(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Stephen Pegge: To put it in context, the Insolvency Service estimates that there is currently evidence of misconduct or misuse of dissolution process in only 1% of cases. Given that there are something like 500,000 dissolutions a year, that might amount to only about 5,000 cases. There is some evidence that it is a rising problem and, given that the average company that is dissolved might have a loan of say £200,000, even 5,000 cases could amount to a risk to creditors of up to £1 billion. It is significant in scale because of the large number of companies, even if it is not currently a high level of risk in proportionate terms. I would emphasise that the vast majority of businesses are honest and straightforward and are not abusing this scheme.
The other factor that members of the Committee may be interested in is that quite clearly over the last year, during the covid crisis, there have been a significant number of companies that have taken finance. Given that the Government, through the British Business Bank, have provided guarantees, there would be an impact on the taxpayer if those loans were not repaid and a claim for repayment were made. Again, that is relevant to consideration.
Q
Stephen Pegge: Yes, we have seen instances of this practice being used to try and avoid liability under bounce back loans. Back in May 2020, UK Finance with the British Business Bank established the bounce bank loan fraud collaboration group. It involves attendees from the Cabinet Office; CIFAS, the UK fraud prevention service; the Treasury; BEIS; and the National Investigation Service—NATIS. The aim is for intelligence to be shared, good practice to be developed and a threat log to be maintained and fed into the National Crime Agency and the National Economic Crime Centre. In fact, this was one of the practices which had been identified through that and has led to some efforts more recently to try to intervene and intercept these cases of dissolved companies involving Companies House and BEIS.
In the meantime, it is always possible that these cases may well have got through and there is some evidence—again, reported by the Insolvency Service—that there could be around 2,000 such cases which are dissolved and where currently the powers to investigate do not exist, so it is a real problem. If it were to become a more popular route for fraud, while there are mechanisms to deal with it and creditors can object when they get notice through alerts when these situations are gazetted, unscrupulous individuals can still get through and it is important that it is closed as a loophole.
As regards the resources of the Insolvency Service, we have all been conscious that, while the number of insolvencies has been low during a period of suspension and the generous support that has been provided to businesses through public agencies and the finance industry, we would expect that to rise significantly in this next period. There is already some evidence that it will do so. It is important that the Insolvency Service is resourced sufficiently to be able to deal with this. The evidence at the moment is that they have been involved in disqualification of directors in something like 1,000 or so cases across the last year, so it is quite possible that there might be a rise in the amount of work that they will need to do. We would certainly support any investigation into what additional resources might be necessary.
Q
David Kerr: In terms of resources and the ability to pursue all the cases that the Insolvency Service might wish to pursue, I guess that is probably a question for the Department. Not all the cases that are investigated will pass the public interest threshold. To the extent that there are cases that pass the test but cannot be pursued for resource reasons, I am sure the Insolvency Service would welcome any additional resources that can be made available to it. From the point of view of creditors, if actions are pursued in relation to covid-related debts and not others, perhaps the measure works against them a bit.
That comes to the second part of your question. There are two elements to this. First, there is the potential disqualification of individuals who are proven to have acted inappropriately. Secondly, and on the back of that to some extent, there is the possibility of compensation orders against those individuals, with a view to putting money back into the hands of creditors. Again, I am sure CICM creditors would wish that to be as effective for its members as for any Government debt.
Q
David Kerr: I think the point has been made about resource. I have heard comments from others on Second Reading and elsewhere about that. It would be unfortunate if the emphasis were entirely on dealing with bounce back loan fraud and if that took resources away from other directors’ conduct investigation cases. That point is not, I suppose, directly relevant to the provisions in the Bill; it is more a question of how it is implemented and taken forward. There have also been some comments about the retrospective element; the previous witness touched on that. I think these cases have to be taken within three years of the relevant date—the date of insolvency or the date of dissolution. I do not think the Department would be able to go back before 2018 in any event, and that was the date on which the consultation was conducted, so I suppose one could argue that directors have had notice of the intended provisions for the relevant period.
Those were probably the only points where there might be concerns to a limited extent, but generally I think the provision is a sensible one that gives the service powers that it does not have currently and which can only be helpful, I would have thought, to trust and confidence in the insolvency regime.
