(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. I know that he does a lot of work on perpetrator programmes through the White Ribbon scheme in Scotland. I am sorry to hear about the experience of one of his local councillors, and I draw to his attention the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023, which recently received Royal Assent. It creates an offence of intentional harassment carried out because of a person’s sex. It is quite possible that that covers his friend’s case, so I would be grateful if he wrote to me or came to see me to discuss it further.
Last month, Sex Matters presented the Prime Minister with a letter signed by almost 15,000 people asking him to
“take urgent action to halt an escalating campaign of violence and intimidation against women in the name of ‘trans rights’.”
It details how women and, in particular, lesbians are being threatened with the loss of their livelihoods and with physical violence, shouted down and intimidated at public events, and sometimes even assaulted for insisting on their rights to freedom of belief and of expression, and for calling for sex-based protections to be upheld. Will the Minister condemn that violence and intimidation? Will she urge the Prime Minister to do so as well and to commit to addressing it by commissioning a rapid review of the impact of extreme trans rights activism on women’s rights, including the rights of lesbians? Will she also open a call for evidence?
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her question, and I certainly condemn the conduct that she has described. Even though holding a gender critical belief is protected in law, both under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010 and, more widely, under article 9 of the European convention on human rights, I am aware of the polarisation and, sometimes, intimidation that surrounds this debate. I have seen the letter that Sex Matters wrote to the Prime Minister, and the hon. and learned Lady should be in no doubt about how seriously this is viewed. I have made reference to the Protection from Sex-based Harassment in Public Act 2023, which creates an offence of intentional harassment where there is any causal connection, even a weak one, to a person’s sex, under which such conduct may fall. She has asked for a rapid review, and I would like to meet her to discuss that further and any next steps.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe Union between Scotland and England was freely entered into. I know that some people are under the misapprehension that now it is some sort of “Hotel California” situation, where we can check out but cannot leave, but that is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Union. The views that I am expounding about sovereignty are not just my eccentric views, but the views that have been expounded by many well-respected Scottish jurists, as the hon. Gentleman knows. It is worthwhile sometimes to take a step back. With all due respect to some of my English friends, they get a bit hysterical about parliamentary sovereignty. Sovereignty can be shared and, ultimately, I believe that sovereignty lies with the people. I will just leave it at that.
It is genuinely a pleasure to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). I will try to avoid too much mince in my own speech, but to continue in the respectful tone that she has struck.
I wish to take a little of the heat out of this debate and to say that I think the British people would recognise in the United Kingdom a country that has honoured its commitments since the launch of the 1951 refugee convention to offer sanctuary to those with a well-founded fear of persecution. The record of the past seven years, where close to half a million people have been granted asylum on humanitarian grounds, bears testimony to that.
I think that the British people would also recognise that there are peculiar and unique problems that have arisen with the small boat crossings. Five years ago, in 2018, 300 people made that journey; last year, it was 45,000. Of those, 80% were men aged between 18 and 40, all of whom had paid a people smuggler and all of whom had the physical strength and wherewithal to make a journey across continental Europe through the small boat route. We know that a third of them arriving last year were Albanian.
I just want to read what Dan O’Mahoney told the Home Affairs Committee—I see that the Chair is in her place—when he appeared before it last October. I am quoting verbatim. He said about the Albanian arrivals:
“The rise has been exponential, and we think that is in the main due to the fact that Albanian criminal gangs have gained a foothold in the north of France and have begun facilitating very large numbers of migrants… Whatever sort of criminality you can think of…there are Albanian criminal gangs dominating”—
in this country—
“whether it is drug smuggling, human trafficking, guns or prostitution.”
He said that a lot of the Albanian migrants
“are not actually interested in seeing their asylum claim through… We typically put them in a hotel for a couple of days, and then they will disappear”
into the underworld.
That unique and specific problem requires a unique and specific answer. We all agree on safe and legal routes. I will not improve on the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) in his powerful speech. I heard from those on the Labour Front Bench, for the first time tonight, that they also endorse quotas, which is part of this Bill, and we agree with that.
In case my intervention earlier was not clear enough, I was simply saying that Harvey Redgrave, writing in a thoughtful piece for the Tony Blair Institute last July, talked about not only safe and legal routes, out-of-country rights of appeal and quotas, but an absolute prohibition on small boat arrivals. That really is the disputed issue in this legislation.
I rise to speak in response to amendments 131 and 132, which were tabled by two Conservatives, one of whom, my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Danny Kruger), is in his place.
I am just going to make a tiny bit of progress, because I have not really started and there is not much time.
