the normalisation of relations with Iran, the part of the American system—and, indeed, the part of the Israeli system—that always likes to define itself against some kind of enemy would have had that enemy removed.

Twenty-five years after the collapse of the Berlin wall, the metrics of the middle east have all changed. The view of the Netanyahu Government in Israel, which is echoed by many in the United States Congress, is that Iran now poses an existential threat to the state of Israel because of the doubts as to whether Iran’s nuclear programmes have a military purpose. Those programmes are the subject of the intensive negotiations that will, we hope, have reached a satisfactory conclusion by 24 November.

As it was I, along with my French and German counterparts, who began the original E3 negotiations with Iran in 2003, I offer the following observations. Iran is not an easy country to negotiate with. That is partly due to cultural and linguistic problems and partly for historical reasons, but fundamentally it is a product of Iran’s complex and opaque governmental system, in which the elected President has constantly to broker decisions with unelected elements, including those in the revolutionary guards and those in the Supreme Leader’s office.

Unlike North Korea, which pulled out of the non-proliferation treaty, or India, Pakistan and Israel—all nuclear weapons states which have never accepted the treaty’s obligations—Iran has stayed within it. The treaty protects

“the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.

However, the treaty is silent on the question—critical to the outcome of the negotiations—of the enrichment of uranium. The Iranians claim a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and I hope the whole House will support them in that. The interim agreement signed last November explicitly recognised that.

The last set of negotiations, which took place between 2003 and 2005 and in which I was directly involved, ran into the ground. The Bush Administration had undermined the Khatami Administration through the “axis of evil” speech, and they did so again by refusing to offer Iran any confidence-building measures until it was too late. By that time, conservative forces in Iran had re-gathered their strength, with President Ahmadinejad the result.

When parliamentary colleagues and I met Foreign Minister Zarif in Tehran in January this year, he pointed out that when I had been negotiating with him in 2005, Iran had fewer than 200 centrifuges. After eight years of sanctions, it now has 18,800. We should be careful what we wish for. The good news about the current round of negotiations is that both sides have kept them confidential. However, it is no secret that the Iranian Government cannot do a deal unless it includes a continuation of enrichment for peaceful purposes, and unless the scale of the programme allowed does not involve the Government having to make significant numbers of its scientists redundant.

The negotiations are predicated on the basis that, because of Iran’s past failures to make full disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there remain unanswered questions about the true intent of Iran’s nuclear programmes. None of us outside the inner workings of the Iranian Government can know for certain what this is. My own instinct is that after the trauma of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran probably did begin work on a nuclear weapons system. More recently, however, a 2007 US national intelligence estimate—which has been reconfirmed by the White House in the past two years—concluded that Tehran had halted nuclear weaponisation work in 2003. If that is the case, there is no reason why, with some flexibility on both sides, a deal should not be concluded. If that happens, the gradual lifting of sanctions—which Iran so desperately needs—will help to bring Iran back fully as a partner in the international community.

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[Sir Richard Ottaway]

Yes, I am aware of that comment. However, the interpretation that my hon. Friend puts on it may be slightly unfair to Rouhani who does not necessarily control the judicial system or the sentences that are being handed down. The question is: can we trust him?

[Mr Baron]

I am listening with intent and interest to my right hon. Friend’s good speech. May I suggest to him that we should not look at this relationship just through the prism of executions and human rights? There are many of our allies in the region that have a similarly poor record, and yet that has not stopped us from calling them allies.

[Sir Richard Ottaway]

I have great regard for my hon. Friend’s views, but there are not many countries in the region that have a human rights record quite as bad as Iran’s. None the less, he makes a valid point, and it has to be taken into account. The question I was asking was: can we trust President Rouhani? The right hon. Member for Blackburn, who has known him for many years, suggests that we can, and I hope that he is right. The question is: what if he is wrong? That is the challenge we all face.

Rather worryingly, the Supreme Leader has been interfering in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with his call for industrial levels of centrifuges and nuclear material production, which caught the negotiators by surprise. When President Obama suggested enriching nuclear rods in the United States in 2009, the Supreme Leader pulled the rug from under that issue as well.

At the UN, President Rouhani suggested there should be a link between helping the west deal with the situation in Iraq and concessions in the nuclear negotiations. I have only one response to that, which is no, no, no. That cannot be the basis on which we proceed. To have a few more enrichment centrifuges for a bit of co-operation is exactly the wrong sort of deal.

