Afghanistan and Pakistan

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Paul Flynn]

I was not present on the Committee, but I saw the sitting on the Parliament channel and was profoundly unimpressed by the evidence given. However, I do not want to dwell on this issue; I want to give other people a chance to speak—I have the advantage of speaking early. I believe that at some point an investigation has to be conducted into why we went into Helmand. Of course it cannot be done now, while we are still there, but I believe that the story revealed will be one of military incompetence and political weakness. We are in the position now—the hopeful time—of talking to the Taliban. I do not know why the Prime Minister does not emphasise this more, but for the first time we are in the position of taking practical steps to build peace that would result in bringing our troops home.

The alternative is that we are currently in a period like that the Americans found themselves in in 1970 and 1971, when they knew that the war was coming to an end in Vietnam. We know that there is no happy ending in Afghanistan, and we should not build up the prospect of an Afghanistan that will somehow be like a Scandinavian democracy or anything of the sort. The ending will be messy.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way, and I apologise for missing the first part of his speech. Does he not think that after 10 years in Afghanistan, the fact that the Prime Minister now says that there has to be negotiations, including with the Taliban—something that has been patently obvious for a long time—is an indication of just what a military and political disaster this whole thing has been?

[Paul Flynn]

I am sure that that will be the judgment of history. I am afraid that we in this House will be seen as not having taken the decisions that we should either. We have not challenged our continuing presence in Afghanistan or the continual sacrifice of the lives of our brave soldiers. This has been a bad episode in our history. Tragically, just as we saw one rotten Government in Afghanistan brought down in 2001—they were not as rotten as the one before, who included the Mujahedeen—the current Government might well be replaced in five years by another rotten Government, and we will ask ourselves, “What was the sacrifice for?” We are now in the position that General Kerry, now Senator Kerry, described in ’71 when he asked himself the agonising question, “Who will be the last soldier I will order to die for a politician’s mistake?”

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), as we have similar views on this issue.

As those Committee colleagues who are here will know, I voted against this report. It will come as no surprise to the majority of Members present that I come to this afternoon’s debate as a sceptic about our mission generally. Having cautioned against our deployment in Afghanistan and voted against the Government’s continued policy—in the one opportunity that we had to debate and vote on the issue, last year—I remain deeply worried about our progress generally. To reflect briefly on the past, our intervention defied all the lessons of history. We fundamentally underestimated the task and we under-resourced it accordingly. We have been playing catch-up every since. Having served as a platoon commander in South Armagh during the 1980s, I have no doubt that the mission suffered in particular from low troop density levels. We have suffered as a result.

My criticism is not levelled at the troops. We all know that they have done everything that could have been asked of them. They and we can be proud of what they have achieved. Rather, my criticism is levelled at the US and UK Governments, who have failed because they have not recognised two fundamental distinctions, which even at this late stage could salvage something positive from this otherwise sorry affair. First, we have failed to distinguish between the key objective of keeping al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan and the four main goals on which that objective is said to depend. Those goals include the achievement of a stable and secure Afghanistan. In fact, the key objective and the attainment of those goals have become confused to the extent that the goals have become ends in themselves. This has given rise to mission creep and loss of focus. The talk of nation building, women’s rights and human rights are but three examples. In effect, we have become missionaries instead of focusing on the mission.

In my view, this confusion permeates the report. For example, the report assesses progress against each of the so-called goals instead of focusing on the key objective. We go into great detail in the report about what we are doing on women’s rights and human rights, for example. The goals are a means to an end, however, not the end in itself. Our main mission in Afghanistan is not to build a better country but to defeat al-Qaeda, and our losing sight of that fact has cost us dearly. That is why I voted against the report, having tried unsuccessfully to make a series of amendments. We are not in Afghanistan to build a better country; we are there to defeat al-Qaeda.

This confusion of purpose has gone to the top of Government. When the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) was Prime Minister, he claimed that our troops were in Afghanistan to protect the citizens of London from terrorism, yet in almost the same sentence he threatened President Karzai with troop withdrawal if he did not end the corruption in his Government. That clearly illustrated the confusion, and I pointed out to the right hon. Gentleman in Prime Minister’s questions back in 2008 that those two statements did not fit well together.