I want to respond to amendments 131 and 132, which would do slightly different things but have the same effect. I will look at you, Dame Eleanor, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes will not be offended if he has to look at my back. Amendment 131 would exclude the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and amendment 132 seeks to disapply the relevant sections of the Human Rights Act 1998 in so far as they may be relevant to decisions taken under this Bill.
I want to say at the outset that I understand the impulse that has brought my hon. Friend here—namely the frustration with the exercise of the rule 39 injunctive relief decision in July, which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West covered so well in her speech. She will know as well as I do that rule 39 is not an inherent part of the European convention on human rights; she said in her speech that it is a rule of the Court.
That decision was taken by a single judge alone. The hon. and learned Lady is right to point out that that is common and standard in injunctive proceedings, but it is none the less somewhat surprising to see that matter go through in the eyes of the High Court, the Court of Appeal here and, finally, the Supreme Court, and then be overturned by the decision of a single judge in Europe. We do not even know who the judge was, but we know that Tim Eicke, our own British judge who sits on the European Court, has never sat as a High Court judge. He is a barrister. I say that with deference to his brilliance, and of course I am not criticising him; that is standard for the European Court of Human Rights. However, it is odd to see our own Supreme Court, with some of the most brilliant justices in the world, being overruled, under a Court rule, by somebody who is probably not of their status. I think that is a true statement.
I went on to say that in the case of Paladi v. Moldova, the Grand Chamber said that a failure to comply with interim measures amounts to a violation of article 34 of the convention, because the high contracting parties have undertaken not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right of applicants to bring their claims before the Court. Whereas it was originally in the rules of Court, the Grand Chamber has now said that failure to obtemper or comply with that would be a violation of article 34 of the convention.
I take the hon. and learned Lady’s point. We are obviously adhering to that, but as a rule of the Court.
Moving on, I was glad to read recently, whether in a press release or in a tweet—I cannot recall—the Home Secretary saying she was glad that constructive talks were now taking place between representatives of the British Government and members of the European Court of Human Rights, focused on resolving that issue. I say that is good because I think it should be possible to resolve that issue, since it is a rule of the Court rather than a principle of human rights. I hope we can move on from there.
If I may say so, with great respect, I do not accept that that decision in itself justifies these two amendments. I think both are weak for legal and constitutional reasons, and I will set out why. First, on amendment 131, my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Mr Clarke) said that he had relied on a paper written for Policy Exchange by Richard Ekins and Sir Stephen Laws. I challenge the expertise of both those people—I question it. One of them has contacted me in the past, but neither are practitioners, and it shows in their writing that they are not regularly in court.
No disrespect is intended, but it is clear that they are not frequently in court arguing these cases, because if they were, they would know the way the law ran.
The hon. Lady and I do not agree about a lot of things, but I believe she has expertise in this area as a barrister—that is correct, is it not?
The hon. Lady has expertise and has practised in this area, so I suggest to her hon. Friends that her views deserve a degree of respect.
On the Government side of the House, I am probably the Member who has most recently been in the immigration tribunals, so I have an idea, but it is not my principal practice area.
The other thing that I think is relevant is that Parliament has in the past successfully recalibrated the interpretation of the convention and changed the way it is interpreted, and had no difficulty with that. The Bill already takes a number of novel steps in relation to established law. First, it creates an absolute duty of removal on the Home Secretary that applies irrespective of any human rights claim, with the exception of the non-refoulement principle. Secondly, the Bill expands powers of immigration detention, granting the Secretary of State a power to determine the period that is “reasonably necessary”, in some ways overriding established Hardial Singh principles. Thirdly, it limits the rights of appeal: the individual has a right of appeal, but that is capped at one. In my respectful submission, the Government must have the opportunity to see those clauses enacted, because I believe that they will be upheld by the European Court of Human Rights.
Back in 2012, the coalition Government changed the immigration rules in relation to the deportation of foreign national offenders and the application of article 8, which is the right to respect for private and family life. Parliament took the view that that was too often being interpreted in favour of the ex-convict, and, as a result, set new rules—from paragraph 398 onwards of the established immigration rules—to make it clear that there were limited circumstances in which article 8 should be engaged. Parliament said in terms that the balance should be struck in favour of the overwhelming public interest in deportation, above any article 8 claim unless there were very compelling circumstances to the contrary. That was upheld in successive decisions by our appeal courts, beginning with MF (Nigeria) in the Court of Appeal.