Q
David Kerr: I was referring partly to the point that had been made by the Committee to the previous witness about whether there would be any issues around natural justice if the retrospective provisions pre-dated the consultation. I do not think that, in practice, that would happen. Going forward, the compensation laws that might be sought can be obtained after the disqualification order or undertaking, so there may be more than three years available to the service from the date of dissolution. There has to be a cut-off. I do not think there is any suggestion that the provisions of the disqualification have to be changed in that respect, merely that they would be applied to these circumstances. They have proved to be satisfactory since 1986 in relation to director disqualification in the insolvency proceedings, so I have no reason to believe that, going forward, those time limits will not be effective in relation to dissolved companies.
Q
David Kerr: None that I can think of immediately.
Q
Dr Tribe: Not necessarily. Going back to my prioritisation point, the Insolvency Service obviously has finite resources that it needs to deploy in the best way possible—I suppose that is a problem for many public bodies— if other types of abuse manifest over time. The most obvious and recent problem is the bounce back loan phoenixism problem, but in due course other things might come about that require us to tinker with our corporate and insolvency law so that we have an effective system that maintains trust and confidence in it. What the Insolvency Service wants to do in terms of prioritising threats to the system will depend on its internal guidance.
Q
Secondly, are there any other more general problems with the dissolution of companies that are important to discuss at this time while changes are being made? Should changes be made to the eligibility criteria on dissolutions? What steps need to be taken prior to dissolution?
Dr Tribe: I will take the first question first. I think you are drawing attention to the compensation order regime, and you did so on Second Reading, too. There is some interesting research by Dr Williams at Cambridge in 2014, who looked—he sort of future-gazed—at how successful the compensation system might be. In that research, he highlighted that some of the directors in small closely held companies, which he argues the regime mainly targets, might end up being adjudicated bankrupt—they might go through the bankruptcy process, I should say—in due course. That would mean, of course, that any pursuit of those individuals would run into another layer of difficulty in trying to get to the value that might be there for the insolvent estate of the company or dissolved company that we are dealing with. His work future-gazed in that way at some of these issues.
It is true to say that, on the compensation regime, we saw one case in 2019, the Noble Vintners case, where insolvency and companies court Judge Prentis made a 15-year disqualification order. That is right at the top of what we call the Sevenoaks scale, after the case in which Lord Justice Dillon set out the various types of malpractice and where they fall on the scale, from two years up to 15. In the Noble Vintners case, it was the most unfit behaviour on the facts of that case that you could have —up at the 15-year period. Then, of course, that was followed by a compensation order that recouped for creditors just over half a million pounds—£559,000.
There has been some success with the compensation scheme. It is in its early days, in a certain sense. Although the reforms came in in 2015, there was a delay in implementation. You are right to say that we should pause for thought and mull over how effective that is. That takes us back to the resourcing and funding point, for one thing. Secondly, it takes us to the idea of that prioritisation agenda and how fruitful a claim that you are going to bring might be to get compensation. It is a power that exists and should exist. It goes some way—as you can see from the case of Noble Vintners—to getting value back into the insolvent estate for the creditors. It is a positive thing for creditors, and something that the disqualification regime did not do until that reform in 2015. Of course, it provided a protection mechanism, but in terms of getting value back into the estate, that is a good reform. That is your first question.
Your second question was on dissolution problems. I think you might be driving at the process of dissolution and how the registrar at Companies House deals with dissolution. After the directors have signed their form, made their declaration, paid the £10 and noted that there is going to be a striking off and that is published in the London Gazette, there is a period of two months where all the parties that should be informed—shareholders, creditors, employees and pension managers, for example—might know of this potential dissolution and should then, therefore, perhaps act on it as creditors. Some of the witnesses who have gone before me may have addressed this, particularly those from the credit community. In due course, as part of a wider analysis of what Companies House and its function is, that step in dissolution may be looked at.
As I said earlier, there are approximately half a million dissolutions per year, and many of those are for very good reasons in terms of, as I have said, maintaining the integrity of the register and getting rid of companies that have been through the insolvency processes but then get dissolved as well. The guidance for the Bill and some other sources note that among those half a million dissolutions, there could be about 5,000 that are potentially problematic that we would want the Insolvency Service to be able to investigate. Obviously, 5,000 is a lot more than the current levels of disqualification under the current provisions. Over the past decade or so, there have been about 1,200 a year, so you can see there is quite a significant upshift in the work that the Insolvency Service might have to do.
