LGBT Conversion Therapy

Debate between James Gray and Crispin Blunt

Monday 8th March 2021 Westminster Hall

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con) [V]]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Elliot Colburn) on leading the debate so well, and I congratulate his Committee on securing it. I have two key points for the Government. The first is that we must legislate. Deliver the promise to protect in law. Use the work done in the Government Equalities Office before 2019. Use the examples elsewhere, particularly in Spain and the Australian state of Victoria, which have already legislated. Our common law system enables the drafting challenge of defining conversion therapy to be met. There is no need to overcomplicate this issue. The police, prosecutors and jurors will know conversion therapy when they see it. Most critically, the victims will know it too, and they will have been equipped with a defence mechanism.

Such a law is an important step as a declaratory statement, as it is as a legal tool. If someone is LGBT, the law says that the state supports them. It supports how they want to live their life. When victims find themselves under pressure that is improperly applied to convert them to something they are not, they will know that it is against the law and that they can call it out. They can say to the person or people who are the source of this—[Interruption.]

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

We have lost the sound, Mr Blunt. You are mute.

[Crispin Blunt]

My apologies.

The law gives the victims the opportunity to go to the police and, therefore, to have a weapon in their hand against the source of a conversion therapy. The state is on the side of victims’ freedom—the freedom that that individual is trying to take away from them.

The second point I want to make is that such protection must include trans people. They are by far and away the most vulnerable group among the LGBT community. Identity around gender dysphoria is surely a much more challenging thing to meet than a minority sexuality, but all must be protected. The law must include trans people, and not only because they are the group who need it the most. In 2018, it appeared that trans people were on a trajectory to achieve their rights and protections to live their lives as they wished, supported by the Government’s comprehensive LGBT action plan, but all that now seems to have changed. Trans people are a community under siege. Organisations whose principle raison d’être is to attack and challenge the very legitimacy of trans people have come into being, and they appear to trans people to be firmly in the ascendant.

The lived experience of trans people reflects the awful paucity of services for them in the United Kingdom, as graphically illustrated by VICE News in January and November. They also see 250 articles a year attacking them in our newspaper of record, The Times. They see that groups such as the Conservative Women’s Pledge and LGB Alliance, whose purpose seems to be to protect cisgender women from trans women, have the ear of Ministers. They see reform of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 abandoned, and the principle of gender-neutral legislation was reversed only last week.

Gender is much more complicated than sexuality, and the drafting of the ban on conversion therapy will need to protect those giving informed, regulated and properly peer-reviewed advice to assist those on the path to reconciling their gender dysphoria. If the legislation does not include the protection of trans people, however, it will send to them the unmistakeable message that their Government do not want to protect them, do not value them and, at some level, do not really accept that trans is really a thing. That awful message would inadvertently make the Government themselves party to the practice of conversion therapy.

Defence and Cyber-security

Debate between James Gray and Crispin Blunt

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I will do my best, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I agree with the conclusion of the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon): this is an extremely important issue and addressing cyber-security rightly sits at the top of our national security agenda. Cybercrime and cyber-attacks are not only tomorrow’s dangers; they are a very real and growing threat today. As others have already made clear, Governments, business and members of the public come under sustained attack from cyber-criminals and foreign powers. There were an estimated 44 million incidents in 2011 alone.

As we become ever more reliant on the internet, our vulnerability increases. Cyber-threats take two primary forms—cybercrime and cyber-attack, although sometimes the distinction is blurred. Cybercrime was estimated by the Association of Chief Police Officers to have cost £57 billion globally back in 2009, while Detica estimated that the 2011 figure for the United Kingdom alone was £27 billion. It is difficult to believe that that there has not been a geometric increase since then.

Large-scale cybercrime is an issue of national security. Cyber-attack and cyber-espionage also present a serious threat both to the state and to the community, and the state should be acting to protect both. As we know, cyber-attacks have had real-world effects, as exampled by the denial-of-service attacks in Estonia in 2007 and the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear development capability, although there appear to be disagreements about the degree of its effectiveness.

Cyber-espionage and theft of sensitive information is another major concern, so addressing the danger of cyber-threats today is real, not academic. The Security Service estimates that at least 20 foreign intelligence agencies currently operate to some degree against British interests. That threat merits our immediate and strong attention, which is why I welcome this debate and the attention the Defence Committee has given to the subject.

[Mr Gray]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Blunt]

Given the amount of time I have left, I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me if I do not give way to him. If I have time at the end, I will come back to him.

What is being done and developed in the strategy? In 2009, the previous Government produced Britain’s first cyber-security strategy, which, though laudable for initiating a centralised approach to cyber-security, I as the then shadow Minister critiqued as being a shallow copy of the then American strategy. I said:

“Minimal or no attention is given to key areas such as co-ordination of the new cyber-structures with existing agencies, response to a cyber incident and information sharing between government, industry”

and international action. I also said:

“There is no consideration within the strategy of how we would respond to a cyber-attack. No mention can be found of a framework for response or who would lead it. There is no discussion of issues such as back-up communications networks for security and emergency personnel.”

