RBS Global Restructuring Group and SMEs
Debate between Jeremy Quin and Clive Lewis(6 years, 11 months ago)
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Clive Lewis
I will continue.
As many Members will know, the stories keep coming, backed up by evidence. It is now clear that we are seeing not just a series of individual scandals, but a full, systemic failure that needs to be addressed by the House.
Let me now focus on how we can move forward. The APPG on fair business banking has identified a series of achievable and transformative objectives that will support our business community. My focus today, however, will be on dispute resolution, restitution, and the need for an independent financial services tribunal with the teeth that will enable it to tackle complex and, for the individuals involved, life-changing scenarios.
I want to touch briefly on the past, because it is important to separate the crises into two distinct phases. The first crisis, in 2007-08, was a crisis of liquidity. The second, which we are discussing today, is a conduct crisis that not only spans the financial services industry, but extends to the role of the professional advisers who are such an integral part of the system. They are Law of Property Act receivers, surveyors, accountants, insolvency practitioners and solicitors. They are all fundamental parts of this matrix, and I will return to them shortly.
The recent section 166 FCA report on RBS GRG concentrates on the years between 2008 and 2013, when banks were under extreme pressure to shore up their balance sheets. However, that behaviour did not spring up spontaneously. Senior banking insiders who worked in RBS between the mid-1990s and the crisis are clear that there was such a modus operandi in GRG for years before the liquidity crisis. Indeed, GRG and its predecessor, Specialist Lending Services, had been known as the “mortuary for businesses” since the late 1990s. During those heady days of liquidity, businesses might have had an opportunity to re-bank with competitors, but once the liquidity crisis hit, that was no longer an option Ever since then our business community has had to deal with the consequences, which have been ramped up to an industrial scale.
Although the title of the debate refers to RBS GRG, it is just a symptom of the underlying issues. In the course of the APPG’s work, it is hard to identify an institution that has not found itself at the centre of a conduct scandal, and I am sure that other Members will give many examples today. The APPG has come across similar instances among the major banking institutions. The HBOS Reading fraud, as a result of which bankers and their associates were jailed for a total of 47 years earlier this year, may seem easy to push aside as “a few bad apples”, but, in reality, it is a consequence of the same systemic failure.
Clive Lewis
I will make some progress first.
In the HBOS case, as with GRG, quite simply, everyone thought that they would not get caught, and so it escalated. We have to ask ourselves how it is possible that this has gone on for so long, completely unchecked. We should have caught it much sooner, but instead it has been left to a dedicated group of individual victims such as Paul and Nikki Turner—and to a relentless pursuit by journalists such as Andy Verity, Joe Lynam, Siobhan Kennedy, James Hurley, Jonathan Ford, Ruth Sunderland, Tom Warren, Ian Fraser and Heidi Blake, to name just a few—to keep the issue alive. That is the journalism that the British public need: journalism that investigates the acts of the powerful and holds them to account. It is the fourth estate playing its rightful role in a healthy, functioning democracy.
Even now, as we begin to get our heads around the issue, we are still not addressing it properly. Why? Because our response thus far has been piecemeal. We must take a step back, and look at the entire ecosystem in which such behaviour managed not just to survive, but to thrive.
Let me briefly remind the House of the possible scale of the scandal. At its peak, GRG held assets of more than £90 billion on its books—all the businesses that were put into special measures. We cannot know for sure how many of those businesses would have survived in another, more benign environment; that is a “how long is a piece of string” question. Indeed, some businesses were placed in GRG for no other reason than the fact that they had made a complaint against the bank. We have to ask ourselves how many of them should have been there in the first place.
Much has been made of the fact that the businesses were “distressed”, but that is a subjective and ambiguous term. We do know that 90% of GRG-administered businesses never made it back to mainstream banking. That is a very high proportion. The cost is immeasurable, but we believe it to be in the tens of billions. Let us be clear: that is the potential size of the injustice that has taken place in our country. If it is indeed that big, it may be the largest theft anywhere, ever. If we begin to take into account the opportunity costs to the economy of business failure and businesses that have been unable to grow—if we begin to include the loss of jobs, homes, health, relationships and taxes—we see that the costs are likely to be immeasurable.
