All 3 Debates between Jim Cunningham and Bob Blackman

Thu 31st Jan 2019
Fri 28th Oct 2016
Homelessness Reduction Bill
Commons Chamber

2nd reading: House of Commons

Jallianwala Bagh Massacre

Debate between Jim Cunningham and Bob Blackman
Tuesday 9th April 2019

(5 years ago)

Westminster Hall
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Bob Blackman Portrait Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)
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I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Jallianwala Bagh massacre.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for two reasons, Mr Hanson. First, I have not served under your chairmanship before and secondly, as I will allude to later on, you and I have shared some of the memories of this terrible event.

It is worth remembering what happened 100 years ago—in fact, it began 100 years ago today. Amritsar is a holy city that is immensely crammed, as it was 100 years ago. It is a place where people live on top of one another. Thousands had gathered at the Bagh in the days before 13 April 1919. British Army officers greatly feared an uprising in or around May, which is when the Army changed its positions for the summer months in India.

On 10 April, a protest took place at the home of the deputy commissioner of Amritsar, calling for the release of two independence movement leaders. The protests spilled over, protestors were shot and some were killed. Bear in mind that this is three days before the massacre itself. That sparked rioting, during which British banks and people were targeted and British lives were lost. On 11 April, a British schoolteacher, Marcella Sherwood, was attacked and left for dead when cycling home. She was saved by local Indian men who recognised her from the school.

Between 11 and 13 April, civil disobedience and protest rang out across the Punjab. By 13 April, the Army had implemented martial law, and the measures included the prohibition of mass assembly. Any gathering of more than four people could be dispersed by the military. On 13 April, 100 years ago, approximately 15,000 people were gathered in the square. It was a common meeting place for people of all religions. They were not just people of the Sikh faith; there were Hindus, Christians, Muslims and Sikhs, present to celebrate and coincide with the Sikh new year festival of Baisakhi. They were gathered in the square. The crowd was peaceful and unarmed. The location, date and time had been set the day before so citizens could register discontent with the political situation, but on a peaceful basis.

On the morning of the massacre, General Dyer had paraded his troops, flexing his power and authority. With martial law on its side, the Army knew it could break up any large groups. However, the scale of the gathering exceeded the Army’s expectation and it was outnumbered by an astonishing margin. The square where the gathering took place is approximately 200 yards by 200 yards. It is surrounded by high walls and has a deep pit in the space. Those present were hemmed in with no shelter and no means of escape.

On the day, the reports say that the massacre took place with 50 Sikhs and Gurkhas under General Dyer’s command. They shot 33 rounds each-a total of 1,650 rounds. The official estimate was that 379 people had been killed and more than 1,000 injured. The reality was that the crowd was so dense that one bullet would kill three, four or even five people as it passed through them. The death toll is therefore believed to be far higher, with more than 1,000 people killed and many thousands injured.

I am sure colleagues will want to relay stories about the massacre. I will talk also about my personal experience, having been to the site. We have to remember this was 100 years ago, when there was no 24/7 news coverage and no mobile phones to take pictures of what had happened and the atrocity that had occurred. It took the British Government until October 1919 to open an inquiry under the direction of the then Home Secretary, Edwin Montagu, led by Lord William Hunter. The inquiry became known as the Hunter Commission, after the Government of India had originally called it the disorders inquiry—talk about an inapt name. The inquiry called witnesses from across the region, which spanned what is now Pakistan, as well as India. At the time, and importantly, those questioned were not put under oath when giving their evidence. In November, after the key eye witness accounts had been taken, General Dyer himself was called to give evidence. For reasons unknown to us—or to anyone—he refused legal counsel or advocacy and represented himself. Almost immediately, he made trouble for himself. Reports of the inquiry suggest that:

“Again and again, Dyer convicts himself out of his own mouth. As his friend Major General Nigel Woodyatt later told him, ‘he was bound to get the worst of it; not so much for what he had done, but for what he had said.’”

That is a particular view.

The report published by the commission found, in summary, that notice to disperse was not issued to the crowd at all, which should have been done by the Army, under its normal terms of engagement, and that Dyer had exceeded his authority—note that he was, temporarily, a brigadier, was really not qualified and had had his own uniform made in his own guise. It also deemed that the time for which the shooting went on, for 1,650 rounds, was an error, although I think that “an absolute atrocity” would be an accurate perspective. The inquiry found no evidence that supported the Army’s theory that a conspiracy was in motion to overthrow British rule in the Punjab.

There have been various different visits to the region since. Her Majesty the Queen visited in 1961, 1983 and 1997. Up until 1997 she made no comment, but in that visit she said in her speech:

“It is no secret that there have been some difficult episodes in our past—Jallianwala Bagh, which I shall visit tomorrow, is a distressing example. But history cannot be rewritten, however much we might sometimes wish otherwise. It has its moments of sadness, as well as gladness. We must learn from the sadness and build on the gladness.”

I think that if Her Majesty the Queen had made that speech later, she would have used different words.