A Companies House review perhaps in due course mulling on what its function is—is it a regulator, is it a repository of information?—might look to dissolution, but in the short term I think you have this £17 billion to £26 billion problem, and there seems to be a loophole that needs to be closed.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
David Magor: The challenges are laid down in legislation; we know what the challenges, and the circumstances surrounding those challenges, are. It is for the valuation officer to look at every individual challenge and how that challenge is made up, and to decide whether it is covid-related or related to a normal material change of circumstance.
The important thing is that the valuation officer inspects every challenge and makes a reasonable decision in every case. That will be absolutely critical. The ones that are covid alone will stand out quite clearly. However, with those where you perhaps have a change in the high street, with the closure of a major retailer because of trading patterns, you have to be very careful to make sure that you do not mistake the fact that the retailer was intending to close anyway for the impact of covid. Remember, the valuation officer is very experienced in this process. The material change of circumstance legislation has been around for a long time, and there is lots of case law. There is absolutely no reason why the valuation officer cannot act in a reasonable and transparent way.
Adrian Blaylock: What David says is absolutely right. It is important to recognise that there are material changes of circumstance that are not related to covid. These can still go through the normal process, and the Valuation Office Agency should be able to distinguish between the different types.
Q
The second question is more specifically to Mr Blaylock and relates to the IRRV’s evidence, in particular to paragraph 6, where you are talking about the benefits of amending provisions of section 47 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. It would be useful to talk through your argument there to help us understand it.
Adrian Blaylock: That is probably aimed at Mr Magor, rather than me. It is really hard to know whether the size of the pot—the £1.5 billion—is large enough or not. The way I expect this scheme to work is for the Government to release guidance on the types of business they expect local government to support. In the announcement on 25 March, they gave a couple of examples of types of businesses that have not been affected but would see a reduction due to a material change of circumstance, and one that has been affected but would not see a reduction through a material change of circumstance.
Local government has to follow guidance issued by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. That is in the regulations; section 47 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 says that it must be taken into account. Until we know exactly the types of business the Government are expecting local government to give support to, it is really hard to say whether £1.5 billion is enough. Airports were given as an example. If airports appear in the guidance as something that the Government want local government to support, as Mr Magor says, their rateable values are large, and therefore the pot probably would not be sufficient, but it is really hard to say at this point in time.
David Magor: On the size of the overall pot, we at the institute have the advantage of having a comprehensive database going back to 1990 of all non-domestic properties. We have been looking at that database and trying to do some early forecasting of how big the pot should be.
You can see from the ministerial statements that the Minister has made quite clear exactly the direction that he wants the relief to go in. You can do a rough calculation by taking out retail, hospitality and leisure properties, exempt properties, small businesses and so on, and you are left with an effective amount of rateable value and an effective number of properties that would get the relief. Of course, the Government have also added local economic factors into the decision on the distribution of the pot, and we do not know the detail of them.
If you look at the eligible rateable value and the eligible properties, once you take out the exempt properties and those that have already received relief, you start to come to a figure well in excess of £1.5 billion. You are starting to look at a figure perhaps three times that amount. Initially, that sounds quite frightening, but of course we do not know the economic impact of covid on individual companies. Again, the Minister said in his guidance that the scheme will be by application, so it will be for companies to choose whether they apply.
No doubt, if we see the draft guidance and it gives clear indications of the way local government is to work, you can frame an application form in such a way that it will target the relief at those in most need. Until we see the guidance, it is difficult to give a clear forecast of whether the pot is large enough, mainly because of the mysterious economic factor. The implication from the Minister’s statements is that it will differ from area to area, so it will be impossible to know what figures the Minister has taken into account unless we have absolute transparency and those figures are made available.
Of course, there is a danger that individual local authorities will challenge the figure. If it is not sufficiently clear, the first thing that elected members will do is compare their figure with that of a similar local authority, and if it is significantly different, they will want to know why, so there are a few challenges ahead for the Minister.
Q
David Magor: I know Adrian will pick up on the impact of it, but I will start. On the guidance, for reliefs under section 47 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988, the Minster is required to give guidance and local authorities to have regard to it. You would expect the guidance to be sufficient to enable local authorities to develop a scheme within the Government’s wishes. From ministerial statements, we know that that scheme will not include awarding relief to retail, hospitality and leisure, or those in receipt of other reliefs that remove their rate liability, and that economic factors will be considered from company to company. I would expect the guidance to clarify those issues and make it clear how the individual pots will operate.
