Military Action Overseas: Parliamentary Approval

Jeremy Quin Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr David Drew (Stroud) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am pleased to be able to make a short contribution today. In 1996, on the back of outrages in east Africa and the fact that Sudan had not long gotten rid of Osama bin Laden from its territory, the US launched a cruise missile attack on Al-Shifa on the basis that it was the site of a plant for the creation of VX. It later transpired that the Al-Shifa plant was producing pharmaceuticals and that there was no evidence whatsoever that chemicals were being used in any improper way. The Sudanese still refer to the incident, keeping the site as rubble, and, on the occasions that I have been there, have offered to show people, including the Americans, what the plant was. I use that as an example of where things have been found to be wrong. Intelligence is not sacrosanct. I have never been a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee and am never likely to be, but it is right for this Parliament to hold the Government to account, and there is nothing more important than Parliament holding the Government to account on whether it is right to go to war.

The Al-Shifa example is about the Americans and their lack of intelligence in this respect. The strike became known as a wag-the-dog incident, because it was more to do with President Clinton trying to offset some of his own problems at home. I cannot say what the motive behind the thinking of the current President of the United States is, but there are sometimes ulterior motives for why people launch attacks. In our case, we have Afghanistan, when we were told that not a shot would be fired and that it would be a straightforward invasion, and Libya, which we were told was about regime change and evolving a democratic structure.

[Jeremy Quin (Horsham) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Drew]

I am not giving way, because we are short on time.

In our case, however, this is more about Iraq. I was in the House at the time of the Iraq war, and I remember that the Government did not willingly give Back Benchers a vote. We dragged it out of the Government, and there was so much opposition that they had to give us a vote. In a sense, Back Benchers created that precedent, which is an important convention.

It is important that Parliament has a view, and one of the problems is that our constituents have been emailing us and stopping us in the street to ask, “What is your view? Why haven’t we heard what Parliament has to say?” The right hon. Member for Twickenham (Sir Vince Cable) made that point, and I totally agree with him. It is important that Parliament has a say. Parliament can get things right and get things wrong, but so can Governments, and it is right that we exercise our democratic right as elected representatives.

A war powers Act—remember that this is just an SO24 debate—would undergo proper scrutiny, as the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) made quite clear, and go through all the process. He suggested that there could be other ways of doing this, but I strongly believe that this debate should be had, because things are unclear at the moment. The Government have changed the convention. They should have come here for a debate—not a question session, but a debate and a vote. They chose not to, however, so the situation is unclear. A precedent was created on Iraq, but it has now been changed, so I merely say that it is right and proper to have this debate today and that we therefore begin to move towards clarity on what was previously a convention of the House. It no longer exists, and it is about time that Parliament had its view and was able to decide on whether the convention is right or wrong.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

I respect the position of the Father of the House, but there is a fundamental difference between intelligence on national security and policy on health, social security benefits or whatever it is.

[Jeremy Quin]

Picking up on the intervention of the Father of the House, how could this House have possibly taken a decision on the proposed action unless we broadly knew the nature of the action, how limited it would be and what would be targeted? That is exactly the information that would have been of use to the Syrian regime.

[Johnny Mercer]

My hon. Friend makes a very clear point. Some of the contributions in this House lend weight to why Parliament should not have a say in this. Time and again, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence have stood up in this country and said, “This is a limited action. This is a one-time action. We are targeting chemical weapons.” Yet there is question after question: “Is this part of a greater war? What are you going to do about Russia?” The Prime Minister must have answered those questions 47 times, and they keep coming.

I am afraid that one of the most galling points in all this is how anybody in this House can take it upon themselves to accuse this Prime Minister, either personally or professionally, of being willing to commit UK service personnel to a conflict at the whim of anybody else when it is not in line with British interests. That is offensive and childish. It is the place of student politics, and it is not acceptable.

I respect all Members of this House, and I profoundly respect those who disagree with me. My right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon) mentioned vanity, and everyone got upset about that. This is not a game. This is not a TV show in which we get to make profound speeches and try to make tactical decisions about military operations of which we know nothing. This is not a game. Inaction while Syria burns is not acceptable, and it has been accepted for too long in this country.

I gently say to my Prime Minister—I have sympathy with Opposition Members—that we have to bring the British people with us. It is a fundamental duty of every Member of this House to go out there and advocate for this nation if we are to take it to war. We have to do that in a way that people will support. People have to understand why they are being committed to war, and we can always do better on that, particularly after Iraq.

I went to Afghanistan and fought what were very lonely conflicts, and every single day I tried to motivate young people to do very dangerous things that nobody in this country really knew about, and sometimes did not care about. Every Member on my Front Bench and in this House has a duty to advocate in that regard.

Finally, on Iraq, I was not here in 2003 but if for the next 20 or 30 years we are persistently to consider the foreign policy objectives of this nation of ours through the prism of Iraq and of the profound mistakes that were made in that process, we will not become the Britain that we all know we want to be. It will inhibit our ability to project our interests into what we want to do. Profound mistakes were made in the decision-making process in Iraq, and we have raked over it for generations. The great British people do not want us to do that at such interminable length that we never actually play a role in the world and become the global Britain that we all know we want to be.

My plea is that on this we listen even more intently to the professionals. If anyone can find a security service professional in this country who thinks the war powers Act is a good idea, I will vote for it tonight, but they will not find a single individual with working knowledge of how security works in this country who will support this Act, and that is why I will not support it, either.