Asquith, leader of the Liberals and a former Prime Minister, said it was

“one of the worst outrages in the whole of our history”,

and I agree with him. Winston Churchill, who was Secretary of State for Air at the time, said:

“The crowd was unarmed, except with bludgeons. It was not attacking anybody or anything. It was holding a seditious meeting. When fire had been opened upon it to disperse it, it tried to run away. Pinned up in a narrow place considerably smaller than Trafalgar Square, with hardly any exits, and packed together so that one bullet would drive through three or four bodies, the people ran madly this way and the other. When the fire was directed upon the centre, they ran to the sides. The fire was then directed upon the sides. Many threw themselves down on the ground, and the fire was then directed on the ground. This was continued for 8 or 10 minutes, and it stopped only when the ammunition had reached the point of exhaustion.”—[Official Report, 8 July 1920; Vol. 131, c. 1729.]

If they had had more ammunition, they would probably have carried on shooting.

General Dyer commented—though I cannot give the date—that,

“I did not know the city very well. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd; but one of producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on those who were present but more especially throughout the Punjab…I think it quite possible that I could have dispersed the crowd without firing, but they would have come back again and laughed.”

That he shot people in such a fashion condemns him out of his own mouth.

He then apparently commented to women at the consulate that evening:

“I’m for the high jump but I saved you women and children.”

No one was under threat. It was a peaceful religious gathering, and we should hang our heads in shame at what was done in the name of Britain.

General Dyer went on to receive a hero’s funeral. He gave the order to shoot, and in my judgment, having read about this topic, he was unfit to hold the position he held. He showed no remorse at any stage for the deaths he had caused, or the damage he had done to the Indian people and to India-UK relations. He remarked to his underlings at the height of the firing:

“Do you think they’ve had enough? No, we’ll give them four rounds more.”

That was outrageous. In spite of that, General Dyer was vigorously defended by—I say this with shame—the Conservative party, as well as most of the military establishment. He evaded any penalties post inquiry, as his military superiors advised that they could find no fault with his actions, his orders, or his conduct otherwise. However, during debate in the Commons, Asquith made his appropriate comments.

At the time of the massacre, O’Dwyer was the lieutenant general of Punjab, and it was understood that General Dyer was his man in the military. Dyer did his bidding and followed his orders closely. A theory has been repeatedly floated that O’Dwyer approved the order to open fire, and was the chief architect of the plan. O’Dwyer, like many of his ilk, was paranoid about a plot to overthrow British rule in the region. The regional British rulers were convinced that the increasingly popular independence movement would involve violence against Brits on a large scale, and would lead to humiliation for the empire—note that the commission found that suspicion without merit and completely untrue.

In March 1940, O’Dwyer was shot by Udham Singh outside a Westminster venue. Singh had been at Amritsar that fateful day, and the story goes that he himself had been shot and wounded. That led to a life of activism that resulted in him fatally shooting the man who, alongside Dyer, many in the Raj held responsible for the massacre. Udham Singh was hanged for taking his revenge.

You and I visited the site of the massacre in August 2016, Mr Hanson, and prior to seeing it at first hand, I expressed ignorance about what had happened there. Nothing can prepare people for seeing the site and imagining what it must have been like for the 15,000 people trapped within that arena—literally in a shooting gallery—by the soldiers who were present. The atmosphere must have been incredible; it must have been horrendous for the people who suffered that massacre. Remember, not only were they shot: some threw themselves down the well to try to escape the bullets, and many were crushed to death while trying to get down that well and out of the troops’ firing line.

Mr Hanson, we saw at first hand the museum that is being created on the site of the massacre, and the fact that India will never forget. We owe it to the victims and their families to never forget what happened in our name. I hope that there will be an apology from the British Government, not just an acceptance of a terrible crime. When the Minister replies, I look forward to him not explaining away what happened, but apologising for our involvement and for what was done in our name. That would be a start; it would clear the air. Equally, I hope that Ministers will go to commemorative events in India: one is to be held later this month, but I particularly hope that Ministers will attend in July, when I understand the museum will be formally opened.

Those who follow these things will know that I have asked for an apology before. I signed two early-day motions—413 in October 2017 and 1868 in November 2018—and last night I tabled another one, 2281, calling on the British Government to apologise and to attend the commemorative events. I encourage colleagues from across the House to sign that early-day motion to demonstrate our cross-party support.

Jim Cunningham Portrait Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
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I certainly support the hon. Gentleman in asking the British Government to apologise, because what he has described —we have all read about it in the history books—is horrendous. Although he mentioned that 1,000 people could have been killed, the Indian Government say the figure is much higher, so the figure is disputed, although I do not contradict what he has said. I certainly support him, and many people in my constituency feel very strongly about it. Also, the area was known as the Indian subcontinent then and people from Bangladesh and Pakistan could equally identify with the massacre. Does he agree with me that they too should be involved in any apology?

Bob Blackman Portrait Bob Blackman
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I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. He is right to say that the number of deaths is disputed. The Indian Government estimate more than 1,000 and the official report at the time stated 379. Because of the absolute disaster on the day, the figures are disputed and we do not have further records. People had gathered from across the Indian subcontinent for the Baisakhi. They came from what we now know as Pakistan and Bangladesh and from India itself, so other countries were involved, as well as citizens and families of other countries. Clearly, they should be remembered, and other Governments will no doubt have a view.