Looking at the negotiations—the deadline is fast approaching—a number of deals have been suggested. Any settlement must have two main features. One is the break-out time. The Foreign Affairs Committee proposed a minimum of at least six months. The second is a verification programme that must be as robust as possible. That must be supported by a rigid inspections regime. It is critical that the International Atomic Energy Agency stays involved throughout the whole process and brings its professionalism to any verification and inspection. There is, in any settlement, a trade-off between reduction in capacity and the relaxation of trade sanctions as an incentive to encourage progress.

There is much talk about the number of centrifuges that can be used for peaceful production. I have been advised that the figure is somewhere in the region of 2,000 to 4,000, against the 18,000 currently in use. Obviously, the fewer centrifuges there are, the greater the time for break-out, and that has to be right at the centre of any negotiation settlement.

We also need to be satisfied that the objectives of the base at Arak, which is the home to the heavy water reactor, are peaceful. Iranians have yet to come up with a good explanation of those objectives. They argue that the facility is being used for medical research, but there is far too much capacity there for that, and no economic reason has been forthcoming.

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[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

First, I thank the Backbench Business Committee for allowing this debate and congratulate the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) on securing it.

To suggest that our relationship with Iran has had a chequered history would be an understatement. Both sides have attempted to demonise each other and used heavy rhetoric, sanctions and so on, and no doubt this has resulted in a lack of progress on a range of issues of mutual interest and benefit. This journey has also been punctuated by a series of missed opportunities and mistakes by both sides. The election of President Rouhani provides a fresh opportunity that we must seize, as several Members have alluded to in this useful and informed debate. The emergence of Islamic State might also provide grounds for co-operation. We must seize the moment to improve relations with Iran. If we do not, we might miss a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and slip back to where we were only a couple of years ago, when the threat of military intervention was high.

The west, especially in Washington and London, has perhaps not done enough to understand the region in general and Iran in particular. There has been a dilution of skills within the FCO, with the closure, at one stage, of the language school and the prevalence of a management tick-box mentality rather than a desire to train diplomats fundamentally to understand a region and get their hands dirty. Some of those decisions have been reversed, but I would still argue that there has been a massive dilution of skills within the FCO, and that has partly been to blame for our failure to understand the region in general.

That has led directly to a series of errors. No one can now dispute that in 2003 we went to war on a false premise, but it does not stop there. We made a fundamental mistake in allowing the Afghan mission to morph into one of nation building in 2006, which we could not properly resource, while our intervention in Libya has proved a complete and utter disaster: an almighty civil war, massive casualties and the Libyan Parliament taking refuge on a Greek car ferry outside Tobruk. If it was any further east, it would be floating into Egyptian waters. It is farcical. Our position on Syria, over the course of just 15 months, has been totally incoherent. Only last year, we were talking, in effect, about intervening on behalf of the rebels, but now we are taking on elements of that very same rebel force. London and Washington must guard against adding Iran to that long list of sorry errors.

Various Members, particularly the right hon. Member for Blackburn and my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk, alluded to the missed opportunities on both sides. We tend to forget in this place that after 9/11 Iran extended the hand of friendship to the west and showed sympathy, and it was not just words: in the early phases of the Afghanistan mission, it actually helped to identify enemy sites, and what was its reward? It was lambasted by President Bush for being part of the axis of evil.

In this debate, we have heard that there have been lots of words but very little action, but Iran tried again. In the early phases of Iraq, it tried to be supportive—there was an alignment of interests—but again it was rebuffed. And we should not forget, by the way, on Afghanistan and 9/11, that at least partly because of the west’s robust rebuttal of Iran’s overtures the moderate President Khatami was removed and the hardliners again assumed the ascendency. I could go back further, but time does not allow. I could go back to the 1953 coup and the fact that we supported Iraq despite its having attacked Iran in a vicious civil war that cost a million lives—something that is imprinted on the DNA of Iranians.

With the nuclear talks ongoing and crucial moments approaching, let us please remember that confrontation has not worked in the past. The number of centrifuges has gone through the roof, despite all the sanctions. The Iranians will not be bullied; they are a proud nation. Anyone who has studied their history, or perhaps travelled or lived there briefly, will know them to be a proud nation that will not be bullied into submission. Our decision to report Iran to the UN Security Council in 2006 led directly to its withdrawing from the enhanced inspection regime, which actually it was entitled to do.