All of those were given coverage in the United States review at the time.

Given the severity of the threat, the then Opposition felt that the strategy was an inadequate response, so before the general election we produced our own paper on cyber-security and keeping Britain safe in the digital age. I am pleased to say that much of it found itself in the Government’s 2011 cyber-security strategy, which is currently being co-ordinated by the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance.

The strategy is far more detailed than its predecessor and offers a more thorough, co-ordinated and ambitious programme to enhance our cyber-security. The recent progress report from the Cabinet Office highlights the successes in implementing the strategy and the progress made towards achieving its objectives by 2015. I commend the strategy for its scope and ambition, incorporating everything from changes to law enforcement to greater co-operation and information-sharing with the private sector and enhancing our cyber-resilience. That the strategy also balances the attainment of security with civil liberties is reassuring.

[Mr Gray]

Everything my hon. Friend says is absolutely right. The Ministry of Defence, of course, has no responsibility whatsoever for this. Is my hon. Friend therefore proposing that the things he is describing perfectly adequately should now become part of a defence cyber-strategy, or is he talking about something other than the topic of this debate?

[Mr Blunt]

My hon. Friend, in his usual perspicacious way, has identified precisely what I am moving on to, but before I finish on the wider cyber-security issue, I want to recognise the contribution made by the Baroness Neville-Jones in pulling this strategy together and much improving our country’s response.

No strategy, however, is incapable of improvement and the Government still appear to preside over a patchwork muddle of agencies and mandates responsible for cyber-security. In 2011, the Intelligence and Security Committee identified 18 different actors with responsibilities for cyber-security, which raises concerns about duplication, cost-effectiveness and confusion. I note the counterpoint expressed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General, who said in evidence to the Defence Committee that although the arrangement is untidy, it is effective, given the need for a cross-Government approach. I must say that, in the absence of a personality as strong as Baroness Neville-Jones, there remain issues about co-ordination and leadership, as was also mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti).

We must recognise that the updated cyber-security strategy is a major step forward, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) has made clear, defence is only one small component of the pan-Government effort and by no means the most important. I wonder whether the bracketing of cyber-security and defence is in fact wise, given the MOD’s relatively limited role. The MOD has only two formal responsibilities: to ensure that armed forces operability is maintained both at home and abroad by securing its networks, and to enhance military operations by developing future cyber-capabilities.

Cyber-capability is immensely important for the armed forces: it is a battle-winning asset. In the same way that military operations become difficult if not impossible without air supremacy, cyber-superiority if not cyber-supremacy is required. What differentiates cyber-security is that it also applies to nearly every aspect of modem civil life. Not many businesses need to worry about the effectiveness of the F-35 and the Eurofighter in their daily operations, but the defensive cyber-capability is a daily national necessity for our financial system. Defence against most high-end cyber-threats, including those to critical national infrastructure, is the responsibility of other Departments, not least GCHQ and the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure. Given that fact, the conflation of cyber-security with defence is possibly misleading, in that it obscures a complex and much bigger picture. However, we are debating cyber-security in the context of defence, so I shall focus on that.

Other hon. Members have outlined the threat, so I simply want to say that the armed forces are increasingly vulnerable to highly targeted forms of cyber-attack, given the networked nature of modern military systems and the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles and robots on the battlefield. Adversaries may seek signals interception to distort intelligence, disrupt logistical supply chains or, most worryingly, render major platforms and systems, such as ships and aircraft, dysfunctional. If we now regard cyber as a fifth domain of warfare, we must expect other countries to do so too. Britain is a world leader in defence technology, but we must expect emerging powers to be keen to shrink the development gap by stealing what they cannot easily or quickly develop for themselves. The need to protect the operability of our armed forces and the integrity of our defence establishment is thus abundantly clear.

Of the £650 million set aside to transform Britain’s national cyber-security capabilities over the next four years, the MOD will receive £90 million. That funding is not intended to secure MOD networks, because that is assumed to be business as usual, but I know that the Department is securing its supply chain against cyber-attack. The point has already been made about the importance of the need for a resilient industrial base, which must form part of the goal of the national cyber-security strategy. The MOD has responsibility to help to manage the security of its suppliers, and I note the work that has been done to that effect.

I also note the emphasis on reserve forces, which other hon. Members have mentioned, and I welcome the establishment of a joint cyber reserve unit. That is exactly the sort of imaginative use of civilian-qualified reservists in the armed forces that we will want in times of need, but we must bear it in mind that if the armed forces need them at a time of crisis, so will their host employers. On a separate point, I am encouraged by the assurance that spending on cyber will automatically be increased in the budgets of future programmes.

Cyber is part of how our armed forces will wage war in future, so the Department must be able to continue to enhance its military cyber-capabilities. I therefore want to touch briefly on cyber-attack. Inevitably, developments in technology will always be highly classified because the possessor of the latest technological advance is likely to have a battle-winning capability. I therefore understand why information in this area is restricted. However, I emphasise to the Minister that the military should understand that this House expects them to possess cyber-attack capability alongside the ability to defend their own networks from cyber-attack.