I would also expect it to give local authorities an element of discretion—after all, section 47 is about discretionary relief—to have a scheme shaped for their area. This is why it has to be done in stages. The first is passing the Bill into law. Then, you issue the guidance with the distribution, give local authorities a chance to analyse that distribution and understand whether it is fair, and what to do at a local level. Local authorities then have regard to that guidance and devise a scheme, which has to be done quickly.
If we had not had this proposed change in the law, the valuation officer and ratepayers’ agents would be settling matters now, and I suspect refunds would have started to circulate. If this scheme is to replace those MCC challenges, you would like to think it would be in force later this year, and that any reliefs would be paid during the current financial year— that must be the aim.
The pot is a one-off that would be distributed as quickly as possible, because now is the time when the money is needed. The real issue for local authorities is devising a scheme and ensuring that they can distribute the pot fairly, and that they do not run out of money. That, in itself, will be a massive problem.
Adrian Blaylock: The only point I would add to that is timing. I think you questioned the timing and the need for haste; as David said, businesses need this money now. The only thing I would question is to ask what this relief pot meant to be compensating for. The majority of the lockdown measures and the restrictions applied during 2020-21 rather than during 2021-22, and there is a specific part of section 47 of the Local Government Finance Act that says that a local authority cannot take a decision more than six months after the financial year to which the decision relates. So, strictly speaking, as at the end of September a local authority will not be permitted to give discretionary relief rate back into 2020-21. That means that either everything needs to be in place and all the local schemes need to be up and running by the end of September, or the relief is not given for 2020-21 but is given for 2021-22 instead. However, what then happens to the businesses that had a material change of circumstances lodged for 2020-21 that are no longer in existence? They have missed out on that.
As for the timing, it is important that the Bill gets through as quickly as possible, but it is also important for people to understand that local government also have to go through their own governance processes. Devising a scheme is not just a case of somebody sitting at a desk and saying, “There you go, this is our scheme”. It needs to go through the proper governance process, which will take time. It could take two or three months for all that to go through its own internal processes, on top of whatever time it takes for the legislation to be passed and the guidance and allocations to be issued by MHCLG. Timing is crucial in this process.
Q
Adrian Blaylock: I do not see why not. If the Government have already taken the decision on the value of the pot—I do not know what they are doing about the allocations, but if they can work out what the allocations need to be for each local authority, they must have a clue now what they want to support, what areas they want to support and where they want local government to focus their attention. If that was to happen, it would allow local government to start formulating plans and start going through the process of putting together their own local policies. I think that would be a positive step.
David Magor: I agree wholeheartedly with that. Draft guidance and an indicative figure of the amount for each local authority would be most welcome at this stage. It would enable planning to start; it would also enable the local authorities to challenge. Better those challenges come now, as we are preparing. We are going through—let us hope—a long, hot summer, and through that long, hot summer local government accountants have nothing better to do than to work out what their relief should be, so I am sure that they would be pleased to see some indicative figures and draft guidance.
Q
Andrew Agathangelou: I am quite a plain-speaking person, so forgive me, but I am about to be quite plain. The regulators need to enforce. There is evidence to suggest that, for example, despite the fact that one of the most important statutory duties of the Financial Conduct Authority—our primary conduct regulator in the UK for the financial service industry—is to try to protect consumers from harm, it is a little reluctant to enforce. That is not my opinion; the chief executive and the chairman of the Financial Conduct Authority gave evidence to the Treasury Committee earlier this year—I will try to find the link for you—admitting, frankly, that they were risk averse, I think the phrase was, when it comes to enforcing and mitigating. That is not verbatim, but that was the gist of it.
Would it not be good, ladies and gentlemen, if as well as having rules in place designed to protect consumers, we had a regulatory framework that had the gumption to go after the baddies whenever it could? There are two very important reasons for that. First, we might get them locked up or make them pay fines, and so on. That is great. That is exactly what we want, but even more importantly than that, it will show that there is good reason for these dodgy directors to not carry on their wicked craft.
It is currently a very low-risk career path for somebody to become a criminally minded director of a company. The chances of their getting caught are very low. The chances of their paying a fine are very low. The chances of their being banged up are also very low. Why? Because the regulatory framework as a whole is not built to cope with the tsunami of criminal activity that is going on. I would say, from a long list of potential improvements, that one of them would be to please encourage our regulators to regulate robustly and enforce effectively.