The IAEA report in November 2011, despite all the rhetoric from the west, had no smoking gun. The US intelligence services said there was no evidence that Iran had decided to go down the road of a nuclear weapons programme or that it was doing so. The evidence suggested that it wanted to get to the point of capability—of having the option of breaking out—as has been reinforced by well-respected people such as Peter Jenkins, the former UK representative to the IAEA, and Robert Kelly, a director of the governing body of that organisation. These people are not fools; they are people who have been at the centre and said the same thing.

That is why we must choose our words carefully on the Foreign Affairs Committee. Our words have been quoted in this debate. We did not say that Iran had decided to develop nuclear weapons or that it was doing so; we said it wanted to reach the point of having the option, and there is a world of difference in that sort of terminology. One is not being an apologist for Iran; one abhors the human rights issues and various other aspects, though I made the point that some of our regional allies also have similarly poor track records in this area. However, if we look at the map from Tehran, we can understand why the Iranians are nervous: they are surrounded by nuclear powers, whether it is Israel to the west, Pakistan to the east, the Russians to the north or the American fleet to the south. Having that option is logical—we are a country that retains an independent nuclear deterrent for very similar reasons.

I raised this issue two years ago, when things almost came to a head from a military point of view. Many Members here today participated in that debate as well, at a time when we were certainly rattling the sabre. Forces were gathering in the Persian gulf and the rhetoric was getting very heavy indeed. One made the point that we needed to try to go the extra diplomatic mile, rather than succumbing to what seemed at the time to be quite a slide into military intervention. My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk was right to say that we lost in that debate—if I remember, the figures were something like 285 to six. To this day, I thank the six who joined me in the Lobby. It was another lonely experience, but at least it was shared across the House when it came to our military interventions.

Let us fast-forward two years. Where are we now? We now have a golden opportunity. We have the joint plan of action, which I hope we go the extra mile to bring to a successful conclusion. We really do need to explore the option of allowing the Iranians to enrich uranium, provided we have an enhanced inspection regime. There seems to be a dragging of feet on the embassy front. Yes, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham) is absolutely right: the storming of an embassy is almost unforgivable. That said, of the three stated enemies of Iran—Israel, the US and the UK—only the UK has diplomatic relations with Iran, stretched though they may be, and we have got to make every effort to keep that door of diplomacy open. It goes without saying—it is a cliché, but it is true all the same—that we make peace with our enemies, not with our friends. We have to keep that door of diplomacy open; otherwise, there is no hope of peace.

We must remind ourselves of the costs of failure. Two years ago there was serious consideration of military intervention, at least by countries in the region. Why is all this important? Because when we refer to the lack of understanding of the region and Iran and to a dilution of skills in perhaps the FCO and in London and Washington generally, we have to try to understand that there is a complex structure in Iran, with multiple centres of authority and constant power struggles. We need to try to influence that, rather than just giving credence to the hardliners by simply adopting a hard-line approach.

A military solution to this problem there cannot be, as ever. A recent US estimate suggests that any military intervention might set back the nuclear programme by only a year at most. We all know that knowledge cannot be eradicated and that if Iran is set on acquiring nuclear weapons, she will not be scared away. If she is not, perhaps any sort of military intervention would encourage her to do so. Looking at post-war history, we should also remember that interventions in countries have tended to embed hard-line views. It is no coincidence that communism, for example, survived longest in the countries where we intervened—we might think of China, Vietnam, North Korea or Cuba.

In conclusion, we have got to seize the moment. We have got to seize this opportunity to try to improve relations, because so much depends on a successful outcome. It could be the key to the resolution of so many issues in the region. We have to be realistic in how we approach this. I agree that we must be quite robust in how we negotiate with the Iranians, but there has to be an element of good will in trying to foster better relations.

I finish with this thought. When President Nixon flew to Beijing in 1972, at a time when US influence in the Pacific was on the wane, he did not deny the reality that China was in ascendancy; but despite being heavily criticised at the time, in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight, it was recognised as a brilliant move. It opened up an era of better relations, at a time when things had been deteriorating fast. He was heavily criticised at the time. I would suggest to the House that we need something similar from our side to try to reach out and break the deadlock. We have a golden opportunity, with a moderate President, newly elected. We now have situations on the ground in the region that beg for mutual co-operation to our joint advantage. Let us seize the moment, because if we do not, I am afraid this will be yet another chapter in the sad history of a very poor relationship, punctuated by missed opportunities, and this time the costs of failure could be very dire indeed. That is what we have to appreciate; that is why we need to try and make it work this time.

