UK Amphibious Capability

Debate between James Gray and Martin Docherty-Hughes

Tuesday 21st November 2017 Westminster Hall

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Of course I totally agree with my hon. Friend.

Let us turn to our allies. The Kingdom of the Netherlands sees the UK-Netherlands amphibious force as a symbol of what it considers to be one of its most important bilateral agreements. It has allowed the Royal Netherlands navy to take important procurement decisions, such as to build the Rotterdam and Johan de Witt amphibious vessels, in the expectation of reciprocal agreements continuing. What consideration has there been of undermining such a relationship by reducing our own capabilities?

Our extensive history of co-operation with the US marine corps, which has been mentioned, was particularly prominent in the cold war, when the Royal Marines were a key component in the plan to reinforce NATO’s northern flank in Norway. It is the Norwegian dimension that first brought the current crisis facing the Royal Marines to my attention, when winter warfare training was scrapped to cut costs. It goes without saying that the reassurance that those joint exercises have given our allies and the skills that they have given the marines exceed any impact on that spreadsheet in the MOD Main Building.

Winter warfare training brings me to my second topic. Traditionally, marines have prepared for their Norwegian exercises in the Grampian mountains, which they have accessed from their base at RM Condor, the home of 45 Commando. There are worries in Angus. I had expected the hon. Member for Angus (Kirstene Hair) to be here to speak for that beautiful part of the world, but as ever it is left to the SNP to fight Scotland’s corner in this place. The possible closure of RM Condor is a story almost as old as the Grampian hills. It was mooted in 2004, again in 2009, and almost went through in 2013, before a Government U-turn. Finally, in last year’s defence estate review, it was announced that the runway at RM Condor would be sold off. I echo the words of my friend and colleague in the Scottish Parliament, Graeme Dey, who said in a debate about the plan:

“By any measure, the UK Government’s approach to Condor is haphazard and unsettling”.—[Scottish Parliament Official Report, 20 April 2017; c. 79.]

I would go further: it is a perfect case study of the dangers of salami-slicing our armed forces.

People in Arbroath will not be reassured if closing the airfield is the last we hear on the issue. Quite simply, a community that is already reeling from the effects of Brexit on its soft fruit industry does not want to read headlines about the jobs of 1,000 Royal Marines being cut. As an aside, I would ask whether the Minister has given much consideration to the Scottish Government’s suggestion that the runway at RM Condor be used to build veteran’s housing. That is vital in an area with a strong tradition of recruitment into the armed forces, particularly the Black Watch.

Following this debate, the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North and others will rush to a Defence Committee evidence session to hear from the MOD’s permanent secretary on the subject of the MOD’s accounts. I expect that we will hear an awful lot about the MOD’s budgetary black hole, which has precipitated this debate. While many will talk convincingly—

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman’s speech must be on the context of the UK amphibious capability.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

It is an important point, Mr Gray, about the accounts—

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. That does not matter. The hon. Gentleman’s speech must be on the context of the UK amphibious capability.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

While many will talk convincingly about the need for tough decisions to be made on amphibious capability—you do well to remind me, Mr Gray—I can only conclude from all that I have read in preparing for this debate that the UK’s amphibious forces are being squeezed for one obvious reason, which few, other than SNP Members, are willing to raise. The simple and inconvenient truth is that amphibious capability is being sacrificed to maintain the nuclear enterprise. Let us look at the top lines of the 2015 strategic defence and security review:

“The Royal Navy delivers our nuclear deterrent, projects our maritime power”—

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman must contain himself to the UK amphibious capability. He may not talk about nuclear capability or anything else. UK amphibious capability is all he may discuss.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I think I was, and I will continue to do so.

Three distinct and unique capabilities underpin the strategic context. As General Sir Richard Barrons elucidated, the failure of the 2015 SDSR was that

“at no time in that review has the amount of resources provided to defence matched the programme”

of which defence capability through amphibious programmes is a part. The talk that I hear from people who know a lot more about it than anyone here is that the First Sea Lord has been presented with a scenario whereby one of these capabilities must be sacrificed. Admiral Sir George Zambellas’s comments in the Committee last week have been quoted, but I will quote what he said in full:

“I imagine the First Sea Lord has a choice between having his left arm cut off or his right arm cut off. Nobody in the world of complex warfare, especially for an island nation that delivers force from the sea, thinks that a reduction in the sophisticated end of amphibiosity is a good idea.”

On the practicalities of the SDSR, no one would expect projecting maritime power, such as the plan to commission HMS Queen Elizabeth next month, to be considered expendable. I also place it on record that the carriers are in no way adequate as replacements for Ocean, Albion or Bulwark, as has been mentioned. That leaves two arms to be cut off. I am not sure that we would have had as many hon. Members along to talk about the Royal Marines had the subject for debate been, “Why the UK’s amphibious capability should be prioritised over the continuous at-sea deterrent”. My SNP colleagues and I have been quite consistent on the ring-fenced MOD budget as it stands: every penny spent on Trident is a penny less spent on conventional forces. Hon. Members need not take just my word for it; at the end of October, an article in The Times by defence editor Deborah Haynes stated that the armed forces would have to find £300 million of savings this year because of cost overruns in the Successor programme. One source quoted said:

“All that is now left to cut is capability”—

amphibiosity. That is why we are here today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Yes, the United States recognises that you will not have one, because you cannot afford it.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. Please finish briefly, Mr Docherty-Hughes.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I know that many hon. Members—including the Chairman of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who is present in the Chamber—would like the defence budget to be increased, but unless the Chancellor pulls the rabbit to end all rabbits out of the hat on Wednesday, that ain’t going to happen. I applaud the willingness of my other colleagues on the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer) and the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), to stand up to their party on this matter. The Royal Marines and the unique capabilities they provide must be protected; no one on the SNP Benches disagrees with that.

I conclude—to your delight, Mr Gray, I am sure—by asking the Minister three questions. First, will she reassure our allies, particularly those in northern Europe, that the forthcoming defence review will not damage existing relationships? Secondly, will she give assurances to those who work at RM Condor that 45 Commando is safe? Finally, will she tell us why an island state is prioritising the maintenance of a weapons system that it will never use over its ability to adequately deploy amphibious forces?