Q
Andrew Agathangelou: I will answer your question, but before I do I would like to elaborate on a small point that you made. I actually think that the regulatory framework has been built by Parliament to do what it is designed to do. The problem is not that it is not capable of doing it; it just does not do it. It is a bit like having a really fast car that is just not being driven fast by the driver. The problem is not the vehicle; it is who or what is controlling it. I just thought I would throw that in.
To respond to your question more specifically, again I am a plain-speaking person. The Transparency Task Force ran an event last Thursday, with the title “The Great Insolvency Scam”. I can provide the Committee with the recorded video testimony of that. The reason why we ran an event called “The Great Insolvency Scam” is that we see insolvency as a very dark and murky part of the world of business and commerce. We believe that there is a pile of evidence suggesting that the Insolvency Service has been weaponised. That is where the Insolvency Service is frankly abusing its very extensive powers.
The net result is that people sometimes have their homes or businesses taken away from them, as a consequence of engineered bankruptcies. It really is an horrific, dark area. It sometimes results in people self-harming, committing suicide and all the rest of it. I will now answer your question directly. Personally, the Insolvency Service is a can of worms. I will repeat that it is my personal opinion. I think the Insolvency Service, in part, is a can of worms that needs to be opened up and looked into. It needs to be properly regulated.
I have enormous concern about giving the Insolvency Service lots more money to carry out the additional work that is going to be necessary as a consequence of this Bill going through, if it does, without first ensuring that the service is fit for purpose. These are very strong views. I am not an extreme individual who has crazy ideas. I have just listened to and seen the testimony of people who have suffered as a consequence of the types of things I am talking about.
Think of this Bill as the start of an ongoing process of reform. Please do not think of it as the end point. Please do not make the mistake of thinking that it is a “job done” situation. It really is not. There is so much to be looked at. I ask the Committee to do all it can, on behalf of the British public, to ensure that the Insolvency Service stops doing what it sometimes does.
Q
Kate Nicholls: Yes, they are. We are having conversations with the three main Departments that we work with—the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, on the food supply and wholesale side—to ensure they are pushing to make sure that grant guidance is as comprehensive as possible and identifies the businesses that need to be caught that have been missed in the past but are disproportionally affected by covid. We are also urging that concern and care are taken to include businesses that have been particularly adversely affected as a result of the delay in step 4.
Q
Kate Nicholls: The quicker, the better is all I can say. A lot of hospitality businesses and their supply chains are clinging on by their fingertips, particularly given that they have had an extra month of restrictions imposed on them. A quarter of hospitality businesses have not been able to open and legally cannot until 19 July.
The remainder are subject to severe restrictions, meaning a loss of revenue of £3 billion. That impacts up the supply chain because if we are not operating at full capacity, we cannot get our supply chain kickstarted. The delay and cooling effect of that month of extra restrictions is significant, particularly in our town and city centre businesses.
We need to have that money as rapidly as possible, particularly because business rates bills started to kick in again for hospitality from the 1st of this month. Some £100 million of business rates bills started to be felt by the most affected businesses; that flows up through the supply chain as it tightens the credit and liquidity within the market.
The money needs to come as rapidly as possible and local authorities need to be given incentives to make that payment as rapidly as they can through the mechanism, so that delays do not hit. The danger is that if you leave it too late, you fail to get support to the businesses that are teetering on the brink and nearly surviving. We have lost an awful lot within hospitality in our supply chain, and we need to make sure we can keep those that are on the brink. The more swiftly we get money to them, the better.
On those businesses that have not benefited and need to be prioritised in this round of funding, the main ones highlighted are events, contract and office catering, particularly those in town and city centres where the delays will happen. You need a concentration on activities in central London, where businesses will not get back on their feet until we get international travel and office workers back in significant volumes. London hospitality is operating at about 20% to 30% of normal revenue levels; in the rest of the country, it is about 60% to 70%.
There is a severe lag on the central London activity zone and a heavy concentration of affected businesses in those two local authority areas, as well as Southwark on the south bank. You need to have focus on town and city centre areas, as well as the other businesses such as catering, weddings, events, conferences and banqueting, the freelance support and supply chain businesses that sit alongside those, and food wholesale, distribution and logistics.
Q
Kate Nicholls: Thankfully, we have seen very few companies in this sector go into liquidation. We have seen some administrations and some companies being revived with inward investment, particularly in the late-night sector. The areas where we have seen the biggest contractions are office-based and London-based.