Equitable Life

Debate between Jim Cunningham and Bob Blackman
Thursday 31st January 2019

(5 years, 3 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Bob Blackman Portrait Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)
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I beg to move,

That this House welcomes the Government’s acceptance in full of the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s findings in relation to its maladministration with regard to Equitable Life; notes that the Parliamentary Ombudsman recommended that policy holders should be put back in the position they would have been in had maladministration not occurred; further notes that the overwhelming majority of victims have only received partial compensation compared to the confirmed losses directly attributed to regulatory failures; and calls on the Government to make a commitment to provide full compensation to victims of the scandal with the end of austerity now in sight.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for allowing us to have this debate, and the Government for finally allowing us to have some time in the Chamber to debate the issues that the Backbench Business Committee wishes to put forward. I declare an interest as co-chairman of the all-party parliamentary group for justice for Equitable Life policyholders. I have held that office ever since I was elected to Parliament in May 2010. I will set out the history of the scandal, the Government’s position to date, the current position on compensation, and what we want on behalf of the victims of the scandal. It is worth recalling that this was a Ponzi scheme. Equitable Life encouraged people to move their life savings into unsustainable pension funds by promising bonuses that could not be delivered. It also paid commission to agents to encourage people to move their savings into these scandalous positions. Ponzi schemes are all very well when money is coming in, but eventually money must be paid out. If the amount of money coming in is unsustainable, the bonuses that are promised to savers cannot be paid.

After almost a decade of operating the scheme, Equitable Life started legal action in 1999 to try to reduce the bonuses; it was unsuccessful in that regard. It then tried to sue its auditors for failing to point out the errors in its scheme. It was unsuccessful in that enterprise, too, and had to pay out more than £30 million in court costs. All that money could have been used to compensate the victims of the scam.

Eventually, the parliamentary ombudsman intervened and took up the case. Her recommendations said that this was the most serious case of maladministration she had ever encountered, and that the people involved were the Government, the regulators and Equitable Life. That is what makes this case unique.

Jim Cunningham Portrait Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
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The hon. Gentleman is making a compelling speech. He is right that the situation has been ongoing for a very long time. The parliamentary ombudsman said—I have read some articles on this today—that people still have not yet been fully compensated, and some of them have actually died. We have raised this issue time and time again over the years. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North East (Fabian Hamilton), who will speak shortly, has done a hell of a lot of good work on this. I congratulate the hon. Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) on securing the debate.

Bob Blackman Portrait Bob Blackman
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I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I have no doubt that the co-chairman of the APPG, the hon. Member for Leeds North East (Fabian Hamilton), will make a substantial contribution to this debate. He has been involved in this for more years than he probably cares to remember.

The previous Government promised some degree of compensation to the victims of this horrible scandal. I was a candidate at the 2010 general election, and in the run-up to it, the only pledge that Conservative campaign headquarters asked me to sign was that we would give full compensation to the victims of the Equitable Life scandal. I regard that pledge, which I signed, as one to the electorate and it is something I will honour. I believe that the Conservative party should honour it in full, and I welcome anyone else who will join me.

Homelessness Reduction Bill

Debate between Jim Cunningham and Bob Blackman
2nd reading: House of Commons
Friday 28th October 2016

(7 years, 6 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Bob Blackman Portrait Bob Blackman
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There are beacons of excellence in local authorities, some of which do a really good job on preventing homelessness. Unfortunately, the norm is that they do not. We must ensure that they do not pass the buck, that they come up to the plate and that they deliver for homeless people.

The aim of the Bill is, first and foremost, to ensure that no one, but no one, is turned away at the door. Everyone should be entitled to some form of support before they get to the stage where they literally have nowhere safe to stay. No one should go to their council for help, only to be told, “Come back when the bailiffs have arrived.” This Bill ensures that everyone, regardless of priority need status, is entitled to receive free information and advice to help them with their situation; and it means that 56 days prior to someone becoming homeless, they will get help. The council will have to produce a personalised housing plan to create a tailored road map for preventing homelessness in that crucial period, so that both the applicant and the council have an agreed set of steps to fulfil the prevention of homelessness.

Jim Cunningham Portrait Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
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I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on bringing the Bill forward today, but will it guard against substandard accommodation? We would not like to see people being placed in substandard accommodation, which is the big issue up and down the country at the moment.

Bob Blackman Portrait Bob Blackman
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I am coming on to that particular issue in a few moments.

The Bill will also ensure that local connection requirements are working in a way that prevents people from moving from one city to another or one part of London to another. People demanding housing in London, for example, would obviously put undue pressure on the system.

The Bill also makes sure that everyone takes an aspect of personal responsibility, so that people will be rewarded with good outcomes for co-operation and engagement with the process. It will bring about a culture change in councils—away from a crisis response towards prevention strategies and a more compassionate approach to helping people who are in that desperate crisis.