Last year, the coalition Government gave a deadline of 2015 for troop withdrawal. Again, that is inconsistent. If our commitment is conditions-based—in other words, if it is to defeat al-Qaeda—one cannot logically place a deadline on it. Yet the Government have made it clear that all combat troops will be withdrawn by the due date, regardless of the situation on the ground. It is therefore little wonder that Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers have admitted that their communications strategy needs to be reviewed, as it appears that Joe Public has still not got the message. Someone should perhaps ask why, after 10 years, the message is somewhat confused. Could it be that the mission itself is incoherent? If that is the case, there is little point in shooting the messenger.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware of any evidence whatever that the streets of London have been made safer by our presence in Afghanistan? Or does he believe that our involvement has caused radicalisation and perhaps made London a more dangerous place, and that we need to look to our foreign policy if we want to make ourselves secure?

[Mr Baron]

The hon. Gentleman raises a serious point. I certainly think that our recent aggressive interventions have radicalised parts of the Muslim world against us—a fact that I think was confirmed by a former head of MI5 in giving evidence. I certainly do not think that our involvement has helped our situation, and I see no concrete evidence that the situation has improved in regard to the threat on the streets of London. If I am wrong about that, I am sure that the Minister will correct me.

The bottom line is that there is confusion of purpose, and the first distinction that we are failing to make is that between achieving the objective and the four main goals.

The second distinction that the Government are failing to explore rigorously is that between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The relationship is complex and not well understood. There is no shortage of evidence—some was submitted to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee—to suggest that the Taliban would not necessarily allow al-Qaeda back into the country if the Taliban were to regain control of certain regions. They know that, ultimately, al-Qaeda led to their downfall. Indeed, US intelligence sources suggest that fewer than 100 al-Qaeda fighters and certainly no al-Qaeda bases are left in the country. To all intents and purposes, we have achieved our mission some time ago—a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), the Chairman of the Select Committee, made well. We all know that the Taliban are not a homogeneous group, but there are fundamental differences between the Taliban and al-Qaeda—yet the threats from al-Qaeda and the Taliban have become conflated and almost synonymous.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr MacShane]

I am glad to hear it, but frankly—I do not want to quote Bismarck and the Balkans and Pomeranian grenadiers—I weep every Wednesday when the poor Prime Minister has to come to the Dispatch Box and yet again read out the name, or perhaps names, of a dead British soldier, and for what? I cannot find an answer to that question.

To give the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), and his colleagues their due, they admit that, because one of their report’s key conclusions, on page 83, is that

“at a strategic level, we seriously question whether the efforts expended…have a direct connection to the UK’s core objective, namely the national security of the UK”.

That is absolutely right; the Select Committee Chairman has summed it up there—it is written down. It is a Foreign Affairs Committee conclusion, and it should be at the forefront of all of our discussions on Afghanistan. There is no longer any connection between UK national security and our men going out on patrol and being shot dead by the Taliban.

The Select Committee’s excellent and thorough report contains an account of a fine passage of questioning, which resulted in a most extraordinary confession by the Foreign Secretary. Committee members were trying to find out who is actually taking decisions on Afghanistan, and specifically in this instance the announcement to withdraw—or retreat—by 2015. Please can we avoid the absurd new euphemism of “draw-down”? It is a retreat and a withdrawal; that is what it is, so let us revert to plain English. The Foreign Secretary said that that decision was taken collectively in the National Security Council. My right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) asked whether the Defence Secretary had been consulted, and the Foreign Secretary replied:

“I am sure the Defence Secretary was consulted, but I cannot tell you when everybody was consulted. You would have to ask the Prime Minister.”

The Committee Chairman asked whether the Foreign Secretary could confirm

“that the decision wasn’t actually made in the Council.”

The Foreign Secretary said:

“It wasn’t a formal item in the National Security Council.”

This gives a fascinating insight into the mechanism of government. Where was the decision taken—by whom and how? We know it was no longer taken on a sofa, but we are none the wiser—[Interruption.] I have not been invited to No. 10 so I cannot check whether the sofa has gone. We do not know who took the decision and on what terms.

I would argue that we should be getting out a lot faster. Canada is out, the Netherlands is out, and Belgium is pulling out half of its men. The presence of international security assistance force-NATO allies in Afghanistan is now getting thinner and thinner, and, yes, it will be a withdrawal. No general wants to be the one who folds up the flag, climbs the ladder to the top of the embassy building and climbs in a helicopter and leaves, but stopping a war is, perhaps, as great a military art as starting one.