We have seen a high number of business failures of individual sites and small and medium-sized enterprises. In particular, we have had contraction in the market of 12,000 hospitality businesses from covid from April 2020 to March 2021. That is a contraction of about minus 8% for pubs and bars, plus 10% for restaurants and hotels, but in major conurbations in the heart of our cities, one in five businesses has failed through the covid crisis. Part of that is very high levels of debt, and that will continue to accelerate business failure and business closure as we come out of this. The first date at which our sector can go cash positive is 19 July, but it is estimated it will take two years before the sector can recover to 2019 pre-pandemic revenue levels and profitability.
As we come out of this, we see a heavily in-debt sector. Previously, debt was used to fund growth and further investment. Pre-pandemic, we were opening two sites a day as we expanded our pubs, bars, restaurants and hotel chains; that was funded largely through the debt and earnings of the businesses. Over the course of the pandemic, we have seen that while the rest of the economy has corporate deposits that are twice the level of corporate debt, in hospitality it is exactly the opposite. We have twice the level of debt as corporate deposits, which means that our sector is going to come out with an anchor on its potential growth and recovery, because it will have to pay down and service that debt and that will delay the recovery further.
You are looking at about £2 billion or £2.5 billion of rent debt. We are waiting to see the Government’s proposals in the detail of the Bill that will help to resolve that. There is also £6 billion of Government-backed loans, which many businesses started to repay this month. That is very challenging when they have limited revenue coming in or heavily restricted revenue. Paying down that debt will to take a lot of time to get through and to get over, and we fear very much that the level of business failure that we saw during the covid crisis will be replicated in the two years as we come out of it, as we try to recover.
Q
Kate Nicholls: It is certainly challenging to be able to get into, and I am not sure it would drill down as closely as local authority by local authority level, but there are certainly indications. You can measure footfall drops by high street data: there is good data from Springboard about footfall in our high streets, towns and city centres, as well as shopping centres. They are measuring it for retailers, but that would also apply to hospitality businesses. It is not just the international tourists: it is the offices, the work from home, and it affects different city centres differently according to the demographic that uses them. It is less to do with our coastal towns—they are benefiting from more domestic tourism and domestic footfall—but you are seeing it in London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester, and to a lesser extent Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle. They are seeing a drop, but London is particularly badly affected because 70% of London hospitality is inbound tourism, and we are not going to see any pick-up in inbound tourism any time soon.
I think there are broad regional differences that you can apply: it is a very rough and ready crude assessment that you can place on it, but there is a possibility of looking at footfall data. However, I would urge the Government to look at the areas of the country and the constituencies where you have a disproportionately dense population of hospitality and tourism businesses—many of which will be SMEs—and where you have the supply chain businesses that support them. They tend to be local supply chains and to be geographically co-located, so that would be a good indicator of where that support needs to be directed.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ Hi, and thanks for coming to give evidence. I am just trying to get a picture of the scale of the problem. To what extent do you think this is a problem? Are the measures in this legislation adequate to deal with the scale of the problem that you think is out there?
Stephen Pegge: To put it in context, the Insolvency Service estimates that there is currently evidence of misconduct or misuse of dissolution process in only 1% of cases. Given that there are something like 500,000 dissolutions a year, that might amount to only about 5,000 cases. There is some evidence that it is a rising problem and, given that the average company that is dissolved might have a loan of say £200,000, even 5,000 cases could amount to a risk to creditors of up to £1 billion. It is significant in scale because of the large number of companies, even if it is not currently a high level of risk in proportionate terms. I would emphasise that the vast majority of businesses are honest and straightforward and are not abusing this scheme.
The other factor that members of the Committee may be interested in is that quite clearly over the last year, during the covid crisis, there have been a significant number of companies that have taken finance. Given that the Government, through the British Business Bank, have provided guarantees, there would be an impact on the taxpayer if those loans were not repaid and a claim for repayment were made. Again, that is relevant to consideration.
Q Thank you for your evidence today, Mr Pegge. I understand that you helped to establish the covid-19 lending schemes. The Government have suggested that some companies have been dissolved to avoid paying back Government loans given as coronavirus support. Have you seen any evidence of that? If these measures go through, do you believe, from your experience and what you have seen, that the Insolvency Service is adequately resourced to deal with the expansion of powers it would have through the Bill?