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[Mr Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) and to participate in this debate, having had the opportunity to listen to some speeches that were extremely thoughtful and provocative in the best sense. In that regard, I pay particular tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) for his continuing considered interest in Iran, and to the debate’s other sponsor, the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon).

In its recent report on UK policy towards Iran, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee rightly said that it would be in the UK’s interest to have a mature and constructive relationship with Iran. In that context, the Government were right to take the in-principle decision to reopen the embassy in Tehran, and the Prime Minister was right to meet President Rouhani in September.

Despite these recent important steps, there are many reasons for considerable caution and care in our engagement with Iran, not least because the 24 November deadline for reaching a comprehensive deal that limits Iran’s nuclear programme is approaching fast. Scepticism about Iran’s motives and intentions for these negotiations is hardly surprising, given the country’s links to terrorist organisations, the routine failure of its politicians to recognise Israel’s right to exist, its support for the Assad regime and the widespread concern that it has in the past actively sought a nuclear weapons capability.

This debate, then, is a welcome opportunity to explore the progress that has been made in the nuclear negotiations, and to examine the progress—or the lack of it—on other aspects of our policy towards Iran, including its future role in the region and its attitude to its people and their rights.

Almost a year ago, my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary welcomed the efforts of the Government, and particularly those of Baroness Ashton, as part of the E3 plus 3 to conclude a thorough and detailed interim agreement in the nuclear negotiations with Iran. As others have said, that included a joint plan of action with a series of crucial commitments—commitments that, if implemented properly, would mean that the aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme that were thought to pose the greatest risk could not be developed further during the period of the interim agreement. In addition, some of the most disturbing parts of Iran’s nuclear programme to date would be significantly scaled back, including the eradication of around 200 kg of 20%-enriched uranium. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s assessment of the extent to which the commitments in this joint plan of action have been adhered to and can be built on.

That interim agreement also set out the elements of what a comprehensive agreement could look like: adherence to Iran’s obligations and rights under the non-proliferation treaty and IAEA safeguards; full resolution of concerns around the heavy water research reactor at Arak; agreed transparency and monitoring; and co-operation on Iran’s civilian nuclear programme. In return for confidence that Iran’s programme is solely peaceful, the plan of action suggests a mutually defined, enrichment-based programme, with agreed parameters and limits—but only as part of a comprehensive agreement. Sanctions would begin to be further lifted at that point.

Others close to the negotiations, notably in the US, have suggested that all the components of a plan for a long-term definitive agreement that should be acceptable to both sides are on the table. As my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary and, indeed, the Foreign Secretary noted, it is the pressure of sanctions, albeit coupled with a readiness to negotiate, that has helped bring Iran to the negotiating table and helped to achieve the progress that has been made.

As the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), who is the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and indeed the right hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames), pointed out, one crucial test of Iran’s willingness to engage with the profound concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme surrounds the access given to the IAEA to its nuclear sites and staff. There remain concerns that IAEA inspectors still do not have full access to every one of Iran’s nuclear sites—for example, I understand that Iran has agreed only to limited inspections by the IAEA at its main enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. IAEA inspectors still do not have access to the heavy water second reactor being built at Arak or to the Parchin military base, mentioned by the hon. Member for Hendon (Dr Offord), where the IAEA and others suspect Iran has attempted to develop a nuclear explosive device in the past. Perhaps the Minister will outline how this critical issue of IAEA access for monitoring is being addressed in the negotiations.

I recognise the importance of reaching a deal, both in building a little more trust in Iran towards the west and in keeping the more reactionary forces in Iran at bay, but negotiations cannot be allowed simply to drag on and on. Can the Minister reassure us that the Iranian side is fully engaged in the negotiations and remains committed to the 24 November deadline? Also, what steps would be taken if agreement were not achieved? Would sanctions that were lifted when the interim agreement was concluded last November, for example, be re-imposed?