Scandals on this scale cannot happen in a vacuum. The role of Law of Property Act receivers, solicitors, insolvency practitioners and surveyors must be considered. Even in circumstances in which every person playing a part has played to the letter of the law, the outcomes have been catastrophic. We have to ask ourselves how that is possible.
As things stand, a business owner understandably assumes that the whole system works effectively, and that when it fails, he or she will have access to justice. That is a logical assumption for those of us who believe that all aspects of our lives should be covered by the rule of law. Anything else is little better than the Wild West, and is no basis for the stable and successful economy that Members in all parts of the House want to see.
The House must tackle the inherent inequality of power in the relationship between businesses and their lenders. From the moment when a business signs a one-sided contract laden with onerous and ambiguous contractual terms, through its life cycle, and into—potentially—insolvency, there is nowhere independent and affordable for that business to go if it is in dispute with its lender. In all cases, businesses must rely on the limited scope of the financial ombudsman, various trade associations and individual institutions to handle complaints. What is the outcome? The public, and businesses, see a group of large, powerful institutions and trade bodies operating from behind castle walls, with no transparency or external accountability, save an expensive and prohibitive court process that is beyond all but the most well-resourced. Justice, for them, is out of reach, and RBS knows that.
When ad hoc redress schemes are set up to deal with scandals such as interest rate hedging products, GRG and HBOS Reading, they are wholly unsatisfactory and largely discredited. They appear to be a cynical exercise in limiting financial institutions’ liabilities rather than a genuine attempt at restitution. The fact that the entire exercise is conducted behind closed doors and the banks are allowed to act as judge, jury and executioner only fuels suspicion. The use of an “independent person”, whom the bank itself appoints, will never instil trust. It is akin to a burglar being allowed to pick the members of the jury for his trial.
To add insult to injury, in the cases of the interest rate hedging product scheme and the RBS GRG scheme, the fact that insolvency law allows the institutions to pay themselves back for their own misconduct brings the process into the realm of farce. It is a system that does not instil confidence. The best our institutions can say is, “Trust us, we’re doing the right thing; but if you don’t like it, sue us.” We have only to look at the content of the debate today to see that self-regulation alone is simply not enough.
I want to be clear: those of us who support this motion are not calling for extensive regulation. We are, however, calling for accountability, transparency and justice, because without proper transparent accountability there can be no trust. Ultimately, trust is what the financial sector depends upon; if we undermine and pollute it, it will never survive in the long run.
The cold fact is that right now in this country the trust that once existed has been shattered. This distrust has become so severe that it is affecting business confidence and productivity. The Government’s own industrial strategy cannot be delivered on these shaky foundations. Simply, if we are to move on, we need to get a handle on the issues and look at the whole ecosystem for our businesses. That is why today we are calling for an inquiry that cuts across departmental lines and looks at the protections afforded to businesses during their life cycle. That way we can map out a long-term plan to ensure sufficient safeguards to prevent such things from ever happening again. More urgently, we are calling for a tribunal system to be set up to deal with financial disputes, a system analogous to that which already exists for employment tribunals. That does not require any primary legislation. The legislation already exists to enable the rapid establishment of a tribunal; it just needs the political will to carry it through.
Andrew Bailey at the FCA has openly supported the tribunal idea, but we are concerned about the recent focus on extending the remit of the Financial Ombudsman Service as this is not the right solution for what is a very complex problem. Once established, this tribunal system will help to ensure that banking works better, not just in the interests of its customers, but for the banking industry itself. This is important because we all acknowledge that the financial sector is critical to the UK’s future prosperity, and the relationship that SMEs have with their bank is a central part of that. In an effectively regulated economy, the relationships between SMEs and the finance sector should be symbiotic, not parasitic; each supports the sustainable growth and the success of the other. But that is not where we are.
It is time that the Government, the FCA and Parliament step up to the plate to ensure that businesses get fair treatment and access to affordable justice. Our businesses deserve nothing less. Our economy requires nothing less, especially at this critical time with Brexit approaching.