Stephen Pegge: Yes, we have seen instances of this practice being used to try and avoid liability under bounce back loans. Back in May 2020, UK Finance with the British Business Bank established the bounce bank loan fraud collaboration group. It involves attendees from the Cabinet Office; CIFAS, the UK fraud prevention service; the Treasury; BEIS; and the National Investigation Service—NATIS. The aim is for intelligence to be shared, good practice to be developed and a threat log to be maintained and fed into the National Crime Agency and the National Economic Crime Centre. In fact, this was one of the practices which had been identified through that and has led to some efforts more recently to try to intervene and intercept these cases of dissolved companies involving Companies House and BEIS.
In the meantime, it is always possible that these cases may well have got through and there is some evidence—again, reported by the Insolvency Service—that there could be around 2,000 such cases which are dissolved and where currently the powers to investigate do not exist, so it is a real problem. If it were to become a more popular route for fraud, while there are mechanisms to deal with it and creditors can object when they get notice through alerts when these situations are gazetted, unscrupulous individuals can still get through and it is important that it is closed as a loophole.
As regards the resources of the Insolvency Service, we have all been conscious that, while the number of insolvencies has been low during a period of suspension and the generous support that has been provided to businesses through public agencies and the finance industry, we would expect that to rise significantly in this next period. There is already some evidence that it will do so. It is important that the Insolvency Service is resourced sufficiently to be able to deal with this. The evidence at the moment is that they have been involved in disqualification of directors in something like 1,000 or so cases across the last year, so it is quite possible that there might be a rise in the amount of work that they will need to do. We would certainly support any investigation into what additional resources might be necessary.
Q If a case passes the public interest test, do you think there should be the resources to deal with that? There is concern that the Insolvency Service may not have the resources, and therefore the ability to follow up on the expansion of powers in the Bill in the public interest. Has your experience been that the Insolvency Service has been able to resource any investigations that might be needed? What tools should the Government use to pursue directors of dissolved companies that they identify as culpable? Do you have a view on that?
David Kerr: In terms of resources and the ability to pursue all the cases that the Insolvency Service might wish to pursue, I guess that is probably a question for the Department. Not all the cases that are investigated will pass the public interest threshold. To the extent that there are cases that pass the test but cannot be pursued for resource reasons, I am sure the Insolvency Service would welcome any additional resources that can be made available to it. From the point of view of creditors, if actions are pursued in relation to covid-related debts and not others, perhaps the measure works against them a bit.
That comes to the second part of your question. There are two elements to this. First, there is the potential disqualification of individuals who are proven to have acted inappropriately. Secondly, and on the back of that to some extent, there is the possibility of compensation orders against those individuals, with a view to putting money back into the hands of creditors. Again, I am sure CICM creditors would wish that to be as effective for its members as for any Government debt.
Q Mr Kerr, you said that the CICM is broadly supportive. Do you have any particular concerns about the Bill? Is there anything that you think is missing from it, or could it be improved?
David Kerr: I think the point has been made about resource. I have heard comments from others on Second Reading and elsewhere about that. It would be unfortunate if the emphasis were entirely on dealing with bounce back loan fraud and if that took resources away from other directors’ conduct investigation cases. That point is not, I suppose, directly relevant to the provisions in the Bill; it is more a question of how it is implemented and taken forward. There have also been some comments about the retrospective element; the previous witness touched on that. I think these cases have to be taken within three years of the relevant date—the date of insolvency or the date of dissolution. I do not think the Department would be able to go back before 2018 in any event, and that was the date on which the consultation was conducted, so I suppose one could argue that directors have had notice of the intended provisions for the relevant period.
Those were probably the only points where there might be concerns to a limited extent, but generally I think the provision is a sensible one that gives the service powers that it does not have currently and which can only be helpful, I would have thought, to trust and confidence in the insolvency regime.
Q That is very helpful. On the three-year cut-off, are you concerned that that is likely to have implications on other investigations that the Insolvency Service carries out if it is not funded properly?
David Kerr: I was referring partly to the point that had been made by the Committee to the previous witness about whether there would be any issues around natural justice if the retrospective provisions pre-dated the consultation. I do not think that, in practice, that would happen. Going forward, the compensation laws that might be sought can be obtained after the disqualification order or undertaking, so there may be more than three years available to the service from the date of dissolution. There has to be a cut-off. I do not think there is any suggestion that the provisions of the disqualification have to be changed in that respect, merely that they would be applied to these circumstances. They have proved to be satisfactory since 1986 in relation to director disqualification in the insolvency proceedings, so I have no reason to believe that, going forward, those time limits will not be effective in relation to dissolved companies.
Q Are any sanctions that are currently available to use against directors who may have dissolved companies to avoid liabilities not being used as much as they could be?