It would be fascinating to look at the official record of the Russian Duma for the 1980s, when the Russians were convinced that they were bringing a civilising mission to Afghanistan, to see whether debates such as this one were taking place. Then, of course, they faced the external foe of the Mujaheddin paid for by President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. There has been little reference to the fact that the Mujaheddin of the 1980s was a product of western foreign policy. We have heard in the past couple of days that Mr Reagan won the cold war, and part of that winning presumably included the driving of the Soviet Union and its troops out of Afghanistan. If that was the case, every Russian would wish that Mr Reagan had won it a lot earlier; they perhaps believe that the red army should never have gone into Afghanistan. However, the money sent by the west to create the Mujaheddin sowed dragons’ teeth that turned into dragons on 9/11 and 7/7, and it would be good if the people examining the history of that era had the honesty to say so.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Is my right hon. Friend aware that after Soviet forces went into Afghanistan there was a considerable number of unreported demonstrations by the families of soldiers who had died there, and that there is a huge memorial movement within Russia today on behalf of those who are still not recognised for the sacrifices they made?

[Mr MacShane]

Yes, indeed. That conflict contributed to the undermining of the Soviet Union, but in the very worst sense, in that it required the senseless sacrifice of a lot of young Russian men finally to persuade Mr Gorbachev and his new Soviet leaders that the action in Afghanistan had to come to an end. In some ways, I wish that we had been able to defeat communism in Vietnam, because the period after the retreat of the United States was a horribly cruel one in Vietnam—we saw what happened with the boat people, the re-education camps and the killings and tortures. But there was no question of our remaining longer in the vain hope that we could have created a more stable, orderly or democratic regime.

The Select Committee’s report stated:

“We welcome the Government’s attempt to engage more pro-actively”—

I never know what that adverb means—

“with parliamentarians on Afghanistan.”

That might interest the Chair, Mr Deputy Speaker, because I understand that a new poem is doing the rounds there. It goes as follows, “From Kandahar to Kabul, the whispers grow and grow, stand by Pashtuns and Tajiks, here comes Mr Speaker Bercow.” We will see whether our Speaker is going to be the magic solution and whether he will be sent down there to spread lightness and parliamentary tolerance among the peoples of Afghanistan. I do not think that anybody can move an immediate amendment and call a Division on that subject—[Interruption.] Perhaps one of his deputies would be more appropriate.

When I talk about “the west” I mean the broad family of democracies—north America, Europe, and our friends in Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea. As long as the west is mired in Afghanistan, we will not be able to promote our core interest now, which is to recover economic strength and to recover confidence in the need to have an adequate security profile against the rise of authoritarian powers, which are arming fast, which might, at some stage, threaten our interests and which, because we are lost in the wildernesses of west Asia, we are unable to see coming over the horizon.

In the few years after America withdrew from Vietnam things were unclear, but for the 20 years after 1980 America led the world in many ways. It did so economically, in inventing new forms of technology and in expanding many human freedoms to do with personal liberty and respect for multicultural and multi-ethnic cohabitation. Right now, America is bogged down in this wretched war. The UK is a minor ally of America and the sooner we are out of this war, the better. I sincerely say to those on the Treasury Bench that if they look at history, they will find that it has very often been the Conservative party that has had a greater sense of geopolitical reality than some of the opposing parties and has known when enough was enough. I would like us out before 2015.

Finally, the title of the report we are debating is “The UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan”. It is very detailed on Afghanistan, and I congratulate the Committee on that, but it does not in any way address foreign policy towards Pakistan. Pakistan hardly gets a mention and is seen only in relation to Afghanistan. That might be the way in which the title of the report was chosen—I am not criticising the members of the Committee—but we need a policy on Pakistan and part of that must involve telling the truth to our great friends in India. As long as they have 500,000 people in an oppressive occupation of part of the region—I am choosing my words carefully—called Kashmir, there will be no possibility that the people or the Government and military of Pakistan, however constituted, will not see that as a direct threat to their identity and national interest. If 500,000 armed soldiers are camped on a country’s western border, that is where that country will have to put its troops.

Until we ask India to take a new approach to Kashmir and to take it off one of the world’s fault lines, we will not be in any position to ask Pakistan to take a new and more helpful approach on Afghanistan or on other issues. The western world, if I might use that term—the Euro-Atlantic world, let us say—has spent too long in majority Muslim countries creating giant armies. Whatever the motives for sending those armies originally, they are making matters worse. It is time to get out. I want to spare the Prime Minister, with his many problems, from ever again having to stand at that Dispatch Box to lament the loss of a British soldier’s life in a conflict of which we should no longer be part.