There has been little public discussion to date about the role Iran is playing or might play in the future in the international effort against ISIL. Some have suggested that the threat ISIL poses in the region should be a reason for more flexibility towards Iran in these nuclear negotiations. I have to say that I do not agree. If there were not a willingness by the Iranians to build the trust of the international community on the nuclear issue, we could be replacing one very difficult threat with the re-emergence of another very significant threat. I hope, instead, that these negotiations will help to build further the scope, if not for trust, at least for better communication on a wider range of issues where our interests are aligned, of which the threat ISIL poses is clearly the most significant at the moment.

There have been reports of Iranian troops on the ground in Iraq, although there has been no formal announcement. Will the Minister set out his assessment of Iran’s role in resisting ISIL both in Iraq and Syria? Iran continues to have a choice as to whether to be a force for stability in the region. Its record to date has been decidedly mixed. It has a history of supporting the Assad regime in Syria and supporting and supplying a series of highly divisive and terrorist groups in the region which pose a continued threat to our allies there, including, but not only, Israel. It would be useful to hear from the Minister about the efforts that he and other Ministers have made in encouraging Iran to take a different approach to regional stability.

Many Members have mentioned the reopening of the embassy, which is, as they have said, a potentially important step in expanding bilateral engagement with the Iranians. An embassy, and diplomatic representation, would help us to develop relationships and gather information, which is essential, over time, to the building of trust and the facilitation of constructive dialogue, and which—again, over time—could perhaps influence attitudes and events for the better. Will the Minister update the House on progress towards the reopening of the embassy? In particular, will he deal with the suggestion by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn that concerns in the Home Office are holding up the issuing of a timetable? Will he also tell us what further action has been taken, or consideration given, to ensure that staff will be safe and secure at the embassy in the future, in the light of the events in 2011 to which the hon. Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham) alluded?

As a number of Members have pointed out, Iran’s human rights record continues to be of deep concern. At the weekend it was reported that the British-Iranian women’s rights activist Ghoncheh Ghavami had been found guilty of spreading anti-regime propaganda and sentenced to a year in prison after being detained for trying to watch a men’s volleyball match. My hon. Friends the Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) and for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) expressed the profound concern that I am sure we all feel about her imprisonment and sentencing. Amnesty International has described her as a prisoner of conscience, and has raised concerns that Ghoncheh and her fellow demonstrators were beaten by police officers when they were arrested.

There have been widespread reports of torture and ill treatment in Iranian prisons, including sexual violence, severe beatings, denial of medical treatment, and long periods of solitary confinement. The number of executions is up. Indeed, as we heard from the hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish), Iran has the highest execution rate per capita in the world. Reyhanah Jabbari was executed on 25 October for killing a former intelligence officer after she had alleged that he had attempted to rape her. Amnesty International has said that it believes the court’s impartiality may have been affected by the victim’s connections with the Ministry of Intelligence. In addition, human rights defenders, journalists and bloggers have been arrested and their work censored.

While in theory Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism are recognised alongside Islam, religious minorities continue to face discrimination, with converts particularly affected. That point was made by the hon. Member for Portsmouth South (Mr Hancock). There have been reports of harassment, desecration of religious sites, restricted access to education and employment, and even arrest and torture. Members of the Baha’i faith, which is not recognised, have been especially discriminated against. The situation for lesbian and gay people is profoundly worrying. Homosexual acts are criminalised, gay people are executed simply for being gay, and many lesbian and gay people have reported that they have been denied access to education or dismissed from employment once their sexuality has become known. Last week, the Iranian delegation to the United Nations Human Rights Council’s periodic review of the human rights situation in Iran again appeared dismissive of concerns.

[Mr Baron]

The hon. Gentleman has given us a list of what we must all agree are abhorrent examples, but are not such crimes also being committed by our allies in the region? We should not just view Iran through that particular prism.

[Mr Thomas]

The hon. Gentleman is right, but we are focusing on the particular issue of British policy on Iran, and it is right for us to draw attention to the dismal human rights record there.

I appreciate the difficulties that are involved in bringing about an improvement in human rights in Iran. Nevertheless, Ministers must continue to take whatever opportunities do arise. I trust that the Minister will tell us what efforts he and other Ministers have made in that regard.

The date of 24 November marks a critical point in our relationship with Iran. Given the profound international concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its destabilising influence in the wider region and its human rights record, the successful completion of a comprehensive agreement could represent the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between our two countries. Labour has supported the Government’s work in building on the approach to the nuclear negotiations that was taken by the last Government, and continues to do so. I hope that Iran will take the opportunity presented by the negotiations to ease international concerns about its nuclear ambitions. It needs to.