David Kerr: None that I can think of immediately.
Q Thank you, that is helpful. Just as a follow-up, are you concerned that there might be a focus on making use of these new powers at the expense of current work on other insolvent companies?
Dr Tribe: Not necessarily. Going back to my prioritisation point, the Insolvency Service obviously has finite resources that it needs to deploy in the best way possible—I suppose that is a problem for many public bodies— if other types of abuse manifest over time. The most obvious and recent problem is the bounce back loan phoenixism problem, but in due course other things might come about that require us to tinker with our corporate and insolvency law so that we have an effective system that maintains trust and confidence in it. What the Insolvency Service wants to do in terms of prioritising threats to the system will depend on its internal guidance.
Q Dr Tribe, I want to ask first whether you have a view about the existing sanctions that are available to use against directors who may be abusing the dissolution process—perhaps powers that are currently available but are not used as extensively as they might be. That is one of the challenges that critics of this legislation may make.
Secondly, are there any other more general problems with the dissolution of companies that are important to discuss at this time while changes are being made? Should changes be made to the eligibility criteria on dissolutions? What steps need to be taken prior to dissolution?
Dr Tribe: I will take the first question first. I think you are drawing attention to the compensation order regime, and you did so on Second Reading, too. There is some interesting research by Dr Williams at Cambridge in 2014, who looked—he sort of future-gazed—at how successful the compensation system might be. In that research, he highlighted that some of the directors in small closely held companies, which he argues the regime mainly targets, might end up being adjudicated bankrupt—they might go through the bankruptcy process, I should say—in due course. That would mean, of course, that any pursuit of those individuals would run into another layer of difficulty in trying to get to the value that might be there for the insolvent estate of the company or dissolved company that we are dealing with. His work future-gazed in that way at some of these issues.
It is true to say that, on the compensation regime, we saw one case in 2019, the Noble Vintners case, where insolvency and companies court Judge Prentis made a 15-year disqualification order. That is right at the top of what we call the Sevenoaks scale, after the case in which Lord Justice Dillon set out the various types of malpractice and where they fall on the scale, from two years up to 15. In the Noble Vintners case, it was the most unfit behaviour on the facts of that case that you could have —up at the 15-year period. Then, of course, that was followed by a compensation order that recouped for creditors just over half a million pounds—£559,000.
There has been some success with the compensation scheme. It is in its early days, in a certain sense. Although the reforms came in in 2015, there was a delay in implementation. You are right to say that we should pause for thought and mull over how effective that is. That takes us back to the resourcing and funding point, for one thing. Secondly, it takes us to the idea of that prioritisation agenda and how fruitful a claim that you are going to bring might be to get compensation. It is a power that exists and should exist. It goes some way—as you can see from the case of Noble Vintners—to getting value back into the insolvent estate for the creditors. It is a positive thing for creditors, and something that the disqualification regime did not do until that reform in 2015. Of course, it provided a protection mechanism, but in terms of getting value back into the estate, that is a good reform. That is your first question.
Your second question was on dissolution problems. I think you might be driving at the process of dissolution and how the registrar at Companies House deals with dissolution. After the directors have signed their form, made their declaration, paid the £10 and noted that there is going to be a striking off and that is published in the London Gazette, there is a period of two months where all the parties that should be informed—shareholders, creditors, employees and pension managers, for example—might know of this potential dissolution and should then, therefore, perhaps act on it as creditors. Some of the witnesses who have gone before me may have addressed this, particularly those from the credit community. In due course, as part of a wider analysis of what Companies House and its function is, that step in dissolution may be looked at.
As I said earlier, there are approximately half a million dissolutions per year, and many of those are for very good reasons in terms of, as I have said, maintaining the integrity of the register and getting rid of companies that have been through the insolvency processes but then get dissolved as well. The guidance for the Bill and some other sources note that among those half a million dissolutions, there could be about 5,000 that are potentially problematic that we would want the Insolvency Service to be able to investigate. Obviously, 5,000 is a lot more than the current levels of disqualification under the current provisions. Over the past decade or so, there have been about 1,200 a year, so you can see there is quite a significant upshift in the work that the Insolvency Service might have to do.
A Companies House review perhaps in due course mulling on what its function is—is it a regulator, is it a repository of information?—might look to dissolution, but in the short term I think you have this £17 billion to £26 billion problem, and there seems to be a loophole that needs to be closed.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons Chamber