This matter has been left to drift in the regulatory and legislative wilderness for too long. The consequences have been catastrophic not only to individual lives but to confidence in our entire financial system. In the wake of Brexit, the introduction of a tribunal system will help to rebuild the strong relationships that once existed between SMEs and their banks, helping the growth of our economy and the international reputation of our financial sector.
It is, however, important to say that constructive progress has been made. The banking futures project brought together stakeholders across the spectrum to produce a coherent and ambitious plan for rebuilding trust. If Members have not read it, I would certainly suggest that they do so. The all-party group on fair business banking and finance has formed a working group, which will be formally announced in the near future, to discuss and look at this area. We should have no doubt that this is an important first step for businesses and industry, but it is just one part of the jigsaw, for with a problem this big, only a systematic, open-minded challenge to the status quo will work for businesses, our banks and our economy. This is an opportunity for us to show the business community and, indeed, the country that behind the lively exchanges that take place here and are seen on television, we as parliamentarians can put aside political point scoring and come together and work toward a common goal. I therefore commend this motion to the House.
Royal Bank of Scotland
Debate between Jeremy Quin and Clive Lewis(9 years, 1 month ago)
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Jeremy Quin
I acknowledge and appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point. I would have a much better case if I could say that all the problems were pre-crisis, but they were not; I fully acknowledge that. There are clearly issues that were endemic in RBS’s culture, and I sincerely hope that it has got a grip on that now.
RBS certainly does have a grip on its corporate structure and how it is conducting its business. It is now far more focused back on the UK and on UK corporate lending. It is the largest single lender to UK corporates, the largest supporter of SMEs, and the largest provider of mortgage lending. That is what we all want to see and wanted to see when the stake was initially taken.
Clive Lewis (Norwich South) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman is saying that RBS has changed and improved its culture, but in The Times this week there was an article suggesting that it has been falsifying the mis-selling data that it has been giving out. I wonder what has actually changed if it is still misbehaving and, in effect, telling these porkies. Surely, in that case, it has not reformed itself and is just the same as it always has been.
Jeremy Quin
I have a lot of faith in the regulatory system that Ministers have put in place over the past five or six years under the coalition Government and this Government. What we need to focus on, as a House, is ensuring that we have the regulatory system that will deliver the results for our constituents and for the broader UK economy. I am nervous that the motion proposed by the hon. Member for Edmonton, although well intentioned, would delay support going into the economy.
I was serving in the Treasury when the stake in RBS was originally taken. I know that no hon. Member would be under any illusion that that stake was ever taken in a leisurely manner with a view to getting a tidy investment. The decision was taken by Labour with the very best of intentions, and it was the right decision to support the UK economy and the UK banking system at an absolutely critical moment.
Jeremy Quin
Does the hon. Gentleman accept, though, that there have been dramatic changes in the regulatory environment? Happily, we will not be returning to 2003, because of the ring-fencing that has been introduced and the extra capital: RBS now has a capital base of 16%. Have there not been improvements in that respect?
Clive Lewis
I think that there have been changes, but as I said earlier, in an intervention, the fact that RBS is back again, and possibly about to be investigated for yet more fraud, does not exactly encourage me to think that those changes have been deep enough.
As I was saying, the sale of RBS was announced not to Parliament, but to a white-tie dinner full of City grandees, in a speech that also promised the City a “new settlement” on financial regulation. We are now starting to see what that “new settlement” looks like, with the Government caving in to economic blackmail from the likes of HSBC, which threatened to move its headquarters unless key post-crisis measures such as the bank levy and the ring fence between retail and investment banking were watered down—that, I think, answers the point made by the hon. Member for Horsham (Jeremy Quin); with the competition authorities ruling out action to break up big banks, even though they acknowledge that their customers are getting a raw deal; and with rumours that the Chancellor personally arranged the sacking of Martin Wheatley, the head of the Financial Conduct Authority, who has a reputation for being tough on bank misconduct.
Some commentators have even suggested that the Government’s desire for a quick sale of RBS is partly responsible for their magnanimous attitude towards the big banks: that the Government do not want to do anything that could damage the bank’s share price in the short term. If that were true, it would be incredibly short-sighted. We would effectively be trading in the chance to build a genuinely safer banking system in our haste to return to the pre-crisis status quo.