The decision by Parliament to circumscribe the ambit of article 8 when it applied to criminals was taken to the European Court of Human Rights for years, but the court would not hear the issue at all until 2017 in the case of Ndidi. I reminded myself today of how that case was approached. In fact, a quite compelling article 8 argument was made: the person had arrived in the United Kingdom as a baby and had never been anywhere else, and the offending was quite low level—drug dealing rather than any harm to the person. The courts here had said that he must be deported to a country that he had never been to before. He challenged that in the European Court of Human Rights, which said, “No, the British Government are absolutely entitled to circumscribe the application of article 8 in the way that they have.” His claim was rejected.
My simple point is that we can do things—in the way that the Government are seeking through the Bill—that may well be compatible with the European convention on human rights, and I have struggled to find any example of the court overturning primary legislation, which is what the Bill is, or constructing it in a way that is disadvantageous to the member state. The fact that so many Members refer back to the prisoner voting case does not enhance their argument. That case is 20 years old and has been reversed. I accept without reservation that it was wrongly decided—I think there was overreach—but I have heard no example from the last 20 years to suggest that the Court is still making the same mistakes.
We have talked about the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 not being a success, but that was not because the European Court of Human Rights said that it was unlawful or overreached; we simply concluded that it did not yet work. For those reasons, I think that the Bill already goes very far and should be given the chance to work through.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberAn experienced employment lawyer like the hon. Member for Middlesbrough will know the true mechanics very well. A union and probably the TUC and Professor Keith Ewing, because he did the last one, will put in a written submission to the ILO, and its committee of experts based at the ILO office in Geneva will respond in due course. It is not appropriate to say that something is the complete answer of the ILO because somebody has waggled a microphone under somebody’s nose at Davos. There is a procedure.
I hope my speech is not confusing the hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon), because I am not suggesting for a moment that what was sent to MPs this morning is a comment on the United Kingdom. It is the ILO’s statement of general principles on minimum service levels, and I will continue, if I may. The ILO says that the second acceptable restriction is where strikes take place in activities that may be considered essential services. It lists, at paragraph 135 of its 2012 report:
“air traffic control, telephone service…firefighting services, health and ambulance services, prison services, the security forces and water and electricity services.”
The report continues:
“In situations in which a…total prohibition of strike action would not appear to be justified…consideration might be given to ensuring that users’ basic needs are met or that facilities operate safely or without interruption, the introduction of a negotiated minimum service…could be appropriate.”
What the hon. Lady is saying is very interesting, but does she accept that, as we are in Europe, any analysis of the legality of these proposals has to start with article 11 of the European convention on human rights? Can she point to any country in Europe with Government-enforced minimum standards that can lead to the sacking of workers on strike? [Interruption.] The Minister should listen to the question carefully, because the answer will be on the record. Can the hon. Member for Newbury (Laura Farris) point to any other country in Europe that has Government-enforced minimum standards, without negotiation and without arbitration—
Can the hon. Member for Newbury point to any country in Europe in which, as a result of Government-enforced minimum standards, without any negotiation and without any arbitration, a worker can lose his or her job, other than—wait for it—Hungary or Russia?
The hon. and learned Lady is right that negotiation is required. I was shocked to find that, in France, the sanction for a person who refuses a requisitioning request is via the criminal courts. I did not know that, and I did not know it is the case in Canada, too. It may be that I have misread the legislation, and that it is a “life and limb” exemption—I am not familiar enough with French legislation.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI would like to accept the invitation of the shadow Deputy Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner), who encouraged us to be respectful in this debate. I wish to be so. We have heard a lot from the Labour party this evening about how the Bill is an act of political violence and an attack on the fundamental freedom of working people, but we have not heard an answer to the fundamental question that the legislation poses: do the British people have a right set out in statute to a basic safety and security guarantee during periods of strike?
Let us start with the law. The right to strike is embedded in international law, most notably in article 11 of the European convention on human rights.
The hon. Lady asks whether any of us on the Opposition Benches care about fundamental safety levels, and yes we do. She asked whether we would support legislating, but legislation already exists. On article 11, she knows as well as I do that the measures have to be “necessary”. The Government’s own memo with the last legislation said that the measures were not necessary in relation to the health service, education and fire and rescue.
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her point, and I will assist her, because I was coming on to that point. The article 11 right may be restricted for two reasons—if the restriction is necessary, yes, and proportionate. The International Labour Organisation, of which the United Kingdom is a founding member, recognises that maintaining a minimum level of service provision can be both when it comes to essential services. Its committee on freedom of association has expressly set out the two circumstances in which it may be appropriate: where strike action would pose a risk to life, safety or health; or where the service is not essential in the strict sense of the word, but where repeated strikes would bring a very important sector to a standstill.