This area is highly sensitive because such technology can be applied against other states’ non-military assets in a way that makes it difficult to be clear about whether the laws of war apply. I will finish by discussing this international aspect. This area sits in the grey area between espionage and conflict. That is why, in 2009, I called for us to co-operate internationally on cyber issues to regulate the relations between states in respect of cyber-conflict. I am delighted that that is recognised in the 2013 statement on aspects of state behaviour in cyberspace. We must try to identify the future international rules of the road that will govern relations between states in this area.

I will end by reiterating three questions. First, by bracketing cyber-security with defence, are we in danger of misleading ourselves about where the main effort needs to be? Secondly, can the lead responsibility for cyber-security be made clearer? Thirdly, are we affording enough resources to research and development in this vital area?

2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers

Debate between James Gray and Crispin Blunt

Thursday 18th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing this debate. He and my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) have made the case for the 2RRF in the context of the current review extremely powerfully. I am not entirely sure that they were wholly served by the arguments of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), whose assault on the supporting arms could be described only as unfortunate. I would have thought that he among others would understand that the armed services, the Army, depend on team work between the different armed services and between the teeth arms and all the supporting arms. They all have an extremely important role to play.

When on coming into office the Government were faced with financial stringency, decisions about the number of infantry battalions as opposed to arm or core regiments, as opposed to engineers, were among the wretched decisions that Defence Ministers then had to take. The point I am about to make is beautifully illustrated by the Public Gallery, which I have never seen looking more impressive. The Officers of the House deserve congratulation on imposing a little bit of discipline up there. If I were the Defence Minister, I might find it quite intimidating, but the view presented in the Gallery makes one think about the wonderful institution that we are discussing today.

Anyone such as me who has had the privilege of serving in the Army understands the essential element of regimental identity. I was lucky enough to serve during the 1980s when I was only training to fight and die alongside my colleagues. Tragically, since 1990, far too many times that training has had to be turned into reality. That is what the deliberate creation of identity within Army fighting units is about. When Ministers are faced with wretchedly uncomfortable decisions about how to reshape the Army as times change and as warfare and the balance between the arms changes, we run straight into the political difficulty surrounding issues of identity.

The Ministry of Defence and the chiefs of staff have attempted to put in place some basis for making choices, but the toxin in the issue has already been alluded to. As my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has explained, this decision has been about political calculation, not about military logic. I believe that these decisions have not been taken by the chiefs. I know from my own experience just how painful it is when one’s regiment is amalgamated. For those who have ceased serving—they, of course, will have spent 20 to 30 years in service—these issues will be at everyone’s heart. For those who are currently serving—their service is likely to be shorter—they will be concerned but they will turn to the right and get on with whatever organisation they are placed in, in order to do their duty for Queen and country.

Issues of identity, graphically represented here today, are incredibly important. I think that my hon. Friend has made his case when it comes to explaining how the decisions have been taken in this particular round. These are incredibly difficult decisions for the Minister for the Armed Forces and his colleagues, although the point has been made that we cannot be entirely sure that it was he who took them.

This brings us to the issue of national sentiment. I shall now do the strategic equivalent of invading Russia and China, and take aim at Joanna Lumley and the Gurkha lobby. I think it is a particular pity that we are talking about the disbandment of a British line infantry battalion when there are battalions of, frankly, foreign mercenaries still in our Army. The national sentiment attached to the Gurkhas is, of course, entirely proper. Their century-plus service to our country is beyond compare, but it is many senses now an historic anachronism. There in 100 years-plus of sentiment associated with them, which led to the then Government being defeated on a measure dealing with the Gurkhas in the last days of the last Administration.

[Mr Gray]

I strongly support the campaign and the debate, but I think it will be extremely unfortunate if we allow the failure of the Government to do their first duty to defend the realm by preserving our armed forces to descend into a battle between whether we prefer the Gurkhas, the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, the Loamshires or whatever. We should be saying that the Army will be too small at 82,000 and that these cuts are unacceptable, as we cannot defend the realm as a result of them. We must not allow ourselves to set one regiment against another.

[Mr Blunt]

It becomes an issue about identity in the end. With parts of the United Kingdom such as South Yorkshire providing the recruits for the Fusiliers or the north-east providing recruits for the Light Dragoons and so forth, there is an important issue of identity and then of wider public policy in relation to having a recruiting regime in another country, bringing Nepalese soldiers into the British Army. That was fine when, frankly, the Gurkhas were cheap. They were paid less than their equivalents—their pensions cost less, too—and there was a deal. It meant that these soldiers went back to Nepal, highly trained to be really good citizens of enormous value to Nepal. We have changed the rules through sentiment. In my judgment, we now have the most expensive infantry in the British Army supporting a training organisation in Nepal, which is quite limited in what it can do in comparison with British line infantry whose future we are debating today. That poses real public policy problems that we should be brave enough to address; we need to be brave enough to work through the sentiment. Of course there is enormous sentimental attachment to the Gurkhas.